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Heroes of the Nations 

A Series of Biographical Studies presenting the 
lives and work of certain representative histori- 
cal characters, about whom have gathered the 
traditions of the nations to which they belong, 
and who have, in the majority of instances, been 
accepted as types of the several national ideals. 



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FACTA DUCI8 VIVENT OPEROSAQUE 
GLORtA RERUM. OVID, IN LIVlAM, 266. 

THE HERO'S DEEDS AND HARD-WON 
FAME SHALL LIVE. 



Frederick the Great 




FREDERICK THE GREAT. 

AFTER THE PAINTING BY CARLO VANLOO. 



FREDERICK THE GREAT 

AND THE RISE OF PRUSSIA 



BY 

W. F. REDDAWAY, M.A. 

FELLOW AND LECTURER OF KING's COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE; LECTURER IN HISTORY 

TO NON-COLLEGIATE STUDENTS ; AUTHOR OF " THE MONROE 

DOCTRINE " (CAMB. UNIV. PRESS) 



G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

NEW YORK LONDON 

27 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET 24 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND 

1904 



LIBRARY of CONGRESS 
Two CoDies Received 

JUN 6 1904 

r. Cooyrleht Entry 
CLASS /\ XXo. No. 
COPY B 



Copyright, 1904 

BY 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 



Published, April, 1904 



Ube Iftnfcfterbocfeer ipress, mew lovft 



-^- 3^ 



// 



TO THE 

NON-COLLEGIATE STUDENTS 

OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE 






PREFACE 

IN attempting to sketch the career of Frederick 
the Great and to define its relation to the 
rise of Prussia, I have made free use of many 
printed works, especially of Frederick's own CEuvres 
and of the elaborate Politische Correspondenz of his 
reign. With these great '* primary " authorities may 
perhaps be ranked the face and voice of modern 
Germany, rich in evidence of Frederick's work, 
which have doubtless influenced my opinions more 
than I am aware of. Among '* secondary " authori- 
ties I owe most to the opulent treasure-house of 
Carlyle's Frederick the Great and to the more sys- 
tematic narrative of Professor Koser. His Friedrich 
der Grosse als Kronprinz, which largely inspired the 
work of Lavisse translated under the title The 
Youth of Frederick the Great, forms my chief source 
for much of Frederick's early life, as does the last 
volume of the Konig Friedrich der Grosse (1903), for 
the domestic labours after 1763. Mr. Herbert Tut- 
tle's judicious History of Prussia gave me much as- 
sistance down to the outbreak of the Seven Years* 
War, and I have often referred to Mr. Lodge's Mod- 
ern Europe and Mr. Henderson's Short History of 
Germany, 
At critical points in the record of the years 17 12 



vi Preface 

to 1786 I was influenced successively by the M^- 
moires de la Margravine de Baireuth, the trenchant 
Frederic II et Marie-Th&ese of the Due de Broglie, 
the Politische Staatsschriften, Schafer's Der Sieben- 
jdhrige Krieg, von Arneth's Oesterreichische Gesch- 
ichte, and Sorel's The Eastern Question in the 
Eighteenth Century. Many of the battles in Saxony, 
Brandenburg, Bohemia, and Silesia form the sub- 
ject of monographs which it was interesting to study 
on the field, sometimes with the aid of collections 
of maps and plans preserved in the neighbourhood. 

It would be impossible without a false pretence 
of erudition to name more than a small portion 
of the books to which some reference must be 
made in writing of the rise of Prussia. Students 
will recognise the debt that I owe to such well- 
known works as those of Ranke, Droysen, Philippson, 
Forster, Seeley, Tsaacsohn, Oncken, Vitzthum, Arch- 
enholtz, and many more, as well as to the Essays 
of Macaulay and Lord Mahon. My account of the 
early history of Brandenburg is in part based on my 
paper of April, 1901, in the Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society. 

I offer my grateful thanks to Mr. G. H. Putnam 
and to Mr. H. W. C. Davis for their counsel, to 
Mr. G. H. M. Gray for minute scrutiny of the proof- 
sheets, and to Messrs. Ernest and Harold Temperley, 
my indulgent comrades in Silesia. To the latter 
this book owes much at every stage. 

W. F. R. 

King's College, Cambridge, 
Jan. gth, 1904. 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

INTRODUCTION I 

CHAPTER I 
THE RISE OF PRUSSIA 3 

CHAPTER II 
FREDERICK AS CROWN PRINCE, 1712-1740 . . 24 

CHAPTER III 
THE PROBLEM OF 1740 . . . ... 56 

CHAPTER IV 
THE SILESIAN ADVENTURE, 1740-1742 ... 83 

CHAPTER V 
THE SECOND STRUGGLE FOR SILESIA, 1742-I745 . 1 28 

CHAPTER VI 
THE TEN years' PEACE, 1746-1756 . . -155 

CHAPTER VII 

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR TO THE BATTLE OF 

LEUTHEN ....... 189 

vii 



viii Contents 



CHAPTER VIII 

PAGE 

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR (cONTINUED). LEUTHEN 
TO MAXEN (DECEMBER, 1757, TO DECEMBER, 
1759) 251 

CHAPTER IX 
THE END OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR, 1760-1763 . 281 

CHAPTER X 
FREDERICK AND PRUSSIA AFTER THE WAR . . 3OI 

CHAPTER XI 
FREDERICK AND EUROPE, 1763-1786 . . . 322 

CHAPTER XII 

Frederick's death and greatness . . . 344 
Index 361 




ILLUSTRATIONS 



FREDERICK THE GREAT . . . . Frontispiece 

After the painting by Carlo Vanloo. 

FREDERICK THE GREAT lO 

After the painting by Christian Wolffgang. 

MAP OF PRUSSIA AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA, 

17.15 22 

PRINCESS SOPHIA DOROTHEA, DAUGHTER OF KING 

GEORGE THE FIRST ..... 32 

After the painting by Hirseman. 

FREDERICK THE SECOND . , , . . 2i^ 

After the painting by Cunningham. 

ELIZABETH CHRISTINA OF BRUNSWICK ... 44 

From an old print. 

VOLTAIRE ........ 54 

From the statue by Houdon at the Comedie 
Franfais. 

FREDERICK WILLIAM THE FIRST .... 64 

After the painting by F. W. Weideman. 

VIEW OF GLATZ IN THE i8tH CENTURY ... 78 

From an old print. 

MAP OF EUROPE IN 1740 ..... 80 



Illustrations 



PAGE 

THE RATHHAUS IN BRESLAU 90 

From a steel engraving. 

THE BOARD OF FINANCES AT NEISSE . . . IO4 

From a steel engraving. 

PLAN OF MOLWITZ, APRIL lO, 174T . . . II4 

THE PARADE GROUND AT POTSDAM . . . I28 

FREDERICK THE SECOND, KING OF PRUSSIA . . I40 

After the painting by F. Bock. 

SANS-SOUCI. CARYTID FRONT" .... 160 

THE EQUESTRIAN STATUE OF MARIA THERESA IN 

THE VIENNA HOFFBURG .... I90 

Reproduced by permission of A. F. Czihaks 
Nachflg, Vienna. 

LEOPOLD, COUNT VON DAUN . . . . . 214 

From a copper print. 

PLAN OF PRAGUE, MAY 6, 1757 .... 2l6 

PLAN OF KOLIN, JUNE 18, 1757 .... 222 

FREDERICK VIEWING THE BURNING BRIDGE AT 

WEISSENFELS ....... 234 

From a relief on his statue at Weissenfels. 

PLAN OF ROSSBACH, NOVEMBER 5, 1757 . . . 236 

PLAN OF LEUTHEN, DECEMBER 5, 1 757 . . . 246 

THE CHARGE OF THE WALLOON DRAGOONS AT KOLIN, 248 
From a relief on the monument of Victory near 
Kfechor, unveiled 1898. 

MAP FOR THE SILESIAN AND SEVEN YEARS' WARS . 254 

PLAN OF ZORNDORF, AUGUST 25, 1758 . . . 260 




FREDERICK THE GREAT 



INTRODUCTION 

IN the Austrian and Prussian capitals to-day the 
traveller may mark the contrast between two 
great statues, in each of which the meaning of a 
reign is set forth with happy instinct. In the heart 
of imperial Vienna is seated the colossal figure of 
Maria Theresa, the Victoria of an age when a Pom- 
padour could sway the fate of nations. Her effigy 
presents her as the mother of her people, displaying 
rather than obscuring the scholars, statesmen, and 
warriors who cluster round her feet, sharing harmoni- 
ously the glory which neither Queen nor people 
could have won without the other's aid. 

In Berlin the superb monument of the Great 
Frederick is instinct with a different spirit. Raised 
high above the throng, the King seems to gaze with 
his inscrutable mask-face at the astounding works of 
his successors. At the base of his lofty pedestal are 
stationed generals and civilians of renown, numerous 
enough almost to confute the Cassius who should in- 
fer of Frederick's Prussia that there was in it but one 



Frederick the Great 



only man. The statue none the less suggests the 
truth. Between monarch and people there was 
ever a great gulf fixed. Through all his life — in 
his counsels, in his despair, in his triumph, and in 
his death — Frederick, almost beyond parallel in the 
record of human history, was alone. 





CHAPTER I 

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA 

THE first task of the student of Frederick's life- 
story is to rid himself of the idea that the 
solitary King was either wholly original or 
wholly free. To seize Silesia, to quarter Poland, to 
rival Austria, to humble France, each was no doubt 
a feat which no Prussian ruler before him had dared 
to attempt. Yet in each of these, as will presently 
be shown, the hand of the living was at once nerved 
and guided by the dead. From his House Frederick 
inherited his might, to his House he turned for inspir- 
ation in the use of it, and to it he dedicated his con- 
quests. He who would appreciate Frederick must 
first survey the road trodden for three centuries be- 
fore him by the Hohenzollerns from whom he sprang. 

*'Why should T serve the Hohenzollerns? " Bis- 
marck is said to have exclaimed. ** My family is as 
good as theirs." It was the complaint of the yeo- 
man against his fellow who has saved money and 
bought the lordship of the manor. 

The early history of the state now called Prussia 
is chiefly the record of a thrifty family— the Hohen- 
zollerns. Since the year 141 5, when the overlordship 

3 



Frederick the Great 



of the sandy tract lying between the middle Elbe 
and lower Oder and stretching across their banks was 
conferred upon him by the Emperor for cash down, 
Frederick of Hohenzollern and his descendants had 
remained lords of Brandenburg. From Nuremberg, 
where Frederick had been Burggrave, they had 
brought with them the vital energy and business 
ability of successful townsmen. So poor was their 
new estate that for many generations relaxation 
would have meant ruin. There was therefore no 
temptation to depart from that policy of adding 
field to field which is the natural law of the industri- 
ous countryman. Whether from native superiority 
or from greater need, the Hohenzollerns were usually 
a little wiser than their neighbours. With the aid 
of a family statute of 1473, which made primogeni- 
ture the rule of succession for Brandenburg, they 
avoided the consequences of that custom of equal 
inheritance which has been the bane of Germany. 
By careful watching of opportunities, by windfalls, 
by purchase, and by covenants for mutual succession 
on failure of heirs made with neighbours whose lines 
died out, the domain of the rulers of Brandenburg 
was in two centuries increased fourfold. When the 
Thirty Years' War broke out and the modern his- 
tory of Prussia began, the head of the Hohenzollern 
family, who had long since become one of the seven 
Electors of the Empire, held sway over an area al- 
most as great as that of Ireland. 

Of the territories by which the original Mark of 
Brandenburg had been augmented, two were of 
special importance. In 1525 East Prussia had been 



The Rise of Prussia 



acquired. This province, which throughout this 
book will be called by its German name of Ost- 
Preussen, was richer by far than the Mark, the kernel 
of the Hohenzollern possessions. It had an import- 
ant city, Konigsberg, for its capital and a coast-line on 
the Baltic. It constituted the domain of the old Order 
of Teutonic Knights, permanent crusaders whose task 
had been to spread the faith and civilisation of their 
fatherland among the heathen Slavs. But the Baltic 
lands had all submitted to the Cross, and the Knights 
became in their turn the objects of a religious mission. 
Early in the sixteenth century, the doctrines of the 
Reformation penetrated the minds of their High 
Master, Albert of Hohenzollern. He turned for 
counsel to Luther himself. In a celibate Order 
which had no more heathen to convert, the husband 
of the nun Catherine Bora could see only a standing 
defiance of the laws of nature and of God. By his 
advice Ost-Preussen was *' secularised," that is, taken 
from the service of religion to form a Hohenzollern 
estate, and in time (1618), though still submissive to 
the suzerainty of Poland, it was added to the main 
body of the Electoral dominions. The Hohenzol- 
lerns thus became distinguished from the mass of 
German princes by ruling territories to which the 
Empire had never possessed any claim. Ost-Preus- 
sen was to them on a small scale what England 
became in 1688 to the House of Orange, or in 1714 
to the House of Hanover. Their policy acquired a 
new breadth and a new weight. Hitherto provincial, 
it became more and more cosmopoHtan, and com- 
merce with the Baltic lands and England began to 



6 Frederick the Great 

hint to the lord of Pillau and Memel that his future 
lay upon the water. 

A makeweight to Ost-Preussen, which would pre- 
vent the centre of gravity of the Hohenzollern lands 
from shifting eastwards, was found in 1609, when the 
family inherited Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg in 
Western Germany. This acquisition, made on the 
very eve of the Thirty Years' War, was accompanied 
in 161 3 by the conversion of the Elector, John Sigis- 
mund, from the Lutheranism which his grandfather, 
Joachim II., had established in 1539 to the sterner 
and more mihtant creed of Calvin. This meant that 
at the very moment when all Germany was taking 
up arms for the greatest religious war of modern 
times, the court and people of Brandenburg were 
hopelessly at variance with one another. A Calvin- 
ist prince ruled a Lutheran people, and the new 
Elector, George William (1619-1640), ''of Christ- 
mild memory " but the weakest of his line, proved 
to be a puppet in the hands of Schwarzenburg, 
his Romanist prime-minister. Under such guidance 
did Brandenburg, ill-knit and ill-armed, become the 
battle-ground between Swede and Hapsburg in their 
struggle for faith and empire. 

What Brandenburg suffered in the terrible de- 
cade 1630-1640, between the landing of Gustavus 
Adolphus in Germany and the accession of the Great 
Elector, can never be fully calculated. The State was 
rudderless, defenceless, and poor ; the combatants 
on both sides brigands, whom years of license had 
habituated to every kind of cruelty. What passed 
could be described by no more patently truthful eye- 



The Rise of Prussia 



witness than Andreas Rittner, the cheery burgo- 
master of Tangermiinde, a httle town on the Elbe 
with a royal history of its own. In his pages may 
be traced the swift descent of the afflicted people 
through every depth of misery down to despair or 
even annihilation. The invaders — it mattered little 
whether Swedes or Imperialists — exacted in end- 
less sequence contributions, lodging, forage, and loot, 
drove off the cattle, broke up the cofifins of the 
dead, laid waste the land, and hunted down the 
inhabitants. The mischief was only increased by 
the feeble efforts of the home government to call 
out and support a militia. The maddened peasants 
turned guerilla. Food failed, for who could sow or 
reap? Men fed on carrion, even, it was whispered, 
on human flesh, and soon pestilence seized on perse- 
cutors and persecuted alike. 

Anarchy and degradation brought forth torture. 
The name of the Swedish Drink attests the cruelty 
of the degenerate deliverers of Germany. " They 
laid men awhile upon the fire," writes Rittner, 

" baked them in ovens, flung them into wells, hung them 
up by the feet, fastened thumb-screws upon them, drove 
sharp spikes under their nails, bound round their heads so 
tight that their eyes started out, gagged them and sealed 
their mouths. Matrons and virgins were oft-times put to 
shame. Husbands must often leave their wives and wives 
their husbands, parents their children and children their 
parents, even on the bed of sickness, for they were power- 
less to save them from abuse, and sometimes when they 
came back they found nought of them save some few 
bones, for all else had the dogs mangled and eaten up." 



8 Frederick the Great 

Not less graphic is the story told in stone in some 
of the tormented cities. Round the giant church, 
spared by the Swedes to uphold the Lutheran faith 
of which it was then the temple and by the Im- 
perialists for the sake of the Roman faith which 
they hoped to establish anew within its walls, 
there may be seen the tombs of many generations 
of citizens. Those of the sixteenth century are 
covered with quaint adornment and graven with 
artistic skill. Then, as war sweeps over the land, 
the series is broken, to be resumed after many 
decades with a rude clumsiness which shows that 
wealth and art had fled from Brandenburg together. 

Though it would be rash to assume that any 
single part of the Mark may be regarded as typical 
of the whole, there seems to be no reason to call in 
question the dictum of Frederick the Great, that 
his ancestors needed a century to repair the damage 
of the Thirty Years' War. This great task was 
confided to a youth of twenty years, an only son, 
yet no favourite of his father, the Elector George 
William, whom he succeeded in 1640. Frederick 
William, known to history as the Great Elector, was 
the great-grandfather of Frederick the Great. By 
common consent he is reputed the founder of the 
glory of the House of Hohenzollern in modern 
times. He found Brandenburg prostrate and threat- 
ened with dissolution. It is from the low-water mark 
of these earliest years, when he with reason bewailed 
difficulties greater than those of David or Solomon, 
that the progress of his State is to be measured and 
his own achievement thereby understood. 



The Rise of Prussia 



He found his exchequer empty, his palace half- 
ruined, the court seeking safety and even sus- 
tenance at far-off Konigsberg, the Austrian papist, 
Schwarzenburg, supreme in the state, the Mark 
trampled underfoot by alien hosts. How should 
an open country like his, the highroad between 
Sweden and Austria, be delivered from the endless 
war? Even if, by miracle, a peace could be de- 
vised, which Calvinists and Lutherans could both 
accept, what prospect, nay what possibility existed 
that territories so ill-compacted as his could be 
welded into a single, solid state ? All the needful 
bonds of union seemed to be lacking. What com- 
mon tie of blood, of faith, of speech was there 
strong enough to bind together Cleves and Branden- 
burg and Ost-Preussen, units gathered by the chance 
of recent history into one hand but dissevered by 
hundreds of miles of alien soil and by chasms of 
sentiment still harder to bridge over? The con- 
stituent parts of Frederick William's domain were 
in 1640 dissimilar in race, in history, and in interest. 
They had no desire for closer relations ; they had 
not even a uniform calendar ; their only common 
political aim seemed to be to flout the Elector, 
who was the bugbear of them all. 

Even were he to make himself master of the centre, 
dangers clustered thick on either wing, while behind 
the Polish problems of the East and the Netherland- 
ish problems of the West a seer might have discerned 
the double peril that encompasses modern Germany. 
Peter the Great and his Russia lay yet in the womb 
of time, but Richelieu and his France were in the 



lo Frederick the Great 

full flood of successful ambition. Thus the organ- 
iser of a North German power must work while 
his horizon was already darkening. In grasping the 
lands which formed his birthright the Great Elector 
was defying, though as yet he knew it not, two of 
the greatest forces of modern times. HohenzoUern 
rule on the Niemen was to become a challenge to 
Russia and to the Slavic advance, while the Hohen- 
zoUern lord of Cleves must ultimately reckon with 
the belief of Frenchmen that the Rhine is the 
boundary designed by nature for their state. 

During the first critical years of his rule, however, 
the plans of the Great Elector were of the humblest. 
Striving for existence rather than for empire, he 
was not too proud to beg for help in every likely 
quarter. Among our own State-papers are to be 
seen his letters suing for petty favours which Charles 
I., so long as diplomacy would serve, was very will- 
ing to grant. The King of England marked the 
small esteem in which he held the untried and ob- 
scure Elector by pressing upon him the hand of his 
niece, a princess of the fugitive and bankrupt House 
of the Palatinate. Frederick William's relations 
with Poland, the suzerain of whom he held Ost- 
Preussen, show yet more clearly how slight was his 
power at his accession. When the Lutherans of 
Konigsberg threatened riot because a Calvinist was 
chosen to preach the funeral sermon of George 
William, the Elector did not blush to solicit the 
Papist King, Wladislaus IV., to admonish these 
unruly Protestants. To this end he bade his minis- 
ter at Warsaw " make humble request to His Maj- 




FREDERICK THE GREAT. 
AFTER THE PAINTING BY CHRISTIAN WOLFFGANG. 



The Rise of Prussia 1 1 

esty that His Majesty would in friendly — cousinly 
fashion let it please him to send a letter to our chief 
Councillors (but as if His Majesty had been informed 
of this from other quarters and not from us) and 
thereby to order them to reprove and repress this 
folly of the unquiet theologians. ... It will 
perhaps be best if you solicit this work only after the 
departure of the Diet." The request was made and 
granted, and the minister instructs the Elector how 
he may palm off the document as a mandate ap- 
proved by the Diet behind whose backs it had been 
obtained. 

Where charity was to be looked for, Frederick 
William was not too proud to beg. But of all pow- 
ers the least likely to be charitable was Sweden, 
whose armies had for nearly ten years been fight- 
ing solely for material compensation. To Sweden 
therefore the Elector offered money and was allowed 
to purchase that deliverance from the war which 
was essential to all his plans (1641). He could now 
begin the task of his life — to reduce all his provinces 
into dependence upon himself and to render Bran- 
denburg, augmented and centralised, a formidable 
military power. 

During forty-eight years (1640- 1688) he pursued 
the old Hohenzollern policy of family aggrandise- 
ment. His success has earned him the title of the 
Great Elector, and the place of the first hero of the 
Prussian state. Yet he is remarkable chiefly for 
his commercial instinct, imbibed perhaps during his 
education among the Dutch, the neighbours to whom 
he always looked for example and alliance. On 



1 2 Frederick the Great 

occasion he could display the soldierly instinct of 
his race, but in time of peace he was hardly a heroic 
figure. With domestic virtues specially to be praised 
in a monarch of that time he combined a weakness 
for strong drink which damaged his health and tem- 
per. He took pride in being abreast of the times, 
reverenced London and Amsterdam, and was ready 
to haggle with foreigners for preferential rates. He 
wrote a good commercial hand, planted cabbages in 
his garden, and hammered out verses which with a 
little doctoring might have graced the poet's corner 
of a provincial newspaper. He was a thrifty house- 
holder, save when he deemed it necessary to 
keep up his position by building a massive palace or 
giving a pompous feast. A convinced Protestant, 
he welcomed serviceable Huguenots to his capital 
with more good-will than serviceable papists. It is 
not impossible to believe that as a German patriot 
he took favours from the Emperor with more inward 
pleasure than from Louis XIV. In what Dr. Proth- 
ero terms " the ocean of recognised mendacity which 
we call diplomacy " he floundered without either 
repugnance or great success. He spent his life in 
unifying his dominions and made a will which if 
carried into effect would have dismembered them 
at his death. That a man of this stamp is desig- 
nated Great suggests that he was not only diligent 
but that he was also fortunate in the conditions 
under which he lived and worked. 

In his early years he owed much to the weakness 
and insignificance which have already been described. 
What rival state was thrown into the shade if Bran- 



The Rise of Prussia 1 3 

denburg was allowed to grow ? Thus, at the close 
of the Thirty Years' War, the Hohenzollern line re- 
ceived indulgent treatment. Their claim to Pome- 
rania was admitted for the eastern half of the 
duchy. The western half was indispensable to 
Sweden, but the rights of the Elector were bought 
up at the price of more valuable ecclesiastical lands 
scattered between the Mark and his possessions in 
the West. The bishoprics of Halberstadt and Min- 
den and the reversion of the rich archbishopric of 
Magdeburg were given to Brandenburg, whose part 
in the war had been contemptible, by the great 
Peace of Westphalia, the fundamental pact of mod- 
ern Europe. Yet its sacred ness was so little appre- ^' 
ciated by the Elector that a few years later he 
would have renewed the war, had not outraged Ger- 
many held him in. 

The Peace of Westphalia had bestowed upon 
Brandenburg and other German states a gift of 
more value than many bishoprics — the gift of inde- 
pendence. In outward show Frederick William was 
still a vassal of the Emperor. He continued to be 
one of the seven Electors who chose the head of 
the Holy Roman Empire and honoured him with 
lowly homage. In virtue of his hereditary office of 
Grand Chamberlain it was the duty of the Elector 
of Brandenburg, prescribed by the Golden Bull of 
1356, to appear at solemn courts **on horseback, 
having in his hands a silver basin with water, and a 
beautiful towel, and descending from his horse, to 
present the water to the Emperor or King of the 
Romans to wash his hands." As a German prince. 



14 Freder'ick the Great 

moreover, he had still to look to the Emperor for 
investiture, leadership, and advice. But his right to 
determine the creed of his subjects, which the Peace 
of Westphalia confirmed, and the right to choose 
allies outside the Empire, which it expressly granted, 
were inconsistent with real vassalage. The gift of 
these admitted Brandenburg to a place in the com- 
monwealth of nations. The Elector had become 
undisputed master in his own house. Soon his 
horizon expanded far beyond the bounds of Ger- 
many. Europe, nay more, as his colonial ventures 
were to prove, the wide world lay open to the Hohen- 
zollern. Both at home and abroad he could strike 
with a freer hand. But his power, though irresisti- 
ble in Brandenburg, was made respectable in Europe 
only by years of toil. Hence the home policy of 
the Great Elector was as straightforward as his 
foreign policy was tortuous. To beat down all 
competing authority, to establish an armed auto- 
cracy, to develop to the utmost all the resources 
of the State— -such was the plan which the Great / 
Elector designed, which his son and grandson per- 
fected, and the fruits of which Frederick the Great 
enjoyed. 

By ' steady pressure, by force, and at times by 
fraud, the Great Elector guarded the future of the 
Hohenzollern power against the danger of obstruct- 
ive provincial parliaments. To make the men of 
Cleves, Brandenburg, and Ost-Preussen feel them- 
selves brethren was indeed beyond his power. But 
he ruthlessly suppressed the institutions which sym- 
bolised their mutual independence of each other and 



The Rise of Prussia 15 

of himself. Carlyle, the great panegyrist of coups 
d'etat, thus describes one example of 

" his measures, soft but strong, and ever stronger to the 
needful pitch, with mutinous spirits. One Burgermeister 
of Konigsberg, after much stroking on the back, was at 
length seized in open Hall, by Electoral writ, — soldiers 
having first gently barricaded the principal streets, and 
brought cannon to bear upon them. This Biirgermeis- 
ter, seized in such brief way, lay prisoner for life ; 
refusing to ask his liberty, though it was thought he 
might have had it on asking," 

The Great Elector's chief legacy was, however, 
the Prussian army. The ruler of mere patches of 
the great northern plain, " a country by nature the 
least defensible of all countries," he girdled it labori- 
ously with a wall of men. In an age when France 
alone possessed a large standing army, this obscure 
German prince raised his force from a few garrisons 
to a host some twenty-seven thousand strong, well 
drilled and well appointed. 

The lord of Brandenburg now became a co7idot- 
tiere of ever-increasing reputation. His regiments 
brought security to his dominions and gold to his 
exchequer. In every European struggle their aid 
was welcome. On the frozen lagoons by the Baltic 
and on the shores of Torbay, on the torrid plain of 
Warsaw, and in the vine-clad valley of the Rhine — 
everywhere the men of the Mark approved them- 
selves good soldiers and punctual allies. In 1660 
the Great Elector netted his profit from the North- 
ern war by receiving Ost-Preussen free from Polish 
suzerainty. The heroic moment of the whole reign 



1 6 Frederick the Great 

came, however, in 1675, when all the threads of the 
Elector's policy — ambition, vengeance against the 
Swedes, military creation, domestic organisation — 
guided him to the stricken field of Fehrbellin. 
While playing his part in the West as a member of 
the coalition against France, he learned that the 
Swedes, his hated neighbours in Pomerania, had 
been hurled upon his domains by their patron 
Louis XIV. He straightway turned his back upon 
the Rhine and stalked silently across Germany to 
rescue his helpless people. His troops had been 
beaten by Turenne and exhausted by the long strug- 
gle with rain and mud. Yet he dared to overrule 
his generals and to strike straight at superior forces 
trained in the school of Gustavus and posted with a 
river in their rear. 

The bold move succeeded. In a hand-to-hand 
struggle, amid bogs and dunes, Brandenburg was 
saved by its chief. At the crisis of the fight he put 
himself at the head of a wavering squadron, and 
with one wild charge shattered the Swedes and their 
prestige together. The result of Fehrbellin was that 
Brandenburg took rank as the first military power 
of Northern Europe and that the land had rest for 
many years. 

Fehrbellin forms a conspicuous landmark on the 
road to Hohenzollern greatness, but it is separated 
by no great interval of time from a double demon- 
stration of the insignificance of Brandenburg when 
confronted with states of the first order. The Em- 
peror flatly refused to admit the claim of the Elector 
to portions of Silesia. The King of France dashed 



The Rise of Prussia 1 7 

from his lips the cup of triumph over the Swedes. 
In an age when rivers were of even greater value 
than at present, the great waterway of Brandenburg 
was the Oder. Ere she could draw full profit from 
the Oder, Stettin, with its splendid harbourage and 
strong strategic position, must be wrested from 
alien hands. At Fehrbellin hope sprang up that the 
time was come. With all the tenacity of his nature 
the Great Elector clung to the task. In 1677 Stettin 
fell, after enduring one of the most desolating bom- 
bardments in history. Before the close of 1678 the 
Swedes were driven from all Western Pomerania. 
They descended upon Ost-Preussen, but Frederick 
William set at naught the winter cold and his own 
infirmity, hurried from Cleves to the Vistula, put his 
troops on sledges, and dashed at the enemy across 
the frozen sea (January, 1679). The triumph of the 
Elector was complete, but at the Peace of S. Germain 
(1679) he was compelled to surrender all his con- 
quests at the behest of Louis XIV. 

In spite of some failures, however, Frederick Wil- 
liam by dogged perseverance accomplished enough 
to justify his reputation as the founder of the Prus- 
sian State. He is still a force in Germany. Fred- 
erick the Great and all the later Hohenzollerns of 
renown have paid homage to his memory. William 
II. embittered the downfall of Bismarck by applaud- 
ing a drama which represented the Great Elector 
deposing Schwarzenburg, the hated counsellor of 
his father. Throughout Prussia the imperious fea- 
tures of the little hero of FehrbelHn are as familiar 
to the people as his deeds. 



1 8 Frederick the Great 

With the death of the Great Elector in 1688 the 
age of iron gave way to the age of tinsel. Fred- 
erick, who ruled in his father's place for a quarter 
of a century (1688-1713), was a prince who prized 
culture above character and strove to imitate in 
his provincial court the splendours of Versailles. 
From time to time, though less often than in 
other royal lines, the business instinct of the Hohen- 
zollerns fails, and of such a lapse Frederick is an 
example. Despising the domestic labours of the 
Great Elector, he was captivated by those ceremoni- 
ous shadows which the German nation is always wont 
to pursue. Frail, even maimed, since childhood, he 
developed a passion for pageants, robes, and titles. 
He could not endure the promotion of his equals to 
rank higher than his own. If the Dutch Statthalter 
rose to be WiUiam III. of England and the Duke 
of Brunswick-Liineburg to be Elector George of 
Hanover, might not he himself, as master of the best 
troops in Germany, also claim to rise? When in 
1696 he was about to visit William of Orange at the 
Hague he declared that he could not consent to sit 
upon an ordinary seat while an armchair was placed 
for the King. The interview therefore was accom- 
plished standing, and when William returned the 
visit he found armchairs of equal dignity set for the 
Elector and for himself. 

Seldom has a ruler's weakness done better service 
to his State. Brandenburg was shielded by its 
poverty from the ordinary fate of German states 
whose rulers tried to copy the profusion of the kings 
of France. Frederick, moreover, had not the force 



The Rise of Prussia 19 

of will to break with all the traditions of the Great 
Elector. He continued to take part in every struggle 
as an auxiliary, but in lione as a principal. His 
country thus enjoyed the glories of war without its 
penalties. It was under the command of Prince 
Eugene, Austria's greatest general, that Branden- 
burgers helped to overthrow the French before 
Turin (1706). And since a large army is the most 
splendid trapping of monarchy, Frederick made his 
army very large. He inherited 27,000 men, he be- 
queathed nearly 50,000 to his son. -n^ 

The climax of his reign was reached in 1 701, when 
he prevailed upon the Emperor to make him King 
of Prussia. In a double sense it may be said with 
truth that he owed his crown to his weakness. It is 
generally believed that the chief motive which 
prompted him to sue for it was vanity. For months 
he could think and speak of nothing else. When 
at last the imperial license came, the enraptured 
Elector quitted Berlin in midwinter and spent twelve 
days in moving with a pompous train to Konigsberg. 
There, with every detail of ceremony that his im- 
agination could suggest, he placed the crown upon 
his head. It is doubtful whether a more sober ruler 
would have prized a throne as he did, and doubtful 
too whether the Emperor would have consented to 
the elevation of a prince less obviously feeble. But 
Frederick had carried on without reserve, the old 
Hohenzollern tradition of standing well with the 
head of the German world. He had even given back 
to Austria the territory of Schwiebus, which the Em- 
peror had assigned to the Great Elector in settlement 



20 Frederick the Great 

of whatever claim the Hohenzollerns possessed to 
portions of Silesia. Now he was prepared to up- 
hold the Hapsburg cause in the War of the Spanish 
Succession. What harm could there be, the Em- 
peror may well have asked himself, in promoting a 
vassal so devoted as this? 

Forty years later, Austria had bitter cause to rue 
the error of her chief. From the very first the crown 
aggrandised the Hohenzollern dynasty. It conse- 
crated their ambition, enlarged their horizon, and 
gave them, as the Lord's anointed, a new claim upon 
the devotion of their subjects. The Order of the 
Black Eagle, which for two centuries has been the 
coveted prize of service to their state, signalised 
the coronation of Frederick I. 

The Great Elector and the first king of Prussia have 
this in common — that whatever may be thought 
of their achievements it is difficult to mistake the 
men themselves. Of the second king, Frederick 
William I. (1713-1740), the father of Frederick the 
Great, the exact opposite is true. His life-work, the 
establishment of the royal power "like a rock of 
bronze," is patent to all. He himself, on the other 
hand, was a mystery to his own children. His most 
gifted admirer, Carlyle, sets out to paint a prophet 
and ends by portraying something very like a mad- 
man. His theory of his own sovereign office was as 
mystical as his practice of ruling was simple. He 
regarded himself, it has been said, as the servant of 
an imaginary master — the King of Prussia — under 
whose eye he lived and worked. Baser princes looked 
on their royalty as a privilege to be enjoyed. To 



The Rise of Prussia 2 1 

Frederick William it was a duty calling for endless toil. 
He struggled to check every detail of government with 
his own hand, as though Prussia were a single manor 
and he the squire. A French critic (Lavisse) thus por- 
trays him wrestling with his ever-multiplying tasks : 

"Have we not too many officials," the King enquires. 
" Could not several places be merged into one ? We 
must see if some of the officials cannot be put down. 
Why is not the beer so good everywhere as at Potsdam ? 
In order to have wool we must have sheep. Now in 
Prussia there are nearly as many wolves as sheep. Quick, 
let me have a minute upon the destruction of wolves. 
How comes it that the salt tax has brought in less money 
this year than last from the district of Halberstadt ? 
The number of officials has not diminished, has it ? 
They must have eaten as much salt as last year. There 
must therefore be fraud or waste somewhere. The 
Superintendent of the Salt Department must be warned 
to manage matters better than he has done of late. 
Can it be that my subjects buy salt in Hanover or 
Poland ? Every importer of salt must be hanged." 

His violence was and still is notorious. He flung 
plates at his children, caned his son in public, cud- 
gelled the inhabitants of his capital, and flung the 
judges down-stairs. He forced his queen, the sister 
of the English King, to drink to the downfall of 
England. He vilified everything French, and in- 
sulted the British Ambassador so seriously that he 
conceived himself bound to leave Berlin. Yet he 
kept Prussia at peace steadily enough to earn for 
himself the reputation of a mere bully whom the 
Emperor could lead by the nose. 



2 2 Frederick the Great 

In spite of the contradictions of his character, 
however, the broad principles of his reign are clear. 
Having stripped the state of the veneer of luxury 
with which Frederick I. had disguised its poverty, 
he took up and developed further the ideals of the 
Great Elector. He made the royal power absolute 
in the state, and increased the army till a population 
of about two and a half million souls supported the 
unheard-of number of 83,000 men under arms. These 
were drilled to such a pitch of perfection that Ma- 
caulay could say that, placed beside them, the house- 
hold regiments of Versailles and St. James's would 
have appeared an awkward squad. Yet this mighty 
force was used for little save to secure the frontiers 
of Prussia and the rights of all German Protestants. 
In territory the ** Sergeant King" gained only from 
the wreck of Sweden part of the prize which the 
Great Elector had grudgingly relinquished at the be- 
hest of Louis XIV. — the mouth of the Oder and 
with it the islands of Usedom and WoUin, and West- 
ern Pomerania as far as the river Peene (1720). 

In the home department, on the other hand, Fred- 
erick William I. made a conspicuous advance from 
the point reached by his grandfather. He showed 
the same military zeal, the same practical insight, the 
same determination to set to rights with his own 
hand whatever in his dominion was governed amiss, 
the same contempt for higher education, the same 
benevolence towards the persecuted of other lands 
who might be made useful to Prussia. But he 
showed also a power of grasping and of simplifying 
the whole system of administration such as few rulers 




f^\l 




Gieenwlch 18° 



Y PRUSSIA 

After the Congress of Vienna, 
1815. 

[ I Prussia, 1807 - 1818 

I I Old Territory, reconquered by 1816 

I I Old Territory not reconquered by 1815 

I I New Acquisitions, 18X6 

I I Acquisitions, Frederick WlUlam in., 



The Rise of Prussia 23 

have ever possessed. His great Edict of 1723 re- 
moved friction from the working of the Prussian 
state. Thanks to this, his son Frederick found the 
organisation described in the sixth chapter of this 
book — a machine of government answering to every 
touch of the royal hand. He found at the same 
time a firm tradition in favour of thrift, dihgence, 
and activity in the steersman of the state. We 
have traced the growth of Prussia to 1740; let us 
now turn to the story of the prince who in that year 
linked her fortunes with his own. 




CHAPTER II 

FREDERICK AS CROWN PRINCE, 1712-1740 

WHAT manner of man was the first-born son 
of Frederick William, known to history as 
Frederick the Great, and what were the 
causes that made him such as he was ? To answer 
either question is a task of uncommon difficulty. 
Even to those who were regarded as his intimates 
Frederick remained an enigma all his life. In his 
early trials he acquired, as Carlyle happily expresses 
it, "the art of wearing among his fellow-creatures 
a polite cloak-of-darkness," and became what he in 
great measure still remains, " a man politely impreg- 
nable to the intrusion of human curiosity." And if 
it passes our wit adequately to describe his personal- 
ity, how shall we determine and distinguish the 
factors which created it ? ^No adding together of in- 
fluences will suffice. Such enquiries lead us far be- 
yond the bounds of mere arithmetic. Of Frederick's 
nature, as of every man's, a greater share was built up 
in ages which have left no record than in the genera- 
tions whose history we can trace. If therefore we 
next endeavour to indicate the influences of his par- 
entage and his surroundings, let us avoid the delusion 

24 



1712-1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 25 

that these alone made him what he was. In Fred- 
erick's case, too, it is perhaps equally needful to be- 
ware of the converse error. His personality, like his 
policy, was not untouched by ordinary influences. 
Parents, tutors, friends, nation, home, even religion — 
each bestowed something upon one who might on 
a too hasty scrutiny be pronounced a freak of nature 
— the ugly duckling of the HohenzoUern brood. 

Frederick's birth, on January 24, 17^, remedied 
the anxieties of a line which had gained too much 
from the extinction of allied lines not to be keenly 
sensitive to its own lack of heirs. His father, Freder- 
ick William, gave vent to rude transports of joy at the 
arrival of a male heir. Frederick I., the royal grand- 
father, who had himself a third time plunged into 
wedlock in the hope of safeguarding the succession 
to the new Prussian crown, seized the opportunity 
to astonish Berlin by the pomp of the infant's christ- 
ening. The* Prussian nation, living in tranquillity 
under the Hohenzollerns, shared in their rejoicing. 

The infant prince represented many noble lines, 
and, it might almost be said, two separate civilisa- 
tions. > Frederick William was a kind of Prussian 
Squire Western. His wife, Sophia Dorothea, was a 
princess of the rising House of Hanover, a lady soon 
to be nicknamed Olympia from her majestic bearing 
as queen. Through her and through his grand- 
mother, a clever daughter of Sophia of Hanover, 
a thin strain of Stuart blood flowed in Frederick's 
veins. His great-grandmother, the wife of the Great 
Elector, was a daughter of the House of Orange, 
born at the moment of its triumph over Spain. A 



26 Frederick the Great 



[!712- 



generation farther back the HohenzoUerns had mar- 
ried into the House of the Palatinate, which in 1618 
threw for the Bohemian crown and lost. But the 
virtues of every Protestant House in Europe could 
not compensate for the infirm health which had 
assailed both the father and the son of the Great 
Elector, and which there seemed reason to fear had 
descended to the offspring of his grandson Fred- 
erick William. Two older sons had died in infancy, 
a daughter, Wilhelmina, though she grew up and 
married, was never robust, and Frederick himself 
seems in his childhood to have been often ailing. 

The home circle of this delicate prince was surely 
the strangest in the world. The royal family of 
Prussia in the reign of Frederick WiUiam I. was 
hardly a family and hardly royal. The monarch 
seemed to regard his sceptre chiefly as a superior 
kind of cudgel. As Prussian King, and therefore ex 
officio the father of his people, he could treat them 
as children, could order them to be anything or to 
build anything or to pay anything, with even less 
risk of resistance than an Elector of Brandenburg 
might have had to fear. He was, it is true, on a 
footing of equality with foreign kings in negotiating 
for a treaty or a province or a bride. But apart 
from his acceptance of the perquisites of royalty, 
his life was one long protest against all that the 
world associated with the name of king. Intolerant 
of state and ceremony, he agonised his chamberlains 
by his behaviour. His recreations were such as 
befitted a bargeman on the Havel or an overgrown 
loafer kidnapped to serve in the King of Prussia's 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 27 

giant grenadiers. In that snuff-taking age, a king 
whose hobby was to smoke pipes in a kind of glori- 
fied tavern-circle known as the Tobacco Parliament 
earned the reputation that would fall in our own 
day to a king who should chew and spit. 

P'rederick William drank himself to death before 
he was fifty-two. Though an artist, if not a scholar, 
he drove Wolf, the philosopher, from his dominions 
and made Gundling President of the Academy of 
Letters because he amused the Tobacco Parliament 
when in his cups. As a sportsman he slew wild swine 
by the thousand and forced his subjects to buy their 
carcasses at a fixed price. He ordered his officials to 
spend only six thousand thalers on the entertainment 
of Peter the Great, but to give out that it cost him 
thirty or forty thousand. His mixture of fervent piety 
and immorality suggests that he was hardly sane, and 
his foreign policy does not discountenance the sug- 
gestion. In some of his officials he placed complete 
confidence, even when proofs that they were bribing 
his envoys abroad to send home false news were in 
his hands. He rushed upon others with his cudgel, 
first breaking their heads and then cashiering them. 
What he was to his children may be inferred from 
the fact that his daughter became his bitter satirist 
and his son his bitter foe. 

Such was the father who directed Frederick's edu- 
cation. His talent for detail was always at the 
service of the state. It could be devoted to no 
worthier object than the training of the future king. 
At the age of nine years, therefore, Frederick found 
every hour of the day assigned to some part of the 



28 Frederick the Great ^ [1712- 

scheme of education by which the crowned Podsnap 
designed to make him such another as himself. 

For all its minuteness, the scheme failed in its 
main object. It failed because Frederick William 
was not the sole factor in moulding and inspiring 
his son. In the royal household were two trembling 
conspirators against the tyrant — his wife and his 
daughter. Sophia Dorothea and Wilhelmina formed 
with Frederick a trio who sighed after the genteel. 
Loathing the pipe-clayed Teutonism in which their 
lord delighted, they longed for newer fashions and 
society more polite, for the wit and gallantry of the 
French court, and for the splendour of their own 
opulent kinsfolk at Saint James's. Their lines 
had fallen in far less pleasant places. In Berlin, 
a quiet country town with dull surroundings and a 
trying climate, they had at least palaces, parties, and 
scandal. In Wusterhausen, to this day a lonely vil- 
lage, they were in exile ; and Wusterhausen was the 
favourite residence of the King. The Europe in 
which they lived, it must be remembered, was a 
Europe which believed with all its heart that what- 
ever Louis XIV. might have been in poHtics, he was 
beyond doubt the Apollo of culture. German princes 
prided themselves on speaking French, on dressing 
a la franqaise, on building palaces that might be 
named in the same breath with Versailles. Fred- 
erick's mother spoke French so well that a Huguenot 
refugee paid her the supreme compliment of enquir- 
ing whether she understood German. His sister's 
memoirs, like his own, are French in language and 
in inspiration. What sympathy, we may wonder. 



17401 Frede7'ick as Crown Prince 29 

could there be between these ladies and a boor who 
hated everything French, whether language, litera- 
ture, art, cookery, or dress, and whose ideal of life was 
to sleep on straw in a barn, wash at daybreak in a tub, 
don a plain uniform, inspect farms, account-books, 
and soldiers, gorge himself with rude German dishes 
in the middle of the day, snore under a tree in the 
afternoon, and devote the evening to tobacco, buf- 
foonery, and strong drink ? 

It is not surprising that, when the King's scheme 
of discipline outraged his son instead of mould- 
ing him, mother and sister were at hand with ready 
sympathy. The wayward boy never forgot their 
kindness, nor the indulgence of the tutors who 
connived at a more humane education than Fred- 
erick William had commanded them to inflict. 
Cordially as the King detested French culture, he 
did not venture to exclude it from a leading 
part in the education of his son. A French lady, 
Madame de Roucoulle, was entrusted with the 
oversight of his earliest years. Madame de Camas, 
whom he called Mamma, was the wife of a French- 
man. His tutor, Duhan, was a Huguenot. French 
was at that time the universal language of the polite 
and learned world. Frederick, who never learned 
English and was forbidden to learn Latin, therefore 
drew all his mental supplies from French originals 
or French translations. 

German he never spoke or wrote with ease. To 
him it stood for whatever was dull in his education, 
— for windy sermons every Sunday, lessons of nearly 
two hours a day in the Christian religion, books 



; 



30 



Frederick the Great [1712- 



full of dismal pedantry, the speech of boors and 
of his father. Thus he early acquired from France 
ideas which he proclaimed throughout his life. 
That literary creation is the highest achievement 
of man, and that next to creation stand patronage 
and culture ; that religion is superstition ; that the 
enlightened man is he who views with calm not 
only the rubs of fortune but also the frailties of 
mankind — such were the abiding traces of Freder- 
ick's education. The King, as may readily be be- 
lieved, did not fail to remark something of this and 
to loathe it. He leaped to the conclusion that a 
boy who preferred French to German, and flute- 
playing to parades, was a monster who would ruin 
Prussia. It never occurred to him that his own 
scheme could be imperfect, and life became one long 
collision between father and son. 

Yet Frederick's most irritating delinquencies — 
his delight in soft living and secret dissipation, his 
distaste for the uniform and duty of a soldier, 
his contempt for Germans and their tongue — may 
fairly be ascribed in great part to mere youthful 
squeamishness and to the tyranny of the King. Had 
Frederick William been wise enough to trust to the 
future and to the past, to reflect that in the long 
line of Hohenzollerns none had been traitor to his 
House, that a lad who could think for himself would 
be more easily influenced than coerced, that at the 
worst he himself was not twenty-four years older 
than his son and might train the state to survive 
Frederick H. as after the Great Elector it had sur- 
vived Frederick I. — had he in short been either a 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 3 1 

sympathetic father or a man of real penetration, 
then history might have heard nothing of either the 
new Junius Brutus or the Ogre of Potsdam, and the 
milHon victims of Frederick's wars might have been 
spared. 

Unhappily for his son and for the world, Frederick 
William was neither sensible nor sympathetic. His 
aversion to an heir who refused to resemble himself 
was doubled when the heir became the advocate of 
a matrimonial policy which he came to regard with 
loathing. From the hour of Frederick's birth the 
dearest wish of the Hanoverian House, and of So- 
phia Dorothea most of all, had been to unite more 
closely the royal lines of England and Prussia. At 
length a double marriage was proposed. The Prince 
of Wales was to marry Wilhelmina, and Frederick 
his cousin Amelia, daughter of George H. In 1730, 
however, England and Prussia were estranged, yet 
Frederick William knew that his household had not 
given up their darling project. Flouted as a father 
and as a statesman, he treated his son so ill as to 
lend colour to the suspicion that he wished him 
dead. Not content with impounding his books, 
forbidding him the flute, compelling him to see his 
mother only by stealth, the tyrant actually rained 
blows upon him in public, even in the camp of the 
Saxon King. " Had I been so treated by my father," 
he is said to have exclaimed, " I would have blown 
my brains out, but this fellow has no honour." 

Unfortunately for Frederick William, the youth 
whom he thus outraged was Crown Prince of Prus- 
sia, and as such by no means lacked friends. To 



32 Frederick the Great wiM- 

England, to Austria, and to his father's ministers 
he was an important pawn in the game of politics. 
Some of the younger officers lent him countenance 
in the hope of favours to come. But the dearest 
friend of his life. Lieutenant von Katte, loved him 
for himself rather than for what he might be able to 
bestow. To Katte the prince confided his fixed 
purpose to flee from a tyranny that was past endur- 
ance. Together they planned to make use of the 
opportunity of escape which might arise when Fred- 
erick should approach the French frontier in the 
course of a forthcoming tour with his father among 
the German courts. 

On August 4, 1730, the attempt was made. The 
confederates tried to steal from the royal camp at 
dawn and to ride into France. Such a flight was not 
without precedent in Hohenzollern history. Fred- 
erick's grandfather, sharing the general belief that 
his stepmother had poisoned his brother and meant 
to poison himself, had first sought shelter at Cassel 
with his aunt and at a later date had quitted the 
Great Elector's court altogether. But for the heir 
to a crown to flee beyond the bounds of Germany 
was a still graver step. The youth of eighteen had 
hardly calculated the probable consequences of suc- 
cess. Where was Frederick William's heir to find 
a safe asylum? Louis XV. was not likely to be 
to him what Louis XIV. had been to the Old Pre- 
tender. George of England would hardly expose 
Hanover to the vengeance of the King of Prussia. 
His envoy had in fact refused to countenance the 
scheme. Nor would the Emperor care to sacrifice 




PRINCESS SOPHIA DOROTHEA, DAUGHTER OF KING GEORGE THE F(RST. 

AFTER THE PAINTING BY HIRSEMAN. 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 33 

the Prussian alliance to mere sentiment. Even if 
Frederick should succeed in finding a refuge for 
himself, he would none the less have left two dear 
hostages at the mercy of the King. " Your mother 
would have got into the greatest misery," declared 
Frederick William a year later. '' Your sister I 
would have cast for life into a place where she 
would never have seen sun and moon again." 

Thanks, however, to the vigilance of Colonel von 
Rochow, his keeper, and to the panic of his page, 
Frederick did not even mount the horse that was to 
have borne him out of Germany. His abortive at- 
tempt inaugurated one of the strangest tragedies in 
history. From the very fact that he was the guest 
of other princes Frederick William could not act in 
haste. The scheme was betrayed to him at Mann- 
heim on August 6th, and he ordered von Rochow to 
deliver his son to him at his own town of Wesel, 
alive or dead. In this mood they continued the 
tour of pleasure, sailing down the Rhine and visiting 
the potentates upon its shores. At last, on the eve- 
ning of the 1 2th, they reached Wesel. Frederick 
William at once interrogated his son, who lied and 
protested his submission. The King replied by 
despatching him to Spandau under the care of a 
general, who was enjoined to frustrate any attempt 
at rescue by killing his prisoner. 

Spandau is the fortress near Berlin where to-day the 
Prussian sentries guard some millions of the treasure 
wrung from France. It was not deemed safe enough 
to keep the Prince of Prussia. " He is very cunning," 
wrote the King, ** and will have a hundred inventions 



34 Frederick the Great \\i\i- 

for making his escape." A stronger gaol was sought 
for. In a sombre plain east of the capital lies Ciis- 
trin, whose grim fortress marks the spot where the 
sluggish Wartha gliding down from Poland silently 
joins the Oder. There, on September 4th, Frederick 
was imprisoned. On the way he had faced a tribunal 
of soldiers and lawyers with a jaunty confidence 
which showed that though he might cower before 
the King he had not forgotten that he was still 
Crown Prince of Prussia. It was rumoured that he 
had poked fun at Grumbkow, his father's most 
trusted counsellor. For himself he asked no fa- 
vours, but avowed his responsibility for all that 
Katte had done amiss. 

A fortnight later, on September i6th, the com- 
mission examined him again. In the meantime 
he had begun to understand the nature of a gaol. 
His father, who lived in such a state of frenzy 
that he ordered that the tongue which spoke of 
this affair should be cut out, had not scrupled to 
condemn him to solitary confinement, a penalty 
often destructive of health and not seldom of rea- 
son. He was clad in brown prison dress, fed on 
the humblest fare, and deprived of light at seven 
o'clock in the evening. Thus prepared, he was sub- 
jected to a merciless inquisition. After more than 
one hundred and eighty questions of fact, came two 
which the King had commanded the interrogators 
to add. '' Do you wish that your life should be 
granted to you or not ? " "I submit to the King's 
mercy," answered Frederick, adding in pencil, when 
the report was laid before him, "and to his will." 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 35 

" Since by violating your honour," ran the last ques- 
tion of all, "you have made yourself incapable of 
succeeding to the throne, will you renounce the suc- 
cession by an abdication that shall be confirmed by 
the whole Roman Empire — to save your life ? " 
** My life is not over-dear to me," replied the Prince, 
" but Your Majesty would surely not be so ungracious 
to me" — and he added a prayer for pardon. The 
King tore up the petition and applied his genius 
for detail to a code of rules for the torment of his 
heir. No one was to speak to the prisoner. Three 
times a day the door of his room might be opened, 
but within four minutes it must be made fast again. 
Mute attendants were to set before Frederick food 
which they had cut in pieces, since the royal com- 
mand deprived him of knife and fork. For Katte 
Frederick William had ordered the rack, but on 
the representations of Grumbkow the order was 
cancelled. For his son he discovered a torture 
which Grumbkow himself was to apply. '' He must 
be told," decreed the King, "that no one thinks of 
him any more ; that my wife will not hear his name; 
that his sister Wilhelmina has fallen under my dis- 
pleasure, that she is shut up in Berlin, and will very 
soon be sent into the country." 

The problem before Frederick William, whose 
wrath increased as he experienced the difficulty of 
laying to his son's account any definite crime, was to 
crush his heir without imperilling Prussia. On Octo- 
ber nth Frederick declared to the commission that 
he was ready to renounce the succession. On October 
i6th the King avowed in writing his desire to make 



36 Frede7^ick the Great [1712- 

his second son his heir. But to do this while Fred- 
erick lived was dangerous, and on what charge could 
he be put to death ? Assassination, though it might 
rectify the succession to Philip of Spain or Peter 
of Russia, was to a Hohenzollern simply impossible. 
And Frederick William was not entirely sovereign 
over his son. It was true that a Prussian subject 
had no longer any right of appeal from the decrees 
of the Prussian King. But the Prussian King was 
also Elector of Brandenburg, and therefore a vassal 
of the Emperor. The heir to the Electorate of 
Brandenburg was equally a prince of the Empire 
and as such could appeal unto Csesar. Moreover, 
no proof could be found that Frederick was a traitor. 
He had neither acted nor tried to act in collusion 
with any foreign Power. His father suspected that 
England was at the bottom of the plot, but no evi- 
dence of this could be found. By no severity could 
his son be brought to confess more than a design 
to run away. Foreign sovereigns protested against 
violence which degraded the royal caste. 

It is difficult to see with what hope the baffled 
King insisted on a quibble which might make out 
his son to be technically a criminal. Frederick, by 
no choice of his own, was a colonel in the Prussian 
army. On October 25th a military court met at the 
King's bidding to try him and his accomplices for 
desertion. 

The court consisted of fifteen offlcers, three from 
each of five grades. The members of each grade, 
after deliberating apart, handed their votes to a 
president, the aged Lieutenant-Colonel von Schulen- 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 37 

burg, who summed up their verdicts and added a 
sixth vote of his own. With regard to the Crown 
Prince, all were unanimous. Declaring themselves 
incompetent to pronounce upon affairs of state and 
of the royal family, they commended the exalted 
penitent to His Majesty's supreme and paternal 
mercy. Katte was condemned by three grades to 
death, by two to lifelong imprisonment. Von Schu- 
lenburg voted for the latter, which by military law 
carried the day, since it was less severe. The King 
denounced their criminal leniency and clamoured 
for "justice," but von Schulenburg stood firm, ap- 
peahng to a Higher Power. Thereupon Frederick 
William decreed '' that Katte, although in conform- 
ity with the laws he has deserved to be torn with 
red-hot pincers and hanged for the crime of high- 
treason which he has committed, be removed from 
life to eternity by the sword, out of consideration 
for his family. In informing Katte of this sentence, 
the Council will tell him that it grieves His Majesty, 
but that it is better that he should die than that 
justice should entirely leave the world." 

Under a sentence which no consensus of civilised 
opinion, no high-placed appeal, no murmur of dis- 
affection could reduce, the doomed man journeyed 
slowly to Ciistrin. Frederick, who believed that all 
would go well with himself and his friend, was 
cheerful still. At five o'clock on the morning of 
November 6th he was awakened by two officers who 
told him that Katte was that morning to be put to 
death and that he must witness it. "What are 
these ill tidings that you bring me?" he is said to 



38 Frederick the Great [1712- 

have exclaimed. " Lord Jesus ! rather take my 
life." Before his judges he had steadfastly declared 
that Katte's guilt lay at his door. Now for two 
terrible hours he wailed, wrung his hands, burst into 
tears, sent to his friend to beg forgiveness, prayed 
for a respite while a courier should lay at the King's 
feet whatever he might desire from his son — renun- 
ciation of the succession, consent to lifelong im- 
prisonment, nay, his own life if Katte's might be 
spared. His honourable clamour moves the heart 
of posterity, but it could vary no line upon the 
parchment on which the King had set down even 
the numbers of the soldiers who were to attend the 
execution. Seven o'clock struck, and the dismal 
procession filed into the courtyard which stretched 
from the fortress- wall to the Oder. As the King 
had commanded, Frederick was led to the window 
of his cell. He saw his friend, who had received 
the communion, standing calm and brave amid the 
soldiers and awaiting with bared head the recital 
of the sentence of death. The prince kissed his 
hand to him and cried aloud for his forgiveness. 
Katte laid his finger upon his lips, bowed respect- 
fully, and answered that there was nothing to for- 
give. He then bade his comrades farewell, knelt to 
receive the chaplain's blessing, and with prayer upon 
his lips submitted to the fatal stroke. 

Frederick had fainted. It was the duty of the 
chaplain to pass straight from the dead offender to 
the' living, and to exhort him to repent. But nature 
made this royal order of none effect. The prince, 
when he came to, could only stare dumbly at the 




FREDERICK THE SECOND. 

AFTER THE PAINTING BY CUNNINGHAM. 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 39 

gloomy pall which draped the body of his friend. 
At two o'clock some citizens brought a coffin and 
bore away the corpse, but Frederick could not with- 
draw his gaze from the place of execution. All that 
day he took no food. At night he passed from de- 
lirium into a second swoon — then fell to raving 
anew. When morning broke he declared that Katte 
was standing before him. But the very violence of 
his emotion made the reaction swift. On the same 
day he told the doctor that he was well and asked 
him for a certain powder. Next day, after much talk 
with the chaplain on matters of religion, he learned 
from him that Katte's fate was not to be his own. 
Nine days later he made peace with Grumbkow, 
who came at the head of yet another Commission to 
exact an oath of strict obedience to the King, and to 
open the prison doors a little wider. Before Christ- 
mas he was reported to be " as merry as a lark." 

The conduct of father and son during this crisis is 
peculiarly worthy of attention because each was his 
own counsellor, and because Frederick never again 
lay under a scrutiny so searching. In the summer 
of 1730 the King reaped all that he had sown during 
his son's boyhood. He found in his heir a youth 
whom he distrusted and despised but could not get 
rid of. He therefore began the task anew and 
inaugurated a second education sterner than the 
first. He had slain his son's friend, not, as he pro- 
fessed, "that justice should not entirely leave the 
world," but that he might, in spite of past failures, 
fashion an heir after his own heart. The loyal father 
of the dead man found consolation in viewing his 



40 Frederick the Great wiM- 

loss as a sacrifice to this design. That this, which 
he believed to be indispensable to the welfare of 
Prussia, was the leading motive of the King's policy, 
grew clearer as his outbursts of wrath against his son 
became less frequent and less fierce. It inspired 
Frederick also with a leading motive — to beguile his 
father into believing that he had his way. 

His first education made him a rebel ; his second, a 
hypocrite. Katte's death had taught him once and 
for all that life would be tolerable only if he gained 
his father's confidence. To this end he applied every 
art which a fertile brain could devise and an un- 
scrupulous actor could practise. He exhausted the 
language of contrition for the past. He promised 
full amendment for the future. He sent letters, as 
many as his father would consent to receive, and the 
burden of all was that he was indeed a new man, 
a second Frederick William, adoring the things that 
he had burned and burning those that he had adored. 
The new Frederick is interested in tall soldiers, his 
father's hobby, and longs to put on the uniform 
which he had been wont to call his winding-sheet. 
He relishes theology and after argument abandons 
what his father calls "the damned heresy " of prede- 
stination. He professes to find pleasure in the work 
of the estates committee and informs his father with 
ecstasy that the rent of some royal domains can be 
raised. He tries to propitiate the King of Prussia as 
Philip of Spain tried to propitiate the English people, 
by pretending to a taste for beer. Even his opinion 
of his own family has swiftly changed. He now 
pretends to reahse that his mother is a mischievous 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 41 

intriguer ; to be content that his sister shall abjure 
the throne of England and marry an obscure Ho- 
henzollern of Baireuth ; to desire that his father may 
live to see his children's children grow up around 
him. Finally he receives at the hands of Frederick 
WiUiam a regiment and a wife and withdraws into 
the marshy solitudes of Brandenburg to make the 
best of both. 

It is the duty of Frederick's biographer to mark 
from Frederick's point of view the stages of this 
second education. The first period lasted rather 
more than two and a half years, from November, 
1730, to June, 1733, and therefore roughly corre- 
sponds with the period of residence at an English 
university which is usually enjoyed at the age at 
which the Crown Prince had then arrived. This 
course began and ended with a crime. Katte was 
done to death for a military offence which a tribunal 
representing the most sternly disciplined army in 
the world had declared not to be death-worthy— 
though their commander-in-chief and king de- 
manded another verdict. A fortnight later, that is, 
on November 20, 1730, Frederick was admitted as a 
humble participant in the proceedings of the local 
Chamber of War and Domains — to assist in duties 
which he privately styled the work of brigands. 
He was to study agriculture under the Director, 
Hille, and in general to survey the foundations of 
the Prussian State. 

He was still a close prisoner living at Ciistrin 
under the heavy cloud of the King's displeasure. 
At Christmas he fell ill and his father wrote on the 



42 Frederick the Great \xi\i- 

margin of a report which told him of it : " If there 
were any good in him he would die, but I am certain 
that he will not die, for weeds never disappear." 
He was forbidden all books save bible, hymn-book, 
and Arndt's True Christianity^ a work of devotion 
dear to humble believers in many lands. Geometry 
and fortifications were classed as " amusement " and 
forbidden, along with cards, music, dancing, summer- 
clothing, and meals outside the house. Again, as 
in the early days of August, Frederick William 
entrusted him to the care of three nobles. These 
were to refuse to converse with him on any subject 
save " the Word of God, the constitution of the land, 
manufactures, police, agriculture, accounts, leases, 
and lawsuits." Such a scheme of education, aimed 
at compounding a king out of a recluse and an 
attorney, it is hardly necessary to discuss. We 
hardly know whether to think the King a simpleton 
for imagining that he would be obeyed, or a fool 
for continuing to issue minute directions if he 
knew that he would not. What is certain is that 
Frederick's household revelled in forbidden gifts, 
diverted itself as best it could, and pressed unceas- 
ingly for further freedom. One pleasure, as Fred- 
erick William knew in his heart, sweetened his son's 
captivity, — in exile he was at least safe from the 
sight of his father. 

The first dawn of forgiveness took place on August 
15, 1 73 1, the King's forty-third birthday. Then 
Frederick received his father in his shabby lodging, 
kissed his feet, Hstened to his reproaches, confessed 
once more that it was he who had led Katte astray. 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 43 

and finally received the royal embrace before all the 
people. Soon came permission to engage in the 
practical study of agriculture, attended by an in- 
crease of liberty and even of amusement. The King 
still imposed restrictions upon Frederick's reading 
and ordered him to sing hymns. He was never to 
be alone or to speak privately to anybody, especially 
to any girl or woman. Within a fortnight of his 
father's visit he had begun his courtship of the young 
wife of Colonel von Wreech. 

The remaining months of the year 1731 brought 
Frederick great pleasure and a heavy blow. He 
grew in favour with his father, who in November 
summoned him to appear for a short time at Berlin 
and at last promised to restore to him his rank in 
the army. But at the same time he lost his 
sister. Wilhelmina was forced by her father into 
an unhappy marriage with the Margrave of Baireuth, 
a humble cousin whose title to the favour of his 
bride was that by accepting him she propitiated her 
father and freed herself from a still less bearable 
suitor. Elated by the progress of his own for- 
tunes, Frederick seems for the moment to have been 
insensible to her trouble and to his own loss. By 
the King's order he paid his sister a visit. But 
he treated her coldly when they met, broke off 
the conversation abruptly, and walked into the room 
to which her husband had courteously withdrawn. 
" He scanned him for some time from head to foot," 
writes Wilhelmina, " and after addressing to him a 
few words of cold politeness he withdrew. . . . 
I could not recognise that dear brother who had cost 



44 Frederick the Great [1712- 

me so many tears and for whom I had sacrificed my- 
self." Frederick's standard of behaviour towards his 
social inferiors was however revealed by other in- 
cidents at this time. His tutor, Hille, was a man of 
the middle classes. In his official position he re- 
ceived reports from a Landrat, or Sheriff, who was 
of noble birth. A reference by Hille to these re- 
ports drew from the Crown Prince the remark that 
it was singular that a nobleman should render ac- 
count to a man of the middle class. Next year he 
wrote to Grumbkow that his daughter was " without 
charms and without ancestors." 

In 1732 Frederick experienced another pleasure 
and a far severer blow. He was allowed to leave 
Ciistrin, but he left it under sentence of marriage. 
This had been decreed in consequence of a curious 
chain of events. Frederick's preceptors had re- 
marked that he scorned administrative detail but 
displayed a taste for high politics. This was evident 
in his suggestions for the disposal of his hand. Now 
he would marry, if he must marry at all, Anne of 
Russia ; now the Archduchess Maria Theresa, re- 
nouncing his succession in Prussia. This suggestion 
was reported by Grumbkow to the Emperor's great 
minister, Eugene. The old diplomat scented danger 
in such large ideas and urged that the Crown Prince 
of Prussia should be bound to the car of Austria. 
He might be encouraged to borrow money from the 
Emperor, and married to Elizabeth of Brunswick- 
Bevern, a niece of the Empress. Frederick William, 
still hot against England, with whose Court his queen 
continued to intrigue, cheerfully assented to the match. 




ELIZABETH CHRISTINA OF BRUNSWICK. 

FROM AN OLD PRINT. 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 45 

In a honeyed letter of February 4, 1732, the King 
broke the news to his son. " She is a creature who 
fears God," he wrote, ''and that is everything." 
The bridegroom elect thought otherwise. He wrote 
to Grumbkow that he hated severe virtue, and rather 
than marry a fanatic, always grimacing and looking 
shocked, he would prefer the worst character in 
Berhn. " When all is said and done he cried, there 
will be one more unhappy princess in the world." 
" I shall put her away as soon as I am master," he 
twice declared. " Am I of the wood out of which 
they carve good husbands ? " "I love the fair sex, 
my love is very inconstant ; I am for enjoyment, 
afterwards I despise it. I will keep my word, I will 
marry, but that is enough ; Bonjour, Madame, et bon 
cheminr 

Frederick's marriage, by which he brought to an 
end the sternest period of his second education, was 
a crime, but the bridegroom was not guiltless. All 
his outcry was made in secret. To the King, in 
whose hands his fate lay, he showed himself all sub- 
mission. Frederick William had in his own young 
days received the names of three princesses from 
whom his father desired him to choose a bride. He 
protested with success against such compulsion and 
his marriage with Sophia Dorothea was something of 
a love-match. Here was an argument to which he 
could hardly shut his ears. His son preferred to 
purchase greater liberty for himself by condemning 
to a life of misery an innocent creature who had 
never harmed him. At the same time, by making a 
happy home-life impossible, he shut out what was 



46 Frederick the Great [1712- 

I perhaps the last chance that he might become in 

lany sense of the words a good man. 

For the moment, however, his submission brought 
him freedom. On March 10, 1732, he went through 
the formal ceremony of betrothal. Some of the 
guests remarked that his eyes were filled with tears 
and that he turned abruptly from his betrothed to a 
lady who was supposed to be the mistress of his 
heart. But a year's respite was granted him. While 
Austrian statesmen schemed to turn the timid, 
ignorant Elizabeth of Brunswick-Bevern into a wo- 
man of the world, who might make her husband a 
Hapsburg partisan, Frederick was learning his work 
as colonel not far from the field of Fehrbellin. It 
was drudgery, but it was not Ciistrin. After a year 
of it he wrote : '' I have just drilled, I drill, I shall 
drill. That is all the news. But it is delightful to 
indulge in a few moments' breathing-space, and I 
would rather drill here from dawn to dusk than live 
as a rich man at Berhn." 

June 12, 1733, was Frederick's wedding-day. The 
Austrian diplomats, who had made the match, went 
far towards flinging away their advantage. At the 
last moment they dared to suggest that Frederick 
William should accommodate the Emperor by enter- 
ing into a new combination which assigned an Eng- 
lish bride to his son. The King was furious at the 
slight, and the marriage was only another step 
towards the alienation of the Hapsburgs and the 
HohenzoUerns. 

After his marriage Frederick's father still dictated 
his movements and kept him short of money. But 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 47 

the period of dragooning was over, and it becomes 
important to enquire what Frederick William had 
achieved by this stage of the second education be- 
gun with crime and carried on with cruelty. One 
answer to this question must be mentioned because 
it is supported by the authority of Carlyle. He 
holds that the execution of Katte was just, that the 
imprisonment of Frederick was salutary, that the 
King was a father yearning to reconcile his son with 
God and with himself, and that he was not only just 
and affectionate but also successful. An opinion 
more widely held is that the execution and im- 
prisonment were unjust but politic, that reasons of 
state excused them, that their righteousness was 
proved by their success, and that by them Prussia 
gained a hero who made her great among the na- 
tions of the earth as none but he was able. 

On reflection we may think it strange that results 
so great should have been achieved by a scheme of 
education so stupid. The King owed the best features 
of his plan to suggestions from outside. He had con- 
demned his son to tedious, nay, dangerous idleness: 
it was Wolden who obtained for him a grudging 
permission to work. He had set him to learn agri- 
culture by attending board meetings : it was Hille 
who urged that he should be allowed to see how 
farming was carried on. The united efforts of Hille 
and Wolden could not convince him that the heir to 
the throne needed any books save books of devo- 
tion. These faults, though significant, were errors 
of detail. But the King's whole plan is open to 
graver objections. It is in fact based on three of 



48 Frederick the Great [1712- 

the commonest yet most fatal errors with regard to 
education. That boys are dough or putty to be 
placed in a mould and beaten till they take the ex- 
act shape of it, that a youth who is destined for a 
given career will succeed best by trying to make 
himself a facsimile of some one else who has been 
successful in it, and that it is good to limit training 
to the acquisition of professional aptitude — these 
are errors which Frederick William held in common 
with pedants and doctrinaires of every era. 

From Frederick's birth onwards he had laboured 
to give him his own characteristics, even his own 
vices, in the hope that as his son's conduct grew 
like his own, so also would his policy. This was 
still the aim of all his measures. But the second 
education is distinguished from the first by the 
ghastly object-lesson with which it opens and by its 
appearance of success. The death of Katte affords 
the measure of Frederick William's powers as a 
teacher. It imperilled the health, even the reason 
of his pupil, but assuredly it was not forgotten. 
Are we then to infer that the King's system atoned 
for its faults by its triumph ? That Frederick was 
bullied into love for his father seems incredible. It 
is true that in public he spoke little ill of him, either 
before his death, when it would have been danger- 
ous to himself, or after it, when it would have been 
detrimental to the office which he had inherited. 
But neither his motto nor his conduct after 1730 
betokened love. " Far from love, far from the 
thunderbolt," are not words of affection, nor is it 
filial piety to cozen, to flatter, and to shun. He ad- 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 49 

dressed the King as *'most all-gracious Father," 
while he secretly petitioned the foes of Prussia for 
funds wherewith to play upon his weakness for tall 
recruits. It was like a foretaste of death, he said, 
when a hussar appeared to command his presence at 
Berlin. 

It may at once be granted that in conduct Fred- 
erick was transformed. Before his disgrace he had 
been a trifler, after it he worked hard till the day of 
his death. What is doubtful is that this result 
could not have been obtained at a less cost. There 
is no evidence that the King had ever tried the 
normal method of giving his son a fitting task and a 
reasonable independence in performing it. Freder- 
ick, moreover, was nearing the age at which many 
triflers develop a new spirit. During his year of 
exile his health improved. He became stouter in 
body and firmer in gait, so that at first even Wilhel- 
mina did not recognise him. This change at least 
was not designed by the father who wished him 
dead, yet to this may he ascribed much of his novel 
energy. 

It is still less certain that his character had gained 
from the second education. Many of the striking 
traits of old reappear. Frederick is still before 
all else brilliant — a gay and versatile young man 
with elastic spirits and a passion for music, so- 
ciety, and intellectual conversation. Despite his 
father's hatred of all things French, Frederick still 
looked on Paris as the Mecca of civilisation. His lit- 
erary ambitions were more pronounced than ever. At 
Ciistrin he had gone back to verses — verses always 



50 Frederick the Great \x1\2 

Gallic, copious, and bad. A Prussian patriot la- 
mented that while he knew not whether his ances- 
tors had won Magdeburg at cards or in some other 
way, he had Aristotle's rules of composition by 
heart. Yet, for all his perseverance, Lord Mahon 
speaks with justice of " his two kinds of prose, the 
rhymed and unrhymed." In the darkest hours of 
his struggle against all Europe, he sat down to 
rhyme in French. " He does not really know the 
Germans at all," complained his tutors. Though 
sometimes brutal, he prided himself on his ceremoni- 
ous politeness — a German version of Louis XIV. 
All through his career he was wont at times to put 
on the great monarch. '* Hush, gentlemen," once ex- 
claimed Voltaire when his royal host thus suddenly 
stiffened, *' the King of Prussia has just come in." 
His morals were no better after confronting death 
than before. '* The flesh is weak," he writes to his 
mother, *' but I do not believe that Cato was Cato 
when he was young." It was said that the motive 
of his amours was vainglory rather than the satisfac- 
tion of vicious desires. No one, wrote harsh critics, 
could rely upon his word, and few if any could tell 
of a disinterested act that he had done. 

Yet in some respects Frederick had gained. His 
talent for diplomacy grew with the need for it. 
His father's schooling had this effect — that he 
learned to outwit his father. The closing years of 
Frederick William's life were cheered by the mirage 
of a good son and a good husband, which of all 
Frederick's fabrications was perhaps the cleverest. 
Progress in diplomacy was attended by increase of 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 5 1 

self-control. Frederick learned in a hard school to 
disguise his true emotions and to feign what he did 
not feel. Hence arises a difficulty which Carlyle 
constantly encounters as he strives to approach his 
hero with paternal sympathy and to penetrate into 
his inner man. He is forced to speak of Frederick's 
"" polished panoply," and to describe him as *' out- 
wardly a radiant but metallic object to mankind." 

The King's handiwork may be discerned in the 
increasing poverty of affection that his son dis- 
played. Frederick WiUiam had killed his friend, 
proscribed his associates, banished his sister, placed 
his mother under a cloud, and forced upon him a 
wife whom he despised. It is not surprising that 
Frederick's heart, never of the tenderest, grew harder 
year by year. He turned to the friendship of men, 
always difficult for kings to win, and doubly difficult 
for an autocrat who was not prone to self-sacrifice. 
It was remarked of him in later life that he softened 
only in illness, and that the sure sign of his recovery 
was renewed harshness towards those about him. 
His intimates were chiefly devotees of art and let- 
ters, among whom Voltaire was chief. But the very 
name of Voltaire, whom Frederick first adored and 
then expelled, hints at the transient nature of these 
ties. As his sister, his mother, and Madame de 
Camas were one by one removed by death, he be- 
came bankrupt of affection, and his old age was con- 
soled only by the fidelity of his servants and of his 
dogs. 

Such was Frederick at his marriage, but his very 
defects contributed for a time to his social success. 



52 Frederick the Great [1712- 

An accomplished man, with great flashing eyes and 
flexible, resonant voice, " musical even in cursing," 
he had a genuine relish for the circle of which 
he was the centre. His schooling had given him 
skill in seeming what he pleased, and whatever 
affection he possessed was given to his friends. At 
Rheinsberg, where he built himself a house and 
lived from 1736 till 1740, he was gay, hospitable, 
and refined, living in apparent amity with his wife 
and fitting himself by study and by administration 
to fill the throne in his turn. 

The year after Frederick's marriage, the year 1734, 
was of high importance in his career. The war of 
the Polish Succession had broken out between France 
and the Empire, and Prussia fulfilled her obliga- 
tions by sending an auxiliary force of ten thousand 
men to serve on the Rhine under Eugene. In this 
campaign, which proved inglorious, Frederick played 
the part of an eager novice, dogging the footsteps of 
the aged hero and copying even his curt manner. 
There he laid to heart several fruitful facts — that 
the great commander never accepted praise to his 
face, that the enemy feared him more than they 
feared his army, and that other Germafi troops cut 
a sorry figure beside the men of Prussia. And — 
though his father had ordered him to keep out of 
harm's way — he proved by his calm while cannon- 
balls were splintering trees around him that the 
traditional courage of the Hohenzollerns had de- 
scended to him. 

Next year (1735) he begged to go to the war again, 
but the King, who had been near death from dropsy, 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 53 

put him off with a journey to Ost-Preussen. This 
was the first of those official tours of inspection 
which later became one of the chief occupations of 
Frederick's years of peace. In 1736 he began a far 
more agreeable pursuit. It was then that he estab- 
lished himself at Rheinsberg, and, that, to quote his 
own testimony, he began to live. 

To live, in Frederick's vocabulary, meant to read. 
He plunged into books, comparing, annotating, an- 
alysing, and learned by four days' trial the lesson of 
the zealous freshman — that man needs more than 
two hours* sleep a day. To the remonstrances of 
the doctors he replied that he would rather suffer in 
body than in mind. Books were supplemented by 
conversation, the society of ladies, music, theatricals, 
literary effort of every kind. His Ajtti-Machiavel, 
a treatise on the duty of princes, attracted the atten- 
tion of Europe, and men of liberal mind awaited 
with impatience the moment at which he would be 
able to put his virtuous maxims into practice. Mean- 
while he revelled in intercourse with philosophers 
and learned men. Frederick styled his house *' the 
temple of friendship," and his guests rejoiced to find 
that the palace of a Crown Prince could be Liberty 
Hall. 

Yet the hand of Frederick William was not en- 
tirely invisible. Thrice every Sunday must the mas- 
ter of the house tear himself from philosophy to 
go to church, and he was also compelled to read the 
sermons which his father's favourite chaplains had 
composed. His own select preacher was Voltaire, 
with whom and with his intimates he "reasoned high 



54 Frederick the Great [1712- 

Of providence, fore-knowledge, will and fate, Passion 
and apathy and glory and shame." From history he 
learned much for every department of life; from 
philosophy chiefly contempt for religion and a 
deep-rooted fatalism which sustained him at many 
moments of disaster. He speaks of 

" this Necessity, which orders all things, directs our 
intercourse and determines our fate." "I know too 
well that we cannot escape from the inexorable laws of 
fate . . . and that it would be folly to desire to 
oppose what is Necessity and was so arranged from all 
eternity. I admit that consolation drawn from the im- 
possibility of avoiding an evil is not very well fitted to 
make the evil lighter, but still there is something calm- 
ing in the thought that the bitter which we must taste is 
not the result of our fault, but pertains to the design 
and arrangement of Providence." 

In such discussions passed many hours of the 
halcyon period, 1736-1740. Of perhaps higher value 
was the insight into the possibilities of human pro- 
vidence which Frederick gained during his visits to 
Ost-Preussen. There he saw how the hand of his 
father had turned a wilderness into the most bloom- 
ing of his provinces, so that a land which the King 
had found swept bare of men by the plague now 
contained half a million prosperous inhabitants. 
When at last (May 31, 1740) he took the place of 
the father whose last hours his presence had con- 
soled, it was with a conviction that if his foreign 
policy had been contemptible, he had shown himself 
heroic at home. 




VOLTAIRE. 

FROM THE STATUE BV HOUDON AT THE COm£dIE FRANCAIS. 



1740] Frederick as Crown Prince 55 

The time had come when the domestic organ- 
isation of Prussia was to acquire a new significance 
in Europe. At Rheinsberg, while protesting that 
he desired nothing more in life than to be left in 
peace with his books and his friends, Frederick had 
been steadily pursuing the study of politics. In 
1738 he had set down on paper ''Considerations" 
which pointed to the need of a new champion 
to defend the liberties of Europe against the 
stealthy and menacing expansion of France. It 
remained to be seen whether Prussian foreign policy 
would in future be influenced by her singular con- 
stitution. To appreciate the meaning and the value 
of Frederick's innovations in both systems we must 
portray the situation that he found on his accession. 
This demands in the first place a brief scrutiny of 
Europe as it was at Frederick William's death. 




CHAPTER III 

THE PROBLEM OF 174O 

IN his instructions for the education of his suc- 
cessor, Frederick prescribed a thorough course 
of European history from the time of the Em- 
peror Charles V. (i 5 19-1 5 56) to his own reign. This 
had been the favourite study of his own youth, so 
that at his accession he reahsed to the full that mod- 
ern Europe owed little of its political contour to 
chance, but much to the aspirations and struggles of 
the several states during the last two centuries. For 
modern Europe was no older than Charles V. Right 
through the Middle Ages the Christian world main- 
tained that supreme authority, like truth, ought to be 
one, and that every Christian should look up to the 
Emperor in matters temporal as he looked up to 
the Pope in matters spiritual. On the secular side, 
however, this theory had crumbled beneath its own 
weight. Even a Charlemagne could not really rule 
the world. As the various races of mankind who 
lived in England, France, Spain, and Scandinavia 
gradually came under the sway of a few national 
rulers, the Emperor dwindled into a dignified presi- 
dent of German princes. His lordship of the world 

5& 



The Problem of ly/fo 5 7 

survived only in distracting claims to rule more 
widely and more exclusively than his attenuated 
power could warrant. Two sharp shocks heralded 
modern times. First Columbus bestowed upon his 
masters, the Kings of Spain, a new world which had 
never heard of Pope and Emperor and which the 
Emperor at least did not pretend to sway. Then 
Luther, wrestling blindly with the papacy, shattered 
the central pillar of the mediaeval world, and modern 
history, the biography of a group of independent 
states, began. 

These states, however, did not enjoy unchallenged 
independence. Each had to work out its own re- 
ligious settlement, and — if it embraced the Reforma- 
tion — had to repel, with whatever help it could find, 
the rescue-work of the Pope and his allies. To the 
end of the sixteenth century, through the careers of 
Charles V., EHzabeth, William of Orange, Henry of 
Navarre, Romanist and Protestant States always 
tended to fall apart into two hostile camps. Even 
in Frederick's time religious afifinity always counted 
for something. He had laid history to heart and, as 
we shall see, profited in his dealings with England 
by the old cry of *' Church in danger." On his lips 
the cry was "a mere ruse. The day of crusades was 
over. In the sixteenth century Spain, Austria, and 
Italy rejected the Reformation ; England established 
its own Church ; France came to terms with the 
Huguenots. At the great Peace of Westphalia Ger- 
many established parity between the warring creeds, 
a boon tardily won by thirty years of desolation. 
Thenceforward affairs of state came first in every 



58 Frederick the Great 

land. Louis XIV.'s revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes in 1685 proved that religious aggression was 
to be feared only as the sequel of undue polit- 
ical preponderance. From the birth of modern 
states down to our own time, the bugbear of the 
nations has been world-rule and their watchword 
equilibrium. 

The first prince who threatened to restore in fact 
if not in form the world-rule which had broken down 
in the Middle Ages was Charles V., the scion and 
pattern of the House of Hapsburg, whose career is 
the narrative of European politics from 15 19 to 1556. 
France, which he threatened most, took the lead 
against him, began the long duel between Bourbon 
and Hapsburg, and thus guarded the liberties of 
Europe till the close of the Thirty Years' War 
(1648). Then Louis XIV. threatened to make 
France in her turn mistress of the world. The equi- 
librium which he, as absolute ruler of the foremost 
State of Europe, seemed to have overthrown, was 
painfully re-established at Utrecht (171 3). A new 
and greater Thirty Years' War was thus brought to 
an end. It left the States weary and timid, dread- 
ing France as a century earlier they had dreaded 
Spain, clinging to peace lest the whole fabric of Eu- 
rope should collapse and with it the gains which 
they had made or hoped to make should vanish. 
France, conscious of weakness in spite of the glories 
of Louis XIV., turned to diplomacy and won Lor- 
raine. England, ridden on a loose rein by Walpole, 
followed her natural bent towards the sea. For 
Austria and the Hapsburg Charles VI., the great 



The Problem of I"/ //.o 59 

problem was to keep what had already been heaped 
together. Only Spain was not afraid to break the 
peace, and in the long run she gained parts of Italy 
by her boldness. 

Most of the territorial profits made by Euro- 
pean Powers during the years 1 713-1740 were made 
at the expense of Charles VI., either as head of 
the Hapsburgs or as Emperor. As it became cer- 
tain "that he would have no son, he grew more 
and more reckless in sacrificing the welfare of the 
Empire to that of his House. The future of his 
heir was indeed precarious. For there was not 
and never had been an Austria in the same sense 
in which there was an England, a France, or a Spain ; 
that is, a well-knit nation, preferring ruin to dismem- 
berment. " Austria " meant the dominions of the 
elder branch of the House of Hapsburg just as 
"Prussia" under Frederick I. meant the dominions 
of the elder branch of the House of HohenzoUern. 
In the case of the Hapsburg agglomeration, how- 
ever, the subjects were too many, too miscellaneous, 
and too rich for the work of a Frederick William to 
be possible. Germans, Hungarians, and Italians 
were only the chief among a motley crowd of races 
which had come under the sceptre of Charles VI. 's 
ancestors and which he strained every nerve to hand 
down to his daughter undispersed. 

The method which Charles selected was to pro- 
claim that his dominions were one and indivisible, 
and descended to a female heir if no male were forth- 
coming. This he did by the famous Pragmatic 
Sanction, a document which for fifteen years, from 



6o Frederick the Great 

1725 to 1740, was the pivot of European politics. 
From State after State Charles purchased a guaran- 
tee of the Pragmatic Sanction, which amounted to 
an undertaking to recognise his daughter, Maria 
Theresa, as heir to the Hapsburg dominions. For 
this he yielded to Spain broad lands in Italy, for 
this he sacrificed commercial prospects to the sea- 
powers England and Holland, for this he consen- 
ted that Lorraine should pass from Germany to 
France, for this he followed Russia into a Turkish 
war which cost him great tracts on either side the 
Danube. For this, too, he committed what was per- 
haps the most dangerous of all his blunders. He 
played fast and loose with a time-honoured ally, and 
estranged the King of Prussia. 

Ever since the Peace of Westphalia had given 
them freedom to make alliances where they would, 
the policy of the Hohenzollerns had been to main- 
tain a good understanding with Austria. It might, 
indeed, happen, as after 1679, when Louis XIV. 
hired them, that some other course became so advant- 
ageous that for the moment they adopted it. In 
general however, the Emperor had most to give. 
To him the German princes still looked for investi- 
ture, for arbitration, and for promotion, and if a State 
desired to exercise its troops, who was so likely as 
the lord of the long Hapsburg frontiers to be at war? 
King Frederick William might reasonably hope that 
the Power which had given his father the crown, 
which had led Prussians to victory before Turin, and 
which had permitted him to keep conquests in 
Swedish Pomerania (1720), would reward his devoted 



The Problem of 1^40 6 1 

service by favouring his pretensions to inheritance 
on the Rhine. 

Though a forceful squire, as a statesman the King 
lacked imagination. He was master of the fin- 
est soldiers in Europe, yet he dared not vindicate 
his claims to Jiilich-Berg without the help of the 
Emperor, and he could not understand that the 
Emperor mi^ht be reluctant to help the master of 
the finest soldiers in Europe. Such was, however, 
the truth. The rise of the Hohenzollerns had long 
been watched at Vienna with not unnatural jealousy. 
Even against the Turk Prussians were but sparingly 
enlisted. The gift of the crown had been hotly 
opposed and bitterly regretted. When Frederick 
William cried, " The Emperor will have to spurn 
me from him with his feet: I am his unto death, 
faithful to the last drop of my blood," it was already 
a Hapsburg maxim that a new Vandal kingdom 
must not arise on the shores of the Baltic. 

The statesmen at Vienna valued the Prussian al- 
liance enough to employ Grumbkow and the Austrian 
ministers at Berlin to hoodwink Frederick William. 
As we have seen, they lavished pocket-money and 
sacrificed a bride in the hope of securing ascendancy 
over his son. But they blundered greatly when to 
please England and thereby to further the Pragmatic 
Sanction, they bade the King break off a marriage 
which all the world knew was fixed for the very next 
day, and they blundered still more when to please 
France and Holland with the same end in view they 
withdrew the promise of supporting him in Jiilich- 
Berg. In 1732 Frederick William, for the only time 



62 Frederick the Great 

in his life, met Charles VI. face to face and the truth 
with regard to the relations between Hapsburg and 
Hohenzollern began to dawn upon him. All his life 
he had been the vassal of an Emperor whom he had 
imagined as a German overlord, heir to the dignity 
of the Caesars, who when the time was ripe would 
look with paternal complacency upon the Prussian 
claims. The vision faded and reveale(i a rival mon- 
arch, pompous, contemptuous, and shifty. The shock 
of disillusionment was terrible, but before his death 
he saw clearly. Once, it is said, he pointed to Fred- 
erick with the words, *' There stands one who will 
avenge me." It is certain that with failing breath he 
warned his son against the policy of Vienna. 

Thus, even supposing that Frederick's view of 
politics had been no wider than his father's, that he 
had come to the throne resolved merely to keep up 
a great army and to win Jiilich-Berg, he would none 
the less have possessed remarkable freedom of action. 
In foreign politics he was fettered by only one great 
treaty, that of Berlin (December, 1728), by which 
Prussia undertook to maintain the Pragmatic Sanc- 
tion. But it was possible to contend that this agree- 
ment, which was made in secret to secure the 
Emperor's assistance in Jiilich-Berg, became void in 
1739, when Austria entered into conflicting engage- 
ments with France. 

Circumstances, too, were favourable to Fred- 
erick's liberty. The very existence of the Prag- 
matic Sanction, a violent remedy against dissolution, 
was a guarantee that Austria would be harmless 
for years to come. If Charles VI. and his heir were 



The Problem of 1740 63 

loath to uphold Prussia on the Rhine, they would 
be very unlikely to risk their own existence by 
taking up arms against her. In other quarters 
Prussia had little to fear. Hanover, the parvenu 
electorate which lay like a broad barrier across the 
direct road from Berlin to the West, had become 
a dependency of England in 1714, and therefore 
was not dangerous. Whatever might be the wishes 
of George II., it was certain that Walpole would 
not spend blood and treasure to maintain the House 
of Pfalz-Sulzbach, Prussia's rival in Jiilich-Berg, at 
Dusseldorf. The Dutch, it is true, felt themselves 
menaced by a Prussian garrison in Cleves, but 
their course had by this time become that of a 
mere cock-boat in the wake of Great Britain. France 
alone remained to be considered, and France, with a 
frontier fifty leagues from Berg, was guided by a 
Walpole of her own, Cardinal Fleury, now nearing 
the close of his eighty-seventh year. If then Fred- 
erick elected to make Prussia more considerable 
among the Powers of the West by pressing his claims 
to Berg he could fling his sword into the scales of 
justice without great fear that a stronger hand would 
turn the balance against him. 

Adventure in the Rhine countries had much to 
commend it to the young King. His House undoubt- 
edly possessed some title to Berg, and it had been 
the secular policy of the Hohenzollerns to forego no 
claim without arguing to the death. The busy and 
fertile Rhineland was a gold-mine in comparison 
with the sterile Mark. Frederick, as an enthusiast 
for the higher civilisation of the West, might well 



64 Frederick the Great 

~—t ■ 

feel drawn towards a duchy which lay more than 
half-way along the direct line from his capital to 
Paris. And, greatest merit of all in the eyes of a 
dynasty of merchants, Berg was eminently salable. 
The Rhenish duchies were like good accommodation- 
lands in the midst of thriving farms. Many rulers 
would always be glad of them and their price would 
therefore be high. 

But the arguments against staking all on Berg 
were also strong. A statesman trained between 
the Elbe and the Oder could hardly be unaware 
that Prussia's heritage in the West was a mere 
windfall and that by interest as by situation she 
belonged to the system of the North. Her natural 
outlook was towards the Baltic, which formed the 
only free road between her centre and her eastern 
wing. It was by foregoing lands on the Baltic that 
she had gained rich bishoprics to the westward 
in 1648. Baltic Powers, Poland, Russia, and above 
all Sweden, had steadily influenced her politics since 
the advent of the Great Elector. History and geo- 
graphy alike seemed to beckon young Frederick to 
the sea. Let us therefore cast a glance at those 
among his neighbours whom he had to take account 
of, whatever plan he might devise. 

Just as the traditional enemy of the Bourbon was 
the Hapsburg, so the traditional enemy of the Ho- 
henzollern was the Vasa. This gifted House had 
ruled in Sweden since 1520 and had chosen for their 
country a path which it was not strong enough to 
follow to the end. They had striven to turn the 
Baltic into a Swedish lake by conquering all its 




•r^--'-\ 



FREDERICK WILLIAM THE FIRST. 

AFTER THE PAINTING BY F. W. WEIDEMAN. 



The Problem of 17 40 65 

coasts. Success seemed nearest when in 1630 Gus- 
tavus landed in Germany, and at the point of the 
sword compelled his kinsman of Brandenburg to fa- 
vour his adventure. The result of these bold steps 
was for Sweden a swift blaze of glory ; for Branden- 
burg a decade of misery inflicted in great part by 
Swedish hands. In 1648 the great treaty compen- 
sated the Swedes for their work by driving the Great 
Elector from the mouth of the Oder. Their ambi- 
tion to be masters of the Baltic shores, however, 
remained, and the Great Elector suffered much at 
their hands before the Peace of Oliva (1660) con- 
firmed his sovereignty over Ost-Preussen. What hap- 
pened at Fehrbellin and after it has been already 
told. The meteoric career of Charles XII. (1697- 
17 1 8), who began by humbling Prussia, but ended by 
losing Stettin to her, is no part of our story, except 
in so far as it interested and influenced young Fred- 
erick. It suffices that in 1740 Sweden was factious 
and impotent, and that her aged King still held that 
part of Pomerania which Prussia did not possess. 
To acquire Western Pomerania was therefore a pos- 
sible object for Frederick's ambition. 

The central mass of the Hohenzollern dominions 
touched along almost the whole of its eastern fron- 
tier a Power whose decline was even more visible than 
that of Sweden. The Polish Republic, which almost 
encircled Ost-Preussen, formed perhaps the strangest 
spectacle that Europe has ever seen. A vaster coun- 
try than any of the Western Powers, Poland re- 
mained in the Middle Ages. Her constitution, 
indeed, seemed to have no other end than to make 



66 Frederick the Great 

progress impossible. There were only two classes, 
nobles and serfs, the free and the unfree. But where 
every freeman was noble, many nobles were poor. 
These served for hire, and were distinguished, it is 
said, from men of lower birth by the privilege of 
being flogged upon a Turkey carpet. The direction 
of this vast country rested with a few thousand 
feudal chiefs who elected a nominal King from 
within their own body or outside it. They made 
the laws themselves, but a single dissentient voice 
could wreck the work of a whole Diet, as the annual 
session of Parliament was termed, and of late years 
this right had commonly been exercised. What 
trade there was, was left to the despised class of 
German burghers. The fighting force grew every 
year more feeble. While Austria could boast a Eu- 
gene and Russia a Peter, while the parade-ground at 
Potsdam was trodden by ever-growing masses of 
men who handled modern weapons with the pre- 
cision given by daily practice, the Poles were blindly 
trusting in feudal levies generalled by a puppet King. 
At Frederick's accession, however, Poland still 
possessed two elements of strength besides her vast 
bulk and the knightly courage of her sons. These 
were the Saxon connexion and the port of Danzig. 
Two years earlier, at the price of war with France 
(1733-1738) and loss of lands in Italy, Charles VI. 
had secured the Polish crown for the son of the late 
King, Augustus III., the Elector of Saxony. The 
Emperor made this sacrifice to win support for the 
Pragmatic Sanction and to propitiate Russia, who 
looked upon Poland as her own if the French can- 



The Problem of ly^o 67 

didate were expelled. And, as the road from Dres- 
den to Warsaw passed through the Hapsburg 
province of Silesia, Augustus had good reason to be 
faithful to the daughter of Charles VI. 

Poland none the less promised much to a king of 
Prussia who could wait. Her artificial connexion 
with Saxony, established by foreign Powers against 
the will of a majority of the Poles, could only weaken 
the frail bonds which bound the State together. 
Poland, all the world had long known, would one day 
fall in pieces, and who should hinder Prussia from 
gathering some of them ? For the moment, how- 
ever, Augustus could defend his new dominions. A 
king of Prussia in a fever to act at once could not 
assail Poland without laying bare his flank to Saxony 
and to her Imperial ally. 

But could Prussia in 1740 afford to wait? If Au- 
gustus's dream were to be fulfilled would not she be 
in jeopardy ? The Elector hoped that the Emperor 
would cede to him a part of Lower Silesia, so that 
Prussia might be for ever divided and hemmed in by 
a Saxon-Polish State. Had we no other guide than 
the map, we might be tempted to guess that it was 
to avert this peril that Frederick seized Silesia. If 
it were true it were a grievous fault. Augustus, 
who was no statesman, might dream of a hereditary 
crown, but a firm Saxony-Poland was in fact impos- 
sible. Dresden and Warsaw were centuries apart. 
Out of two such halves no strong whole could be 
compounded. The one was German, the other 
Slav ; the one industrial, the other primitive ; the one 
Lutheran, the other partly Romanist and partly 



68 Frederick the Great 

Orthodox. Compounds so discordant could have 
found no abiding unity in a monarchy based on the 
treason of their common head against the constitu- 
tion of each. Nor could such a State have barred 
for a decade the path of the Muscovite Colossus 
which Peter had already roused and which Catherine 
and Alexander were soon to reinspire. 

In weighing Frederick's wisdom we must not for- 
get that the share of Poland which he might expect 
that Prussia was destined to acquire, and which did, 
in fact, fall to her during his own lifetime, would 
change Ost-Preussen from an isolated province into 
a strong hmb of a well-knit State. It gave her the 
lower waters of a third great arterial river — the Vis- 
tula. But it came to her in 1774 shorn of its chief 
glory, the old portal of the Vistula and strong tower 
of Poland, the matchless town of Danzig. Frede- 
rick had seen that fair city, a hearth of German 
culture among the Slavs, with its giant Marien- 
kirche towering over a mass of battlements and 
gates and churches of stately civic halls and man- 
sions hardly less stately, the whole forming a Venice 
of the North beside which his capital was but a 
market town. He must have taken note of the 
foundation of all this grandeur, great warehouses on 
busy wharves, canals crowded with masts and hulls 
from many lands. And he cannot have been blind 
to the fact that within a few miles of this prize lay 
Ost-Preussen, and that, since Augustus had surren- 
dered Curland, within a few miles of Ost-Preussen 
lay Russia. Seldom has a king had clearer warning 
to look before he leaped. 



The Problem of 1^40 69 

Thus, without departing from the policy of the 
men who had made Prussia what she was, the young 
King had his choice between adventure on the 
Rhine or across the Peene and a policy of expect- 
ant watchfulness on the Vistula. But if he were 
capable of building upon the foundations of his 
forefathers the loftiest structure that they would 
bear, then a still more glorious conquest might be 
his. Lord of Stettin and of the ports of Ost-Preus- 
sen, he might claim a share in what all the nations 
coveted, the empire of the sea. 

It is one of the most grotesque facts in history that 
the Emperor William IL, when he cried, " Our future 
lies upon the water," should have been uttering as 
prophecy what ought to have been commonplace 
for a century and a half. Even in 1740 the truth 
that the New World offered a fairer career than the 
Old was not hidden from statesmen less astute than 
Frederick. Since the Armada foundered in 1588, 
the nations of Europe had been realising it one by 
one. Spain and Portugal, the first in the field, still 
held a vast heritage across the ocean, but their 
monopoly was not as unchallenged as of old. First 
the Dutch, who as subjects of Spain had monopolised 
that carrying-trade which seemed to be beneath the 
dignity of an Iberian gentleman, enriched them- 
selves so rapidly that they were able to throw off 
the yoke of Philip II. and to establish a colonial and 
commercial empire of their own. Then England, 
tardily comprehending the changing conditions of 
life, grappled with their little republic in a long and 
doubtful struggle. Finally weight told, and after 



70 Frederick the Great 

the Revolution of 1688 England under her Dutch 
King led the way and Holland followed in a cam- 
paign against a rival dangerous to both. For France 
had been guided by Colbert into the path of great- 
ness beyond the seas, and it was by grasping at Spain 
and the Indies that Louis XIV. aroused the keenest 
apprehensions that he might become dictator of the 
world. Only at the cost of two mighty wars had 
the danger from France been averted for a genera- 
tion. By the Peace of Utrecht (i 7 1 3) the Sea Powers 
gained security for themselves and for their com- 
merce, but the prize of North America still remained 
to be fought for between France and England. 

In the early years of the eighteenth century other 
competitors put to sea. Under Peter the Great, the 
new land Power, Russia, struggled to become mari- 
time, though her horizon, as yet, hardly extended 
beyond European waters. But in 1722 the Em- 
peror Charles VI. made his port of Ostend the 
headquarters of a new Imperial East India Com- 
pany, and England, France, and Holland joined in 
an outcry against German competition. Nine years 
later they were appeased. The Hapsburg sacrificed 
the future of his House to its past. To purchase 
guarantees of the Pragmatic Sanction he withdrew 
his support from the Company, which none the less 
was able to maintain itself for more than sixty years. 

If then the tide had set so strongly towards 
distant continents that even conservative ill-knit 
Austria was swept along with it, we may well ask, 
what of Prussia? The history of our own time 
makes the question more pertinent. North Germany 



The Problem of ly^o 71 

has shown beyond dispute not only that she can 
now build ships, a fact which proves little or nothing 
as to her powers in the past, but also that she can 
fill them with brave and skilful seamen, whose char- 
acter only many generations of worthy forefathers 
could create. These forefathers were the Prussians 
of Frederick's day, poor, fearless, and docile, living 
on the borders of the Baltic, speeding and welcom- 
ing its fleets at Memel, at Pillau, at Colberg, and 
above all at Stettin. Why, it may be wondered, 
was Frederick blind to the signs of the times? 
Why did not he at the very outset of his reign 
hasten to employ the power of the Crown, which 
Frederick William had raised so high, to equip a 
Prussian Baltic Company, a Prussian West Africa 
Company, even a Prussian East India Company ? 

Never was the political situation more favourable 
to such an enterprise than when Frederick grasped 
the reins. No neighbour could enforce a veto upon 
Prussian maritime enterprise. Poland was in the 
last stage of impotence and decay. Russia, who 
might form a good customer, was not yet equipped 
for conquest. Austria could not afford to offend a 
German ally. Sweden had lost her sting and her 
province of Pomerania was a hostage at Frederick's 
mercy. The Sea Powers would view the enterprise 
askance, but they too had given hostages to Prussia. 
If England played foul, the master of eighty thou- 
sand men could overrun Hanover in a fortnight and 
the Dutch would think twice ere they provoked the 
lord of Cleves. Of all Powers Denmark, the surly 
janitor of the Baltic, was perhaps the best able to 



72 Frederick the Great 

injure Prussian commerce with impunity, but the 
heir of the Great Elector might be trusted to find a 
way with Denmark. Thus Europe seemed to invite 
Prussia to follow the destiny which nature pre- 
scribed, and which led to wealth. Firmly governed, 
armed to the teeth, learned, Protestant, and rich, she 
might have pursued her old opportunist poHcy on 
the mainland with full confidence that the future 
would bring her wider boundaries and yet greater 
strength. 

In an earlier generation and with smaller means 
the Great Elector had perceived that the true path 
for Prussia lay across the seas. Balked of Stettin, 
he strove to make Pillau and Memel his London 
and Amsterdam. His little Armada of ten frigates 
attacked the Spaniards with success. In a humble 
way there began to be Brandenburgish West Indies, 
and in 1683 Fort Great-Fredericksburgh was built 
upon the Brandenburgish Gold Coast. But the 
Great Elector's son and grandson lacked either his 
firm hand or his imagination. While Frederick I. was 
squabbling with the Dutch about armchairs, the 
Dutch were driving his subjects from West Africa. 
Frederick William, the apostle of domestic economy, 
was impatient of flunkeys, universities, and colonies, 
the several extravagances of his father and of his 
grandfather. Would Frederick II. prove himself 
more enlightened? 

We see with amazement that he did not. A 
prince who was accounted clever, who had spent 
the first decade of manhood in pondering on high 
politics, who revered the memory of the Great 



The Problem of 1^40 ^^y 

Elector, and followed the fortunes of England with 
keen interest — how could such an one ignore what 
the movement of the times and the course of 
after events seem to point out so clearly ? Among 
his first acts was the establishment of a new depart- 
ment of manufactures. He commanded the head of 
it to take measures for improving the condition of 
existing industries, for introducing new ones, and 
for bringing in foreign capital and foreign hands. 
Why did he not at the same time establish a depart- 
ment of marine ? Why did he wait till East Frisia 
fell to Prussia before making even a half-hearted 
effort to win profit from the sea? 

A partial explanation may lie in the fact that Fred- 
erick lacked the inspiration drawn from travel. The 
stupid fears of Frederick William that his son would 
become too Frenchified in his life or too Austrian in 
his politics had closed to Frederick the doors of the 
best school of his time. Who knows how much profit 
the Great Elector brought to his State from his edu- 
cation in Holland, or Peter the Great from his jour- 
neys in the West ? Save at Danzig, Frederick had 
hardly seen with his own eyes the dignity which 
commerce might create. Save for two stolen days 
in Strasburg in the first months of his reign, a secret 
visit to Holland in 1755, and a meeting with the 
Emperor in Moravia in 1770, he was fated never to 
gain fresh knowledge of what would now be foreign 
lands except at the head of his army. 

Again, Frederick's political economy was unfa- 
vourable to Prussian commerce. At Ciistrin he 
learned from Hille that the only trade by which a 



74 Frederick the Great 

country can profit is that which adds to its stock 
of gold and silver. His father had carried this idea 
to its logical conclusion. He had seized the pre- 
cious metals and locked them up. Like a timid 
farmer who thinks that the bank will break, he had 
hidden in his cellars the hoard which represented 
the economies of a lifetime. Frederick therefore 
found a treasure of more than twenty-six million 
marks, at a time when the weekly wage of a com- 
mon soldier hardly exceeded one. 

It seems clear that a policy of hoarding could be 
wise only when war was in sight. In time of war 
that Government would be happiest which had most 
coined money with which to pay its troops. But in 
time of peace not even Frederick William could 
take a breed from barren metal by keeping it locked 
up. Profit could be drawn from it in either of two 
ways. The coined metal might be spent to ad- 
vantage, so that the State bought something, such 
as a school, or a farm, or a flock of sheep, which 
would in the future be worth more than the sum 
laid out. Or it might be lent to citizens who would 
pay for the use of it and establish with its aid some 
business which might be taxed. By locking up the 
surplus funds of the country, however, the King 
stifled commerce at the birth. Frederick did not 
detect the fallacy, and Germany waited till the 
nineteenth century for her commercial rise. 

Though nimble-witted and fond of philosophy, 
the King was hardly profound. His lector, the 
Swiss de Catt, tells a significant story of his first 
discussion with a singular stranger on a Dutch 



The Problem of ly^o 75 

vessel, whom he did not suspect to be the lord of 
Prussia. Frederick, he says, 

"tried to prove that creation was impossible. At this 
last point I stood out in opposition. * But how can 
one create something out of nothing ? * said he. 
' That is not the question,' answered I, ' the question is, 
whether such a Being as God can or cannot give ex- 
istence to what has yet none ? ' He seemed embar- 
rassed and added, ' But the Universe is eternal.' 'You 
are in a circle,' said I, ' how will you get out of it ? ' ' I 
skip over it,' said he, laughing; and then began to speak 
of other things." 

He wrote incessantly on history and politics, 
always with the clearness and sprightliness that 
seem inseparable from the French tongue which he 
employed, and always with the confidence of a 
journalist and of a king. Of his ancestor Joachim 
I. he says : " He received the surname of Nestor 
in the same way as Louis XHI. that of ' the Just ' ; 
that is, for no reason that any one can discover" — 
and this is a very fair example of his style. Sense, 
lucidity, concise statement, even wit, distinguish his 
writings. He made so many confident generalisa- 
tions on political affairs that some have almost of 
necessity proved correct. But of deep insight, still 
less of great constructive power, there is little trace. 

In freedom from illusions, however, Frederick sur- 
passed some rival statesmen. This was abundantly 
illustrated at the very outset of his reign. He saw, 
as Charles VI. could not, that the claim of the 
Emperor to be lord of the world rested on no firm 



76 Frederick the Great 

basis. Early in 1737 he had written: ** If the 
Emperor dies to-day or to-morrow, what revolutions 
will come to pass ! Every one will wish to share his 
estate, and we shall see as many factions as there 
are sovereigns." The discovery, indeed, was by no 
means new. More than a century earlier Gustavus 
Adolphus had told the Germans that their con- 
stitution was rotten. But Frederick informs the 
Emperor pointedly that he is only first among his 
peers. He was equally clear-sighted in the choice 
of means to spread his views. William the Silent 
had perceived a fact dark to many statesmen since 
his time — that the public opinion of Europe is 
worth much and that it may be courted through 
the Press. Frederick had already composed the 
earliest of his many pamphlets, which he intended 
to publish anonymously as the work of an English- 
man, to rouse the Sea Powers against France. 

More significant than all else was the fact that 
he viewed his own strength with clearer eyes than 
his father's. Frederick William had never been able 
to convince himself that Prussia was a strong State : 
Frederick wears no blinkers and with his accession 
the day of half measures is over. Two years be- 
fore this he had written to Grumbkow words which 
express his real opinion of the old policy of his 
House. The affair of Berg, which he as Crown 
Prince earnestly hoped would enable him to win 
fame on the battle-field, had then entered upon a 
phase adverse to Prussian expectations. Austria 
had been prevailed on to join with France and the 
Sea Powers in claiming that it should be referred to 



The Problem of I y 40 "J 7 

the arbitration of a congress, and Frederick William, 
though disgusted, had decided to give way. Of 
this decision Grumbkow approved, writing, " I am 
persuaded that a King of Prussia, like a King of 
Sardinia, will always have more need of the fox's 
hide than of the lion's." Frederick replies (March, 
1738) : 

" I confess that I perceive in the answer a conflict 
between greatness and humiliation to which I can never 
agree. The answer is like the declaration of a man who 
has no stomach for fighting and yet wishes to seem as if 
he had. There were only two solutions, either to reply 
with noble pride, with no evasions in the shape of petty 
negotiations whose real value will soon be recognised, 
or to bow ourselves under the degrading yoke that they 
wish to lay upon us. I am no subtle politician to couple 
together a set of contradictory threats and submissions, 
I am young, I would perhaps follow the impetuosity 
of my nature; under no circumstances would I do any- 
thing by halves." 

Close observers held that a change of king would 
be followed by a change of policy and that Fred- 
erick was likely to attempt great things. What 
these would be no one, with the possible exception 
of the young King himself, had the least idea. 
What in the opinion of the present writer they 
should have been is sufficiently indicated above. 
What they were, will be shown in the following 
chapter. 

At first, for all his determination to lose no time, 
the results of his accession seemed but small. No 



78 Frederick the Great 

human being could maintain that he was swayed 
by his affections. Though Duhan, Keith, and 
Katte's father received some measure of compen- 
sation for their sufferings, Frederick's behaviour 
towards those concerned in his early struggles em- 
boldened the wits to say that his memory was 
excellent as far back as 1730. His Rheinsberg 
friends expected to share the spoils of ofifice. They 
were disappointed in a way that has reminded 
Macaulay of the treatment of Falstaff by Henry V. 
Frederick was as masterful as his father. The aged 
Prince of Anhalt-Dessau, who had created the 
Prussian army, and the aged General von Schulen- 
burg, who had risked all rather than condemn Katte 
to death, were humiliated by royal reprimands. 
Grumbkow, with whom he had corresponded for 
more than eight years in terms of affectionate 
intimacy, might have caused him a moment's em- 
barrassment, but he had just died — ''for me the 
greatest conceivable gain," the King assured his 
sister. He broke up his father's useless and costly 
regiment of giant grenadiers, a measure which Fred- 
erick William had himself advised, but he increased 
the effective strength of the army by nearly ten 
thousand men. At the same time he sounded, more 
clearly even than his ancestor George William, the 
note of religious toleration for which Brandenburg 
had been honourably distinguished in the time of 
her greatest peril. " In this country," he instructed 
his ofificials, " every one shall get to heaven in his 
own way." 

The crowned philosopher alwaj^s recognised the 



The Problem of ly^o 79 

difference between the things which were Ceesar's 
and the things which were God's. The scion of 
a Calvinist House, he began his reign by authoris- 
ing the Lutherans to restore their ritual, which had 
been arbitrarily simplified by his father. He was 
soon to court the favour of Breslau by supplying 
her with Protestant preachers, and of Glatz by 
bestowing vestments upon a statue of the Virgin. 
When Romanist Europe expelled the Jesuits, he 
seized the opportunity of picking up well-trained 
teachers cheap. Some of his papist subjects had a 
fancy for buying handkerchiefs which bore the 
effigies of saints. Frederick, eager to encourage 
the linen manufacture, bade his officials find out 
which saints were the most popular and adjust the 
supply to the demand. 

A story cited by Carlyle illuminates Frederick's 
views upon the relations between Church and State. 
He was questioning the monks of Cleve, to whom 
the old dukes had assigned an income from the 
royal forest-dues for masses to be said on their 
behalf. " * You still say those masses then ? ' * Cer- 
tainly, your Majesty.' ' And what good does any- 
body get out of them?' 'Your Majesty, those 
old sovereigns are to obtain heavenly mercy by 
them, to be delivered out of purgatory by them.* 
* Purgatory ? It is a sore thing for the Forests, all this 
while ! And they are not yet out, those poor souls, 
after so many hundred years of praying?' Monks 
have a fatal apprehension. No. * When will they 
be out, and the thing complete ? ' Monks cannot 
say. * Send me a courier whenever it is complete ! * 



8o Frederick the Great 

sneers the King," and leaves them to finish the Te 
Deum which they had begun to greet his arrival. 

Lastly, the forms with which Frederick took up 
the kingship showed that the fears of his father and 
the hopes of enlightened men were ahke without 
foundation. It became clear that the philosopher- 
king, though he relieved famine and tempted learned 
foreigners to Berlin, would not revert to the ill-timed 
pageantry of his grandfather. Nor — though he freed 
the press and restricted to a few cases the use of 
torture— would he anticipate the glory of some 
Hohenzollern who is still unborn by fostering a spirit 
of individual liberty among his people. Impatient 
of coronation, which he classed among the " useless 
and frivolous ceremonies which ignorance and super- 
stition have established," he received the homage of 
his subjects by proxy everywhere save in Ost-Preus- 
sen, Brandenburg, and Cleve. At Konigsberg he 
paid homage to the memory of liberties which his 
ancestors had crushed, and which he had no inten- 
tion of animating anew. The ceremony at Berlin 
was made memorable by one of his rare displays of 
feeling. When he appeared on the balcony of the 
Castle and looked down upon the surging crowd in 
the square below, he was so affected that he re- 
mained standing many minutes, silent and buried in 
thought. Then, recovering himself, he bowed to the 
multitude, and rode off to attend a military review. 

It is, however, on his journey to Wesel, his Rhenish 
capital, that he reveals most clearly how the Crown 
Prince has changed into the King. Wilhelmina had 
found him of late so careless, even so uncivil, a cor- 




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The Problem of 1^/40 8 1 

respondent that the news of his coming to Baireuth 
prostrated her with joy. He seemed to her so altered 
in countenance and developed in form that, just as 
after his imprisonment at Ciistrin, she hardly recog- 
nised him. But a less welcome change was only 
too perceptible. Wilhelmina found her brother's 
caresses forced, his conversation trivial, their sister, 
the Margravine of Ansbach, more favoured than 
herself. The remainder of the journey proved that 
Frederick at least remained true to the French. At 
Frankfort he disguised himself for a flying visit to 
Strasburg. There his little party put up at an inn, 
sent the landlord to invite officers to their table, and 
visited the theatre. The mask was penetrated by a 
runaway Prussian whose tall brother had been kid- 
napped for the army and who recognised the son of 
his former King. The greatest pleasure of all came 
last. At Wesel, besides dealing with the affair of 
Herstal, which will be described in the next chapter, 
Frederick for the first time paid homage in person 
to Voltaire. 

At the end of October Wilhelmina visited Berlin, 
but her brother welcomed her coldly. She found 
abundant proofs that he had become inscrutable. 
She describes in her Memoirs how the Queen 
Mother had shut herself up, equally astonished and 
mortified at her complete exclusion from affairs of 
State. " Some complained of the little care he had 
to reward those who had been attached to him as 
prince royal ; others, of his avarice, which they said 
surpassed that of the late King ; others of his pas- 
sions ; others again of his suspicions, of his mistrust. 



82 Frederick the Great 

of his pride, and of his dissimulation.'* This criti- 
cism from an unwonted quarter may possibly be 
explained away. It has been suggested that the 
King's treatment of his sister at Baireuth was due 
to the same policy of repelling every possible claim- 
ant to influence his policy, which may be held to 
excuse the snubs inflicted upon Dessau and Schulen- 
burg and the dignified exile of Frederick's mother 
and wife. His conduct at Rheinsberg, whither Wil- 
helmina followed him, does not admit of the same 
excuse. 

" The little spare time that he had," she complains, 
"was spent in the company of wits or men of letters. 
Such were Voltaire, Maupertuis, Algarotti, and Jordan. 
I saw the King but seldom. I had no ground for being 
satisfied with our interviews. The greater part of them 
was spent either in embarrassed words of politeness or 
in outrageous witticisms on the bad state of the Mar- 
grave's finances; indeed he often ridiculed him and the 
princes of the empire, which I felt very much." 




CHAPTER IV 

THE SILESIAN ADVENTURE, 174O-1742 

THE proceedings of Frederick in 1740, trivial as 
some of them are, reveal him as a statesman, 
just as the events of 1730 revealed him as 
a man. They therefore possess an interest such as 
hardly any other part of his reign can claim. For a 
few months he is free to choose his own path in life, 
guided only by instinct and education. Thus an 
element of free-will is present which is to some ex- 
tent lacking in two notable crises of his fortunes — 
the tragedy of 1730 and the miracle of 1757. This 
year sums up, as it were, the eight and twenty 
which had gone to make Frederick what he was : it 
shapes his course in the six and forty that were to 
follow. 

In the story of Prussia, 1740 inevitably suggests 
comparison with 1640, when the Great Elector like- 
wise stood at the parting of the ways. Then and 
for years afterwards the choice had lain between 
existence and ruin ; now it was between increase by 
natural growth and perhaps speedier increase by 
speculation. For a century Prussia had seldom de- 
parted from a policy of thrift and autocracy at home 

83 



84 Frederick the Great 



[1740 



and opportunism abroad. Would she now abandon 
it ? Frederick's early measures showed that he in- 
tended no sweeping changes in domestic politics. 
We may therefore postpone an examination of the 
system which he there pursued. For us he is at 
present only the lord of ninety thousand of the best- 
drilled troops in the world, entangled in no alliances 
and hampered by no fears. What choice would be 
for him the wisest ? 

Calm reflection on the situation of Europe in 1740 
seems to show that Frederick's strength was to sit 
still. Signs were abundant that the peace which 
had prevailed almost from his birth could not endure 
much longer. Apart from the problem of Austria, 
grave questions had arisen which not even a Wal- 
pole and a Fleury could settle otherwise than by the 
sword. France and England, it was felt, would soon 
resume the duel which the Peace of Utrecht had 
but interrupted, and would struggle for primacy in 
America and in the world. Spain and England were 
already at war, and Europe knew that the Bourbon 
Kings of Spain and France, who were uncle and 
nephew, were joined in close alliance. To strike at 
King George without crossing the sea France must 
aim at Hanover, and the sword of Frederick, the 
neighbour of Hanover, would be bid for by both 
sides. According to the convenient theory then 
current, a prince could hire out an army without 
committing his State to war, so that Frederick stood 
to gain much, — money, military glory, experience 
for his men, perhaps even territory for his House, — 
while he need stake nothing save that which he had 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 85 

long desired to hazard, — his own life and the lives 
of his soldiers. 

A Hohenzollern was the last man in the world to 
undervalue what he might wish to sell. Frederick 
strove to persuade Europe that in him a new and 
greater Gustavus had appeared. He increased his 
army ostentatiously and bade his representative at 
Versailles speak of his active and impetuous way 
of thinking. 

*' You can say," he continues, " that it is to be feared 
that this increase kindles a fire which may set all 
Europe in a blaze; that it is the way of youth to be 
adventurous, and that the alluring visions of heroic 
fame may disturb and have disturbed the peace of 
countless nations in the world." 

The prospect of acquisitions in the Rhineland 
seemed first to engage his thoughts. In hopes of 
winning Berg he not only made overtures to France, 
but even invited the help of Russia. The fruit of 
these negotiations was small. Their significance, 
however, is great, since they showed that Frederick 
intended to choose his allies without regard to the 
tradition of his House in favour of Austria, and also 
that he would not shrink from favouring Muscovite 
development by employing Cossacks in Western 
Germany. 

At the same time that he bargained in this spirit 
with foreign Powers, Frederick compelled his brother 
Germans to mark the change of accent which he was 
introducing into the old language of his House. 
Brandenburg had taken up the informal protectorate 



86 Frederick the Great [1740- 

of the German Protestants when the Saxon Elector 
by becoming Romanist (1697) resigned it. Fred- 
erick William devised a safe but effective method 
of checking Romanist aggression. If any German 
prince persecuted Protestants, the King of Prussia 
used forthwith to apply similar oppression to his 
own papist subjects. Thus, without stirring from 
Berlin, he stayed the hand of persecutors in the dis- 
tant valleys of the Neckar and the Salzach. His son 
soon proved himself ready to go to greater lengths. 

Claims and counter-claims as to territory had 
arisen between one of the great Romanist princes, 
the Archbishop of Mainz, and the Landgrave of 
Hesse-Cassel, the heir of one of the earliest cham- 
pions of the Reformation. The former relied on 
his own troops and on those of neighbouring bish- 
ops, while he also possessed the support of the 
Emperor, whose right to judge the case had been 
challenged by his opponent. The Landgrave ap- 
pealed to the King of Prussia and to other princes 
of the Empire. Frederick's reply was immediate, 
emphatic, and successful. " In case of need," he 
wrote to his brother-Elector of Mainz, " we should 
not know how to refrain from affording to the 
aforementioned His Dilection the Lord Landgrave 
William the necessary protection and help against 
unlawful force and disturbance." At these words 
the hostile coalition — Elector, bishops, and Emperor 
— melted away. The young King, it was apparent, 
had entered the field of German politics with ^clat. 

Equally peremptory and equally successful was 
Frederick's verdict for his own claims in a dispute 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 87 

with the Bishop of Li^ge with regard to Herstal, a 
tiny barony lying on the Meuse to the westward of 
Aix-la-Chapelle. The inhabitants had resisted the 
officers of his father, who would gladly have sold 
Herstal to Li^ge, and the Bishop, who wished to 
buy but could not come to terms, had eggfed them 
on. Frederick, scorning the advice of his ministers, 
resolved to use his strength as a giant. From Wesel 
he sent the following ultimatum to the Bishop : 

" Cousin ! Knowing all the attacks that you have made 
upon my unquestionable rights over my free barony of 
Herstal, and how the seditious men of Herstal have been 
supported for some years in their detestable disobedi- 
ence to me, I have ordered my privy-councillor Ram- 
bonnet to visit you on my behalf, to demand from you 
in my name a sincere and categorical explanation within 
the space of two days, whether you wish to protect the 
mutineers of Herstal in their abominable disorder and 
disobedience. In case you refuse, or delay that just 
reply which I demand of right, you will render yourself 
solely responsible before all the world for the conse- 
quences which your refusal will inevitably bring after 
it. I am, etc." 

" This is strong, this is lively," cried the ambassa- 
dors at Berlin when they read it ; '' it is the language 
of Louis XIV. ; it is a beginning which shows what 
we must expect some day from this prince." Their 
prophecy was to be fulfilled sooner than they antici- 
pated. In the meantime the new diplomacy won 
another triumph. The Bishop made no reply to the 
ultimatum and in a week's time the Prussians, sow- 
ing apologies broadcast over Europe, seized his 



88 Frederick the Great [1740- 

county of Hoorn. The apologies concluded with 
the assertion : " His Majesty will never put from him 
a just and reasonable arrangement with the said 
prince, as the sole end which his justice and modera- 
tion have in view in this affair, these two invariable 
principles being the pole-star of all his actions." The 
"just and reasonable arrangement" proved to be 
the payment of two hundred thousand thalers to 
the King. 

Frederick could therefore congratulate himself 
that within five months of his accession he had 
taught both Prussia and Europe that he was stronger 
than his father. It was clear that he was resolved 
not to be hoodwinked by man or woman. He had re- 
jected the advice of his cautious ministers with the 
pleasantry that when they spoke of war they re- 
sembled an Iroquois talking of astronomy. The 
event had gone far towards silencing the taunt of 
Europe that " the Prussians never shoot," and to- 
wards establishing the truth of Frederick's well- 
known simile, " The Emperor is an old phantom of 
an idol and has no longer any nerves." 

A king of Prussia with such a spirit as Frederick 
had already shown was not likely to rest long upon 
his oars. But it was chance that determined the 
course that he was next to steer. The Herstal 
treaty, which confirmed his second diplomatic vic- 
tory, was signed on October 20th. Six days later a 
swift courier brought to Rheinsberg the news that 
on that same day the Emperor, Charles VI., had 
died. Frederick lay ill of fever. He defied his 
doctors, took quinine, and was well. He sent for 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 89 

his cautious minister Podewils and for the dauntless 
soldier Schwerin, and wrote to Voltaire : 

" The least expected event in the world forbids me 
this time* to open my soul to yours as is my wont. 
... I believe that in June it will be powder, soldiers 
and trenches rather than actresses, ballets and theatres. 
. . . This is the moment of the entire transformation 
of the old system of politics: the stone is loosed which 
Nebuchadnezzar beheld when it rolled upon the image 
of four metals and destroyed it." 

Two days later he expressed himself with still greater 
confidence: *' I am not going to Berlin, a trifle like 
the Emperor's death does not demand great com- 
motions. All was foreseen, all was thought out in 
advance. So it is only a question of carrying out 
designs which I have long had in my mind." 

These designs were, in brief, so to use the political 
situation created by the death of Charles VI. as to 
add to Prussia the whole, or at least the north- 
western part, of the Hapsburg province of Silesia — 
the fertile basin of the upper Oder. In conception 
and in execution the idea was Frederick's own. It 
is the pediment of his fame as a hero of his nation. 
All the world knows that the capture of Silesia 
converted Frederick the Second into Frederick the 
Great. It is therefore imperative that at this point, 
with judgment unclouded by the smoke of battle and 
the incense of victory, we should address ourselves 
to the double enquiry. Was it necessary ? and Was 
it right? postponing but not evading the further 
question, Was it wise ? 



90 Frederick the Great 



[1740- 



The plea that Silesia was necessary to Prussia, that 
the existence of Prussia could only be prolonged or 
her people safeguarded or fed if Silesia were hers, 
may be dismissed at once. Necessity is the usual 
pillar of a claim to extend the area of dominion over 
lands lately rescued from barbarism. The Law of 
Nations declares that, when under such conditions 
two civilised states desire the same territory, one 
may further its claim by showing that without this 
addition the territory which it already has would be 
rendered worthless. But what might give a good 
title to Fashoda would be absurd if applied to Bres- 
lau. Frederick had himself investigated the subject 
nine years before when studying under Hille at 
Ciistrin. He then concluded that Silesia did Prussia 
commercial injury by exporting to her goods at lower 
rates than the merchants of Brandenburg could afford 
to take. This state of things, he and Hille thought, 
demanded a protective tariff. It could not by any 
stretch of imagination dictate or justify the annexa- 
tion of a province. Nor from a military point of 
view was there imperative necessity for acquiring 
Silesia. It was no doubt desirable for Prussia that 
she should avert future danger by thrusting a wedge 
between Saxony and Poland, and that more than 
one-fifth of the road from Vienna to Berlin, by way 
of Breslau, should be in Prussian hands. But no 
Prussian could maintain in 1740 that if Glogau and 
Breslau remained Austrian his state would be im- 
perilled in the same sense as the German Empire 
would have been imperilled if Metz and Strasburg had 
remained French in 1871, or as the British Empire 





THE RATHHAUS IN BRESLAU. 

FROM A STEEL ENGRAVING. 



1742] The Silesian Adventure * 91 

would be imperilled to-day if Pretoria and Johan- 
nesburg were still in hostile hands. The plea of 
hereditary right, not that of necessity, was put for- 
ward by Frederick as the basis of his claims. In 
1740 the latter would have seemed equally absurd in 
law and in fact. 

The second question, Was it right for Prussia to 
attempt to acquire Silesia for her own profit ? may 
seem to have little claim to discussion by Frederick's 
biographers, because considerations of right and 
wrong counted for little with Frederick himself. 
There seems to be no evidence that Frederick either 
in his public or private life practised the stale hy- 
pocrisies of truth and morality. What it seemed to 
him profitable to do, that he did ; what it seemed to 
him profitable to say, that he said. '' If there is 
anything to be gained by being honest, let us be 
honest; if it is necessary to deceive, let us deceive," 
are his own words. In the case of Silesia, his avowal 
to Podewils, who urged that some legal claim could 
be furbished up, is sufficiently explicit. On Novem- 
ber 7th the King writes : " The question of right 
(droit) is the affair of the ministers ; it is your affair ; 
it is time to work at it in secret, for the orders to 
the troops are given." Two days later he received 
the news of the death of the Empress of Russia, 
which was worth more to him than a thousand title- 
deeds. Russia had no clear rule of succession, and 
usually fell into anarchy at the demise of the Crown. 
Frederick could therefore strike southward with con- 
fidence that his flank was safe. 

The question. Was it right ? has, however, a deeper 



92 ' Frederick the Great [1740~ 

historical interest than that involved in the biography 
of a king of Prussia. Frederick's indifference to all 
right renders it unnecessary to reflect in his case 
upon the spectacle of a good man cheerfully doing 
evil in the service of the State — of Sir Henry Wotton 
setting out with a jest " to lie abroad," or of Cavour 
exclaiming, " If we did for ourselves what we do for 
Italy, what scoundrels we should be ! " But it is to 
be borne in mind that in 1740 it was impossible to 
lay down with certainty the duty of a state towards 
its neighbours. The standard of right and wrong 
for states in their dealings with one another was not 
yet fixed. Nearly a quarter of a century later it was 
possible for Frederick to write, " The jurisprudence 
of sovereigns is commonly the right of the stronger." 
But Maria Theresa was taught that sovereigns must 
rule their peoples as branches of one Christian family. 

Hitherto the old idea that a state was the property 
— the estate— of the king had not lost all its influence. 
Even in England, which was already the leader of 
the world in politics, the dynasty elected by the na- 
tion had great weight in determining foreign policy. 
Without the knowledge of any Englishman, WiUiam 
III. had committed England to the partition of 
Spain, and in defiance of most Englishmen George 
II. was soon to commit her to the defence of the 
Pragmatic Sanction. But if England was not yet 
wholly free from the ancient notion, much more did 
Austria and Prussia, bundles of Hapsburg and Ho- 
henzollern lands, resemble the estates of their rulers. 

From this two consequences followed, vital in that 
day, almost incomprehensible in ours. It was, in the 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 93 

first place, a maxim universally accepted among the 
rulers of the Continent that the inhabitants of a 
province had little or no share in choosing their 
overlord. They might possess rights, even the right 
not to be divided between several lords, but they 
could be sold or exchanged or given away by one 
overlord to another without their own desire or even 
consent. This maxim was accepted to the full by 
both Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns, whose fortunes 
had been made by the union of family estates, and 
who never hesitated to barter those estates to ad- 
vance their own fortunes. Thus the fact that a pro- 
vince would be happier under an overlord who 
professed the same religion with itself would, accord- 
ing to the ideas prevalent in 1740, afford no good 
reason for change. Religious oppression by a ruler, 
it was universally admitted, entitled other rulers to 
interfere. But religious differences between ruler 
and ruled gave no such right. 

In so far, then, as States still resembled estates, 
the relations between them varied according to the 
personal character of their kings and princes. The 
nation ruled by an honourable king observed its en- 
gagement strictly, at whatever inconvenience to itself. 
If a State evaded its engagements the king's honour 
was held to have been tarnished. Unfortunately for 
Europe, this theory had been shaken, if not shat- 
tered, by the reign of Louis XIV. The Apollo of 
France, the cynosure of the Christian v/orld, the 
king who was the very fount of honour and in per- 
son the very pattern of chivalry, had in his dealings 
with the Dutch and the Germans shown himself a 



94 Frederick the Great [1740- 

kinsman of Machiavelli and of Bismarck. His con- 
spicuous severance of political from personal morality 
shook the faith of the world, and in the corrupt gen- 
eration which followed Louis XIV. and nurtured 
Frederick even the standard of personal morality 
sank low. 

At the death of Charles VI., therefore, men were 
perplexed about the source of law as between State 
and State. It seemed no longer sufificient to trust 
in princes, and yet what new code could be set up ? 
Frederick's attack upon Silesia struck a deadly blow 
at the remnant of the old system. His whole career 
was to influence the new profoundly. 

In answer to our two first questions it would there- 
fore appear that the attack upon Silesia was not dic- 
tated to Frederick by hard necessity, and that, tried 
by the old standard of honour between princes, it 
was clearly wrong. The third question — Was it 
wise ? — is of a different order, for it is far from certain 
that the wisdom or folly of Frederick's act has been 
sufficiently tested by time. A safe step towards the 
truth, indeed, is to examine the international situa- 
tion and calculate Frederick's chances of success, as a 
statesman would compute them from the facts Avhich 
lay before him in 1740. First of all, however, we 
must account for the fact that Frederick, who was 
only the third Hohenzollern to wear a crown, found 
himself in a position to assail the dynasty which had 
held for centuries the foremost place in Germany. 

The House of Hapsburg, perhaps to a greater ex- 
tent than any other of the ruling families in Europe, 
lay under the spell of its own past. This was due in 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 95 

part to its native pride and sluggish blood, in part 
to its long association with the oldest and most dig- 
nified institution of the Christian world — the Holy 
Roman Empire. From 1438 onwards the descend- 
ants of Rudolf of Hapsburg had been chosen in 
unbroken sequence to fill the ofifice which entitled 
its possessor to style himself Lord of the World. 
The radiance of old Rome had gilded Vienna for so 
long a time that it seemed to have transfigured the 
race that reigned there. Thus the Hapsburgs grew 
proud with a pride which no other House could 
rival, and no Hapsburg was prouder than Charles 
VI., the Anglo-Austrian candidate in the War of 
the Spanish Succession. His pride was fatal, for it 
banished him from the world of fact. He could 
never comprehend how Europe could leave off fight- 
ing to make him King of Spain, nor how the King 
of Prussia, who served him with towel and basin as 
Grand Chamberlain of the Empire, could cherish 
aims and aspirations which conflicted with his own. 
Pompous ceremonies and parchments made up so 
large a part of his own life that he came to believe 
that they expressed realities. Hence he made the 
cardinal error of his life. He committed the future 
of his House to the Pragmatic Sanction. Domestic 
economy was beneath his notice. While Frederick 
William was crying out because his son's tutors 
permitted an item " for the housemaids at Wuster- 
hausen," to appear in the accounts, dishonest stew- 
ards were debiting the Emperor with twelve buckets 
of the best wine for the Emperor's bath and two 
casks of old Tokay for Her Majesty's parrots. When 



96 Frederick the Great [1740- 

Charles VI. died the treasury was almost empty; 
the army seemed to have passed away with Prince 
Eugene; the ministers were blunderers of seventy 
and the sovereign a woman of twenty-three. 

Maria Theresa had, however, much in her favour. 
Though untried in affairs of State, it was certain that 
her birth, her beauty, her piety, her courage, her 
wifely devotion, and her unfailing goodness of heart 
would win the affection of her subjects. And the 
realm of the Hapsburgs needed only loyalty to be 
strong. Its broad and smiling provinces could furn- 
ish inexhaustible supplies of men and food, and the 
rank and file had proved their courage in a hundred 
wars. Besides, after all the trouble and sacrifices of 
Charles VI., in what quarter could immediate danger 
arise? The rulers of Bavaria, Saxony, Spain, and 
Sardinia had each a claim to some part of his inherit- 
ance, but they could each and all be confuted or 
bought off. A miscellaneous empire like that of the 
Hapsburgs could never be wholly free from such dis- 
putes. What might well give confidence for the 
future was the fact that France, so long the moving 
spirit of Europe and the implacable foe of Austria, had 
in 1738 given to the Pragmatic Sanction the most 
ample guarantee that the wit of man could devise. 
What her king had then undertaken, her all-power- 
ful minister had lately confirmed. In January, 
Fleury had written to the Emperor : 

"The King will observe with the most exact and 
inviolable fidelity the engagements which he has made 
with you, and if I may speak of myself after a name so 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 97 

worthy, I venture to flatter myself that my pacific inten- 
tions are well enough known for it to be supposed that 
I am very far from thinking of setting Europe on fire." 

Both King and Cardinal were sincere, and the best 
proofs of their sincerity were the signs of coming 
strife between them and England. It was clearly to 
the interest of France that they should keep their 
pledge. 

If she had nothing to fear from France, Maria 
Theresa had everything to hope from Prussia. It is 
hardly necessary to say that Frederick William, the 
devoted vassal of the Emperor, had been among the 
first to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction. His son, 
so Austrian statesmen might argue, had to thank 
the Emperor for protection when he lay in prison, 
for secret supplies of money, for experience in the 
field, above all for admission by way of marriage to 
the outer circle of the Imperial family itself. Now 
he expressed himself in terms which convinced the 
consort of the Queen, Francis of Lorraine, that his 
attitude towards the young couple was that of a 
father. Francis even flattered himself with expecta- 
tions of Prussian support in his candidature for the 
office of Emperor. Although the Austrian resident 
at Berlin wrote towards the end of October, 1740, 
that the gossips spoke of dangerous designs upon a 
portion of Silesia, and although, on November 19th, 
Maria Theresa gave utterance to a fear that the price 
of Prussian protection would be a slice of her heredi- 
tary dominions, still no one at Vienna had the least 
suspicion of the blow that Frederick was preparing. 



98 Frederick the Great [1740- 

What was hidden from the victims was hidden 
also from Europe and from Berlin. Till the end of 
November, the only clear fact was that Prussia was 
arming fast. Envoys besieged Podewils and the 
King, and even Voltaire journeyed to Rheinsberg in 
the hope of piercing the veil. All their efforts were 
vain. The conviction that Silesia was in danger 
gathered strength, but no one could be sure that 
Frederick would move at all, or that if he moved 
it would not be towards the Rhine. He astutely 
feinted in the direction of Berg by strengthening the 
garrisons in Cleves and repairing the roads to the 
West., At the same time he toiled hard to baffle 
official curiosity at home and abroad and to feel the 
pulses of the Powers, especially that of France. 
Wilhelmina, who saw her brother revelling in the 
social pleasures of Rheinsberg, had no idea of what 
was in the wind. 

At last, when secrecy was no longer profitable, the 
King's design was allowed to appear. On November 
29th, the English ambassador wrote from Berlin 
that the project of invading Silesia was as good as 
avowed. Frederick had yet to meet and to brave 
the Marquis di Botta, who came from Vienna on a 
special mission to the Prussian Court and encoun- 
tered the stream of troops flowing towards Silesia. 
At their meeting the King dropped the mask of 
friendship. " I am resolved," he said in effect, " to 
safeguard my rights over parts of Silesia by occupy- 
ing it. Yield it to me and I will support the throne 
of Maria Theresa and procure the imperial crown 
for her husband." ** Impossible for us," urged the 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 99 

Austrian, " and for you, criminal in the eyes of all 
Europe." Argument was plainly futile, and both fell 
to threats. " The Prussian troops make a handsomer 
show than the Austrian," said Botta, ''' but ours 
have smelt powder." "The Prussian troops will 
prove themselves as brave as they are handsome," 
replied the King. Three days later, on December 
1 2th, he attended a masquerade in the apartments 
of the Queen, questioned the French ambassador 
with regard to the disposition of Fleury, and after- 
wards supped in public. To the last moment the 
routine of pleasure was performed. 

Next morning Frederick set out for Silesia. He 
had first to shake off two lads of fourteen and ten, 
his brothers Henry and Ferdinand, the youngest 
colonels in his army, who seized the skirts of his coat 
and begged him to take them to the war. A day's 
drive brought him to Frankf urt-on-Oder, and between 
Frankfurt and the frontier of Silesia was encamped 
an army of 19,000 men with seventy-four guns. The 
heart of the despot not yet twenty-nine years old 
beat high with lust of adventure and with confidence 
of success. On the evening of December i6th, he 
wrote to Podewils from Silesian soil : 

" I have crossed the Rubicon with waving banners and 
resounding music ; my troops are full of good-will, the 
officers ambitious and our generals consumed with greed 
for fame ; all will go as we wish and I have reason to 
promise myself all possible good from this undertaking. 
. . . I will either perish or have honour from it." 

Frederick's next step was to issue to the world 
L.ofC. 



lOO Frederick the Great 



[1740- 



a document, of which one thousand copies had been 
printed in deepest secrecy exactly a month before. 
This was designed to reassure the people of Silesia 
as to the intentions of the King of Prussia. It was 
dated December ist and gave out that a general 
war was threatening, in which Silesia, " our safeguard 
and outwork," would be involved and the security 
of Prussia threatened. To avert this peril the King 
saw himself compelled to despatch troops to Silesia. 

" This is by no means intended to injure Her Majesty 
of Hungary, with whom and with the worshipful House 
of Austria we rather most eagerly desire to maintain the 
strictest friendship and to promote their true interest 
and maintenance according to the example of our glorious 
forefathers in our realm and electorate. That such is 
our sole intention in this affair, time will show clearly 
enough, for we are actually in course of explanation and 
agreement with Her Majesty." 

Commentary on this profession, if not sufficiently 
suppHed by Frederick's interviews with Botta, was 
afforded two days after his entry into Silesia. Then 
for the first time a Prussian representative, Borcke, 
informed the rulers of Austria of his master's pro- 
ceedings. Shamefaced and without hope of success, 
he began the unwelcome task by offering to the 
Archduke Francis his master's guarantee for the 
Hapsburg lands in Germany, a place in the Prussian 
alliance with England, Holland, and Russia, his vote 
at the Imperial election, and a loan of two million 
florins. Then he named the price — the cession of 
all Silesia. " Rather the Turks before Vienna," cried 



1742] The Silesimi Advenhcre loi 

the Archduke, " rather the Netherlands to France, 
rather any concession to Bavaria and Saxony." 
And when he grew calmer and spoke of negotiation, 
the door opened and Maria Theresa asked whether 
her husband was there. 

Next day the subject was broached anew by a 
more Olympian plenipotentiary, Oberhofmarschall 
Gotter, who had arrived after Borcke's message was 
made known. He found Vienna stirred to its depths 
and the English ambassador declaring that if such a 
thing were done Frederick would be excommunicated 
from the society of Governments. None the less 
he took the high tone and strove to intimidate the 
pHable Archduke. 

" * I bear,' he said, * in one hand safety for the House 
of Austria and in the other, for Your Highness, the 
Imperial crown. The treasures of the King my master 
are at the service of the Queen, and he brings her the 
succour of his allies, England, Holland and Russia. 
As a return for these offers and as compensation for the 
peril which he incurs by them, he asks for all Silesia, 
and will take no less. The King's resolve is immovable. 
He has the will and the power to possess himself of 
Silesia, and if it be not offered to him with a good grace 
these same troops and treasures will be given to Saxony 
and Bavaria, who are asking for them.' " 

Gotter's words seem to strike the keynote of the 
Silesian adventure. His silence as to legal claim 
throws into strange relief the preposterous character 
of the moral claim which he advances. Saxony and 
Bavaria had made no overtures to Frederick, and 



I02 Frederick the Great [1740- 

Frederick, as soon became apparent, was willing to 
accept much less than the whole of Silesia. The 
spirit of Maria Theresa breathed in the calm and 
dignified reply of the Archduke. Her high-minded 
confidence in Providence, her allies, her people, and 
herself blunted all the weapons of Prussia — the 
threats and cajolings addressed to the sovereign and 
the three hundred thousand thalers offered to the 
ministers. Austria declared that the invasion must 
cease or she would not even negotiate. Thereupon 
Gotter and Borcke joined their voices to the loud 
and unceasing chorus of remonstrance with which 
Prussia and Europe assailed the ears of Frederick in 
vain. 

The young King's firmness may be ascribed in 
part to an overweening confidence in his own talents 
and in part to the favourable progress of his enter- 
prise. He knew himself to be a cleverer man than 
his father and he had boundless faith in prompt and 
decided action. His success in the affairs of Mainz 
and Herstal could not but have augmented his self- 
esteem. The sight of the well-found and eager 
army which a word from him had assembled filled 
him with a sense of omnipotence. He declared that 
it must not be said that the King of Prussia 
marched with a tutor at his elbow. The minister 
of France, who admitted his great power of becom- 
ing what he wished, smiled maliciously at what he 
wished to become. 

" Fully convinced of his superiority in every depart- 
ment, he already thinks himself a clever statesman and 
a great general. Alert and masterful, he always decides 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 103 

upon the spot and according to his own fancy. His 
generals will never be anything but adjutants, his coun- 
cillors anything but clerks, his finance-ministers any- 
thing but tax-gatherers, his allies among the German 
princes anything but his slaves." 

Frederick's whole career is a vindication of this 
estimate. 

Already, both in Silesia and in Europe, good 
progress had been made. No Austrian armies dis- 
puted Frederick's advance, for Charles VI's grandi- 
ose projects had denuded his home provinces of 
troops. The natural defences of Silesia, too, vi^ere all 
on the wrong side. Mountains formidable though 
by no means impassable screened it from loyal Bo- 
hemia and loyal Moravia, and thus blocked the di- 
rect paths to Vienna. Only a few hills and streams 
barred an attack from the side of Saxony and no 
natural obstacle intervened between Breslau and 
Berlin. The strong portal looking towards Prussia 
was Glogau, which closed the Oder, the great natu- 
ral highway of Silesia. Breslau, the capital, a city 
which Frederick could praise as the finest in Ger- 
many, was too big to be a fortress by nature and too 
independent to be made one by art. In the main 
Protestant, and therefore ill-disposed towards Aus- 
trian rule, it stood firmly upon its right to provide for 
its own defence and refused to receive a garrison. 
Glogau was therefore the only formidable fortress in 
Lower Silesia, the half of Silesia where Protestant 
feeling was strongest and which was most exposed 
to the Prussian invasion. The south-eastern half. 
Upper Silesia, contained two other strong places of 



I04 Frederick the Great [1740- 

high importance — Brieg, which commanded the up- 
per Oder, and Neisse, which secured the backdoor of 
the province towards Austria. But Glogau, Brieg, 
and Neisse were all ill-supplied and undermanned. 
Without a field army to use them as bases and sup- 
ports they could not oppose a serious obstacle to 
the army of the King. 

Frederick's worst foe, indeed, was the weather, 
which tested the endurance of the Prussians and 
found it great. Torrents of rain fell from the 
eighteenth of December to the twentieth. 

" Waters all out," says Carlyle of the latter day, 
"bridges down, the country one wild lake of eddying 
mud. Up to the knee for many miles together ; up to 
the middle for long spaces; sometimes even up to the 
chin or deeper, where your bridge was washed away. 
The Prussians marched through it, as if they had been 
slate or iron. . . . Ten hours some of them were out, 
their march being twenty or twenty-five miles; ten to 
fifteen was the average distance come." 

Their unshaken discipline was the trophy of Fred- 
erick William and the best omen for the adventure of 
his son. On December 22d he knocked at the door 
of Silesia and was not dismayed at finding it shut. 
Wallis, the Governor of the province, had thrown 
himself into Glogau, had worked manfully to make it 
defensible, and now stood firm. Without siege-guns 
Frederick could hardly hope to take the place, and 
for a few days his own command was brought to a 
standstill. He summoned the reserve under the 
younger Prince of Anhalt-Dessau to join him at 




THE BOARD OF FINANCES AT NEISSE. 

FROM A STEEL ENGRAVING. 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 105 

Glogau and used the delay to organise a system by 
which Silesia should feed his troops for the future, 
but should feed them with the minimum of incon- 
venience and waste. Meanwhile the enterprise con- 
tinued to be fortunate. On December 27th Schwerin 
and the right wing surprised Liegnitz, an industrial 
town within sight of the western wall of mountains, 
and on the same day the Young Dessauer brought 
the reserve to Glogau and set Frederick free. 
" Thou wilt shortly see Silesia ranked in the list of 
our provinces," wrote the King. " Rehgion and our 
brave soldiers will do the rest." 

In Silesia and in Europe alike the philosopher- 
king counted much on religion. He cheerfully 
accepted the role of Protestant hero assigned him 
by the people, first of Berlin, then of Silesia, and 
finally of England. Never was this role more ser- 
viceable than in his dealings with Breslau. Leaving 
the Young Dessauer to blockade Glogau, he pressed 
on to the capital and, aided by the frost, accom- 
plished the journey of seventy miles in three days. 
Much display of friendship and a little sharp prac- 
tice sufficed to win the city, and Frederick, gracious 
and debonair, entered it in great state. Thus in 
three weeks from his departure from Berlin the 
King destroyed the Austrian civil government of 
Silesia. Half the province lay almost passive in his 
grasp, and he had secured a base for the conquest of 
the other half. 

The remainder of the month of January, 1741, was 
spent in pressing home the advantage already won. 
The smaller towns, Ghlau, which would be useful as 



io6 Frederick the Great 



[1740- 



a base till Brieg could be acquired, Ottmachau, and 
Namslau, capitulated one by one. It was true that 
the activity of the young Austrian general, Browne, 
produced an ever-increasing disposition to resist, and 
that Glatz, hedged in by hills, defied the besiegers. 
But the area under Prussian control was steadily 
increased. Brieg was masked as Glogau had been, 
and Neisse, after a futile bombardment of four days, 
was treated in the same way. Schwerin was set 
free to drive Browne through the mountains into 
Moravia and to lead the army into winter quarters. 
On the 29th of January, Frederick returned to Ber- 
lin and plunged with zest into the whirlpool of 
diplomacy which had been stirred to its depths by 
his adventure. 

Great as was his trust in resolute action and in 
accomplished facts, he could not disguise from him- 
self the truth that on one side his calculations had 
broken down. Austria, inspired by a Queen whose 
high soul it was not in Frederick's power to meas- 
ure, was not one whit nearer to compliance with his 
demands. Russia, as he foresaw, was likely to do 
little to help her, but the action of the Western Pow- 
ers was less easy to calculate. Frederick felt sure of 
one thing above all else — that under no circumstances 
would France and England be on the same side. 
He therefore devoted himself to the task of winning 
the alliance of one and the neutrality of the other. 

Frederick's simultaneous courtship of two Powers 
whose latent enmity to each other was beginning to 
reappear throws valuable light on his diplomatic 
methods and upon his regard for the truth. 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 107 

" A veracious man he was, at all points," says Freder- 
ick's greatest biographer; "not even conscious of his 
veracity; but had it in the blood of him; and never 
looked upon ^ mendacity ' but from a very great height 
indeed. He does not, except where suitable, at least he 
never should, express his whole meaning, but you will 
never find him expressing what is not his meaning. 
Reticence, not dissimulation . . . Facts are a kind 
of divine thing to Frederick; much more so than to 
common men; this is essentially what Religion I have 
found in Frederick." 

By his verdict that Frederick was a "veracious" 
man and his seizure of Silesia a righteous act, Car- 
lyle robs the story of his life of half its value. The 
plain meaning of the facts which he adduces seems 
to be that he was an astute man, careless of truth 
and right. Hence we may enquire with keen inter- 
est, How far can such means lead to lasting success ? 
In deference to a great name, however, two of 
Frederick's letters may be placed side by side. It 
will then be unnecessary to recur to this ungracious 
topic. From this time forward it will be assumed 
that the reader has formed his own opinion of Fred- 
erick's truthfulness. 

So soon as he realised that his negotiation with 
Austria might break down, Frederick turned to 
France. On January 5, 1 741, he wrote to Fleury 
from Breslau : 

" My dear Cardinal, I am deeply impressed by all the 
assurances of friendship which you give me and I will 
always reply to them with the same sincerity. It de- 
pends only upon you, by favouring the justice of my title 



io8 Frederick the Great [1740- 

to Silesia, to make eternal the bonds which will unite 
us. If I did not make you a sharer in my plans at first 
it was through forgetfulness rather than for any other 
reason. It is not everyone who is as unfettered amid his 
work as yourself, and to Cardinal Fleury alone is it granted 
to think of and to provide for everything." 

And in sending the letter he added : 

" I ask nothing better than a close union with His Most 
Christian Majesty, whose interests will always be dear to 
me, and I flatter myself that he will have no less regard 
for mine." 

At the same time he was making proposals for a 
close union with the natural enemy of France. In 
the same month, January, 1741, he addressed the 
following sentences to George II. : 

" My Brother! I am delighted to see that I have not 
deceived myself in placing confidence in Your Majesty. 

" As I have had no alliance with anyone I have not 
been able to open my mind to anyone; but as I see Your 
Majesty's good intentions I regard you as already my 
ally, from whom I ought in future to have nothing secret 
or concealed. Far from desiring to disturb Europe, I 
demand only that heed be paid to the justice of my un- 
contestable rights. I place unbounded confidence in 
Your Majesty's friendship and in the common interests 
of Protestant princes, which require that those oppressed 
for their religion should be succoured. The tyranny 
under which the Silesians have groaned is frightful, and 
the barbarity of the Catholics towards them inexpress- 
ible. If the Protestants lose me they have no other 
resort. 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 109 

" If Your Majesty desires to attach to yourself a faith- 
ful ally of inviolable constancy, this is the time: our in- 
terests, our religion, our blood is the same, and it would 
be sad to see ourselves acting against each other: it 
would be still more grievous to oblige me to concur in 
the great plans of France, which I intend to do only if I 
am compelled." 

The question of alliances was still unsettled on 
February 19th, when Frederick again left Berlin 
for the scene of war. Prussia might be doomed 
to act alone ; her safety lay in her own right hand. 
New armies were set on foot, but a skirmish at 
Baumgarten, in which he narrowly escaped capture, 
proved to Frederick that the Austrians were mov- 
ing and that his own troops were not all that 
could be desired. Nor was the Prussian strategy 
above criticism. The Old Dessauer, the father of 
the army, held up his hands in horror at the disposi- 
tions of Schwerin. Weak detachments were can- 
toned everywhere and the mountain-passes not 
secured, although Neisse, Brieg, and Glogau were 
still Austrian, and the Prussians would be at the 
mercy of an army entering Silesia from the Bohe- 
mian side. 

But soon the King's spirits, which had been de- 
pressed by the danger of a European coalition 
against him, were raised and the military situation 
greatly improved by a brilliant feat of the Young 
Dessauer. Glogau, Frederick had been pleased to 
decree, must be taken. At midnight on March 8th- 
9th, therefore, a combined assault was made with 
that perfect organisation and cool courage which 



no Frederick the Great [1740- 

already distinguished the Prussian infantry. In an 
hour the work was done, at a speed which made 
the loss on each side the merest trifle. Frederick 
could congratulate his lieutenant on " the prettiest 
military stroke that has been done in this century," 
and himself on the acquisition of an open high- 
road to Breslau. The capital now became a safe 
central storehouse for the Prussians, and its value 
as a base of operations was greatly enhanced by the 
gain of control over the Oder. So far as Glogau 
itself was concerned, it may be convenient to remark 
that the work had never to be done a second time. 
In a wall near the northern portal may be seen a 
stone inscribed F. R. 1741— a token of Prussian 
sovereignty which from that day to this has suffered 
no erasure. 

The next task was to secure Neisse, the Glogau of 
Upper Silesia. The problem was complicated by 
the fact that the Austrians had succeeded in fling- 
ing a thousand men into the fortress, and that a 
relieving army under Marshal Neipperg was known 
to be on its way from Vienna. Frederick therefore 
determined to turn the blockade into an active siege, 
while one covering army was established to the 
westward., and Schwerin received orders to concen- 
trate another to the south-east. The detachments 
were being called in for this purpose when the King 
had to acknowledge a surprise which led to the first 
pitched battle of the war and which might have 
ruined his whole enterprise. While Schwerin was 
carefully shutting the south-eastern gate of Silesia in 
Neipperg's face, the marshal passed him on his right 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 1 1 r 

and, by a creditable march over roads supposed to be 
impracticable, arrived at Neisse on April 5th. The 
advantage of this bold move was soon apparent. 
Frederick and Schwerin, who had been within an 
ace of capture, were also marching northwards, but 
they were separated from their friends by the river 
Neisse and by a superior force of the enemy. Neip- 
perg was strong in cavalry and longed to follow up 
his advantage by crushing the Prussians in detail. 

Frederick was saved, however, by Neipperg's 
ignorance of the strength and position of his foes. 
With a force of less than sixteen thousand men, the 
marshal's plain duty was to use his temporary super- 
iority in numbers by meeting the enemy in the 
field and striving to destroy him. Failing in this, 
he might make for Ohlau and the magazine. But 
after crossing the Neisse, he lost touch with Fred- 
erick's force and believed himself to be between 
hostile armies on the north and south-east. Snow 
and rain hampered his movements and chilled his 
men. He therefore abandoned the initiative, and 
on April 9th sat down within sight of friendly Brieg 
to await events. He was right in supposing that a 
Prussian force lay to the south-east of him. It was 
the army of Frederick and Schwerin, which had re- 
ceived reinforcements from all sides. It was three 
times as strong as he believed it could be, and it 
was within five miles of his camp. He was wrong, 
however, in supposing that a stronger force lay to 
the north in Ohlau. Ohlau was weak and Frederick 
was hastening thither to save his heavy artillery and 
magazine. Neipperg lay right across his path and 



112 Frederick the Great [1740- 

a battle was inevitable. It would soon be proved 
whether the Prussian troops were indeed as brave as 
they were handsome, or whether Europe was right 
in thinking that Prussia would pay dear for the pre- 
sumption of her King. 

Frederick reahsed the importance of the crisis. 
For two days, it is said, he could neither eat nor 
sleep. On April 8th he wrote to his brother and heir, 
Prince Augustus William, bidding him farewell if 
the next day should be his last. In that event he 
commended to his care four of his friends, " those 
whom in life I have loved the most," as well as two 
of his servants. The next day, however, proved 
tempestuous and the Prussian attack was postponed 
till April loth. Then the morning sun shone out 
upon a plain hardened by frost and covered to a 
depth of two feet with snow. The Prussian baggage 
was packed at five o'clock, and by nine the whole 
force had silently taken rank. An hour later, the 
march northward began, the army pressing slowly 
through the snow towards Ohlau, and feeling for 
the enemy who lay across their path. At last the 
vanguard surprised an Austrian outpost, captured 
twenty men, and learned that Neipperg lay en- 
camped in and about Mollwitz, a village less than 
two miles ahead. 

How twenty-two thousand men could have ap- 
proached so close to the enemy unperceived, it 
is hard to understand. Neipperg, it is true, did 
not expect to be attacked. There was some screen 
of woods between the Prussians and Mollwitz, and 
the country-folk were Protestants who volunteered 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 113 

information only to the Prussians. But the day 
was clear and the scene as flat as the parade-ground 
at Potsdam ; the Austrians were particularly well 
supplied with scouts and their general's avowed 
plan was to shape his course according to the move- 
ments of his opponents. None the less it was in 
fact not till after ten o'clock that he received the 
alarm, and by that time the Prussians were methodic- 
ally ranking themselves for battle. Had the same 
opportunity come to Frederick later in life, he would, 
as he himself declares, have flung troops upon Moll- 
witz and the neighbouring villages and put the 
Austrians to flight before they could form. But in 
this first fight every traditional precaution was 
carefully observed, " the faithful apprentice-hand," 
says Carlyle, *' still rigorous to the rules of the old 
shop." 

While Neipperg was bustling and hurrying to 
collect his army from three villages and to draw it 
up in front of Mollwitz, the Prussians were manoeu- 
vring into place as though they were on parade. 
Two long lines were formed across the plain. These 
were three hundred paces apart, so that if the front 
were pierced, which was hardly supposed possible, 
the rear could fire their flintlocks without massacring 
their comrades. Heavy guns to the front, cavalry 
on the wings, were the orders, and, as the enemy 
were superior in cavalry, Frederick copied an ex- 
pedient of the great Gustavus by placing two regi- 
ments of grenadiers between the squadrons of horse 
on either wing. At length all was ready, and at 
midday the Prussian cannonade began, galHng the 

8 



114 Frederick the Great [1740- 

Austrian cavalry and as yet uiianswerable by the 
Austrian guns. 

Neipperg had ordered the cavalry to wait till a 
general advance could be made. But the left wing, 
refusing to be shot down like dogs, suddenly defied 
their ofificers and dashed at the Prussian right. They 
lost all formation, but they found a foe unschooled 
in their tactics. First pistol-shot, then a stroke with 
a sabre as sharp as a razor right at the head of the 
enemy's horse, finally, as horse and man went down, 
a thrust from the rear at the rider — such an attack 
was beyond the experience of the Prussian cavalry, 
and they could not stand against it. As often as 
Austrian horse met Prussian on the day of MoUwitz 
they gained an easy victory. They captured some 
of the guns, plundered the baggage, tore several 
gaps in the line, and drove the King himself in head- 
long flight from his first battle. 

For some time Frederick was driven helplessly 
here and there amid his ruined cavalry in a fight 
which was unlike anything that he had ever seen 
and which he was impotent to control. His generals 
begged him to quit the field. To his inexperienced 
eye all seemed lost, and at last Schwerin confirmed 
his fears. "There is still hope," said this tried cap- 
tain to his sovereign, " but in case of the worst it 
would be well if your Majesty in person would 
bring troops from Ohlau and Strehlen." Bewildered 
and despairing, the King turned his back on the 
wreck of all his hopes and fled far to the south-east. 
Distancing many of his attendants in a swift ride of 
more than thirty miles, he arrived at Oppeln on the 




>"Z/" 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 1 1 5 

Oder, only to be repulsed by the unexpected fire of 
a party of Austrian hussars who had seized the 
town and who captured some of his worse-mounted 
companions. To this check, for he then doubled 
back towards his army, he owed the fact that at the 
close of a ride of nearly fifty miles he received the 
news of victory without delay. 

When Frederick left the field it was about four 
o'clock. The havoc in the Prussian ranks had been 
wrought by unsupported charges of horse. Schwe- 
rin could still count upon his infantry, which in the 
midst of the whirlwind had stood firm as a rock and 
by sheer steadiness and speed of firing had tumbled 
masses of cavalry into ruin. His first act was to 
send to the Young Dessauer, who commanded the 
second line, an exhortation to do his duty and to 
keep his men from firing volleys into the backs of 
their comrades. The Young Dessauer, who hated 
Schwerin, replied that he needed no judge save the 
King and that he would do his duty without any 
reminders. 

After this exchange of courtesies, Schwerin braced 
himself to the task of retrieving the day. He assured 
his infantry that the King was well, that no battle 
could be won or lost by cavalry alone, and that he 
placed his trust in them. He then ordered his right 
wing forward against the Austrian infantry. These 
were raw levies and gave signs of unsteadiness be- 
fore the Prussians came within range. Range, in 
days of weak powder and clumsy muskets, was some 
forty-five paces, and the sight of the enemy bearing 
down upon them, shoulder to shoulder, was too much 



ii6 Frederick the Great [1740- 

for undisciplined men to face. Neipperg drew sup- 
ports from his right, but even his victorious cavalry 
soon refused to face the fire which was poured in by 
men perfectly trained and furnished with the iron 
ramrods invented by the Old Dessauer. The Aus- 
trian infantry, which was able at the best to fire less 
than half as fast as the enemy, hid trembling one 
behind another and tried to endure a torment to 
which they could not reply. As the sun was sink- 
ing Schwerin pressed his advantage home. With 
sounding music and waving banners, in irresistible 
advance, the Prussian left swept down upon the 
weakened Austrian right. Neipperg saw that the 
battle was lost. He retreated first behind Mollwitz 
then, seeing that his men would not stand, round 
the Prussian left and eventually to Neisse. 

Except that his magazine was saved and that he 
was soon able to capture Brieg, Frederick derived 
little immediate military advantage from what he 
describes as " one of the rudest battles fought within 
the memory of man." The chief profit of Neip- 
perg's march had evaporated before the battle, at the 
moment when Frederick and Schwerin became super- 
ior in numbers. In spite of Mollwitz the Austrian 
army remained on Silesian soil, and it was better 
placed near Neisse than near Brieg. In killed and 
wounded each side had lost about 4500 men, nearly 
one-fourth of the combatants engaged. And in 
spite of Frederick's hoarded millions and well-filled 
regiments, it was clear that, if the contest were to 
remain a duel between himself and Maria Theresa 
alone, the size and natural wealth of Austria must 



1742] The Sile Stan Adventure 117 

tell in the long run. After MoUwitz, Frederick would 
still have been glad to accept Lower Silesia as the 
price of his alliance with Austria and a contribution 
to her exchequer. 

Prussia's greatest gain from MoUwitz was increase 
of prestige. Though her cavalry did not regain their 
nerve for many a day, her infantry, the backbone of 
the army, had proved that it was indeed as brave as 
it was handsome. Frederick never alluded to his 
own departure from the field. In later life he accus- 
tomed himself to inaugurate the Prussian military 
year by celebrating the anniversary of the triumph 
which he had not seen. Every fifth of April the 
Guards were twice ordered to the charge and dis- 
missed with the words, '* Thus did your forefathers 
at MoUwitz." The traditional Austrian contempt 
for Prussia had received its first signal rebuke. The 
story survives among the villagers of MoUwitz that 
when the call to arms disturbed one of Neipperg's 
ofificers at dinner he called to the landlord to keep 
the dishes hot. '' We will come back soon," he 
promised, " but we have to go and dust the Prussians' 
jackets for them." 

Victory in the field reconciled Prussian opinion to 
Frederick's Silesian adventure, but this was a small 
gain in comparison with its effect on opinion in Eu- 
rope, especially in France. At the Court of Louis 
XV. the party opposed to Fleury and to peace had 
been gathering strength day by day. Hot-headed 
men and women, blind to the true interests of their 
country, could see in Austria only the hereditary 
enemy from whom lands and laurels were to be won. 



1 1 8 Frederick the Great [1740- 

Chief among them was Marshal Belleisle, a man who 
conceived great schemes and advocated them with 
eloquence and charm. His plan was that France 
should ally herself with Prussia, procure the Imperial 
crown for Charles Albert of Bavaria, and, in spite of 
all her pledges to support the Pragmatic Sanction, 
endow both the Bavarian and Saxon claimants with 
Austrian lands. Having thus humbled Austria and 
made the fortunes of Austria's rivals, France might 
gain the Netherlands and Luxemburg for herself 
and dictate to a divided Germany for ever. 

Before Mollwitz, Belleisle had progressed with this 
policy so far as to be entrusted with a mission to the 
Diet which assembled at Frankfort to elect an Em- 
peror. Frederick's victory encouraged all the ene- 
mies of the Hapsburgs and thus lightened the task 
of Belleisle. In May, 1741, Charles Albert accepted 
the role marked out for him, and early next month 
the King of Prussia, despairing of an alliance with 
England, came to terms with France. By a treaty 
signed at Breslau in the deepest secrecy, he agreed 
to renounce his claims to Jiilich-Berg, and undertook 
to vote for Charles Albert at the Diet. France in 
return guaranteed him in the possession of Lower 
Silesia, and undertook to safeguard Prussia by send- 
ing an army to support Charles Albert within two 
months and by stirring up Sweden to make war on 
Russia. The coalition against Austria gathered 
strength as it proceeded, and with the exception of 
the English and the Dutch no nation hesitated to 
desert the Pragmatic Sanction. 

The idea with which Frederick began the Silcsian 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 119 

adventure was at length realised. He had, as he an- 
ticipated, stirred up general confusion, amid which 
the strong man who knew his own mind could hardly 
fail to carry off some spoils. To France, as the 
moving spirit, he was all gratitude and devotion. 
But his real design henceforward was to leave his 
confederates to subdue Austria, while he himself de- 
voted all his powers to grasping what Prussia could 
hope to retain. What he gained from Belleisle's 
work was made manifest in the summer and autumn 
of 1 74 1. While the Bavarians and French were ad- 
vancing in triumph down the Danube towards Vienna, 
the Austrians could take no thought for Silesia. 
Frederick, therefore, had leisure to train his cavalry 
and consolidate his conquest. He treacherously de- 
stroyed the municipal independence of Breslau, 
which he had bound himself to preserve, but did 
little actual fighting. Neisse, protected by Neip- 
perg's army, seemed still too strong to be attacked. 

Meanwhile the extreme peril of Maria Theresa's 
throne forced the Queen to make trial of desperate 
remedies. By throwing herself upon the generosity 
of the Hungarians, the traditional rebels against her 
House, she more than doubled the force at her dis- 
posal. Her endeavour to purchase France was futile, 
but a hint from Frederick was now enough to in- 
augurate negotiations with Prussia. Early in Oc- 
tober these issued in the famous convention of Klein 
Schnellendorf. In deep secrecy, for Fleury had 
written that the King of Prussia was false in every- 
thing, even in his caresses, and the French ambas- 
sador kept a watchful eye upon his movements, 



1 20 Frederick the Great [1740- 

Frederick met Neipperg at a castle in the neigh- 
bourhood of Neisse. Each was accompanied by one 
companion, while the English ambassador, Lord 
Hyndford, who had arranged the interview, acted as 
clerk and witness. There Frederick, who had just 
written to Belleisle a letter full of encouragement, 
sold his allies for his own profit. It was agreed that 
after a sham siege of Neisse the Austrians should 
evacuate Silesia, and that Prussia should become neu- 
tral in fact though not in show. To Neipperg, whose 
army would now be free to act against the French in 
Bohemia, Frederick gave wise counsel for the cam- 
paign. *' Unite all your troops, then strike home 
before they can strike you." If the Austrians should 
succeed, Frederick might join them ; if not, he would 
be compelled to look to himself. To deceive the 
French, the English ambassador was to report him 
as deaf to all propositions. If any word of the con- 
vention got abroad, the King declared he would deny 
all and regard all as void. 

This conspiracy against Frederick's allies was 
punctiHously carried into effect so long as it was 
profitable to Prussia. For fifteen days Neisse sub- 
mitted to a bombardment and two hundred cannon- 
shot were fired off by either side. After seven days 
Neipperg's army made off, attended by a Prussian 
corps in seeming pursuit, and at the time appointed 
the strong fortress was surrendered. On the very 
same day the King accepted a treaty for the parti- 
tion of Austria. The Prussians then, as arranged, 
went into winter quarters in Upper Silesia, which 
Austria was eventually to retain, and from time to 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 121 

time sham skirmishes took place to hoodwink the 
French. 

At the beginning of November the King left 
Neisse for Berlin, pausing on his way to view the 
scenes of all his triumphs. At Brieg and Glogau he 
inspected the fortifications, but at Breslau he drove 
in state to the grand old Rathaus and received the 
homage of Lower Silesia, the province secretly ceded 
to him at Klein Schnellendorf. The ceremony was 
immediately followed by the reorganisation of the 
Government in Church and State. The province 
was simply made Prussian, with absolute rehgious 
equality, heavy but not harsh taxation, and a regular 
system of conscription. 

At Klein Schnellendorf Frederick had hinted that 
if the Austrians were not successful in Bohemia they 
could not expect him to do more than stand neutral. 
The event soon showed what he meant. Before the 
end of November Prague was stormed in brilliant 
fashion by the Bavarians, French, and Saxons. 
Frederick's allies had succeeded where he expected 
them to fail. He at once proclaimed his intention 
of standing by the winning side. " My fingers itch 
for brilliant and useful action on behalf of my dear 
Elector," he wrote to Belleisle. He broke all the 
provisions of the convention of Klein Schnellendorf 
and derided the suggestion that such a pact could 
ever have existed. *' Should I be so foolish as to 
patch up a peace with enemies who hate me in their 
hearts, and in whose neighbourhood I could enjoy 
no safety? " the King demanded. *' The true prin- 
ciples of the policy of my House demand a close 



12 2 Frederick the Great 



[1740- 



alliance with France." Such was the substance of 
the argument which Frederick addressed to Fleury. 

Lord Hyndford, however, had witnessed all that 
passed at Klein Schnellendorf, and would not allow 
England to be duped by lies. Frederick therefore 
told him frankly that he intended to set the con- 
vention at defiance. The allies, he showed, had 
150,000 men against Austria's 70,000 and could do 
with her what they would. If she published the 
convention she would only expose her own folly, and 
perhaps she would not be beHeved. Then, besides 
treating Upper Silesia as his own and laying hands 
on the adjoining county of Glatz, he ordered the 
conquest of Moravia. Ere the year was out Schwerin 
was in Olmiitz, the chief town of the North, and 
it seemed as though the allies would filch yet an- 
other province from the Queen. " Alas ! " wrote 
the philosopher -king on one occasion to Voltaire, 
•* trickery, bad faith and double-dealing are the lead- 
ing feature of most of the men who are at the 
head of the nations and who ought to set them an 
example." 

Never was the fortitude of Maria Theresa more 
needed or more illustrious than in these winter 
months. The earlier gleams of light — Vienna spared 
and Frederick bought off — only made yet more 
black the clouds which now gathered over her 
throne. Her father had flattered himself that he 
bequeathed to her the support of united Europe. 
Within a year of his death the greater part of Eu- 
rope was leagued to despoil her. France, Spain, 
Bavaria, Prussia, Saxony, the Elector Palatine, the 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 123 

Elector of Cologne formed the coalition, and the ac- 
cession of Sardinia was the prelude to a severe strug- 
gle on the side of Italy. The loss of Bohemia almost 
without a blow made the Queen well-nigh forgetful 
of Silesia until the perfidy of Frederick opened the 
former wound anew. At the same time a revolution 
at St. Petersburg extinguished for the time being 
the Austrian influence in Russia and thereby in- 
creased the King's security. Then came the attack 
upon Moravia, and before the end of January, 1742, 
the Imperial crown passed from the Hapsburg fam- 
ily by the election of the head of a rival House — 
Charles Albert of Bavaria. 

Amid all these disasters, however, the courage of 
the young Queen, rooted as it was in her belief that 
right must triumph, remained unshaken. She or- 
ganised new armies and inspired them with her own 
spirit. Before the resurgent might of Austria the 
new-made Emperor sank into impotence. Within a 
month of his election the Queen recovered her cities 
on the Danube and overran the hereditary lands of 
the Bavarian. Et Ccesar et nihil laughed the wags. 
What would his allies, France, Prussia, and Saxony, 
do to relieve him ? 

The position of affairs may be simply stated. Two 
Austrian armies were in the field, one conquering 
Bavaria, the other protecting it against an attack 
from the side of Bohemia, where the allies were still 
masters of Prague. If this second army were driven 
back by a superior force, the first would be recalled 
to support it. Thus Bavaria and Bohemia, the actual 
and the pretended inheritance of Charles Albert, 



1 24 Frederick the Great [1740- 

would be freed from the Austrians together. At the 
same time the French in Bohemia would be reheved 
from the fear of being outnumbered and attacked, 
and the Saxons would have the simplest march pos- 
sible — straight into Bohemia by the natural highroad 
of the Elbe. Every military consideration thus 
summoned Frederick to join in clearing the king- 
dom of Austrian troops. But this plan promised 
no special advantage for the King of Prussia and it 
opened no market in which he might barter his 
allies. With infinite labour he therefore secured the 
adoption of another, in which these defects were 
remedied. This was that he should lead the Saxon 
army into Moravia to assist the Prussians in con- 
quering the province, and in thus creating a diver- 
sion which, he maintained, would aid the Emperor 
as well as any other. 

The Saxons reluctantly left their country with no 
force, save the French, to guard its frontier against 
the Austrian army of Bohemia. Frederick was there- 
fore secure against treason on his flank and could 
again stir the waters of politics in full confidence 
that his House would gain some profit. Moravia 
might become to Silesia what Silesia had now be- 
come to Brandenburg — a dependency and an out- 
work. Or if this was too much to hope for, he as 
conqueror of Moravia might at least dictate to 
Vienna the surrender of a Silesia augmented by 
cuttings from the Bohemian kingdom, of which 
Frederick regarded the Emperor or the Queen as 
lawful sovereign exactly according to his conveni- 
ence at the moment. At the worst Moravia might 



1742] The Silesian Adventure 125 

pass to the Saxon House, which was a weaker and 
therefore a safer neighbour than the Hapsburg. 

All these calculations were falsified by events. 
The invasion of Moravia was a far more difficult 
task than the invasion of Silesia. Instead of a level 
and fertile country inhabited in part by Protestant 
well-wishers, Frederick found a rugged desert whose 
people hated the Prussians and did them every mis- 
chief in their power. He devastated the land by 
way of penalty, and dragged the grumbling Saxons 
through clouds of guerillas to Briinn, the capital, 
where he induced them to join him in a siege. As 
leader of a composite army, however, he was no 
longer served with the prompt and unquestioning 
obedience which the unmixed Prussian forces had 
displayed. 

Briinn made a stout resistance and Prince Charles 
was deputed to march to its relief. At this point 
the heroism of the Queen seemed to be rewarded by 
a sudden change of fortune. Frederick tried once 
more to sacrifice his allies to his own profit, but in 
vain. England, now guided by Carteret in place of 
Walpole, was actively supporting Maria Theresa. 
Sardinia deserted the coalition against her. At 
Vienna, men regained a confidence which was height- 
ened by the news from the North. Prince Charles 
feinted against the French in Bohemia and Fred- 
erick dismissed the Saxons to help them. This was 
but the first step towards the abandonment of the 
whole venture. After a toilsome retreat and count- 
less skirmishes, the exhausted Prussians crossed 
safely into Bohemia before the end of April and 



126 Frederick the Great 11740- 

again the negotiators were set to work. Once more 
they failed and the Prussians found themselves be- 
tween Prague and the army of Prince Charles, which 
was now making thither from Moravia. 

A conflict was inevitable. It took place at 
Chotusitz, near the Elbe, within three marches of 
Prague, on May 17, 1742. This battle is remarkable 
not only because seven thousand men fell in three 
hours, but also because it is the first victory actually 
won by Frederick himself. His imperious temper 
had cost him the services of Schwerin, the hero of 
MoUwitz, while the Old Dessauer had been rebuked 
for disobedience and sent to the rear. But the 
Prussian infantry were as steady as at MoUwitz, 
the cavalry, who suffered terribly, much better, and 
the King proved that he could seize the moment for 
decisive action on the field as well as in the cabinet. 
Four thousand Prussians fell, but casualties, captures, 
and desertion reduced Prince Charles's force of thirty 
thousand by one-half. 

The victory of Chotusitz assisted Frederick once 
more to abandon his allies. It added force to the 
diplomacy of England, whose policy was to help 
Austria a great deal against the French, but not at 
all against the Prussians. While the English am- 
bassadors were urging the Queen to submit to the 
loss of Silesia, the Austrian troops pressed the 
French hard in Bohemia and thus forced P'rederick 
to hurry on a peace. Within four weeks of Chotu- 
sitz, victor and vanquished had come to terms. 
Frederick withdrew from the war and received all 
Silesia except a fringe on the south-west, as well as 



1742] 



The Silesian Adventure 



127 



the county of Glatz in full sovereignty for ever. 
On July 28th these terms were embodied in the 
Treaty of Berlin, which closed the First Silesian War. 
In twenty months, at a cost of two pitched battles, 
Frederick had added to Prussia sixteen thousand 
square miles of fertile land and a million and a 
quarter of inhabitants — a greater prize than any 
that his ancestors had won. He was not yet thirty- 
one years of age. 




CHAPTER V 

THE SECOND STRUGGLE FOR SILESIA, 1742-1745 

AFTER following Frederick's career through 
many phases in a dozen years, we observe 
him with interest as he quits the whirlpool 
of foreign adventure for the calm of government 
at home. We may well enquire how far three 
crowded and strenuous campaigns have transformed 
our hero. It is impossible that the deeds done at 
Breslau, Mollwitz, Klein Schnellendorf, Olmiitz, and 
Chotusitz and the strenuous toil of twenty months 
in departments new to him should have left no 
mark upon himself. The story outlined in the 
foregoing chapter suggests that he moved from place 
to place and from task to task with great speed and 
that his life, perhaps even his throne, were more 
than once in danger. But it can convey no ade- 
quate idea of the inundation of ambassadors, gen- 
erals, messengers, officials, and busybodies which 
daily surged in upon the King. Frederick, it must 
be remembered, was his own commander-in-chief 
and his own prime minister at a time when, as he 
himself confessed in later years, he had not the 
least knowledge of war, when, owing to his father's 

128 



1 



1742-1745] The Second Struggle for Silesia 129 

jealous absolutism, he had had the briefest possible 
experience of diplomacy, and when his powers both 
in war and in diplomacy were taxed by the pro- 
blems of a newly- won province which must be con- 
ciliated at all costs. 

The strain was indeed severe. Under it Fred- 
erick became more statesmanlike but not more 
humane. After a course of the waters at Aix-la- 
Chapelle, he diverted himself as of old with litera- 
ture and the society of wits. But he made no effort 
to improve his domestic life. His queen had re- 
tired to Schonhausen, a modest country-house in 
the dreary plain which lies on the north side of 
Berlin — a dwelling so remote that the swift ex- 
pansion of recent years has not yet brought it 
within the city. The King's thoughts ran already 
upon a bachelor establishment at Potsdam, the Sans 
Souci of later years, where he might escape from 
the society of his relations to enjoy that of his 
friends. For his subjects he attempted to provide 
few benefits beyond a codification of the law — 
little enough for one who had held out hope of a 
revolution in the art of kingship. It is true that he 
built the great Opera House at Berlin, that he 
lavished money upon actors and musicians, and that 
he endowed an Academy of Sciences. But he made 
French the only vehicle of learned and literary 
thought ; and though Berlin might shine in Europe, 
the Prussian people gained little benefit thereby. 

The King even enjoyed for a time the society of 
Voltaire, at that time the King of Letters. The 
transaction is characteristic of the age. The bril- 



130 Frederick the Great [1742- 

liant Frenchman, having quarrelled with his peers 
at home, obtained from Louis XV. an informal 
commission to pry into the secrets of Prussia. Be- 
fore leaving France, he vented his spleen in a parcel 
of epigrams upon Louis and his subjects, which 
he sent in all secrecy to his affectionate admirer, 
P'rederick. The latter, thinking to close the doors 
of France to his guest and so to cage him at Berlin, 
published them all at Paris. Both betrayals failed. 
As a diplomat Voltaire extracted only banter from 
his patron and disciple, while Frederick found that 
Louis XV. was indeed what Voltaire had termed 
him — " the most stupid of kings," for the epigrams 
did not sting him. 

Frederick's wider experience of life, it is clear, 
had rather hardened his heart than softened it. 
As a king he had developed, faster doubtless than 
in time of peace, along the lines with which we are 
already familiar. He was still conspicuously ener- 
getic, imperious, and mercantile. His energy is 
the more striking by contrast with the habit of 
his contemporaries. Philip of Spain was sluggishly 
obeying his wife. Louis of France, whom Frederick 
termed a good man whose only fault was that he 
was King, was toying with mistresses, patronising 
sieges, and pointing out the faults in a policy which 
he was too indolent to cheek. Augustus of Saxony 
was sacrificing his armies lest he should be late for 
the opera. The Czarina Elizabeth has been de- 
scribed as " bobbing about in that unlovely whirl- 
pool of intrigues, amours, devotions, and strong 
liquor, which her history is." In a word, the 



1745] The Second Struggle for Silesia 131 

princes of Europe still in great part looked on their 
office as an inheritance to be enjoyed. Meanwhile, 
the King of Prussia was rising at dawn, reviewing 
troops, inspecting fortresses, drafting and conning 
despatches, superintending his players, and con- 
stituting himself a judge of appeal for all his 
kingdom. 

Whether judge, general, or stage-manager, he 
was always the King of Prussia, and his naturally 
imperious temper mounted higher day by day. 
His stern treatment of the Old Dessauer and the 
alienation of Schwerin have already been men- 
tioned. In time of peace his ministers met with 
no greater forbearance. They were treated at best 
as clerks, and often as dogs. The faithful Pode- 
wils, who had just rendered priceless services to 
his master in the negotiations with Austria, pre- 
sumed to suggest that the King should remain for 
a time in Silesia. '' Attend to your own affairs, 
Sir," was the reply, "and do not presume to dictate 
whether I ought or ought not to go. Negotiate 
as I order you, and do not be the weak tool of 
English and Austrian impudence." With the same 
imperious brutality Frederick wrote to the honoura- 
ble nobleman who represented him at Vienna. " Do 
not forget, Sir, with what master you have to do, 
and if you take heed of nothing else, take heed for 
your head." 

As with his dependents, so with states weaker 
than his own, Frederick always played the dictator. 
To grace his new opera he had engaged the famous 
dancer Barberina, who was then at Venice. Her 



132 Frederick the Great [1742- 

English lover persuaded her to break the contract 
and remain there and the Doge and Senate professed 
themselves powerless to interfere. Frederick there- 
fore seized a Venetian ambassador in Berlin and 
held him as a hostage, until the Venetians in their 
turn violated justice by sending Barberina a prisoner 
to Berlin. 

With an imperiousness equal to that of his father 
Frederick combined the traditional Hohenzollern 
willingness to buy and sell. He failed to buy 
Silesia, but he succeeded in buying Glatz. The 
county of Glatz belonged to Bohemia, and in 1741 
Frederick recognised Charles Albert as King of 
Bohemia. From him he purchased territory which 
the Bavarian had never possessed and which he 
could never hope to possess without foreign aid. 
The Prussians conquered the country and in 1742 
Maria Theresa offered to cede it. Thereupon the 
King accepted from Austria what he had declared 
to belong to Bavaria and announced that he was 
no longer bound to pay the purchase money agreed 
upon. 

Frederick seems to be still in all essentials the 
man whose development we have traced from his 
birth to his accession. He is tougher, as it were, 
in mind and body alike. He has thrown off the 
feeble health of his earlier years and the lust for 
mere adventure which possessed him in the twen- 
ties. But experience has only added to his trust 
in himself, to his belief that '' negotiations without 
arms are music without instruments," that war de- 
termines disputes, and that bravery and leadership 



1745] The Second Strttggle for Silesia 133 

determine war. His faith in prompt and decided 
action was never more conspicuous than in 1744, 
when on the death of its prince without lineal heirs, 
he seized Eastern Frisia. Hanover also had claims 
to the land, but nothing could withstand the speed 
with which the Prussians made this miniature Silesia 
their own and thus acquired in Emden an outlet 
on the North Sea. 

Frederick's schemes are, indeed, so daring, and 
his acts so swift and decisive, that many have be- 
lieved — as he himself seems to have believed at the 
time — that he was gifted with almost superhuman 
insight and rose superior to human weakness. It 
may, therefore, be well to cite the words in which 
Professor Koser of Bonn, the greatest living authority 
upon the subject, has set down his impression of the 
King as he was at the end of the First Silesian War. 

"To us he seems neither superhuman nor inhuman, a 
man not ready made and complete, but still in process 
of growth. The cold ' satanic ' calculator shows himself 
more than once a sanguine man, a man of impulse. 
Sometimes insolent and sometimes almost faint-hearted, 
he lets his bearing be easily decided by the impressions 
of the moment. In his haste and heat and lack of ex- 
perience he makes plenty of mistakes, not only in war, 
but also in politics. He does not look far into the future, 
and sometimes, however near to his heart lies his good 
repute, he takes no thought for it in time to come. And 
as he himself later admits, he owes a great part of his 
successes to fortune and to chance. In one word, we 
grant plenty of what the King, grown more mature, has 
described as the ' giddiness ' of his younger years." 



#. 



134 FVederick the Great [1742- 

When Frederick, pleading that in shipwreck each 
must save himself, forsook his allies in the summer 
of 1742, he did so with certain definite intentions. 
He wished to give Prussia time to digest Silesia, and 
Europe time to accustom herself to Prussia. " The 
only question now," he wrote to Podewils, "is to 
accustom the cabinets of Europe to see us in the 
position which this war has given us, and I believe 
that much moderation and much good temper to- 
wards all our neighbours will lead to that result." 
The words breathe peace, but peace only so long as 
it was both safe and profitable for Prussia. " The 
safety of our new possessions," he had just pointed 
out, " rests on a large and efficient army, a full treas- 
ury, powerful fortresses and showy alliances which 
easily impose upon the world." For a time, it is 
clear, the King intended to revert to the old policy 
of drilling men and saving money. But it seems 
equally clear that if all went well the question which 
Frederick propounded in 1740 would in due course 
present itself again. " When one has an advantage 
is he to use it or not ? " Is it reasonable to suppose 
that the conqueror of Silesia would in future answer 
No? 

For the present, however, while the Prussian sys- 
tem of government was being established in Silesia, 
Frederick scanned every rise and fall of the political 
barometer. What he saw made him at first con- 
gratulate himself on having forsaken a losing cause 
before it was too late. Early in September, 1742, 
the Saxons quitted the war empty-handed, and it 
was evident that France repented of her share in it. 



1745] The Second Struggle for Silesia 135 

Before the end of the year her troops had been 
driven out of almost all Bohemia, and in January, 
1743, the death of Fleury deprived her of what unity 
in policy and administration she still possessed. 
Worse than all else, the Sea Powers now entered 
vigorously into the war. George II. was anxious to 
protect Hanover ; Carteret and the English people 
longed to strike a blow at their natural enemy, 
France ; and the importunity of England at length 
induced the Dutch to move. 

Frederick, though he had arranged affairs in Russia 
to his liking, had, therefore, every reason to fear lest 
Austria should grow strong enough to turn against 
himself. He was annoyed beyond measure by the 
news of King George's lucky victory over the French 
at Dettingen on June 27, 1743. " The devil fly away 
with my uncle," he wrote to Podewils. He declared 
that he would never hear the name of France again. 
*' Noailles is beaten, and by whom ? By people who 
do not understand how to draw up a line of battle, 
and who, in fact, did not draw one up." Frederick's 
disgust was only increased by the fact that his mili- 
tary criticism was well founded. Owing to George's 
want of skill, Noailles had caught his army in a trap, 
from which it escaped only by calm courage and 
desperate fighting hand to hand. " I have tolerably 
well foreseen everything that has passed in Europe 
hitherto," wrote the King of Prussia, " but for this 
blow I was not prepared." 

Dettingen and the fear of worse to follow im- 
pelled Frederick to take up arms anew. Early in 
September, 1743, he visited Wilhelmina at Baireuth 



136 Frederick the Great [1742- 

and endeavoured in vain to organise a league of 
German princes to rescue the Emperor. The Aus- 
trian diplomats were more successful. In the same 
month, by a treaty made at Worms, they secured 
the definite alliance of England and Sardinia. Fred- 
erick noticed with some alarm that the Treaty of 
BerHn, which gave him Silesia, was not treated at 
Worms as indispensable to the future of Germany. 
In December a compact more distinctly menacing to 
Prussia, should she again interfere in the war, was 
concluded between Austria and Saxony. 

Early in the new year (1744), therefore, Frederick 
turned unabashed to France. He offered to join 
her in a war which both parties should pledge them- 
selves to continue until Bohemia should have been 
wrested from the Queen. The Emperor was to re- 
ceive the greater part of the kingdom, but Prussia, as 
in 1742, claimed the four Bohemian circles east of the 
Elbe and also that fringe of Silesia which the Treaty 
of Berlin had left in Austrian hands. Early in June 
all was arranged. By the so-called Union of Frank- 
fort some share in the undertaking was promised by 
the Elector Palatine and the Landgrave of Hesse- 
Cassel. But the substantial allies were, as in the 
earlier war, France, Prussia, and Bavaria. The gen- 
eral plan agreed upon was that France should crip- 
ple the Sea Powers by attacking the Netherlands 
and Hanover. If the result was to bring an Aus- 
trian army into Alsace, Frederick promised in his 
turn to cripple Austria by flinging eighty thousand 
men into Bohemia. In that case the French under- 
took to make another campaign in the East. 



1745] The Second Struggle for Silesia 137 

The motives which inspired Frederick to take 
action are so clear that there is no need to seek 
them in the solemn accusation against Austria which 
he gave to the world in August. He deemed it ex- 
pedient to take up the attitude of a German patriot, 
who, after exhausting the resources of negotiation, 
was driven to repel by force the conspiracy of the 
Queen of Hungary against the constitution of the 
Empire. 

" The race of those Germans of old, who for so many 
centuries defended their fatherland and their liberties 
against all the majesty of the Roman Empire, still sur- 
vives, and will make the same defence to-day against 
those who dare to conspire against them. ... In 
one word, the King asks for nothing and with him there 
is no question whatever of personal interests. His Maj- 
esty has recourse to arms only to restore liberty to 
the Empire, the sceptre to the Emperor and peace to 
Europe." 

Such was the Prussian account of the origin of the 
Second Silesian War. 

Frederick again resorted to the method of simul- 
taneous parley and stroke which had served so well 
when he seized Silesia. On the same day (August 
7, 1744) that his ambassador at Vienna announced 
his crusade to rescue the Emperor, he himself aston- 
ished the Saxons by showing them the Emperor's 
order to permit the passage of Prussian troops. It 
is characteristic of the tangled politics of the time 
that Prussia and Saxony remained technically at 
peace with each other while Frederick, as the Em- 
peror's servant, led sixty thousand men up the Elbe 



138 Frederick the Great [1742- 

into Bohemia and Augustus, as the ally of the Queen 
of Hungary, sent twenty thousand men to act against 
him. For the moment Frederick profited by his 
speed. At the beginning of September he lay be- 
fore Prague and joined forces with twenty thou- 
sand men whom Schwerin had brought from Silesia. 
Eighty thousand Prussians were thus assembled in 
the heart of Bohemia, and on September i6th they 
took the capital. 

The appearance of success was, however, delusive. 
Far from being panic-stricken by Frederick's sud- 
den spring, the scrupulous Queen rejoiced to see 
him break the treaty which gave him a title to 
Silesia. From every point of the compass she sum- 
moned forces to defend Bohemia. The army of 
Alsace recrossed the Rhine with great skill and 
marched eastwards. They were undisturbed by the 
French, among whom Frederick's treacheries were 
passing into a proverb : — se battre pour le rot de 
Prusse, to fight without reward. Clouds of irregular 
horse issued from Hungary. The Saxons were 
marching southwards. The people of Bohemia 
showed themselves hostile to the Prussians and 
assisted an Austrian army to maintain itself in the 
kingdom. What course, we may ask, was the wisest 
for a commander surrounded by so many dangers? 

After the fall of Prague Frederick lay in the cen- 
tre of Bohemia, a kingdom walled in by a quadri- 
lateral of mountains. He held the north-eastern 
gates which led into Silesia. The south-western 
led into Bavaria, and through them the army of 
Alsace was soon to enter. But at the head of nearly 



1745] The Second Struggle for Silesia 139 

80,000 men the King was vastly stronger than any 
single force that could be brought against him and 
his communications with Prussia were safe. There 
was therefore much to be said for a simple defensive 
policy. North-eastern Bohemia was the prize that 
Frederick hoped to gain by the war, and this he 
could have held like a second Silesia. Such a de- 
sertion of his allies would, however, have shocked 
public opinion, particularly in France, and Frederick 
admits that he shrank from it on that account. 

The next best course, if some offensive movement 
must be made, would have been first to crush the 
army of Bohemia and then to hold the south-western 
gate against the army of Alsace. This course was 
advised by Schwerin and favoured by the King. 
But the fatal influence of Belleisle proved stronger 
than the promptings of common-sense. France was 
avenged for the treacheries of Klein Schnellendorf 
and Berlin when Frederick allowed himself to be 
persuaded 'to strike due south, in the hope of 
conquering Bohemia, opening communications with 
Bavaria, and cowing Vienna. 

At first the plan prospered. Several towns were 
captured for the Emperor, and by October 4, 1744, 
the Prussians had almost reached the frontier of 
Austria proper. Then they began to realise that 
they were the dupes of a mirage. The armies of Bo- 
hemia and of Alsace had united in their rear and lay 
between them and Prague. They found themselves 
isolated, ill fed, and worse informed. Swarms of 
light horse enveloped them, cutting off convoys, 
scouts, and messengers. Schwerin opened a line of 



140 Frederick the Great 11742- 

retreat, but their recent conquests were lost with the 
garrisons which held them. The Austrians had 
found a soldier, Field-marshal Traun, and at his 
hands Frederick received painful lessons in the art 
of war. The King had already begun to negotiate. 
He thirsted for French co-operation and a pitched 
battle, but could obtain neither boon. Traun, who 
was now superior in numbers, had no need to fight. 
He occupied unassailable positions to the north of 
Frederick's force and left hunger, disease, and irregu- 
lars to do their work upon the enemy. Thus har- 
assed, the Prussian rank and file deserted by 
thousands, and many offered their services to Traun. 
Schwerin again took umbrage and withdrew from 
the campaign. 

Step by step the reluctant King was driven 
towards Silesia. Before the end of November it 
was plain that his whole enterprise must be aban- 
doned. It was mid-December before the last de- 
tachments of some 40,000 men, the remnant of 
his 80,000, straggled across the mountains to the 
friendly walls of Glatz. Thanks to the determina- 
tion of Maria Theresa, a postscript had yet to be 
added to the history of the campaign. In the spirit 
of her own Hungarians, who scorned to provide a 
commissariat because their forefathers had journeyed 
from Asia to the Land of the Five Rivers without 
one, the Queen dictated a winter assault upon Si- 
lesia. The Old Dessauer, whom Frederick had left 
in command, at length succeeded in clearing the 
province of anything like an Austrian army, but it 
was not till February that the Prussians were able 




FREDERICK THE SECOND, KINQ OF PRUSSIA. 

AFTER THE PAINTING BY F. BOCK. 



174-5] The Second Struggle for Silesia 141 

to go into winter quarters. Thus a campaign which 
had begun with the conquest of Bohemia came to an 
end to the sound of Te Deums sung at Berlin for the 
deliverance of Silesia. Europe began to suspect 
that the sword of Traun had pricked the Prussian 
bubble. 

The anxiety with which Frederick awaited the 
spring of 1745, when he must expect to have to 
fight in earnest for Silesia, was rendered more in- 
tense by a sudden change in the attitude of his 
allies. He had joined in the struggle with the ex- 
pectation that Austria would be attacked by the 
French and hampered both by the war in Italy and 
by the forces of the Emperor. On January 20th, 
how^ever, Charles Albert died, and the youth who 
succeeded him was soon beaten to his knees. By 
the Treaty of Fiissen, in April, Austria and Bavaria 
agreed to ignore the past ; and the latter for the first 
time guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction and pro- 
mised to vote for the husband of Maria Theresa at the 
imperial election. The effect of this treaty upon 
Frederick's position will be appreciated when it is 
borne in mind that the road from France to Austria 
passed through Bavaria, while the Austrian Nether- 
lands, which France coveted, lay at her very door. 
Thus it was easy to suspect that in the coming cam- 
paign Prussia would receive little effective help from 
France. Suspicion passed into certainty when Louis 
XV. elected to accompany his army in person. 

The campaign of 1745 might therefore be expected 
to fall into two separate halves. In the Netherlands, 
France would be pitted against the Sea Powers and an 



142 Frederick the Great [1742- 

Austrian contingent, while in Silesia Austria would 
make a great effort against Prussia. At the same 
time the secondary struggle of Austria with Spain 
and France would go on in Italy, while French and 
Austrian corps would guard the Rhine. It is 
evident at a glance that the withdrawal of the French 
and Bavarians must greatly improve the prospects of 
Austria with regard to Silesia. And when (May, 1745) 
she was joined by Saxony, whose help all parties 
desired, in an undertaking to make no peace until 
Frederick should resign Silesia and Glatz to the one 
and part of his hereditary dominions to the other, 
the Queen might well be sanguine. Much of her 
advantage was, however, thrown away by an error 
common to Hapsburg rulers, who are wont to believe 
that no family is so fitted as their own for command. 
The invasion of Silesia was entrusted to Prince 
Charles of Lorraine, the nominal leader of the army 
in the previous year, while Traun, the real author of 
the Austrian success, was sent to watch the Imperial 
election at Frankfort. The consequence was that 
the Austrians did not move till May, and that they 
were worse generalled than the Prussians. 

Meanwhile Frederick had been assiduous in pre- 
paring for war and in negotiating to avoid it. 
He was ready to put 80,000 foot and 30,000 
horse into the field : but he had sued in vain for 
the alliance of Saxony and the aid of England 
and of Russia. The King, who in 1740 had offered 
millions to Maria Theresa and planned a partition 
of her dominions, must in 1745 implore Louis XV. 
for a subsidy to avert the partition of his own. But 



1745] The Second Struggle for Silesia 143 

the danger to Prussia, though real, was not yet as 
overwhelming as her enemies believed. " Excellent 
bearskin to be slit into straps," chuckles Frederick's 
admirer, ** only the bear is still on his feet." 

The King could still count upon two mighty allies, 
— upon his army, whose spirit had been restored by 
the successes of the Old Dessauer in the defence of 
Silesia, and upon himself. Both grew year by year 
more valuable. At this crisis, as events were soon to 
prove, Frederick's spirit was worthy of the Queen 
herself. " I have made it a point of honour," he 
wrote to Podewils on April 27, 1745, "to contribute 
more than any other to the aggrandisement of my 
House. I have played a leading part among the 
crowned heads of Europe. These are so many per- 
sonal engagements which I have taken and which I 
am resolved to fulfil even at the cost of my fortune 
and my life." Since the middle of March he had been 
making ready in Silesia, and in April he sent home 
directions for carrying on the government if Berlin 
should be in danger. 

Next month he learned that his French allies, who 
were bent on capturing Tournay, had gained a great 
victory at Fontenoy (nth May, 1745). He re- 
ceived the news with mixed feehngs. He had been 
striving to find w^ords which might force into the 
mind of Louis XV. the truth that victories in the 
Netherlands would do nothing for the common 
cause in Germany. " We beg the King of France," 
he wrote, " not to imagine that any efforts of his in 
Flanders can procure the least relief for the King of 
Prussia. If the Spaniards land in the Canary Islands, 



T44 Frederick the Great [1742- 

if the King of France takes Tournay, or if Thamas 
Kuli-Chan besieges Babylon it is all one," since such 
feats could not influence the war in Bohemia and 
Moravia. Yet it was not disheartening to know that 
Dettingen had been avenged and that other foes of 
Austria could more than hold their own. With re- 
newed hope, Frederick bent all his energies to the 
task of holding Silesia. 

The King had learned much from Traun, and he 
was no longer compelled to consult the interests of 
his allies. He therefore avoided the mistakes of the 
former year. In 1745 his clear gaze penetrated the 
heart of the problem which he had to solve, and he 
followed the right course with the coolest daring. 
Silesia, he knew, was divided from the country of 
the enemy by a mountain rampart more than three 
hundred miles in length and pierced by many roads. 
Veiled by clouds of light horse, Prince Charles 
might choose any of these roads without betraying 
his choice to the army of defence. What Neipperg 
had accomplished when he entered Silesia in 1741 
might be repeated by Prince Charles on a greater 
scale, and with less favour from fortune the Prussians 
might this time be crushed in detail. Frederick 
therefore drove sentiment from his breast, aban- 
doned south-eastern Silesia to the Hungarians, and 
concentrated all his force in the neighbourhood of 
Neisse, a stronghold which the Prussians had made 
impregnable. His design was to admit the invaders 
to Silesia in the hope of catching them at a dis- 
advantage and of destroying their enterprise at a 
blow. 



1745] The Second Struggle for Silesia 145 

The result was that, when the allies came, they 
came in the highest spirits. Their progress had been 
as fortunate as they could have hoped. First, as usual, 
troops of wild riders poured into Silesia from the 
south-east. They enjoyed the success which Fred- 
erick's plan assured to them, and treason among his 
soldiers gave them Cosel, a fortress on the upper 
Oder. Then Prince Charles moved northward from 
Koniggratz into the mountains and 30,000 Saxons 
joined him on the way. On June 3, 1745, the com- 
bined army marched proudly down into the plain. 
Breslau lay little more than two days' march to the 
north-east of them. 

The fixed idea of Prince Charles was that Fred- 
erick would behave in 1745 as he had behaved in 
1744; that is to say, that he would retreat. This 
delusion had been carefully fostered by the King. 
Discovering that one of the spies whom he kept in 
the Austrian camp was in fact selling Prussian secrets 
to the enemy, Frederick cleverly hinted to him that 
he was afraid of being cut off from Breslau. The 
spy informed Prince Charles, who readily gave credit 
to information which confirmed his previous belief. 
Frederick then ordered some repairs on the roads 
leading to the capital and supplied further proof of 
his intention, if any were needed, by leaving the 
passes unguarded. Prince Charles therefore emerged 
from the mountains in entire ignorance of the fact 
that he was to be attacked by a force of 70,000 men. 
The invaders encamped upon a plain some five miles 
broad and as flat as the field of Mollwitz, with the 
little town of Hohenfriedberg on the edge of the 



146 Frederick the Great [1742- 

mountains to their rear, and Striegau, a place of 
greater size, on the hills before them. The Saxon 
vanguard, which had already been in contact with 
the enemy, was instructed to seize Striegau next 
morning, if the Prussians still ventured to hold 
it. ** There can be no God in heaven," said Prince 
Charles, '* if we do not win this battle." 

Frederick's camp lay almost at right angles to 
the line of the allies between Hohenfriedberg and 
Striegau. That night (June 3-4, 1745) the Prussians 
stole silently from their stations, crossed a stream 
which separated them from the enemy, and ranged 
themselves before him in line of battle. At dawn 
they began a general attack as furious as it was un- 
expected. The Saxons, always unfortunate in war, 
were the first to suffer, and their dogged resistance 
only increased their loss. The Austrian infantry 
stood firm, but their cavalry could no longer face 
the Prussians. Thus the Austrian centre and right 
wing, though favoured by the ground, could gain no 
advantage sufficient to compensate for the disasters 
of the Saxons on the left. Hohenfriedberg was a 
soldiers* battle, and the decisive stroke was an irre- 
sponsible charge of the Baireuth dragoons, who 
dashed at the enemy through a dangerous gap in 
the Prussian line. The shock carried all before it. 
More than sixty standards were captured by this 
regiment alone. By eight o'clock in the morning 
the Austrians were in retreat towards the mountains 
and the invasion of Silesia was at an end. 

The allied army fled so quickly, writes the his- 
torian of the EvangeHcal church at Hohenfriedberg, 



1745J The Second Struggle for Silesia 147 

that little damage was done in the place, and the in- 
habitants were soon able to bear what succour they 
could to the wounded, who lay in thousands on the 
plain below. In about four hours' fighting the vic- 
tors had lost more than 4000 men killed or wounded, 
and the vanquished about 10,000. These figures do 
not, however, represent one tithe of the advantage 
which Frederick gained at Hohenfriedberg. He had 
reduced the aUied army by some 25,000 men, of 
whom 7000 were prisoners and many more deserters. 
Every German army at that time included thousands 
of professional soldiers who fought for either side 
indifferently and preferred the victors' pay to their 
pursuit. Thousands more fought against their will, 
and the retreat through mountains gave them an 
opportunity to slip away. For a month the Prus- 
sians hung in the rear of the allies and drove them 
as far as Koniggratz. Instead of his defensive atti- 
tude in Silesia, Frederick now took up a defensive- 
offensive in Bohemia, a plan which was as creditable 
to his strategy as the battle had been to his tactics. 
Above all other advantages he had gained this at 
Hohenfriedberg — that he could henceforth trust his 
cavalry. Worthless at Mollwitz, respectable at Chotu- 
sitz, at Hohenfriedberg they proved themselves su- 
perb. The panel which commemorates the victory 
in the Prussian Hall of Fame portrays the dragoons 
swooping down upon the white-clad infantry of 
Austria. 

The triumph of Frederick the Warrior on this 
bloody fourth of June revealed interesting glimpses 
of Frederick the man. In his first transports of 



148 Frederick the Great [1742 

delight he hugged the French ambassador and aston- 
ished him by owning gratitude to God. *' So decisive 
a defeat," he informed his mother, " has not been 
since Blenheim." He believed that the Queen would 
now come to terms, and wrote to Podewils that it 
must have softened the heart of Pharaoh. His de- 
hght found vent in music, and he composed his 
March of Hohenfriedberg. But soon the states- 
man reappeared. None of these ebullitions clouded 
his insight into the situation of affairs. He saw 
clearly that his aims of the year before were still 
impracticable, that what he needed was peace, and 
that his victory must have brought peace nearer 
by discouraging the enemy. 

It is true that now, as so often before, Frederick 
underrated the firmness of the Queen. He was 
further disappointed by the unyielding attitude of 
Augustus, who possessed a dangerous patron in 
the Czarina. But England, the paymaster of the 
coalition, had no stomach for a war of vengeance 
against Prussia. To her the Austrian alliance was 
merely an investment. It would be profitable only 
if it produced hard fighting against her real foes, 
the French. Fontenoy, where the Sea Powers had 
been left to do their own fighting, shook her faith 
in her Hapsburg ally, and the conduct of the 
Eastern campaign showed that the Queen's thoughts 
centred on the recovery of the province which 
England had induced her to give up. At this 
juncture England herself was attacked. The in- 
vasion of the Pretender compelled her to recall her 
troops from the Continent and favoured the conven- 



17451 The Second Struggle for Silesia 149 

tion which was concluded at Hanover towards the 
end of August. By the Convention of Hanover, 
signed on the 26th August, 1745, Frederick a third 
time deserted the French. He promised to vote for 
Francis at the Imperial election on condition that 
Silesia should be guaranteed to him by all Europe, 
while George H. undertook to induce Austria to 
renew the Treaty of Berlin within six weeks. 

The good ofifices of England, which as usual con- 
sisted in pressing the Queen to buy off her enemies, 
were entirely useless. At the end of August Aus- 
tria and Saxony drew closer together, and on Sep- 
tember 13th the House of Hapsburg regained its 
old prestige by the election of Francis as Emperor. 
Soon afterwards Frederick perceived that he had 
exhausted the supplies of north-eastern Bohemia 
and began to retire towards Silesia. By the end of 
September he had crossed the Elbe and encamped 
with 18,000 men at the foot of the mountains near 
the village of Soor. There something like his own 
manoeuvre of Hohenfriedberg was practised upon 
him by Prince Charles with an army almost double 
the size of Frederick's. Under cover of darkness the 
Austrians took up positions commanding the Prus- 
sian camp. Only the King's swift grasp of the situ- 
ation and the wonderful skill and speed of his troops 
averted a great disaster. In a five hours' fight the 
Austrians were driven off, leaving more than 4000 
men on the field and more than 3000 in the enemy's 
hands. The number of Prussian casualties exceeded 
3000 — a heavy price to pay for bad scouting. Fred- 
erick was, moreover, put to great inconvenience by 



150 Frederick the Great [1742- 

the sack of his camp and the capture of his secre- 
tary, the silent, assiduous Eichel. 

At Soor, Frederick gained a safe retreat to Silesia 
and a lesson to be careful in the future. But victory- 
made him inattentive to the lesson. The behaviour 
of his men had been beyond all praise. They formed 
under fire ; the cavalry charged up-hill and routed 
the enemy, and the infantry, though unsupported, 
attacked superior numbers and captured batteries. 
The King, not unnaturally, began to beheve that 
there was nothing which he and his soldiers could 
not accomplish. The result, in a future as yet far 
distant, was great glory mingled with great disaster. 

During the winter months the Prussian rank and 
file gathered fresh laurels. Once more Frederick 
believed that he had tamed the Queen and once 
more he found himself mistaken. As in every pre- 
vious year of the Silesian wars, Maria Theresa or- 
dered an attack upon her enemy in the winter. 
This of 1745 was threefold and the goal was not 
Breslau but Berlin. Prince Charles's army was to 
march from Bohemia into Saxony and to join with 
the Saxons in a march to Frankfurt-on-Oder, while 
10,000 men detached by Traun crossed Germany 
and seized Berlin. Enough of this elaborate plan 
was blabbed to the Swedish ambassador by the 
Saxon Premier, Count Briihl, to put Frederick upon 
his guard. His own army had gone into winter 
quarters. A force under the Old Dessauer, which 
had been stationed for some time at Halle in readi- 
ness to spring at the throat of Saxony, was likewise 
laid up for the winter. Podewils and the Old Des- 



1745] The Second Struggle fo7^ Silesia 151 

sauer refused to credit a scheme at once so grand- 
iose and so dangerous to the Saxons, who in case 
of failure would be left at the mercy of Prussia. 
The King, however, overruled them, rushed into 
Silesia, collected 35,000 men, marched for some days 
parallel with the unsuspecting Prince Charles, and 
on November 23, 1745, crushed his Saxon vanguard 
at Hennersdorf. At this blow the whole enterprise 
collapsed. The Austrians retired into Bohemia, fol- 
lowed by Augustus and Count Briihl, who stub- 
bornly rejected the Prussian overtures for peace. 

Meanwhile the Old Dessauer, who had captured 
Leipzig, was making for Dresden under urgent or- 
ders to attack the Saxon force wherever he might 
find it. Four armies were at this time converging 
upon the capital. The Saxons under Count Ru- 
towski, with whom were the Austrian contingent 
from the West, formed a force of 35,000 men and lay 
to the westward of the Elbe and of the city. The 
Old Dessauer, having secured Meissen, had provided 
a bridge across the river by which Frederick march- 
ing from the East could join him in case of need. 
But Prince Charles with 46,000 men was advancing 
towards Dresden from the side of Bohemia, and 
Frederick feverishly urged his veteran lieutenant to 
strike a speedy blow. If the allies were to join 
forces the war might be prolonged and it seemed 
likely that Russia would attack Prussia in the 
spring. 

Prince Charles was in fact only five miles distant 
when, on December 15th, the Old Dessauer came 
upon Rutowski strongly posted at Kesselsdorf. 



152 Frederick the Great [1742- 

** Heavenly Father," prayed the old man in the 
hearing of his devoted soldiers, " graciously aid me 
this day : but if Thou shouldest not be so disposed, 
at least lend not Thy aid to those scoundrels the 
enemy, but passively await the issue." The task of 
the infantry was even harder than that of capturing 
the batteries at Soor. Twice they were repulsed 
with a loss of nearly 1500 men out of 3600. But 
the usual impetuosity of armies not perfectly trained 
came to their aid. The Saxons in the intoxication 
of victory charged from the entrenchments, only to 
be routed by the Prussian horse. This proved the 
turning-point in a battle which cost Rutowski 3000 
men killed and wounded and twice as many taken 
prisoner. 

The Prussians lost some 4600 men, but they 
gained peace. Prince Charles fled once more into 
Bohemia and Dresden made no resistance. In the 
hour of triumph Frederick's bearing was admirable* 
All through the winter campaign he had showered 
insults upon the Old Dessauer, a prince born the year 
after Fehrbellin and hero of well-nigh half a hundred 
battles and sieges. " My field-marshal is the only 
person who either cannot or will not understand my 
plain commands." " You go as slowly as though you 
were determined to deprive me of my advantage." 
Such were the royal words which had goaded the 
old man into attempting the impossible at Kessels- 
dorf, where he exposed himself recklessly and re- 
ceived three balls through his clothing. Now he 
enjoyed as ample amends as Frederick's conception 
of the royal dignity permitted him to bestow. On 



1745] The Second Struggle for Silesia 153 

the day after the battle the King sprang from his 
horse at sight of him, advanced to meet him with 
doffed hat, embraced him, and accepted his guidance 
over the field. 

At Dresden Frederick stayed eight days and 
showed himself anxious to please. He entered the 
city, it is true, as a conqueror, in a carriage drawn 
by eight horses, and he exacted a million thalers 
from the land. But he visited and honoured the 
children of Augustus, played a leading part in the 
society of the place, attended church and opera 
on Sunday, and in general acted with the utmost 
moderation. 

In the existing political situation, such conduct 
was no less politic than humane. In spite of his 
triumph over the Saxons, Frederick's position was 
far from secure. Augustus was only a recent recruit 
in the phalanx of kings arrayed against Prussia. 
Russia, his patron, had yet to be reckoned with 
The army of Prince Charles was unbroken. South- 
ern Silesia was flooded with Hungarians. Traun 
might yet leave the Rhine and revive the painful 
memories of 1744. In face of all these dangers 
Frederick had no reserves. His treasury was empty 
and the anger of the French at the Convention of 
Hanover forbade him to expect assistance from 
them. These considerations made him willing to 
name a low price for peace. Even when fleeing 
from Traun in 1744 he had demanded a part of 
Bohemia. Now after four victories he stipulated 
only that Austria should renew the Treaty of Ber- 
lin. Maria Theresa was thus confronted with the 



154 



Frederick the Great [1742-1?45] 



painful choice between abandoning, at least for the 
present, all hope of recovering Silesia and resigning 
the help of the Sea Powers, on which her hope of 
retaining Italy depended. The Saxon alliance had 
broken down, a negotiation with France was unsuc- 
cessful, and the Queen wisely consented to accept 
Frederick's terms. At Dresden on Christmas Day, 
1745, treaties were signed which restored peace to 
a great part of Germany and closed the Second 
Silesian War. 




CHAPTER VI 

THE TEN years' PEACE, 1746-1756 

TWO Silesian wars, episodes in the eight years of 
general turmoil produced by the Austrian 
Succession question, had now been brought 
by Frederick to a fortunate end. The Hapsburgs 
once more possessed the Imperial crown, but the 
Hohenzollerns were masters of Silesia and their days 
of vassalage were over. 

The course of history has shown that by gaining 
Silesia Prussia enabled herself to become in time 
the principal German state. From this time on- 
ward, the Teutonic elements in the Hapsburg realm 
became more and more outweighed by the rest, 
until in 1866 Austria, as a Power whose political 
centre was Buda-Pest, was finally expelled from Ger- 
many. In 1745, it is true, the full significance of the 
transfer of Silesia was felt rather than understood. 
But it was felt strongly enough to prevent Frederick 
from deluding himself with the vain belief that Aus- 
tria would be easily reconciled to her loss, or that 
she regarded the Peace of Dresden as more sacred 
than the Peace of Berlin. The Queen, it was said, 
could not behold a Silesian without tears. Her 

155 



156 Frederick the Great [1746- 

spirit was so high that she is beHeved to have 
thought seriously of becoming her own commander- 
in-chief, and her resources grew greater with every 
year of peace. 

Frederick's task of holding what he had so lightly 
seized in 1740 therefore grew no less difficult as time 
went on. He had good reason for remaining con- 
stant to the principle which he professed at Dresden : 
" I would not henceforth attack a cat, except to de- 
fend myself." His policy, as he wrote in his Testa- 
ment of 1752, was to maintain peace as long as 
might be possible without lowering the dignity of 
Prussia. '' We have drawn upon ourselves the envy 
of Europe by the acquisition of Silesia," he confessed. 
" It has put all our neighbours on the alert ; there is 
none who does not distrust us." The ink of the 
Treaty of Dresden was hardly dry ere new plans 
were mooted to blot it out. The attitude of Russia 
towards the victor was menacing, that of Poland 
defiant, and it was easy to see that Austria and 
Saxony had an understanding with the Northern 
Powers which boded him no good. 

Frederick was, however, no longer a novice in 
diplomacy and he knew his own mind. Evading all 
efforts to tempt him back into the whirlpool of war, 
he watched its successive phases till the Peace of 
1748. He saw the Queen turn her energies to Italy, 
while the Sea Powers, who could not maintain 
themselves in the Netherlands without her aid, 
hired troops in the only market open to them and 
brought 35,000 Russians to the Rhine, But the 
value of this new factor in the politics of Western 



1756] The Ten Years Peace 157 

Europe had not been tested when the Peace of Aix- 
la-Chapelle was patched up. Then the exhausted 
combatants entered upon the task of reconstruction, 
in which Frederick had more than two years' start of 
them. To him the peace brought a guarantee by 
all Europe of the treaty by which he held Silesia. 

Imperfect as it was, for it settled no great ques- 
tion, the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle gave pause to the 
armed strife of Europe for eight years. Prussia 
therefore enjoyed a full decade of rest before I7S^) 
when the third and greatest of her struggles for 
Silesia began. She dared not put off her harness, 
but she stood at ease. After the peace her army 
still numbered 135,000 men. But the crowned com- 
mander-in-chief had nov/ a leisure unattainable in time 
of war. His excuse for deserting his ally at Dres- 
den was that he wished to enjoy life and to labour 
for the good of his subjects. Now his opportunity 
had come. It would be strange if a reign of less 
than six years had destroyed the ideal which Fred- 
erick championed in his early treatise on kingcraft. 
Prussia and Europe might well expect that he would 
be, like the great-grandfather of whom he wrote the 
words, " as great in peace as in the bosom of victory," 
and that he would apply his untrammelled power 
to remedy whatever defects his enhghtened insight 
might still discover in the Prussian State. Frederick 
the Warrior had cleared the way for Frederick the 
Reformer. Ought not Prussian history in the fifties 
to be a story of regeneration ? 

The King himself, however, practically omits the 
record of this decade from his history of the reign. 



158 Frederick the Great 11746- 

He assigns as the reason that ''poHtical intrigues 
which lead to nothing deserve no more notice than 
teasing in society, and the particulars of the internal 
administration do not afford sufficient material for 
history/' His great English admirer holds that this 
routine work in itself was eminent, that ^' one day 
these things will deserve to be studied to the bot- 
tom ; and to be set forth, by writing hands that are 
competent, for the instruction and example of Work- 
ers," but that " of Frederick's success in his Law- 
Reforms, in his Husbandries, Commerces and Fur- 
therances, conspicuously great as it was, there is no 
possibility of making careless readers cognisant at 
this day." Carlyle then explains that the visit of 
Voltaire to Frederick and their quarrel is one of the 
few things perfectly knowable in this period and the 
only thing which the populations care to hear. 

The following chapter of this book is written in 
the belief that readers of the story of Frederick may 
well demand, above all else, whether he is justly 
termed "The Great," and if so, in virtue of what 
achievements ? Unless we are willing to answer that 
the title is his of right because he seized Silesia and 
held it against great odds, these questions compel 
us to enquire into his home administration. We 
know well that the ruler is strong only because he 
wields the collective strength of his nation, and that 
his chief task is to render the nation stronger and to 
improve the machinery by which its strength is col- 
lected and exerted. A great ruler is one who, when 
the difficulties which he had to contend with are 
taken into account, is perceived to have accom- 



1756] The Ten Years Peace 159 

plished much more in the performance of this task 
than could be expected from an ordinary man. If 
we find that Frederick improved the lot of his sub- 
jects in a remarkable degree, or that he invented 
beneficial institutions, or devised a system by which 
the future of government in Prussia was assured and 
progress made easy, then we shall have to concede 
to him a right to the title of Great other than that 
which conquest may confer. 

It is of high importance to ascertain at the outset 
of the enquiry how far Frederick was free to act as 
he pleased and to what extent he was fettered by 
constitutional or social ties. His whole manner of 
life, indeed, was such as to suggest the most com- 
plete freedom. From the moment of his father's 
death he was master of his people and of his policy 
as few European potentates have ever been. Auto- 
cracy as well as diligence is stamped upon even the 
externals of his everyday existence. Though his 
stature was not quite five feet seven inches, his ablu- 
tions, when performed at all, shght and few, and his 
dress of the shabbiest, no one ever suggested that 
his presence lacked kingliness. He usually wore an 
old grey hat of soft felt, a faded blue uniform smeared 
with the snuff in which he indulged immoderately, 
and boots which through neglect were of a reddish 
colour. But his bearing, stern and caressing by 
turns, his clarion voice, and his glance which, as a 
contemporary owned, nothing could resist, made him 
the cynosure of whatever company he was in. The 
absence of the customary trappings of royalty ren- 
dered the King of Prussia less formidable to the 



i6o Frederick the Great [1746- 

poor, whom he patronised, while it marked his con- 
tempt for the official and middle classes, whom he 
sometimes allowed to kiss the skirts of his dirty coat. 

Frederick, it need hardly be said, was fully con- 
scious of his own superiority to his subjects in birth, 
address, and talent. During his incognito visit to 
Strasburg in 1740, Marshal Broglie remarked the 
contrast between Frederick and Algarotti on the 
one hand and the awkward Germans of the party on 
the other. The vivacity of the King's circle was 
almost all imported from abroad. Many years later 
the French philosopher d'Alembert stated that Fred- 
erick himself was the only man in Prussia with 
whom it was possible to hold conversation as the 
word was understood in France. The man who by 
right of birth was absolute ruler of Prussia had some 
reason to believe that he was also the greatest poet, 
historian, philosopher, critic, administrator, legislator, 
statesman, captain, and general in his dominions. 

There is perhaps no more conclusive proof of his 
wisdom than that his consciousness of this unique 
endowment did not cause his home policy to be- 
come tyrannical and his foreign policy grandiose. 
From the second fault he was saved by his keen eye 
for realities, which taught him that, as he confessed, 
Prussia was playing a part among the Great Powers 
without being in fact the equal of the rest. That he 
never became a tyrant, was probably due in part to 
natural humanity and in part to the philosophy 
which was his pride. He was often harsh towards 
his subjects, but he proclaimed that his duty was to 
make them happy and he never shed their blood. 



1756] 



The Ten Years Peace i6i 



His threats to execute his ministers were mere in- 
sults. But philosophy did not check one evil to 
which he was inclined by nature and impelled by 
situation. Nothing short of human sympathy could 
have mitigated his contempt for the populace, which 
gathered strength with years. *' My dear Sulzer," 
he replied to an educational theorist who urged that 
men were naturally inclined to good, ** you do not 
know that cursed race as I do." ''It is more prob- 
able," he held, "that we sprang from evil spirits, if 
such things could exist, than from a Being whose 
nature is good." As he rode through the streets of 
his capital on one famous occasion, he came upon 
a group of the discontented staring at a seditious 
cartoon. " Hang it lower down," was his scornful 
order, " so that they need not strain their necks to 
see it." 

To the service of those whom he termed the 
rabble, none the less, Frederick devoted a great 
share of a life of incessant labour. Every day, Sun- 
day and week-day alike, was parcelled out so as to 
contain the greatest possible amount of work. *' It 
is not necessary that I should live," wrote the King, 
" but it is necessary that I should act." He toiled 
for the State and for himself, and, with the exception 
of regular visits to his mother and Madame de Camas, 
he admitted few social claims upon his time. His 
Queen never even saw his favourite home, Sans 
Souci, which he built in the park at Potsdam in 
1747. She knew so little of his affairs that she gave 
a party at Schonhausen while he was lying in ex- 
tremis. The consideration which he denied to her 



1 62 Frederick the Great [174-6- 

he did not give to others whose title to it was less 
strong. As he grew older, he curtailed even the 
short time that he had been wont to spend in his 
capital, and divided the bulk of the year between 
seclusion at Potsdam and the inspection of his 
provinces. 

His habit was to rise at dawn or earlier. The 
first three or four hours of the morning were allotted 
to toilet, correspondence, a desultory breakfast of 
strong coffee and fruit, preceded by a deep draught 
of cold water flavoured with fennel leaves, and flute- 
playing as an accompaniment to meditation on busi- 
ness. Then came one or two hours of rapid work 
with his secretaries, followed by parade, audiences, 
and perhaps a little exercise. Punctually at noon 
Frederick sat down to dinner, which was always the 
chief social event of the day and in later life became 
his only solid meal. He supervised his kitchen like 
a department of State. He considered and often 
amended the bill of fare, which contained the names 
of the cooks responsible for every dish. After din- 
ner he marked with a cross the courses which had 
merited his approval. He inspected his household 
accounts with minute care and proved himself a 
master of domestic economy. The result was 
a dinner that Voltaire considered fairly good for a 
country in which there was no game, no decent 
meat, and no spring chickens. 

Two hours, sometimes even four, were spent at 
table. Occasionally the time was devoted to the 
discussion of important business with high officials, 
but in general Frederick used it to refresh himself 



1756 J The Ten Years Peace 163 

after his six or seven hours of toil. He ate freely, 
preferring highly spiced dishes, drank claret mixed 
with water, and talked incessantly. He was a 
skilful and agreeable host, putting his guests in- 
stantly at their ease, and, by Voltaire's account, 
calling forth wit in others. After dismissing the 
company he returned to his flute, and then put 
the final touches to the morning's business. After 
this he drank coffee and passed some two hours 
in seclusion. During this period he nerved him- 
self for fresh grappling with affairs by plunging 
into hterature. In the year 1749 he produced no 
less than forty works. About six o'clock he was 
ready to receive his lector or to converse with 
artists and learned men. At seven began a small 
concert, in which Frederick himself used often to 
perform. Supper followed, but was brief, unless 
the conversation was of unusual interest. Other- 
wise the King went to bed at about nine o'clock 
and slept five or six hours. In later life he gave 
up suppers, but continued to invite a few friends 
for conversation. He then allowed himself rather 
more sleep. In his last years he lost the power to 
play his flute and with it, apparently, the desire 
to hear music. 

The sketch which has been given of Frederick's 
daily life suggests that whatever his power might 
be, it was not subjected to the interference of 
others. At Potsdam there was no place for the 
ordinary influences which were brought to bear 
upon Kings. Frederick would not endure the 
presence of any woman, and, strictly speaking, he 



164 Frederick the Great [1746- 

had no courtiers. His intimates were not politi- 
cians, but wits and men of letters, for the most 
part of foreign birth. Even those who accused 
him of hideous vices admitted that he never suf- 
fered his accomplices to have the smallest influence 
over him. Eichel and the two other secretaries 
who worked with the King every day were slaves 
rather than counsellors. They lived in such seclu- 
sion that, according to the French ambassador, 
Eichel was never seen by any human being. Dur- 
ing Frederick's last illness, he forced their success- 
ors to attend him at four o'clock in the morning, 
so that the few weeks that might yet remain to 
him should be serviceable to the State, One of 
them fell to the ground in a fit, but the King 
merely summoned another, and went on with the 
business. Through their hands passed Frederick's 
correspondence with his ministers, whom he rarely 
saw. '* In his orders of two lines," grumbled a 
subordinate, '' he announced no reasons." He was 
of course obliged to listen to the ambassadors of 
foreign Powers. As though to avenge himself for 
this, he tolerated no suggestions from his own. He 
desired spies rather than advisers, and often chose 
men of inferior intelligence to fill high diplomatic 
posts. On every hand we find tokens that Fred- 
erick looked to his own breast alone for inspiration 
in the exercise of his power. 

To realise how unfettered was the authority that 
Frederick wielded we must consider the peculiar 
structure of the society over which he ruled and 
of the machinery by which he ruled it. Frederick's 



1756] The Ten Years Peace 165 

Prussia was a state which just a century of strong 
monarchical rule had manufactured out of a num- 
ber of Hohenzollern fiefs. Its basis still remained 
feudal. There were few social classes, and strong 
barriers separated class from class. The career 
open to a Prussian was strictly limited by his birth. 
Between town and country the law reared a divid- 
ing wall, unseen but impassable. Townsmen alone 
were allowed to become manufacturers, merchants, 
and civil servants. They paid a special tax, the 
*' Excise," levied on the articles which they con- 
sumed. They had magistrates of their own choos- 
ing, a relic of the municipal independence which 
the Great Elector had broken down. 

To the countryfolk, on the other hand, the King 
looked for his army. They were divided into two 
great classes ; the nobles, who alone might become 
officers, and the peasants, who were still serfs tied 
to the estates of their lords. The nobles enjoyed 
exemption from ordinary taxes and paid only a 
small feudal rent to the Crown. Upon the should- 
ers of the peasants fell the heavy burden of the 
" Contribution," a direct payment in money. Neither 
they nor the nobles might become craftsmen or 
engage in commerce. The barrier which separated 
the two classes of countryfolk was as firm as that 
which separated both from the dwellers in towns. 
New patents of nobility were rarely granted by the 
King, but all the children of a noble were nobles. 
Even the soil was divided into noble-lands and 
peasant-lands, and neither class might acquire the 
portion of the other. 



1 66 Frederick the Great [1746- 

It is easy to see that this system of rigid class 
division was unlikely to ensure to every Prussian 
the career for which he was best fitted. In Fred- 
erick's eyes, however, it possessed two supreme 
merits, and for the sake of these he was willing to 
make it eternal. It provided a gigantic army and 
it contained no germ of opposition to the Crown. 

Prussia under Frederick was practically one vast 
camp. Every social class had a military function to 
perform. The King was commander-in-chief and 
paymaster-general. The nobles formed the corps of 
officers. Some of the peasants were called on to 
bear arms while the rest laboured in the fields to 
produce the necessary supplies of food. The burgh- 
ers, who have been styled the commissariat depart- 
ment of the army, armed and clothed the troops, 
and helped to provide funds with which to hire the 
foreigners of whom half the army was composed. 

It was possible to entrust to foreigners so great a 
share in Prussian wars because the framework of the 
army was of iron. The native half of each regiment 
was drawn from a particular locality. It consisted 
of peasants led by the lords whom they had been 
accustomed from infancy to obey. The regiment 
was ruled in a fashion almost patriarchal by a com- 
mander who gave it his own name. Under this sys- 
tem esprit de corps became a passion, and none 
knew better than Frederick how to turn it to good 
account. To the army " Prussia " was a name which 
within the memory of their fathers had been arbitra- 
rily assigned to the dominions of the elder branch 
of the House of Hohenzollern. Where national 



1756] The Ten Years Peace 167 

patriotism was in its infancy, local patriotism was all 
the more intense, and it was by playing upon this 
that Frederick, the Father of all his lands, called 
forth many marvellous feats of arms. 

But the King, though he fostered profitable senti- 
ment, was far too wary to trust to it over much. He 
had other expedients for attracting nobles to the 
colours and for keeping the ranks full. He with- 
drew his royal favour from those of noble birth who 
were so unpatriotic as either to avoid his service 
or to leave it in a few years. The social arrange- 
ments which have been outlined above were yet 
more powerful in securing a supply of officers. The 
nobles were numerous, poor, and brave. They must 
find some career, and what other lay open to them? 
When Frederick's father began to impress cadets, 
many parents even tried to prove that they were not 
of noble birth. But with them, as with many other 
classes of the discontented, firm government in the 
long run brought cheerful obedience. ** The King's 
bread is the best," became their maxim. Frederick 
marked his appreciation of their worth by rarely giv- 
ing commissions to men of lower rank. It was not 
the least of his gains that he thus acquired military 
authority over the most influential class in his 
dominions. 

He made sure of the common man by stern dis- 
ciphne. Although the Prussian members of each 
regiment were bound together by social and local 
bonds, by no means all of them were willing to fight 
for the King. They were conscripts, not volunteers, 
and they were released only when they became unfit 



1 68 Frederick the Great [1746- 

to serve. Not a few deserted to the enemy under 
stress of war. The foreigners who were their com- 
rades under arms were a varied host. Some were 
mercenaries, some deserters from the enemy, some 
keen fighting men who were glad to serve in the 
finest army in the world. Many had been kid- 
napped or pressed or tempted into the Prussian serv- 
ice by false promises or admitted when their own 
countries were too hot to hold them. Frederick's 
directions to Prussian commanders for the march are 
based on the assumption that many of the men will 
desire to run away. When in time of war some of 
the peasants volunteered, the astonished King asked 
what finer deed the Romans of old had performed. 

His standing remedy against disintegration was 
" to make the discipline so stern and the punish- 
ments so severe that the men would learn to fear 
their own superiors more than the enemy." 

" The punishments were barbarous," writes Professor 
Martin Philippson. '' Thrashing was customary. Im- 
prisonment, sharpened by all kinds of chastisement and 
torment, was not rare. The most terrible of all was run- 
ning the gauntlet, in which the offender was stripped to 
the waist and forced to run from twenty to thirty times 
through a living lane of hundreds of soldiers armed with 
rods, while the officers looked to it that every man laid 
on lustily. Hundreds of wretched men gave up the 
ghost under these tortures." 

Yet of the rank and file it may be said with more 
confidence than of any other section of Frederick's 
subjects that they loved the King. 



1756] The Te7t Years Peace 169 

Enough, perhaps, has been said to suggest that 
where classes were so sharply divided there was 
little likelihood of any national resistance to the 
Crown and that the Prussian military system gave 
Frederick a peculiar authority over two great sec- 
tions of his people. A further source of power 
consisted in his enormous wealth. In every province 
the Crown possessed vast domains amounting in all 
to nearly one-third of the soil of Prussia. The result 
was that Frederick was lord of innumerable peasants 
and by far the greatest capitalist in his dominions. 
To him the nobles looked for help in time of dearth, 
while the townsmen expected him to bear the initial 
loss of new industrial enterprises. His domestic 
policy was directed towards the maintenance of this 
position. For him the notion of taxes fructifying in 
the pockets of the people had no charm. His ideal 
was that of subjects paying the greatest possible 
amount of taxes to be administered by the head of 
the State. Under his father's rule the limit of 
profitable taxation had already been reached, but 
Frederick was able to make the collectors stricter 
than before. Though no spot in the Mark or Pom- 
erania or Magdeburg was ^more than twenty miles 
from a border, the frontiers of his straggling do- 
minions were watched with a vigilance which became 
proverbial. An Italian priest, whom he begged to 
smuggle him through the gate of heaven under his 
cassock, professed that he would be charmed to do 
so, provided that the search for contraband were not 
so keen as in Prussia. Liberty of commerce and 
remission of taxes were not among the ideals of a 



170 Frederick the Great [1746- 

King who claimed to direct all the economic activi- 
ties of his people. 

The Prussian clergy had less power than the 
moneyed interest, and less desire than the landed 
interest, to oppose or influence the will of the King. 
His absolutism was favoured by the fact that in his 
dominions several jealous churches existed side by 
side, and that he alone could be the umpire in their 
disputes. His own point of view was perfectly clear. 
He valued pastors because they taught their people 
to obey their superiors and not to rob and murder, 
as, in the King's opinion, they would do if unre- 
strained. If the pastors accomplished this duty 
with reasonable success they might, without fear of 
his displeasure use any ritual or proclaim any doc- 
trine of which their congregations approved. 

Frederick regarded the Protestant teaching as far 
more useful than the Romanist, but was determined 
to protect each in the enjoyment of its rights and 
privileges. He professed himself willing to build 
mosques for Turks and heathen if they would 
people the land. He was the official head of the 
Lutheran Church, whose clergy then, as always, 
preached the divine right of Kings. The King for 
his part usually jeered at their faith only in private. 
At times, however, he allowed his contempt for 
their observances to appear. When several congre- 
gations appealed to him to condemn a new hymn- 
book he despatched a refusal, and added with his 
own hand, *' Everyone is free to sing * Now all the 
woods are resting' and more of such stupid non- 
sense." In the same spirit he answered the clergy 



1766] The Ten Years Peace 171 

of Potsdam who begged him not to block out the 
h'ght from their church, *' Blessed are they which 
have not seen and yet have believed." 

Frederick's relations with his many papist sub- 
jects ran all the smoother because the contemporary 
Popes were as a rule too much engrossed. by troubles 
within their own flock to engage in unnecessary 
aggressions. His treatment of the papists in his 
hereditary dominions was always carried out in the 
spirit of his answer to the monks of Cleves. Though 
hardly meritorious in the eyes of the Holy Father, 
it was too upright to give reasonable cause of 
offence. Near the royal palace in Berlin rose the 
Hedwigs-Kirche, a temple modelled on the Pantheon 
at Rome and built by the heretic King for the use 
of Romanists. 

In the conquered provinces, however, a more diffi- 
cult problem confronted him. The Romanists, who 
formed the bulk of the population of Upper Silesia 
and were powerful even in Breslau, could not be ex- 
pected to accept with pleasure the head of an alien 
church as their supreme lord. The Prussian confis- 
cation of one-half the net revenues of the conventual 
houses and at a later date the disgrace of Cardinal 
Schaffgotsch were measures dictated by needs of 
State, but not on that account less unwelcome to 
the Church. The papists of Silesia, particularly the 
clergy and the Jesuits, long continued to hope for 
the restoration of Hapsburg rule. 

Even in Silesia, however, P>ederick's policy of im- 
partial firmness disarmed his religious opponents in 
the end. While his neighbours were expelling the 



172 Frederick the Great [1746- 

Jesuits from their dominions and confiscating the es- 
tates of the Church, his doors stood open to the fu- 
gitives and the original settlement of the relations 
between Church and State remained unvaried. It 
must not be forgotten, too, that the King of Prussia 
was the patron and paymaster of a vast number of 
ecclesiastics of all creeds. This fact finds illustration 
in one of the practical jokes which he played upon 
his needy friend Pollnitz. Although he had already 
changed his religion in hope of a lucrative marriage, 
Frederick tempted him by hinting that a rich canonry 
in Silesia was vacant. Next day, as he expected, 
Pollnitz came to tell him that he had again recanted 
and was now eligible for the post. The King re- 
plied that the appointment was already made, but 
that he had still a place of Rabbi to dispose of — 
" Turn Jew and you shall have it.'* With the same 
cynicism he exhorted and often compelled the clergy 
to practise apostolic poverty. " We free them from 
the cares of this world," he wrote to Voltaire after 
a sweeping measure of confiscation, "so that they 
may labour without distraction to win the Heavenly 
Jerusalem which is their true home." It is not sur- 
prising if Carlyle is justified in stating that under 
Frederick ** the reverend men feel themselves to be 
a body of Spiritual Sergeants, Corporals and Cap- 
tains, to whom obedience is the rule and discontent 
a thing not to be indulged in by any means." 

If, then, it is vain to look either to any class of so- 
ciety or to the military or ecclesiastical organisations 
for a possible check upon Frederick's absolutism, the 
remainder of our quest must be confined within two 



1756] The Ten Years Peace 173 

fields — the Judiciary and the Executive. It is idle 
to imagine parliaments in Frederick's Prussia. His 
ancestors had freed themselves from the privileged 
assemblies which grew up in the several provinces 
under the feudal system. To this day his successors 
upon the Prussian throne reject the claims of their 
subjects to what William II. stigmatised as ** the free- 
dom to govern themselves badly according to their 
own desires." Nor was the absence of parliament 
atoned for by the influence of public opinion. So- 
ciety at Berlin occasionally ventured to mark its dis- 
approval of the King's action. It was, however, a 
narrow caste, which lacked even the wit to temper 
despotism by epigram. The King, though he en- 
dowed his capital with many handsome buildings, 
took little pains to conciliate its inhabitants by living 
in their midst, and on occasion did not scruple to 
play upon their stupidity. ^' In 1767, the King found 
the public at Berlin inclined to tattle on the chance 
of another war. To turn their attention he immedi- 
ately composed and sent to the newspapers a full 
account of a wonderful hail-storm stated, though 
without the smallest foundation in fact, to have 
taken place in Potsdam on the 27th of February in 
that year. Not only did this imaginary narrative 
engross for some time, as he desired, the public con- 
versation, but it gave rise to some grave philo- 
sophical treatises on the supposed phenomenon." 
(Mahon.) 

Many despotisms have, however, been tempered 
by the judicial system of the nation or by the estab- 
lished machinery of administration. We, therefore, 



174 Frederick the Great [1746= 

turn finally to the judges and civil officers of Prussia 
for some check upon Frederick's power. But we 
find that in the department of law he was as absol- 
ute as in any other. His subjects were no longer 
entitled to carry their suits to the Imperial courts, 
and the King at once supplied the deficiency, and 
kept his judges under by making himself in person 
an accessible and swift tribunal of final appeal (1744). 
In this connexion the case of Miller Arnold is of 
world-wide celebrity. A miller living near the Polish 
border was condemned by his lord to be evicted for 
persistent non-payment of rent. He appealed to the 
chief court of the province for restitution, alleging 
that another noble, who afterwards bought the mill, 
had deprived him of water by restoring a fish-pond 
higher up the stream. When the court decided 
against him, he availed himself of the privilege of 
petition which Frederick accorded to all his subjects. 
The King deputed one of his colonels to investigate 
the matter in company with a member of the pro- 
vincial court. The colonel reported in favour of 
Arnold, but his colleague upheld the previous de- 
cision. The King, convinced that his colonel was 
in the right and that a poor man was being robbed 
of his livelihood by a legal quibble, ordered the pro- 
vincial court to make a fresh enquiry. This second 
investigation only served to confirm their previous 
view of the case, though an expert in drainage was 
of opinion that the fish-pond really restricted the 
flow of water to the mill. They declined to alter 
their verdict and Frederick ordered the judges at 
Berlin to revise it. 



1756] The Ten Years Peace 175 

The judges obeyed and revised the depositions 
with great care. Once more sentence was pro- 
nounced against Arnold. Thereupon the King de- 
termined to make an example of those who in his 
name oppressed the poor under form of law. He 
summoned before him the Chancellor and the three 
judges at whose door he supposed the guilt to lie. 
To the Chancellor he addressed six words only : 
*' March, thy place is filled already." The three 
judges were first rated like malefactors and then 
flung into the common gaol. 

It would be tedious to recite all the items of the 
King's vengeance. His hand fell as heavily upon 
the provincial court as upon the judges at Berlin. 
When the Minister of Justice refused to pronounce 
sentence against them, Frederick himself condemned 
them to loss of ofifice, a year's imprisonment, and 
the payment of all that Arnold had lost. Thus the 
miller triumphed, though he had in truth suffered 
no loss of water power. Not till the succeeding 
reign was his knavery exposed and the royal decree 
reversed. 

These proceedings, which took place in the later 
years of the reign, serve to show that Frederick was 
strong enough to trample the law and its ministers 
underfoot. In general, however, he proved himself 
practical, impartial, and firm in all that pertained to 
the judicial system. The story that a miller of Pots- 
dam refused to sell his wind-mill to the King and 
answered his threats with a reference to the courts, 
has been destroyed by modern criticism. " The laws 
must speak and the sovereign be silent," was, how- 



176 Frederick the Great [1746- 

ever, one of his maxims. The distrust of lawyers 
which caused him to prefer the verdict of one 
colonel to that of many judges did much to inspire 
the sweeping changes for which the years following 
the Peace of Dresden are illustrious. 

Frederick's law-reforms were in great part achieved 
by the aged jurist Cocceji, who, with the King's 
support, triumphed over all the interested opposition 
of lawyers and of his rivals. In the course of the 
years 1747 and 1748, he abolished superfluous courts, 
raised the fees for litigation, quickened the procedure, 
established satisfactory tests for judges and advo- 
cates, reduced the numbers of these functionaries, 
and did away at one stroke with the whole class of 
solicitors. The violence of these reforms is a fresh 
proof of the King's omnipotence. He might by a 
stroke of the pen have given binding force to the 
Codex FridericianuSy a famous code of law which 
Cocceji drew up on principles of his own choosing. 

It is evident that in Prussia the judges were forced 
to be *' lions under the throne." The civil service 
gave less proof of courage and was equally impotent 
to oppose the will of the King. Its structure might 
have been designed for the very purpose of pre- 
venting any official save the King from enjoying any 
substantial power or prominence. The lower agents, 
who could not be dangerous, had no colleagues, but 
all the higher functions were performed by boards. 
The villages were governed by the bailiffs of their 
lords, and thus a vast number of petty local officers 
were directly responsible to the representative of the 
Crown. Above the bailiffs stood the Sheriff {Land- 



1756] The Ten Years Peace 177 

rai), who was nominated by the local nobles, but 
appointed by the King and acted as his factotum. 
One young Landrat strove to convince Frederick 
that there were locusts in his country by sending 
him some live specimens in a box. They escaped 
in the palace, and the angry King straightway altered 
the conditions of the office, decreeing that in future 
no one should be eligible who was under thirty-five 
years of age. 

In the towns royal commissioners were charged 
with the collection of the " Excise " and with duties 
of general supervision. But at the next stage col- 
legiate administration begins. Landrat and com- 
missioner alike were responsible to the Provincial 
Chamber for War and Domains — a body such as 
that on which Frederick had served while a prisoner 
at Ciistrin. The individual members of the Chamber 
served the Crown as inspectors in their province and 
as special commissioners to carry out the public 
works which the King constantly initiated. The 
Chamber as a whole reviewed the work of the lower 
officials and reported to the General Directory, a 
clumsy corporation of ministers, which in its turn 
reported to the King. It is hardly necessary to ob- 
serve that Frederick conceded to no person or body 
in this hierarchy the right to stand between himself 
and any business with which he chose to interfere. 
He, like his father, often preferred the evidence of 
his own eyes and of his soldiers to the statements 
of his civil servants. 

The General Directory had been created by Fred- 
erick William in 1723. 



I j^ Frederick the Great [1746- 

" We wish," he frankly stated, " that any odium, how- 
ever undeserved, should fall not on us . . , but on the 
General-Ober-Finanz-Kriegs-und - Domdnen - Directoi'ium 
[General Supreme Financial War and Domains Direct- 
ory] or on one or other of the members of the same, 
unless it shall prove possible to make the public change 
its bad opinion." 

The members were instructed to give such a turn 
to the business that this aim might be realised, ** be- 
cause/' as the King expressed it, " we wish to be 
frugal as regards the love and affection of our sub- 
jects and of the friendship of our neighbours.'* 

The new body, as its name implies, was primarily 
concerned with finance, which lay at the root of all 
Prussian government. It was called into being at 
the moment when Frederick William amalgamated 
two machines for collecting and expending revenue. 
It presided over the administration of the old feudal 
revenue which came from the Domains and over 
that of the new national revenue which came from 
the Contribution and Excise, — taxes imposed for 
the support of the apparatus of war. Foreign affairs 
and justice, each of which formed the charge of two 
or three other ministers, lay outside the sphere of 
the General Directory. 

This consisted of four departments, each of which 
supervised the general administration on one great 
section of the soil of Prussia. The North-east, the 
Centre, the West, and the districts lying between the 
Centre and the West formed four distinct spheres of 
government, each of which was the special charge 
of a chief minister and several assistants. To these 



1756] The Ten Years Peace 1 79 

sectional departments, however, were assigned vari- 
ous minor charges extending over the whole king- 
dom. Thus the second department, which governed 
the Electoral Mark and Magdeburg, at one time also 
fulfilled the functions of commissary-general for all 
Prussia. It had in addition oversight over questions 
of salt, millstones, cards, and stamps, in whatever 
locality they might arise. If the chief of the de- 
partment had four or five assistants a certain special- 
isation was possible, but he was obliged to reckon 
with the contingency that one or more of them 
might be commissioned to spend part of their time 
in another department. 

The General Directory, as Frederick found it, con- 
tained four departments, but five chief ministers. 
The fifth, whose functions were the general super- 
vision of justice and of finance, was in Frederick 
William's conception a royal spy upon his colleagues. 
If they were idle, deceitful, or inharmonious, it was 
his duty to report the facts to the King, '' that His 
Majesty may get no short measure anywhere and 
may not be tricked." 

It is easy to see that this machine of government, 
however cumbrous, was admirably designed to serve 
a despotic king. An army of clerks and inspectors 
was always at his disposal. If he desired to know 
what was passing in the furthest corner of his domin- 
ions, a curt note of enquiry to the General Directory 
sufficed to set the machine in motion. The Direct= 
ory met five times a week, with no vacations. At 
its bidding, commissioners were appointed by the 
Provincial Chamber to ascertain the facts. In due 



i8o Frederick the Great [1746- 

course the Chamber received, digested, and anno- 
tated their report, and supplied the necessary infor- 
mation to the Directory. There, in the department 
which presided over the province in question, the 
papers were again sifted and abstracted. 

The Directory could not often be hoodwinked by 
its subordinates, for Frederick William had furnished 
it with an army of local spies. Check after check 
was applied. When the member of the department 
before whom the affair was brought had satisfied 
himself, he procured the assent of his colleagues. 
The department procured the assent of the Direct- 
ory as a whole. The Directory then reported to the 
confidential servants of the King. Eventually the 
most concise and accurate information obtainable, 
together with a table of arguments for and against a 
given course of action, was laid before the King by 
Eichel and his colleagues in the Cabinet. Frederick 
had only to glance at the paper and scrawl a few 
words upon it in the morning and in the afternoon 
to sign a royal order embodying his decision. Then 
General Directory, Provincial Chamber, Sheriff, and 
Bailiff set to work in turn to procure the execution 
of his commands. 

It was objected that little Prussia had thirteen or 
fourteen ministers when France required no more 
than five. But the multiplication of high officials 
had this advantage — that it prevented them from 
leaving the real conduct of affairs in the hands of 
obscure subordinates. Not only must every State 
paper be signed by one or more ministers, but every 
signature impHed actual knowledge of its contents, 



1756] The Ten Years Peace i8i 

The system, too, prevented the rise of any single 
man or board that could challenge comparison with 
the King by reason of its ascendancy in any great 
function of government. Even Cocceji appeared to 
the people merely as a royal commissioner appointed 
to accomplish a definite mission. 

Corruption on any great scale was impossible. 
The public accounts passed under so many eyes that 
the King of Prussia could never, like Charles VI., be 
deprived of three-fourths of his revenue before it 
reached the exchequer. It was useless to bribe 
Frederick's ministers to betray him, for they had not 
the power. They were there to give him information 
and to obey his behests. He seldom asked them for 
advice. " Good counsel does not come from a great 
number," was his maxim. Newton, he maintained, 
could not have discovered the law of gravitation if he 
had been collaborating with Leibnitz and Descartes. 
As Minerva sprang armed from the head of Jupiter, 
so must a poHcy spring from the head of the prince. 

Frederick, therefore, admitted no man or body 
of men as his colleague, in the work of govern- 
ment. The officers of the Directory, Justice, and 
Foreign Affairs were not allowed to form a conclave 
which might meddle with questions of general wel- 
fare. As a body they were wont to appear before 
the King only once a year. As individuals they 
seldom communicated with him save in writing. 
The ministers of Foreign Affairs had not even the 
privilege of writing about all of the important 
matters which fell within the scope of their depart- 
ment. Their master kept the conduct of weighty 



1 82 Frederick the Great [1746- 

negotiations within his own Cabinet and corres- 
ponded with his ambassadors direct. Eichel was 
his sole familiar. Secrecy, which the King termed 
the soul of public business, was thus preserved in- 
violable. *' To pry into my secrets," he boasted, 
"they must first corrupt me." 

This is not the place to marshal the disadvantages 
to the State which the Prussian system of admin- 
istration involved. At this stage it is sufficient to 
note that it placed absolute power in Frederick's 
hands and that he regarded it as a monument of 
the highest wisdom. " If you depart from the 
principles and the system that our father has intro- 
duced," ran his warning to his brother and heir, 
** you will be the first to suffer by it.'* 

The ten years of peace were therefore not devoted 
to structural reform. In the first year of his reign 
Frederick had created a fifth department of the 
General Directory. To it he entrusted first the 
trade and manufactures of the whole kingdom and 
later the posts and the settlement of immigrants 
from other lands. In 1746 he established in like 
manner a sixth department, that of Military Affairs. 
These changes merely developed the system of 
Frederick William a little further. By a new de- 
parture, however, the Government of Silesia was 
made independent of the General Directory. For 
reasons which the King never stated, Miinchow be- 
came the only minister for the province, and he was 
responsible to Frederick alone. With this addition 
the whole framework of government was stereo- 
typed by an ordinance of 1748. 



1756] The Ten Years Peace i8 



o 



The years 1 746-1 756 are notable for Frederick's 
use of his machine rather than for the changes which 
he made in it. He now displayed in action the 
principles of domestic policy which were the fruit of 
his early training and the guide of his later years. 
His ideal is as simple to understand as it was difficult 
to realise in practice. He allowed his subjects to 
think as they pleased on condition that they acted 
as he pleased. Neither in home nor in foreign policy 
did the King recognise any bounds to the assistance 
that he might demand from the dwellers within his 
dominions. 

The main object of his foreign policy was to extend 
the borders of Prussia to the utmost limit consistent 
with the safety of the State. His home policy was 
to bring within those borders the greatest possible 
number of men, to prevent them from falling below 
a certain moderate level of righteousness, comfort, 
and knowledge, to organise a huge army, to collect 
a vast revenue, and to enable Prussia as far as pos- 
sible to supply all the needs of every one of her 
people. Other states were useful to her because 
they supplied recruits to her army, teachers for her 
artisans, and gold and silver in exchange for her 
surplus manufactures. The gold and silver were 
drawn into the treasury by taxation and used to 
build villages, to establish new manufactures, to 
hire more soldiers, and to fill Frederick's war-chest. 
Then, by war or a display of force which made war 
superfluous, a new province would be joined to 
Prussia and the routine of development, taxation, 
armament, and acquisition could begin anew. 



184 Frederick the Great [1746- 

It does not appear that Frederick regarded any 
single part of this programme as weightier than the 
rest. In spite of all his economies and accumula- 
tions he was no miser, cherishing money for its own 
sake. He hoarded treasure so that his army might 
be sure of pay in time of war and his subjects sure 
of help in case of devastating calamity. On the 
same principle he maintained and added to the 
huge Government granaries, which bought in years 
of plenty and sold, at high but not exorbitant prices, 
in years of dearth. Frederick did not refuse to 
make some profit from the institution, but his main 
object was to confer upon the State the inestimable 
boon of freedom from famine. The establishment 
of public warehouses for wool, silk, and cotton was 
similarly designed to guard against glut and short- 
age. It was merely a new adaptation of the policy 
of the Staple, which England had discarded at the 
end of the Middle Ages. But it secured a market 
to the Prussian producer and an unfailing source of 
supply to the Prussian manufacturer and placed the 
whole traffic in raw materials under the supervision 
and control of the State. 

Frederick is as little open to the charge of megalo- 
mania as to that of avarice. He was singularly free 
from foibles. He frankly admits that the adventure 
of 1740 was partly inspired by the desire to make 
himself a name. But before the Peace of Dresden 
his lust of mere conquest seems to have been ex- 
tinguished. Thenceforward his armaments and ac- 
quisitions were strictly regulated by reasons of State, 
and in his conception of statecraft domestic poHcy 



1756] The Ten Years Peace 185 

stood on a par with foreign. He likened the Fi- 
nances, Foreign Policy, and the Army to three 
steeds harnessed abreast to the car of State, and him- 
self to the charioteer who directed them and urged 
them on. 

Frederick's most striking innovations in the de- 
partment of home affairs were made during his later 
years. It will therefore be necessary in a subsequent 
chapter to give further illustrations of the working 
of his principles and to calculate the results which 
he accomplished. All through his reign, however, 
the process of internal improvement and interference 
was carried on in conformity with these ideas. Agri- 
culture, as the basis of all, had the first claim upon 
the King's attention, and he made unceasing efforts 
to render every acre of the land productive and to 
provide it with a cultivator. If in the course of his 
innumerable journeys he observed a waste place that 
seemed capable of improvement he would commend 
it to the Provincial Chamber as a site for a certain 
number of new villages of a given size. If the sug- 
gestion proved feasible it was carried out at the ex- 
pense of the State, which reaped its profit in course 
of time from the new taxpayers, producers, and re- 
cruits, who were thus included in the commonwealth. 

The most signal of these victories in time of peace 
was the reclaiming of huge swamps lying along 
the Oder below Frankfurt. In July, 1747, the King 
appointed commissioners, including the famous ma- 
thematician Euler, and placed troops at their dis- 
posal. The task demanded not only dams and 
drainage works, but also in parts excavation of a new 



1 86 Frederick the Great [1746- 

bed for the great river. It was urged forward by 
Frederick with all speed. He often inspected the 
works and exacted a report of their progress week 
by wdek. Boats were commandeered by force from 
the reluctant villagers. Some of those whose fishing 
rights were done away conjured the King, " falling 
at his feet," so ran their petition, ** most submiss- 
ively in deepest woe and dejection as a most terrl 
fied band fearing the fatal stroke," that he would 
lay to heart the ruin which his measures would 
inevitably bring upon them. The King drily an- 
swered that they might let him know when they had 
suffered any actual harm and compensated them with 
reclaimed land. 

Early in 1753 Frederick was able to make ar- 
rangements to people the new province which he had 
thus conquered from the domain of Chaos. The 
landowners, who had shared in the general opposi- 
tion to the enterprise, were compelled to resign to 
the State their claim to a large percentage of the 
reclaimed land and to provide a prescribed number 
of peasants for the remainder. Born Prussians were 
as a rule declared ineligible, for here was an oppor- 
tunity of tempting valuable fresh blood into the State, 
Freedom from military service to the third genera- 
tion, exemption from taxes for some years, and at 
first actual assistance were the terms offered to many 
immigrants. The result was that Frederick secured 
an influx of new subjects from far and wide. 
The Rhineland, Wurtemburg, Mecklenburg, Swed- 
ish Pomerania, Saxony, Bohemia, Poland, and the 
mountains of Austria— all sent contingents. He laid 



1756] 



The Ten Years Peace 187 



out more than 500,000 thalers in all and secured a 
rental of 20,000. More than 250 villages were cre- 
ated. Thanks in great part to this policy of internal 
colonisation, the numbers of the people steadily 
rose. At his accession Frederick had ruled over 
rather more than 2,200,000 people. Thirteen years 
later the number in the old provinces had become 
more than one-sixth greater, while East Frisia added 
90,000 souls and Silesia some 1,200,000 more. In 
1756 the total exceeded 4,000,000. 

The decade which followed the Peace of Dresden, 
though uneventful in comparison with the periods 
of seven years which it divides, was thus by no 
means barren. For Frederick it was indeed a period 
of manifold activity. It was signalised by the es- 
tablishment of Sans Souci and by the memorable 
visit of Voltaire. For three years (1750- 1753) the 
King enjoyed the constant exchange of homage 
with the cynosure of the world of letters, who de- 
scribed his new home, Potsdam, as '' Sparta and 
Athens joined in one, nothing but reviewing and 
poetry day by day." Each of the two friends re- 
vered the genius and despised the character of the 
other. The sequel was a desperate quarrel, and the 
flight and arrest of Voltaire. When he was suffered 
to pass beyond the reach of Frederick's sceptre he 
strove to avenge himself with the pen which had 
lavished exquisite flattery upon the King for many 
years and which was often to resume the old style 
in the future. 

Literary effort and witty company were, however, 
only the King's solace in a life of labour. Day by 



1 88 Frederick the Great [1746-1756] 

day he scanned the political horizon, resolved to 
take no action which would not serve the State, and 
to shrink from nothing if Prussian interests were 
threatened. Day by day, too, he urged forward the 
labours of peace and the preparations for war. 
While Silesia was being gradually assimilated and 
the old Prussia developed, Frederick was making 
use of his new possession, East Frisia, in a tardy 
and only moderately successful endeavour to fur- 
ther commerce overseas. Commerce in Frederick's 
opinion ranked far below agriculture and manufac- 
tures in value to a state with ideals such as those 
which he had chosen for Prussiac He therefore de 
voted far more of his energy to the task of forward- 
ing Prussian industry, which he argued gave em- 
ployment to a thousand times as many men, brought 
more gold and silver into the country, and remained 
more amenable to State control. At the same time 
he was steadily accumulating treasure and perfecting 
his military force. In the fateful year 1756 he had 
upwards of 14,000,000 thalers stored up for war. 
The standing army then numbered more than 150,- 
000 men. 




CHAPTER VII 

THE SEVEN YEARS* WAR TO THE BATTLE OF 
LEUTHEN 

ALL the world knows that in 1756 the King of 
Prussia embarked upon a struggle in compar- 
ison with which his previous wars might 
almost be called sham-fights. This was the Third 
Silesian War, commonly known as the Seven Years* 
War, which Macaulay's lurid prose depicts as setting 
almost the whole globe on fire. The true cause of 
Austria's new struggle, not merely to regain Sile- 
sia, but also to curb the dangerous power of Prussia, 
will be patent to all who have followed the story of 
Frederick's life. It was the memory of past wrong 
quickened by apprehensions of worse to come. 
Maria Theresa could not believe that Heaven would 
suffer her despoiler to go unchastised,and she watched 
the political horizon for signs that the day of venge- 
ance upon him was at hand. At the same time all 
the neighbours of Prussia perceived with that instinct 
which is the surest guide of states that the system to 
which they belonged was jeopardised by an intrud- 
ing Power whose conduct had been such as to justify 
a crusade against her. 

189 



1 90 Frederick the Great 

In that age of unstable alliances and easy wars it 
was certain that a conviction shared by so many 
states would sooner or later lead to action. It was 
equally certain that, while Frederick was king, 
Prussia would strike back. Hence we may regard 
with some indifference nice balancings of moral judg- 
ment upon the great fact of 1756, when Frederick 
suddenly made war upon Austria and treated Saxony 
with almost greater violence. It seems idle to main- 
tain that because Austria had yielded up Silesia by 
treaty she was debarred for ever from retaliating 
upon Frederick in the fashion which he had set. 
Who would apply such a rule to the problems of the 
present ? If it be lawful, in our own day, for France 
to hope to recover Alsace and Lorraine, or for 
Spain to hope to recover Gibraltar, it is not easy to 
understand why, in 1756, Maria Theresa might not 
lawfully hope to reverse the verdict of 1742 and 
1745. And if she and her neighbours contemplated 
something more than a recovery of lands actually 
lost, if they sought to reduce the King of Prussia to 
the harmless level of a Margrave of Brandenburg, 
who can be indignant or even surprised? A new 
coalition against Frederick would be merely the Aus- 
trian answer to his own riddle, *' If I have an advant- 
age, am I to use it or not ? " 

But if, as seems undeniable, Austria and her 
neighbours had good grounds for hoping to attack 
Prussia, and if, as Frederick had reason to believe, 
the danger was becoming imminent in 1756, what 
could be more futile than the statement that none the 
less he was not justified in striking the first blow? It 




THE EQUESTRIAN STATUE OF MARIA THERESA IN THE VIENNA HOFFBURQ. 
REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF A. F. CZIHAKS NACHFLG, VIENNA. 



The Seven Years War 191 

is true that for reasons of current politics the Aus- 
trian Chancellor, Kaunitz, schemed with success to 
shape events so as to make Prussia seem the aggres- 
sor, and that he thus established the conditions 
under which Austria could claim the fulfilment of a 
treaty of defensive alliance. At a distance of a cen- 
tury and a half, however, such subtleties can be 
appraised at their true value. Though in 1756 war 
emerges from as dense a cloud of diplomacy as ever 
befogged the path of European history, our genera- 
tion may regard the Third Silesian War as the natu- 
ral result of the original aggression of Frederick and 
of the abiding interests of other Powers. 

Those interests, however, demand a brief explana- 
tion, for they determined the time and the form of a 
war which at some time and in some form was 
inevitable from the very moment at which Austria 
and Prussia laid down their arms at Dresden. In 
an age when the true course of states was steered by 
kings and statesmen of whom some were lazy, some 
self-seeking, some timid, some honestly mistaken in 
their designs, it was not to be expected that many 
should, like Prussia, make straight for a definite goal. 
Since the Peace of Utrecht, Europe had lived in an 
atmosphere of general uncertainty. Nations formed 
countless short-lived comradeships for the pursuit 
of objects often transient. It was almost impossible 
to forecast who, if war broke out, would be ranged 
on one side or the other, and hardly less difficult to 
forecast the side upon which those who had entered 
the war as allies of one of the combatants would be 
found at the end of it. What might, however, be 



192 Frederick the Great 

anticipated with confidence was that few Powers 
would neglect the chance of profit which war 
afforded. Walpole's famous boast, " There are fifty 
thousand men slain in Europe this year and not 
one Englishman," was called forth by his triumph in 
keeping clear of the War of the Polish Succession, 
which was not too remote to embroil every other 
Great Power. 

While there was then a tendency for every Power 
to share in every war as an auxiliary if not as 
a principal, two alliances had become traditional. 
Ever since the undue predominance of France first 
imperilled the liberties of Europe, England had 
steadily supported Austria against her. And so 
soon as the Great Elector showed that Prussia might 
be a serviceable ally, France strove to employ her 
with a view to the humiliation of Austria. Though 
only occasionally successful in engaging Prussia, she 
continued to regard her as a natural ally. Thus 
each of the maritime and commercial rivals of the 
West had its liaison with one of the German Land 
Powers of the East. 

More to be reckoned on than these connexions 
were, however, three great antipathies which the 
course of history had revealed. The clash of in- 
terest between Austria and Prussia seemed destined 
to distract Germany until one or other proved 
supreme, and, so long as Maria Theresa confronted 
Frederick, it would be made harsher by a duel 
between the sovereigns. Russia, while Elizabeth 
ruled, would go with Austria. The giant State 
whose westward path had been marked out by Peter 



The Seven Years War 193 

the Great already discerned in Prussia the athlete 
braced to dispute the way. Ost-Preussen was always 
a tempting bait, and long ere this an ambassador at 
Frederick's Court reported that the King feared 
Russia more than his God. None the less Frederick 
had permitted his sharp tongue to goad the luxurious 
Czarina into a fury which surpassed that of the 
Queen whom he had robbed of Silesia. In April, 
1756, the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg 
was informed that Russia was ready to co-operate 
in an immediate attack upon Prussia by sending 
80,000 men, and that she would not lay down her 
arms until Maria Theresa had recovered Silesia and 
Glatz. 

The jealousy of the rival states in Germany and 
the wrath of the despot who swayed the policy of 
Russia would count for much in the coming war. 
Weightier still was the struggle between France and 
England for the primacy in three continents and on 
the seas. This great national duel had been begun 
by William III. and brilliantly continued by Marl- 
borough. During the pacific rule of Walpole, when 
the two countries were nominally in alliance, Eng- 
land was gaining strength and taking up a position 
in America and India which her rival could not 
witness unmoved. The close league formed by 
France with Spain, the monopolist of the New 
World, rendered lasting peace with England impos- 
sible and even Walpole was forced into war. This 
war, known as the War of Jenkins* Ear, began with 
an attack on the Spaniards in 1739, and developed 
into a world-wide struggle with the French in which 



194 Frederick the Great 

Dettingen and Fontenoy were incidents. The settle- 
ment at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, which put an end 
to it, was obviously a mere breathing-space. In the 
early fifties hostilities broke out anew between the 
English and French in India and North America, 
and it could hardly be doubted that Europe would 
soon catch fire. 

In 1756, therefore, war between France and Eng- 
land had already begun, and war between Frederick 
and his two Imperial neighbours was imminent. The 
custom of Europe and the precedent of the former 
struggle made it in the highest degree unlikely that 
these wars would be kept apart. What would be 
the connexion between them ? The answer was 
determined by three accidents. The King of Eng- 
land happened to be Elector of Hanover, the ruling 
spirit at Vienna happened to be Kaunitz, and the 
mistress of Louis XV. happened to be Madame de 
Pompadour. 

Hanover, argued George II., will certainly be at- 
tacked by the French. It must be defended at all 
costs. The only possible defenders are Austria, 
Russia, and Prussia. Austria, the old patron of 
Hanover, would be preferable. But the Queen has 
grievances against England and is bent on attacking 
Prussia. Alliance with her would therefore expose 
Hanover to the Prussians as well as to the French, 
and must therefore be regarded as out of the ques- 
tion. Russia and Prussia remained to be considered. 
Russia actually made a convention to hire out troops 
for the defence of Hanover. But Russia, the King 
found, also desired to attack Prussia, and was there- 



The Seven Years War 195 

fore as ineligible an ally as Austria. Only the Prus- 
sian alliance remained possible. In January, 1756, 
by the Convention of Westminster, it was secured. 

The Convention of Westminster, by which Fred- 
erick bound himself to defend Hanover against 
attack, helped on the far more difficult task of 
Kaunitz. This was no less than to reverse the secu- 
lar policy of France and Austria and to bring Bour- 
bon and Hapsburg into alliance. Kaunitz based his 
calculations on the assumption that France might 
help Austria to recover Silesia, but that England 
never would. This view of the political situation was 
urged for seven years with great ability by a states- 
man in whom the Queen reposed a confidence greater 
than that with which our own Elizabeth honoured 
Burleigh, and who treated her in return with a 
haughtiness such as Essex would never have dared 
to show. Kaunitz, whose life was spent in the en- 
deavour to exalt the power of his mistress, forced 
her to shut her windows to humour his prejudice 
against fresh air, and stalked out of her Council 
when she interrupted him with a question. At 
another meeting, it is said, she remonstrated with 
him on his riotous Hving. He replied that he had 
come there to discuss her affairs, not his own. 

But the great, it is said, are known to the great, 
and Maria Theresa's confidence in Kaunitz seemed 
to be justified when his visionary scheme proved 
feasible. It was easy to form a league to despoil 
Prussia. Kaunitz tempted Russia with parts of 
Poland, Poland with an indemnity in Ost-Preussen, 
Saxony with Magdeburg, Sweden with Prussian 



196 Frederick the Great 

Pomerania, the princes of the Empire with the 
favours which the Emperor alone could bestow. But 
it required great powers of imagination to conceive 
that France might quit the beaten track of history, 
which was at the same time plainly the path of self- 
interest, in order to assist her hereditary foe in a 
great land-war at a time when she needed all her 
strength to meet England upon the seas. 

Kaunitz had not only the strength to see this 
vision, but also the fortune to realise it in fact. The 
circumstance that favoured him the most was that 
the Pompadour was now at the height of her 
influence in France. The mistress of Louis XV. 
furthered the plan of Kaunitz for selfish reasons, 
but in the expectation that its result would be the 
exact reverse of what it was. She desired to keep 
the peace in Europe in order that she might con- 
tinue to live quietly at Versailles. The Minister of 
Marine, moreover, was her friend ; the minister who 
might profit by a land-war was her enemy. She 
therefore favoured a covenant of neutrality with 
Austria in the hope that the two wars would thus be 
kept apart. 

The Convention of Westminster, however, made 
it impossible that the affair should rest here. The 
fact that Prussia had bound herself to resist a French 
invasion of Hanover frustrated all Frederick's efforts 
to propitiate the Pompadour and to throw dust in 
the eyes of the French. 

" If the ministry of France will consider it well," 
wrote Frederick on January 24th, ". . . it should 



The Seven Years War 197 

find nothing to say in reason if I undertake such a con- 
vention, by which, moreover, I flatter myself that I 
render an essential service to France, seeing that I shall 
certainly arrest 50,000 Russians by it, and shall hold in 
check another 50,000 Austrians at least, who but for that 
would all have acted against France." 

He further endeavoured to discount his alliance 
with George II. by turning a sympathetic ear to the 
French plans for assisting the Young Pretender, and 
by advising her to strike in Ireland and on the south 
coast of England at the same time. It was beyond 
his art, however, to disguise what he had done, and 
Kaunitz knew how to profit by it. 

The labours of the diplomatists were immense, 
but at last they were successful. On May i, 1756, 
by the Treaty of Versailles, both France and Aus- 
tria undertook for the future to defend the European 
possessions of the other with 24,000 men. In the 
war with England, Austria was to remain neutral, 
but if in the course of it any province of France in 
Europe were to be attacked by any ally or auxiliary 
of England, Austria promised by a secret article to 
provide the stipulated assistance and France offered 
a similar guarantee. This might be interpreted as 
binding Austria to join in the war if the French 
were masters of Hanover and the Prussians marched 
against them. It thus deprived the Convention of 
Westminster of half its value, and at the same time 
threatened to connect the war against England, 
which France had begun brilliantly at Minorca, with 
the war against Prussia, for which Elizabeth was 
clamouring. Negotiations for a still closer union 



198 Frederick the Great 

between Austria and France were pressed on, and 
Kaunitz hoped that in 1757 all would be ready. 

Too much was, however, in the wind for Fred- 
erick's keen scent to be entirely baffled. Austria, 
indeed, sincerely desired peace for the present. The 
published articles of the Treaty of Versailles were 
innocent. The English ministry disingenuously 
tried to lull the protector of Hanover into false se- 
curity by assurances that they could answer for Rus- 
sia. But the King of Prussia had his own sources of 
information as well as the most perfect faith in the 
malevolence of his fellow-men. For three years and 
a half one Menzel, a clerk in the Saxon Foreign 
Office, had been furnishing him with copies of the 
secret state-papers of Augustus. The whole truth 
about the negotiations against Prussia was not known 
at Dresden, but enough reached Frederick from this 
source to impress upon him the desirability of an- 
ticipating his foes. So early as June 23, 1756, he 
sent to General Lehwaldt, in Konigsberg, three sets 
of instructions, military, economic, and secret, for 
dealing with the anticipated Russian invasion, and 
even for negotiations with a view to peace. 

" You know already," wrote the King, " how I have 
allied myself with England, and that thereupon the Aus- 
trian court, from hatred of my successful convention 
with England, took the course of allying itself with 
France. It is true that Russia has concluded a subsidy- 
treaty with England, but I have every jeason to believe 
that it will be broken by Russia and that she has joined 
the Austrian party and concerted with her a threatening 
plan. But all this would not have caused me to move 



The Seven Years War 199 

if it had not been brought to my notice through many- 
channels and also by the march of Russian and Austrian 
troops that this concert is directed against myself." 

Frederick probably told the truth to his com- 
mander-in-chief in Ost-Preussen. On the same day 
Sir Andrew Mitchell, the shrewd and honest Scotch- 
man who then represented England at the court of 
Prussia, had an audience with the King. He re- 
ported that, notwithstanding the great number of 
enemies, the King seemed in no wise disconcerted, 
and had already given orders everywhere. '' In a 
fortnight's time he will be ready to act. His troops, 
as I am informed, are complete, and the artillery in 
excellent order." 

On the eve of war, then, Frederick's sword was as 
sharp as of old and his courage as high. He soon 
showed that his pen had not lost its cunning. At 
the end of June he indicted his enemy before the 
•judgment-seat of England. Austria regarded her 
new connexions, so stated his clever memoir, as the 
triumvirate of Augustus, Antony, and Lepidus. The 
three courts, like the three Romans of old, had sac- 
rificed their friends to each other. 

"The Empress abandoned England and Holland to 
the resentment of France, and the court of Versailles 
sacrificed Prussia to the ambition of the Empress. The 
latter proposes to imitate the conduct of Augustus, who 
used the power of his colleagues to aggrandise himself 
and then overthrew them one by one. The court of 
Vienna has three designs towards which her present 
steps are tending — to establish her despotism in the Em- 
pire, to ruin the Protestant cause, and to reconquer 



200 Frederick the Great 

Silesia. She regards the King of Prussia as the great 
obstacle to her vast designs." 

Thus Frederick claimed to be the champion of the 
balance of power and of Protestantism, and proposed 
to solicit not only Denmark and Holland, but even 
the Turk and the Empire for aid. His appeal to 
England concluded with the assurance that Prussia 
was not cast down. " Three things can restore the 
equilibrium of Europe — a close and intimate con- 
nexion between our two courts, earnest efforts to 
form new alliances and to foil the schemes of the 
enemy, and boldness to face the greatest dangers." 

A paper of this kind, brilliant, concise, astute, and 
even eloquent, is worth many thousand lines of the 
rhymed platitudes by which the author set greater 
store. We might expect to hear that it was followed 
at once by a spring at the throat of the enemy. It 
is true that Kaunitz, who was not yet ready for war, 
and who wished that if war must come Frederick 
should be the aggressor, held the Russians back. 
But he was pressing forward warlike preparations in 
Bohemia and Moravia, and Frederick was not likely 
to ignore the advantage of striking swiftly and of 
waging war outside his own borders. The military 
men, when they saw the evidence in the King's 
hands, were all for action. " Schwerin," says Car- 
lyle, '* much a Cincinnatus since we last saw him, 
has laid down his plough again, a fervid ' little Marl- 
borough' of seventy-two.'' He urged the immediate 
seizure of Saxony, as a base ot operations against 
Bohemia. 

Cooler heads, indeed, counselled Frederick to have 



The Seven Years War 201 

patience. On behalf of England, a Power always 
singularly dispassionate when the interests of a Ger- 
man ally were at stake, Mitchell urged that many 
chances of war and politics might swiftly change the 
face of affairs, and that to attack Austria would give 
unnecessary provocation to France. The faithful 
Podewils ventured to spend a summer afternoon at 
Potsdam in labouring to turn the King from his pur- 
pose. In his letter of July 22, 1756, to Eichel, he 
speaks of the " respectful freedom " with which he 
begged the King not to drive France and Russia to 
do what they had no desire to do that year if Aus- 
tria were not attacked. Let him rather use the ten 
months' grace before the next campaign in securing 
allies within and without the Empire, in trying to 
reconcile France and England, and in preparing an 
imposing defence. 

" But all this," says the poor man, " was com- 
pletely rejected as arising from far too great timid- 
ity, and at last I was dismissed coldly enough with 
the words, 'Adieu, Monsieur de la timide politique.' " 
His concluding phrases, however, have in them so 
much of prophecy that they may be cited here. 

" That it was not doubtful that progress and success 
might at first be brilliant, but that the complication of 
enemies, at a time when the King was isolated and de- 
prived of all foreign help, which had never happened to 
him yet, at least in regard to the diversions which had 
been made in his favour in the two preceding wars, 
would, perhaps, make him remember one day what 1 
took the respectful liberty of representing to him for the 
last tif?ie.'* 



202 Frederick the Great 

Such is the literal rendering of the French into 
which Podewils, who writes the bulk of his letter in 
a jargon of German, French, and Latin, forces his 
tortuous German thoughts. 

Frederick, indeed, seems already to have passed 
the stage at which he could be influenced by argu- 
ment. An agile rather than a deep thinker, he 
reached at times a point at which calculation became 
agony and the only remedy was action. Now, as in 
his earlier adventure, " pressed with many doubts, he 
wakes the drumming guns that have no doubts." 
That a mere Prussian minister should combat his 
plans seemed to him little short of lese-tnajest^. Nor 
could he be moved by those who were not so tightly 
bound to the car of Prussia. Mitchell followed 
Podewils with arguments, and Valori, the French 
ambassador, followed Mitchell with threats. Fred- 
erick's answer was a series of blunt questions pressed 
home twice over at Vienna — Have you a treaty with 
Russia against me? Why are you arming? Will 
you solemnly declare that you do not intend to at- 
tack me this year or next ? The final answer was 
received on August 25, 1756. Next day the Prus- 
sians invaded Saxony. 

The Seven Years' War had begun. Needless to 
say, every movement of the Prussians had been 
planned out long before. The army was under or- 
ders which enforced the most perfect mobility. A 
hundred supernumeraries had been added to every 
regiment. On the 13th to 15th August Frederick 
issued directions that the secret of their destination 
was to be strictly kept from the troops. They were 



The Seven Years War 203 

to take with them provisions for nine days, every 
cavalryman carrying three days' supply of hay, and 
every infantryman three days' supply of bread, while 
bread for six days was placed in the single baggage- 
cart allowed to each company. None of this reserve 
of food was, however, to be broken into save in the 
utmost need, and no officer of any rank whatever 
might have table utensils of nobler metal than tin. 

A word would set all in swift motion, but the ma- 
chine had to be arrested until it should be known 
that the Prussian ultimatum was rejected. Kling- 
graffen, Frederick's ambassador at Vienna, caused 
some delay by asking for instructions. On the 24th 
the King wrote to General Winterfeldt, the most im- 
patient advocate of war: "The cursed courier is 
not yet here, so I have been compelled to stop the 
regiments till the 28th. Klinggraffen deserves to be 
made a porter by way of punishment. Such stupid 
tricks are unpardonable and the prolonged uncer- 
tainty is unbearable." On the 26th, however, after 
hearing from Vienna, the King was able to set all in 
motion anew. 

" The answer," he wrote to his brother, the Prince of 
Prussia, "is impertinent, high, and contemptuous, and 
as for the assurances that I asked of them, not a word, 
so that the sword alone can cut this Gordian knot. . . . 
At present, we must think only of making war in such a 
fashion as to deprive our enemies of the desire to break 
the peace too soon." 

While one royal messenger was bearing this mes- 
sage from Potsdam to Berlin, others were on their 



204 Frederick the Great 

way to Vienna, to Dresden, and to every division 
of the Prussian army. Klinggraffen was instructed 
to return a third time to the charge, with the final 
offer that if the Empress-Queen would declare defin- 
itely that she would not attack Frederick that year 
or the next, the troops now moving should be re- 
called. More profit was, however, expected from 
the message to the Saxon Court. King Augustus, 
or Count Briihl, was to be informed, " with every ex- 
pression of my affection and of your respect that 
good breeding can supply," that Frederick was com- 
pelled by the Court of Vienna to enter Saxony with 
his army in order to pass into Bohemia. 

" The estates of the King of Saxony," continued the 
royal missive, " will be spared as far as present circum- 
stances allow. My troops will behave there with perfect 
order and discipline, but I am obliged to take precau- 
tions so as not to fall again into the position in which 
the Saxon Court placed me during the years 1744 and 
1745. ... I desire nothing more ardently than to 
behold the happy moment of peace, so that I may prove 
to this Prince the full extent of my friendship, and place 
him once more in the tranquil possession of all his es- 
tates, against which I have never had any hostile design." 

This declaration was addressed to a ruler who had 
made no engagements hostile to Frederick, and who 
now offered to observe perfect neutrality and to 
allow his troops to pass. A commentary upon it is 
supplied by a document which was probably drawn 
up several days earlier, and which was soon to be 
put in force. By this " instruction " for the admin- 



The Seven Years War 205 

istration of Saxony during the war, '* in order that 
His Majesty may not leave a highly dangerous 
enemy in his rear," the Prussian minister von Borcke 
is directed to suspend the native administration of 
the land and to substitute a Prussian Directory of 
War. The Saxon royal revenue, it is said, amounts 
to about six million thalers, but Frederick *'will be 
contented with five million, so that the inhabitants 
may be solaced thereby." In other respects the 
order and temperance which distinguished the Prus- 
sian Government were to be applied to the subjects 
of Augustus. Such was Frederick's plan for the fu- 
ture of Saxony, a would-be neutral, during the war. 
The problem which the King set himself was to 
cripple Austria before Russia or France could come 
to her assistance. Austria had assembled forces in 
Moravia and in Bohemia. If Frederick attacked the 
former the Bohemian army might cut off his retreat. 
He therefore directed Schwerin to guard Silesia 
while he himself converted Saxony into a base for 
the invasion of Bohemia. From the Saxons he ex- 
pected little or no opposition. He therefore pro- 
posed to march in three columns upon Pirna, a 
fortress situated at the point at which the Elbe 
bursts through the mountain-wall of Bohemia to 
enter the fertile plains of Saxony. Then, with a 
granary and a highway behind him, he would follow 
the river into Bohemia as far as Melnik, less than 
twenty miles north of Prague, where it ceases to be 
navigable. He would thus at the very least have 
gained a commanding position on the further side of 
the mountains. 



2o6 Frederick the Great 

" As he does not think that the Austrians will soon be 
ready to attack him," wrote Mitchell on August 27th. 
"he imagines they will throw in a strong garrison into 
Prague, that \sic\ as the winter approaches, he can have 
good quarters in Bohemia, which will disorder the fin- 
ances at Vienna and perhaps render that court more 
reasonable." 

To the ambassador of England Frederick made 
light of his enterprise and insisted that it would 
permit him, if necessary, to defend Hanover. But it 
is difficult not to surmise that he looked for a great 
campaign. The capture of Prague, the rout of the 
army of Bohemia, and the seizure of its magazines — 
all this would be a fitting sequel to the coercion of 
Saxony. It was not too grave a task for the main 
host of Prussia. 

Even the lesser scheme failed, however, because 
Augustus, though a weakling, was a man of honour. 
His army was less than twenty thousand strong, but 
it sufficed to hold Pirna and to block the highway of 
the Elbe. On September 9, 1756, Frederick entered 
Dresden, but Augustus had fled to the army and lay 
safe in the impregnable rock-fortress of Konigstein. 
While the invader was rifling his archives for proofs 
of a great conspiracy against Prussia, he offered to 
observe the most benevolent neutrality and begged 
for an exact statement of what more could be ex- 
pected from him. He received the answer on Sep- 
tember 14th from the lips of Frederick's favourite, 
Winterfeldt. It was nothing less than that he should 
join Prussia in attacking Maria Theresa. 

" How can I turn my arms against a Princess who 



The Seven Years War 207 



has given me no cause for complaint, and to whom, 
in virtue of an old defensive alliance of which Your 
Majesty is aware, I ought to furnish 6000 auxiliaries, 
only that it is doubtful whether the present war is a 
case of aggression ?" Such was the old King's reply 
to the Prussian tempter, and he coupled with it 
renewed assurances of neutrality. Frederick reiter- 
ated his demands and expressed regret that he could 
not extend complaisance further. By no effort of 
diplomacy could he shake the honourable firmness 
of Augustus, and it was therefore necessary to gain 
the highroad into Bohemia by force, 

Frederick had surrounded Pirna, but he did not 
venture to assault it, though Napoleon declared at 
first sight that there were nine points of attack. It 
was clear, however, that hunger must soon force the 
Saxons to move and that their only hope lay in 
succour from the Austrians. Browne, the Irishman 
who had proved himself to be one of the Queen's 
best generals, therefore led an army northward to 
the foot of the mountains and was confronted by 
Frederick in person at Lobositz. On October i, 
1756, a fierce fight of seven hours proved indecisive. 
Early in the day the King sent twenty squadrons of 
horse to meet disaster at the hands of the Austrian 
gunners, and later the Prussian infantry showed that 
they were still the men of Mollwitz and of Soor. 
The Prussians kept the field of battle, but of nearly 
6400 killed and wounded more than half were theirs. 

The relief of Pirna was checked but not frustrated. 
Lobositz is, however, chiefly memorable as the 
day on which the Austrians first encountered the 



2o8 Frederick the Great 

Prussians at their best and were not beaten. It is no 
more than Frederick's due to remark that the troops 
whom he had now to face were men who had learned 
what his father's army had to teach. They had 
adopted the Old Dessauer's iron ramrod, and the 
swiftness of their fire was no longer less than the 
half of their opponents'. Their artillery, thanks to 
the labours of Prince Lichtenstein, was always good 
and not seldom superior to the Prussian. 

In little more than a fortnight after Lobositz the 
campaign of 1756 was at an end. On October nth, 
Browne reached Schandau, on the right bank of the 
Elbe, where he expected the starving Saxons to 
join him. They were not ready, and after waiting 
two days he was compelled to retreat. The failure 
of the reheving expedition sealed the fate of Au- 
gustus's army. On October 17th, the rank and file 
laid down their arms — only to be compelled, in defi- 
ance of the terms of surrender, to take them up 
again as soldiers of the King of Prussia. 

Augustus, however, did not suffer martyrdom in 
vain. He lost his army and his Electorate, but his 
'' ovine obstinacy " ruined the attack upon the Queen. 
In the hour of triumph Frederick wrote to Schwerin : 
'* As for our stay in Bohemia, it is impossible for 
either of us to establish a sure footing there this 
year, for we have entered the province too late. We 
must confine ourselves to covering Silesia and Sax- 
ony." Both Prussians and Austrians tacitly agreed 
to postpone the decisive blow till the new campaign. 

To balance the gain and loss which Frederick 
owed to his preference of his own plan to the 



The Seven Years War 209 

" timid policy " of Podewils we must take into 
account wider considerations of war and politics. 
By treating Saxony in Hohenzollern fashion, with- 
out scruple and without riot, the King undoubtedly 
gained some advantages. He found in the archives 
at Dresden the material for yet another manifesto 
to Europe. He tested and inspired his army, which 
only knew that under his leadership it had won a 
battle, captured an army, and conquered a state. 
He even increased its numbers by forcing the van- 
quished Saxons into the ranks. Above all, he won 
security for the western flank of Silesia and a safe 
base from which to attack Bohemia. 

But all this was purchased at a great price in 
material and moral strength. Prussia was still a 
Power which had to ask herself whether she could 
bear a second or a third campaign. To raise new 
taxes was difficult if not impossible. Frederick, it 
might almost be said, paid for the war out of his 
own pocket with the help of his allies and of the 
enemy. Already he showed some signs of being 
pressed for money. In the middle of September 
he made secret arrangements for borrowing 300,000 
thalers from a house of business in Berlin. Soon 
the Saxon officials were told that their pay must 
fall into arrear and Frederick observes with some 
brutality that Augustus, who had retired to his 
second capital at Warsaw, could support his queen 
and her household in Saxony from the French and 
Austrian subsidies. He thus denied to the victim 
that courtesy for his family which he had osten- 
tatiously promised from the first. 
14 



2IO Frederick the Great 

It may be doubted whether 14,000 pressed men, 
even though some of them might otherwise have 
found their way to the enemy, compensated Prussia 
for the loyal veterans who fell at Lobositz. Through- 
out the war Frederick found no servants less reliable 
than the Saxons whom he had impressed and no 
foes more bitter than their countrymen who es- 
caped. As for Saxony itself, it is true that if war 
must come, which Podewils regarded as dubious, 
Prussia derived much strength from her possession 
of it. But Frederick's treatment of Saxony re- 
moved all possibility of escaping not only from a 
war, but from war upon the scale that he professed 
to expect. The spectacle of the suffering King in- 
flamed all his enemies. As an exile in Warsaw 
Augustus was a more valuable ally to Austria than 
he could have been in Dresden. He made it 
absurd for Frederick to pose as the defender of 
German princes against the Hapsburg. In January, 
1757, a majority of those princes, assembled in Diet 
at Ratisbon, solemnly commissioned the Hapsburg 
to marshal their corporate might against the Prus- 
sian aggressor. 

Frederick had treated the defensive alliance be- 
tween the two Empresses as a conspiracy against 
himself. Early in February it became such ; save 
that what he might once have termed a conspiracy 
now wore the aspect of a crusade. All the North 
was summoned to unite with Austria in curbing 
Prussia for ever, and Russia bound herself to keep 
80,000 men in the field until the lost provinces 
had been regained. Frederick had even performed 



The Seven Years War 2 1 1 

what Kaunitz and the Pompadour could not com- 
pletely accomplish. France now gave in her whole- 
hearted adhesion to the league for the recovery 
of Silesia and Glatz. She pledged herself to pay 
Austria a heavy annual subsidy, to place 105,000 
French troops in the field, and to enlist 10,000 
Germans. The history of the negotiations, which 
were prolonged till May i, 1757, shows how real 
were the difificulties to be overcome before Bourbon 
and Hapsburg could unite. 

In May, 1757, when the new campaign began, 
Frederick thus stood face to face with what it is 
hardly an exaggeration to term a world in arms. 
He, and no other, had brought Prussia to this pass. 
A coaHtion unprecedented in history was the result 
of the aggressions of 1740 and 1756. All the world 
believed that the hour of reckoning had struck and 
that the Third Silesian War would bring the pun- 
ishment from which chance had delivered the King 
who made the First. 

To the biographer of Frederick, 1757 is welcome, 
for Frederick now begins to be a hero. Had a chance 
bullet at Lobositz struck him down, the world would 
have known only a king who promised to bring in a 
new era of government, but who owed to his father's 
work and methods the chief part of whatever success 
he achieved. For creative power he would have 
taken rank below the Great Elector and Frederick 
William, for military renown below the Old Des- 
sauer and Schwerin ; for the aggrandisement of his 
House, who knows ? for who can calculate what 
havoc the Coalition of 1757 would have wrought 



212 Frederick the Great 

with his dominions? The Frederick who had be- 
queathed to Prussia several volumes of prose and 
verse in French and the memory of sixteen years' 
tenure of Silesia would hardly be known to fame 
as Frederick the Great. 

In 1757, however, he takes his stand for the exist- 
ence of Prussia. At the moment that the military 
balance turns against him the moral balance turns 
in his favour. Courage, energy, resource, determin- 
ation, all displayed through a score of lifetimes, 
if sensations rather than moments make up life, — 
Frederick is the embodiment of these things durin-g 
the next six years. At first it is his daring that 
seems to eclipse all else. If Frederick feared not 
God, neither did he regard man. Far from being 
dazzled by the array of sceptres marshalled against 
him, he determined to strike before his foes could 
form. 

With the first breath of spring he despatched 
three royal princes and the Duke of Bevern against 
four several points in Bohemia. " If those false 
attacks have so far succeeded as to cover the King 
of Prussia's real intention," writes Mitchell on April 
1 8th, '' I may venture to say that His Prussian 
Majesty is upon the point of executing one of the 
boldest and one of the greatest designs that ever was 
attempted by man." Just at this juncture a plot 
against his life was discovered. *' I think upon the 
whole His Prussian Majesty has had a very narrow 
escape^ which however seems to have made no 
impression at all upon him, nor to have created 
in him the least diffidence whatever of anybody." 



The Seven Years War 2 1 3 

Such is his Scotch friend's account of the King at 
the outset of the chequered campaign to which he 
owes the immensity of his fame. 

Frederick's courage was not foolhardiness, for the 
very reason that he was one, and his enemies were 
many. Every coalition must encounter the difid- 
culty of concerting a plan of campaign acceptable 
to all and the still greater difficulty of securing 
honest and punctual co-operation. The coalition 
against Frederick had the advantage that several 
of its members could serve the common cause by 
following the course most profitable to themselves. 
The Russians might be expected to overrun Ost- 
Preussen and the Swedes to attack Prussian Pom- 
erania with the best will in the world, while the 
Austrians had every incentive to be vigorous in 
the conquest of Silesia. But France consented to 
help to make Silesia and Glatz Austrian chiefly in 
order that she might secure Austrian help nearer 
to her own borders. The motley forces of the 
Empire had little interest in the quarrel, and the 
activity of Russia depended upon a czarina whose 
health was bad. Speed and secrecy were alike 
unattainable by a machine which could be set in 
motion only after debate between the Board of 
War at Vienna, the corrupt and factious Court at 
St. Petersburg, and the inharmonious ministers of 
France. Once set in motion, however, the gigantic 
machine seemed irresistible. Kaunitz could launch 
battalions against Prussia from every point of the 
compass. Although a new English minister, Wil- 
liam Pitt, seemed disposed to stand by Frederick, 



2 14 Frederick the Great 

it might well be thought incredible that Prussia 
could escape destruction at the hands of such a 
multitude. 

Frederick's plain course was to make use of the 
speed and secrecy for which the Prussian movements 
were famous. The Queen was massing troops in 
Bohemia. She had determined to raise 150,000 
men, but with sisterly partiaHty she halved their 
effectiveness by appointing Prince Charles to the 
command. This appointment favoured the plan 
which Mitchell admired so highly. Frederick was 
devising a new form of the manoeuvre by which he 
decoyed the Austrians to Hohenfriedberg. He was 
so successful that everyone on the Austrian side 
believed that his one object was to maintain himself 
in Saxony. To them the four sham-invasions of 
Bohemia seemed to be designed to conceal the 
King's defensive operations and to paralyse their 
own attack. The illusion was strengthened because 
at the same time they learned that Torgau and 
Dresden were being fortified in all haste and that 
barricades were rising on the roads from Bohemia 
into Saxony. The last thing that they could sus- 
pect was that Frederick was on the eve of attacking. 

The result was that the movement planned for the 
previous autumn was now carried out in the face of 
133,000 Austrians. Frederick's three columns issued 
from Saxony, Schwerin came from Silesia, and be- 
fore the end of April 117,000 Prussians were en- 
camped in Bohemia. In the face of such a force 
the astonished Austrians abandoned the magazines 
which they had stored for the conquest of Saxony 




LEOPOLD, COUNT VON DAUN. 

FROM A COPPER PRINT. 



The Seven Years War 2 1 5 

and fell back on Prague. Having occupied a strong 
position to the east of the city, Prince Charles 
awaited the arrival of Field-Marshal Daun, who was 
advancing from the south. 

Now the Prussians were to learn that a royal 
command has drawbacks. Frederick was burning 
to attack the enemy. He had staked the success 
of the campaign on the chance of a pitched battle, 
and the timid tactics of Prince Charles filled him 
with impatience. At his back was the finest army 
in the world. He was opposed by cavalry who had 
never beaten their Prussian opponents since MoU- 
witz, by infantry who had never beaten them at all, 
and by a general whom he despised. Preferring, as 
usual, the boldest course, he crossed to the eastern 
side of the river Moldau, which runs through Prague, 
and signalled to Schwerin to join him. 

Prince Charles did not venture to oppose a move- 
ment by which the enemy's force was made almost 
equal in number to his own. Such inertness could 
be justified only if he believed either that he was 
very weak or that his situation was impregnable 
and that Daun's arrival would make him sure of 
victory. His position indeed was strong enough 
to have given pause to a general less impatient 
than the King of Prussia. All Frederick's royal 
authority had to be exerted before Schwerin would 
consent that 64,000 men, of whom the half had been 
marching since midnight, should attack a strongly 
fortified position held by 60,000 of the enemy. But 
the vanguard of Daun's 30,000 was within ten miles 
of the capital and Frederick had his way. 



2i6 Frederick the Great 

His forlorn hope at Prague on May 6, 1757, was 
to cost more blood than had been spilled on any 
field in Europe for nearly fifty years. The Prussians 
began by marching with great skill round the Aus- 
trian right. Browne, however, suggested an effective 
counter-manoeuvre, so that when Schwerin assailed 
the flank at ten o'clock he did so under unsuspected 
disadvantages of ground. " The cavalry began the 
encounter, and after several fruitless attacks Zieten 
with the reserve overthrew the Austrian cavalry. 
In the pursuit, however, his troops came upon one 
of the enemy's camps and drank so deep that they 
were of no more use that day." Such is the state- 
ment of Schafer, the Prussian historian of the war. 
At the same time the infantry of the first line 
pressed forward, but found that the way to the 
enemy lay through the treacherous slime of fish- 
ponds coated with green, which Frederick in his 
haste had taken to be meadow-land. They strug- 
gled across unharmed, but the well-served Austrian 
batteries began to destroy them at a range of 400 
paces. Then their onslaught was shattered by the 
Austrian grenadiers, and Schwerin, as he seized the 
colours to rally his men, was slain by a blast of 
grape-shot. The Austrian grenadiers began a tri- 
umphant counter-charge, but they were unsupported, 
for their army had now no leader. Browne had fallen 
early in the charge, and Prince Charles collapsed 
in wrestling with problems too great for his powers. 
The Prussian second line was therefore able to re- 
pair the disaster of the first, and, after a terrible 
struggle at close quarters, they stormed the heights 



mm/JM PRUSSIAN 



AUSTRIAN 




PRATS CH 

PLAN OF PRAGUE, MAY 6, 1757. 



The Seven Years War 2 1 7 

and won the battle. Many of the Austrians fled 
southwards across the river Sazawa, but the greater 
number took refuge behind the walls of Prague. 

In the battle itself Frederick played the part of a 
brave and skilful leader. His first impression was 
that he had gained a decisive victory. In the even- 
ing he wrote to his mother : 

" My brothers and I are well. The Austrians are in 
danger of losing the whole campaign and I find myself 
free with 150,000 men, and that we are masters of a 
kingdom which must provide us with troops and money. 
The Austrians are scattered like chaff before the wind. 
I am going to send part of my troops to compliment 
Messieurs les Frangais and to pursue the Austrians with 
the rest." 

He informed Wilhelmina that about 5000 men had 
been killed and wounded. To his ally, George II., 
he sent word that the battle had been '' as decisive 
as possible," and to his Scotch friend, Field-Marshal 
Keith, that he believed that the capture of Prague 
would finish the war. Fuller knowledge showed 
that these ideas were ill-conceived. The King's 
impatience had caused an attack across treacherous 
ground with weary men. The pursuit therefore 
failed, and the Austrian casualties did not greatly 
exceed the Prussian. Frederick himself later com- 
puted his loss at i8,ooo men, "without counting 
Marshal Schwerin, who alone was worth above 
10,000." The most moderate estimate states it at 
12,500. The Austrians lost some 13,000, including 
prisoners, but nearly 11,000 more fled across the 



2 1 8 Frederick the Great 

Sazawa, and the Prussians made an unwonted haul 
of baggage and artillery. One of the musketeers 
wrote home that 186,000 Prussians had beaten 295,- 
000 Austrians and captured 200 guns. The army 
and the people were jubilant, but the price was 
great. "Schwerin's death," said the King, long after, 
•* withered the laurels of victory, which was bought 
with too much precious blood. On this day fell the 
pillarsof the Prussian infantry . . . and a bloody 
and terrible war gave no time to rear them anew." 

The success of the campaign now hung on the fate 
of Prague. If the capital and its defenders fell into 
his hands without delay, the King might still exe- 
cute the remainder of his daring scheme. He might 
sweep away Daun, enter Moravia, and dictate peace 
at Vienna. Thence he might lead his army to the 
western scene of war, to crush the forces of the Em- 
pire, and drive the French across the Rhine. A 
strong reinforcement, he believed, would enable 
Lehwaldt to grapple with the Russians, whose sol- 
dierly qualities he had not yet learned to appreciate. 
The moral effect of his victory was felt by all Eu- 
rope. Frederick became the hero of the English 
nation. At Vienna depression reigned, and Kaunitz 
grew loud in his appeals to France and Russia. 
Roving bands of Prussians spread terror through the 
Empire by pretending to be the vanguard of the 
King, and demanding contributions from the magis- 
trates of hostile towns with threats of stern meas- 
ures if their demands were not complied with. 
Austria could not protect her German allies, and 
Louis XV. feared that she might now desert him as 



The Seven Years War 2 1 9 

Prussia had deserted him in 1742 and 1745. If 
Prague fell the coahtion would be shaken if not 
destroyed. 

But however great the profit to be gained by the 
fall of Prague, Frederick realised that he could not 
hope to carry by storm a city which Browne had 
previously undertaken to hold with 8000 men and 
which now contained a garrison of 44,000. He 
therefore detached the Duke of Bevern with a force 
of 17,500 to observe Daun in the south, while he 
himself set to work to reduce Prague by starvation. In 
the hope of destroying the magazines he maintained 
a severe bombardment, which put the inhabitants to 
great suffering but brought little military advantage. 
He even brought a notorious burglar out of gaol to 
break into the city and procure information. Prince 
Charles, who had plenty of meal though little meat, 
did not risk his army in a sally en masse, but with 
the approval of his Government simply waited for 
Daun to set him free. This was an afflicting poHcy 
for the impatient King. On May 24th, Frederick 
hoped '* at present more than ever that all this race 
of Austrian princes and beggars will be obliged to 
lay down their arms." On May 29th, he informed 
Wilhelmina that a week ought to see the end, but 
before the week was over he began to admit the 
possibility of failure. On June nth he wrote to 
Lehwaldt that it might be three or four weeks be- 
fore he would be free to move. Next day, after 
hearing from Bevern that Daun could no longer be 
kept at bay, he sounded the knell of the whole 
enterprise : 



2 20 Frederick the Great 

"Who loses time in war," runs Frederick's broken 
German, " cannot make it good again. Had you pressed 
forward at once towards Czaslau, Daun would have re- 
treated further . . . and I wager that if one flies at 
his throat he will do it. To get together lo battalions 
now is impossible, but perhaps I will come myself to 
make an end of the matter, so that what has been gained 
by bravery be not lost by hesitation. . . . Daun 
must be driven into Moravia be he weak or strong, else 
we do not win Prague and cannot resist the other ene- 
mies who come on, and the whole campaign, however 
well begun, is lost." 

The cause of this note to Bevern was that with 
less than 10,000 men he had at last fallen back be- 
fore the enemy. Daun, whose caution was to earn 
him the nickname " Fabius Cunctator,'' had assem- 
bled an army some 54,000 strong and was advancing 
under strict orders to venture a battle for the relief 
of Prague. Frederick felt that the crisis called for 
his own presence. For the issue he had no fear. In 
order to risk nothing during his absence, he took 
with him only some 14,000 men, so that by strict 
count of heads he would attack against odds of 
more than five to three. But if Schwerin were worth 
10,000 men, the King may well have believed that his 
own value was far greater. On June i6th he wrote 
to his representative in London that he had joined 
Bevern, 

" in order to march straight on Field-Marshal Daun, to 
fight him, and to drive him altogether out of Bohemia 
into Moravia. I flatter myself that in a few days I shall 



The Seven Years War 221 

be able to give you good news of our success; and when 
this expedition is happily over, I believe that the town of 
Prague will fall of its own accord, and that then with 
hands more free, I shall be able to send a detachment 
against the French." 

The King's confidence was in great part warranted 
by what he had already seen in the present war. It 
seemed that only a Browne would dare to attack 
Prussian troops led by their King. Had not Prince 
Charles been overruled by his generals, he would 
have abandoned Prague to avoid a battle. Daun 
had retreated before Bevern till he became over- 
whelmingly superior in force, and he advanced only 
when his Queen promised him gratitude for a vic- 
tory and her continued favour if he were beaten. 
The most that could be expected from such com- 
manders as these was that they would stand on the 
defensive in a strong position. 

This very fact made the tactics of the Prussians 
doubly formidable. Drilled to the last degree of 
perfection, they could change their formation with 
a speed which their enemies admired but could 
not rival. Frederick could therefore veil his move- 
ment till the last moment. Having chosen the 
enemy's most vulnerable wing, he could strengthen 
the wing opposed to it without fear that the enemy 
would either accomplish the countermove in time 
or attack the section which he had weakened. It 
was therefore of little consequence that the Aus- 
trians greatly outnumbered the Prussians in the 
part of the field where no fighting was likely to 
take place. The battle was gained because the 



222 Frederick the Great 

Prussians swiftly overcame all that nature and art 
could oppose to them at the spot selected by the 
King for contact. The doomed wing would be 
broken, the centre laid bare, and then the cau- 
tious Austrian would make off, rejoicing that it was 
not dishonourable to be beaten by the King of 
Prussia, and that the attack demanded so much pre- 
liminary marching that the weary victors were not 
often terrible in pursuit. 

Such were the tactics attempted in the battle of 
June i8, 1757, when Frederick attacked Daun in his 
camp overlooking the highroad between Vienna and 
Prague, within sight of the town of Kolin. The 
country undulates sufificiently to make it impossible 
for the King to have ascertained every detail of the 
problem with which he was confronted. But from 
many points, and with especial clearness from an iso- 
lated height across the highway, he could see that the 
Austrian right wing held the crest of a gentle slope 
south of the road and parallel with it, and that it was 
at the further extremity of this wing that the ground 
seemed most favourable to the attack. 

The morning of the stifling summer's day was spent 
in marching along the line of the highroad towards 
Kolin, and it was after midday that the Prussian left 
turned upon the enemy. Zieten, the terrible hussar, 
put to flight the Austrian horse, but an oak-wood 
gave them shelter behind which to rally, and mean- 
while Daun made all haste to move up supports to 
his right. But though the Austrians fought doggedly 
and poured in a deadly artillery fire, the matchless 
Prussian infantry pressed on. They captured point 






B 




The Seven Years War 223 

after point of Daun's position until the moment 
came at which, although their cavalry had turned 
tail, they needed only reinforcements to crush his 
right. It was the duty of Prince Maurice, the son 
of the Old Dessauer, to bring help from the centre. 
The moment was critical. The Austrian musketeers, 
seven times charged by the Prussians, had shot 
away their last cartridge. '' Four fresh battalions," 
wrote the King four days after, '' and the battle was 
won." Daun had already begun to withdraw his 
heavy guns and to issue orders for retreat. But b}^ 
a fatal misunderstanding, due, it is hinted, to the 
impatience of the King in giving orders, Maurice 
was attacking the enemy more than half a mile 
further down the line. Still nearer to the Prussian 
right General Manstein defied orders and dashed at 
the enemy. 

The Prussians were therefore involved in a frontal 
attack, and their inferiority in numbers at once be- 
gan to tell against them. Yet still, though Frederick 
had only the reserves of cavalry in hand and these, 
even when he put himself at their head, refused to 
pass through the fire to aid them, the dauntless 
Prussian left achieved fresh triumphs. When the 
deadly wrestle reached its fourth hour they still 
maintained their hold upon the heights. Daun 
hurled his light Saxon cavalry upon them, but with 
a heroism worthy of Mollwitz field they formed 
into groups and drove back the foe. But at this 
moment the Count de Thiennes, colonel of a regi- 
ment of young dragoons from the Netherlands, 
begged for leave to attack. He won a grudging 



2 24 Frederick the Great 

assent, at first refused, *' but," said Daun, " you won't 
do much good with your beardless boys." *'You 
will see," answered Thiennes and galloped back to 
his regiment. " Boys," he cried, after repeating the 
field-marshal's taunt, " show that though you are 
beardless you can bite." Uniting with the Saxons, 
the "boys" swept the enemy's horse from the field, 
then flung themselves on the grim square of tattered 
heroes, broke it, and drove it from the heights. This 
was the prelude to a general flight of the exhausted 
remnants of the Prussian infantry. Almost beside 
himself with rage and disappointment, Frederick 
collected some forty men and led them against the 
foe. But even the King could not persuade them to 
suicide. One by one they slunk away till at last his 
adjutant put the question, " Will your Majesty take 
the battery alone ? " Frederick once more gazed 
at the enemy through his glass, then rode to Bevern 
on the right and ordered retreat. 

Of 31,000 Prussians little more than 17,000 were 
left. As at Prague, it was the infantry whose loss 
was the greatest. Of 18,000, more than two-thirds 
were killed or captured. It was true that they had 
inflicted upon the enemy a loss of more than 8000 
men, and that Daun, " like a good Christian who 
would not suffer the sun to go down on his wrath," 
did nothing by way of pursuit. But Frederick saw 
at a glance that the conquest of Bohemia was now 
beyond his strength. On June 20, 1757, the very 
day on which Prince Charles had announced that 
he would be compelled to surrender, the besiegers 
quitted Prague. 



The Seven Years War 225 

Frederick's plan was to retreat slowly through 
north-eastern Bohemia into Saxony, exhausting the 
country as he went. " My heart is torn in pieces," 
he wrote to Prince Maurice two days after the battle, 
" but I am not cast down and will try on the first 
opportunity to wipe out this disgrace." Perhaps 
because, in hi., own phrase, " a certain Hungarian 
rabble has taken kennel on the highways," his 
letter to his sister makes light of Kolin. " I at- 
tacked Daun on the i8th. In spite of all our efforts, 
we found the country so difficult that I believed my- 
self bound to abandon the enterprise in order not 
to lose my army." For the information of Berlin, 
Eichel magnified the gentle slopes which are all that 
the battle-field can show into " a steep mountain, cut 
by many ravines and defiles at its base." But to 
London the King sent a franker statement. 

"After winning eight battles in succession, we have 
for the first time been beaten, and that because the 
enemy had three posts on a tolerably high hill fortified 
by strong batteries one behind another. After taking 
two of them, the attacking battalions and their supports 
had suffered so much that they were too few to force 
the third post, and so the battle ended for lack of 
combatants." 

The transports of the Queen and the exaggerated 
caution with which Daun and Prince Charles ne- 
glected to follow up their advantage attested the 
truth of Frederick's assurance that his situation was 
by no means desperate. 

From day to day however, it altered for the worse. 



2 26 Frederick the Great 

Disaster in the field was followed by affliction in the 
home. Within a fortnight of Kolin, Frederick sud- 
denly learned that his mother was no more. The 
crushing news was blurted out by a letter from his 
wife, whose thoughtless use of a red seal in place of 
a black one frustrated the kindly machinery which 
Podewils and Eichel had devised for preparing the 
mind of the King. He had just written to Wilhel- 
mina a letter full of confidence. 

" You have nothing to fear on my account, dear sister, 
men are always in the hands of what is called destiny. . . 
Germany is passing through a terrible crisis. I am 
obliged to stand alone in defending her liberties and her 
faith. If I fall, there will be an end of them. But I 
have good hope. However great may be the number of 
my enemies, I trust in the goodness of my cause, in the 
admirable courage of my troops and in the goodwill 
which exists from the marshals down to the humblest 
soldier." 

Then the blow fell and for two days, even at such 
a crisis, the flow of political correspondence is 
checked. His grief finds utterance in an agonised 
note to his sister Amelia. 

"All kinds of misfortune are overwhelming me at 
once, ... I am more dead than alive. . . . Perhaps 
Heaven has taken away our dear Mother that she may 
not see the misfortunes of our House." " Yesterday 
and the day before," writes Eichel on July 3d, " His 
Majesty's grief has been very great and violent, but to- 
day it is somewhat lessened, because his Majesty has 



The Seven Years War 227 

taken into consideration his duty to his state, his army 
and his faithful subjects at the present crisis, and the 
necessary orders have somewhat relieved his depres- 
sion, though there is no lack of gloomy moments and 
intervals." 

On the same day the King began to pour out his 
soul to Mitchell, who owns himself " most sensibly 
affected to see him indulging his grief and giving 
way to the warmest filial affections." 

Calamity was, however, as impbtent as success to 
teach Frederick good faith towards his allies. Mitch- 
ell had reported on June 30, 1757, that *' he renewed 
to me on this occasion his firm resolution to hearken 
to no terms of peace without His Majesty's privity 
and approbation." On July 9th he describes a fur- 
ther interview in which " His Prussian Majesty said 
that, as he resolved to continue firmly united with 
His Majesty, it would be for their mutual interests 
to think of terms of peace, honourable and safe for 
both, and to concert together what terms they would 
adopt, if a favourable opportunity occurred to pro- 
pose them." Yet between these assurances of fidel- 
ity to England Frederick accepted with enthusiasm an 
offer made by Wilhelmina to send an envoy to pro- 
cure peace with France by bribing the Pompadour. 

" I will willingly charge myself with his expenses," he 
writes on July 7th. " He may offer the favourite any- 
thing up to 500,000 crowns for peace, and he may raise 
his offers far higher if at the same time they would 
promise to procure us some advantages. You see all 
the nicety of which I have need in this affair and how 



2 28 Frederick the Great 

little I must be seen in it. If England should have the 
least wind of it all would be lost." 

Job's tidings continued to pour in upon the King. 
In the sunshine of Kolin the crop sown by Kaunitz 
was ripening fast. Before July was half over Fred- 
erick learned that the French had seized East Frisia 
and were striking east, that the Swedes were sending 
17,000 men into Pomerania, and that the Russians 
were likely to destroy Lehwaldt in Ost-Preussen. 
Thus all his northern frontier was on fire and the 
army of the Empire was about to join the Austrians 
in kindling new conflagrations in the south. Bo- 
hemia, of course, must soon be abandoned, and how 
would it be possible to hold Saxony, Silesia, or even 
Brandenburg against such a host of foes? Men 
said that in Voltaire the King of Prussia had lost 
his pen and in Schwerin his sword. 

In the latter half of the month the situation al- 
tered still further for the worse. While Frederick 
lay motionless at Leitmeritz on the Elbe, intent on 
devouring Bohemia till the last moment, but keep- 
ing open his retreat into Saxony, his eldest brother, 
Augustus William, was out-manoeuvred by the Aus- 
trians further east. Prince Charles, with inferior 
numbers, seized one of his posts, outpaced him to 
Zittau, burnt the magazine there, and finally com- 
pelled him to flee far into Saxony. Nothing re- 
mained but for the indignant King to rescue the 
heir to the throne, who had thus opened to the 
enemy the Lusatian door into both Saxony and 
Silesia. On his way Frederick paused to garrison 



The Seven Years War 229 

Pirna, and there, on July 27, 1757, he received what 
Mitchell terms '' a draught of comfort to one who 
has not had a single drop since the i8th June." 

So serious was the crisis that the King had sent 
orders to Berlin that at the first news of further 
disaster in Lusatia the archives and treasure should 
be removed to Ciistrin. That very day he had 
written a plain account of the situation to convince 
his ally of England how desperate was his plight. 
" If I except Spain, Denmark, Holland, and the 
King of Sardinia, I have all Europe against me. 
Even so, I fear not for the places where I can set 
armies against them, but for those where he who 
comes will find no one to oppose him." 

Such was the King's mood when his friend, the 
ambassador of England, laid before him Avith delight 
the contents of as considerate a despatch as was 
ever penned in Whitehall. Sympathy for Kolin, 
approval of the new plan of campaign, ** entire re- 
liance upon the King of Prussia's great military 
abilities," a cheerful review of the forces still at 
his disposal — all this might be expected from the 
ministers of George II. But what followed might 
well have heaped coals of fire upon Frederick's head. 
His ally, little suspecting the overtures to the Pompa- 
dour, persisted in treating him as a man of honour. 

"The hint his Prussian Majesty threw out to you, of 
an inclination to peace, is agreeable to the language that 
Prince has held from the very beginning of the present 
troubles in Germany. . . . The King will at all 
times be glad to contribute to a general pacification, 
whenever equitable conditions can be had for himself, 



230 Frederick the Great 

the King of Prussia, and their allies . . . the King being 
determined to take no steps in an affair of this conse- 
quence without his Prussian Majesty's concurrence and 
approbation." 

Then follow solid offers of co-operation with ships 
and above all with gold, the latter " only meant as 
the convenient and proper contingent of England to 
her allies." 

Frederick, by Mitchell's account, received the 
message 

'Svith a flow of gratitude not to be described. After a 
short pause, he said, ' I am deeply sensible of the King's 
and your nation's generosity, but I do not wish to be a 
burden to my allies; I would have you delay answering 
this letter till affairs are ended in Lusatia; if I succeed, 
I will then consult with you upon the different points 
suggested in the letter and give my opinion freely upon 
them. If I am beat, there will be no occasion to an- 
swer it at all; it will be out of your power to save me, 
and I would not willingly abuse the generosity of my 
allies by drawing them into unnecessary and expensive 
engagements that can answer no valuable purpose.' I 
was pleased, but not surprised," the report continues, 
" with the noble dignity of this answer, for I have seen 
the King of Prussia great in prosperity but greater still 
in adversity." 

There was, however, little of dignity or greatness 
in the King's treatment of his unlucky brother and 
heir, whom he met on the road to Bautzen two days 
later. It was in the early hours of the morning, 
according to the narrative of an eye-witness, the 



The Seven Years War 



son of one of the chief dehnquents, that Augustus 
WilHam saw the King and beside him Winterfeldt 
and Goltz, two of his own generals, for whom he 
had waited a full hour in vain. Each of the royal 
brothers rode at the head of his staff, and in Fred- 
erick's train were Prince Henry and Ferdinand of 
Brunswick. At a distance of about three hundred 
paces the King stopped. Augustus William did the 
like, and he and his party doffed hats. The King's 
party bowed to them, but Frederick turned his horse 
round, dismounted, and lay down upon the ground 
as though awaiting his vanguard. He made Winter- 
feldt and Goltz sit by him. All his officers dis- 
mounted, as did the Prince and his party. Soon 
Goltz crossed over to the Prince and said a few 
words to him, whereupon the Prince called his offi- 
cers together and requested him to repeat the King's 
message in their presence. This he did in the 
following words : 

" His Majesty bids me tell Your Royal Highness that 
he has cause to be very dissatisfied with you. You 
deserve that a court-martial should be held over you, 
and then you and all the generals with you would lose 
your heads. But His Majesty is not wiUing to carry the 
matter so far, because in the General he would not 
forget the Brother." 

Augustus William made answer like a brave man, 
exculpating his generals, and requesting a strict en- 
quiry into his own conduct. But the King replied 
only by putting himself at the head of his vanguard, 
which had now come up, and riding on with his 



232 Frederick the Great 

staff past the Prince, always keeping from three to 
four hundred paces away from him. At Bautzen he 
encamped, but still kept at a distance from the 
fugitives, lest, suggests Eichel, their fear should 
contaminate his own officers. Augustus William, 
treated like a leper, applied for permission to go to 
Dresden. " The Prince may go where he will," said 
Frederick to the lieutenant who bore the letter. 
He went to Berlin and died of a broken heart. 

If anything could palliate brutality to the merely 
unfortunate it would have been the situation in 
which Frederick was placed by his brother's blunder. 
Despite all his efforts, the Austrians remained mas- 
ters of the pass into Lusatia. With French, Swedes, 
Russians, and Imperialists all pressing on, it became 
imperative to dispose of the Austrians by a second 
Hohenfriedberg. But Prince Charles was not to be 
tempted from the strong position which Daun had 
chosen with his wonted skill. After three impatient 
weeks Frederick decided 'that the peril from the 
French was too acute to permit of further delay in 
trying to force the Austrians to give battle. Early 
in August he received the news of Cumberland's 
downfall at Hastenbeck. Hanover lay at the mercy 
of the French under Richelieu, and when on August 
25, 1757, the King turned his face towards the west, 
Soubise with a second French force and the army of 
the Empire was already at Erfurt. Frederick was 
determined to maintain his hold on Saxony. Bevern, 
he decided, must watch the Austrians, distance and 
fortune must account for the Russians and Swedes, 
while he himself undertook a march of two hundred 



The Seven Years War 233 

miles to muster 20,000 men and lead them against 
Soubise. 

It seemed at first as though the King did wrong 
to trust in fortune. On August 30, 1757, the army 
of Ost-Preussen was vanquished by the Russians at 
Gross-Jagersdorf. Frederick, however, kept on his 
way. In the middle of September he reached the 
scene of action, only to suffer from the caution of 
Soubise a month of the same torture that Prince 
Charles had inflicted in Lusatia. Then he was sud- 
denly called upon to hurry a hundred miles towards 
the north-east to drive the Austrians from his capital. 
In his absence Prince Charles had moved eastwards 
into Silesia and his rearguard of light cavalry, 15,000 
strong, seized a favourable moment for a foray on 
Berlin. They exacted a ransom of 200,000 thalers 
from the town, and then made off by forced marches. 
Frederick, who feared an invasion in force, was 
greatly relieved at the news, which reached him on 
October i8th. Next day, despairing of bringing the 
French to book, he informed Prince Maurice that it 
was time to think of chasing the Austrians from 
Silesia, but on the 23rd he sent him word that Sou- 
bise was after all leaving the hills and marching 
straight for Leipzig. 

** Here very much is altered in a day," he added 
with his own hand. It was in fact the turning-point 
of the most marvellous and chequered year of Fred- 
erick's life. Full of hope, he ordered a concen- 
tration between his own command and those of 
Ferdinand, Keith, and Maurice. The sum-total was 
not great, but the quality and temper of the troops 



234 Frederick the Great 

were incomparable. They were face to face with 
Frenchmen, of old the scorners of the German race, 
which they were wont to conquer by their arms and 
to corrupt by their example. Now these invaders 
were laden with the spoils of Thuringia. Insolent and 
infatuated, they were too proud to see among them- 
selves defects which were patent to Prussian eyes. 
It was little wonder that Frederick's veterans shared 
the ardour of their King. " The spirit of the soldiers 
was remarkable," noted Mitchell when they came to 
Leipzig. " They did not complain of fatigue, not- 
withstanding of the long marches, but desired to be 
led out immediately, and murmured on being ordered 
to quarters." 

Three days later their desire was gratified. On 
the last day of October, 1757, Frederick was at 
Weissenfels on the Saale, checked for the moment 
because the enemy burned the bridge in his face and 
held the line of the river against him. His road 
from Leipzig had led him across the dismal plain 
where Charles XII. held for a moment the fate of 
Europe in his hand, past the granite slab which 
marks the spot where a greater King of Sweden fell 
at the head of his men. The region is memorable 
in history, but the deed which would have been 
most notable of all was averted. At Weissenfels, 
tradition says, Frederick owed his life to the chivalry 
of a French officer who forbade an artilleryman to 
pick him off. 

The French and Imperialists gave up the line of 
the Saale, joined forces, and took up a strong posi- 
tion in the undulating country to the west. On 




00 < 

3 52 

CO X 

UJ o 

X u. 



UJ o 



The Seven Years War 235 

November 3rd, Frederick crossed the river and ex- 
pected that next day the intolerable tension would 
be at an end. When, however, he came to recon- 
noitre the enemy's position in force he found that to 
attack it against odds of two to one would be to 
invite a second Kolin. To the exultation of the 
allies, he drew back under a heavy cannonade and 
encamped with his left wing resting on Rossbach. 
On November 5th, Eichel, who was lodged at a safe 
distance, sent word of this fiasco to the Government, 
which had taken refuge in Magdeburg. " The whole 
war," wrote this most submissive of Frederick's 
slaves, ** is of no avail. May Your Excellency soon 
make a good peace." He added a postscript : "At 
the moment of closing this, about 2 o'clock '\\\ the 
afternoon, we hear a very loud cannon-fire and, as it 
seems, musketry also." Frederick was being deliv- 
ered from his troubles by a game of hide-and-seek. 

The King's object in encamping near Rossbach 
was to turn the allies' position, or, failing this, to 
hang upon their rear when hunger should compel 
them to retreat. By the enemy, however, the move- 
ment was attributed to fear. Hot-headed French- 
men, full of the martial traditions of their race, urged 
Soubise to crush a foe whose stroke they had yet to 
learn lest his little army should escape them. Venge- 
ful Saxon voices joined with theirs, while shivering 
Imperialists, who for five days had subsisted on what 
food they could pick up among the peasants, clam- 
oured for the break-up of the camp. Soubise at last 
gave way and planned a second Soor, to be done 
this time in broad daylight. Screened by the low 



236 Frederick the Great 

hills, the allies were to march round Frederick's left 
and to take him in flank and rear. Believing them- 
selves to be four times as strong as the King, they 
feared only lest he should flee to Merseburg in time. 

After a march of some three hours the allies 
reached a point due south of Rossbach. With a 
salutary access of caution, the French proposed to 
encamp there, right on Frederick's flank. But this 
proposal was angrily resisted by the Imperialists 
and Saxons, and at the critical moment the news 
came that the Prussians were retreating. It was 
evident that they could delay no longer without 
permitting Frederick to escape. If, however, they 
hastened round the eastern end of the long, low 
ridge which hid his army from view, they might still 
take it in flank as it fled along the road to Merse- 
burg. With this plan in mind, Soubise and his col- 
leagues cast prudence to the winds. From the first 
they had omitted to name a place of retreat or a 
formation to be adopted in case they should be at- 
tacked. Now their army hurried along pell-mell, 
with three generals at the head of the cavalry, the 
infantry straggling after as best they might, the 
French reserves pressing between the marching col- 
umns and the artillery, and the whole flank exposed 
on the left, where the low ridge still screened the 
enemy from their sight. 

Behind that ridge Frederick was ranking his men 
for battle. He, too, had believed his opponents to 
be in retreat and received with coarse taunts and 
disbelief the report of a lieutenant that they were 
trying to outflank him. The sight of their infantry, 



mM& PRUSS/AN 



AUSTRIAN 






■■"\.i\m\% 



NOV I 



i| dEDRA 










PETTSTAOT ^ S'^l^"' 



''/iimim\^:fl\\v"^^ 



lf'^'^''^S'f^ Tl^ ' ^ nr-^ 






•.../^/(u-y/'^ 



PLAN OF ROSSBACH, NOVEMBER 5, 1757. 



The Seven Years War 237 

however, convinced him that they meant even more 
than a reconnoissance. At a glance he saw his op- 
portunity. '' In less than two minutes," writes an 
onlooker, '* all the tents lay on the ground, as though 
someone had pulled a string behind the scenes, and 
the army was in full march." At first, by great luck, 
the heads of the Prussian columns pointed north-east 
towards Merseburg, and thus the allies were deluded 
into the belief that they were in retreat. Then, 
hidden by the ridge, they moved east and finally 
south-east, converging towards the enemy. In the 
waning November afternoon they formed line and 
waited unseen, cannon massed on the right. Prince 
Henry with the infantry in the centre, on the ex- 
treme left Seydlitz, the prince of dragoons, smoking 
his short clay pipe till the King should order the 
charge. 

Little more than an hour after the Prussians 
struck their tents they were dashing at the open 
flank of the alHes, and ere another hour had passed 
Frederick's western frontier was saved. The so- 
called battle of Rossbach would be better named 
the drove of Reichartswerben. But for the slaughter 
inevitable when the best troops in the world swooped 
down upon a mob, the encounter would have been 
a pure farce. First Seydlitz by repeated charges 
drove the cavalry of the allies off the field. Then, 
to the accompaniment of a heavy cannonade, Prince 
Henry led the infantry down the slope and poured 
swift volleys into the medley out of which Sou- 
bise was vainly struggling to form a line of battle. 
Some of the French, Swiss, and West-German troops 



238 Frederick the Great 

showed fight, the rest fled. Finally Seydlitz fell 
upon their rear and the butchery was checked only 
by darkness. At the cost of about five hundred 
men Frederick destroyed an army of nearly fifty 
thousand and made himself the hero of the Teutonic 
race. He jeered at the vanquished enemy in blas- 
phemous French verses and set to work to reap the 
fruits of victory. 

Everywhere save in Silesia the aspect of affairs 
was changing in his favour. A report that EHzabeth 
was dying caused the Russians to withdraw from 
Ost-Preussen just when their victory had placed it 
at their mercy. Lehwaldt was therefore set free 
to undertake the defence of Pomerania against the 
Swedes. England, inspired by Pitt, was proving her- 
self a worthy ally against France. A new army 
was formed for the defence of Hanover. The com- 
mand was offered to Prince Ferdinand, and British 
soldiers were to serve under him. For the present 
year at least, the North and West might be ac- 
counted safe. But from the Eastern theatre of war 
the news was bad. Prince Charles had followed 
Bevern into Silesia and now stood between him and 
Schweidnitz. Not a moment was to be lost if the 
King would save this important fortress. 

Once more, however, Prussian speed was equal to 
all demands. Two days after Rossbach Frederick 
was already on his way. ** I will leave you as strong 
a corps as I can on this side," he writes to Keith, 
*' and march unceasingly for Silesia. A toilsome year 
for me ! " In good heart after Rossbach, he strongly 
approved of Bevern's resolve to attack the Austrians. 



The Seven Years War 239 

*' For God's sake have no fear of a weak enemy," 
he wrote, " but trust to your own insight and ex- 
perience." But the days of Schwerin and the Old 
Dessauer were over. Except Henry and Ferdinand, 
Frederick had now no general from whom he could 
expect victories like his own. While he strode 
swiftly through Saxony Silesia was lost. On No- 
vember 18, 1757, at Konigsbruck, he learned that 
Schweidnitz had fallen without a blow. The con- 
fused reproaches and threats which he poured out 
upon Bevern and his generals were futile, for on the 
22nd Prince Charles drove the Prussians from Bres- 
lau across the Oder, and within the week the capital 
was Austrian once more. 

Before the news of Breslau reached him Fred- 
erick had declared to Bevern that he was firmly re- 
solved to attack the enemy, but that it must be with 
their united forces, "else I am too weak and not 
much over 12,000 strong." Next day, November 
24th, at Naumburgon the Queiss the report reached 
him that Bevern had gained a victory. He there- 
fore planned to catch Prince Charles in a net at Neu- 
markt by marching from Liegnitz to meet Bevern 
sallying forth from Breslau. He even hinted that 
Keith might surprise Prague, and wrote to Ferdi- 
nand : " With good fortune I flatter myself that I 
shall finish this business in a fortnight." '* The 
Almighty shows us one great mercy after another," 
wrote Eichel. Next day they learned part of the 
truth, though rumour multiplied fourfold the Aus- 
trian loss of 6000. " Defend Breslau to the last 
man — on peril of your head," was the sum of Fred- 



240 Frederick the Great 

crick's orders to his brother-in-law, accompanied by 
much military counsel and a promise of speedy aid. 
But soon the news came that Bevern was a prisoner, 
that his army had fled to Glogau, worst of all, that 
Breslau had capitulated without firing a shot. Thou- 
sands of the garrison voluntered to serve Maria The- 
resa. It is said that one battalion quitted the capital 
in a strength of nine officers and four men. After 
sixteen years Silesia seemed to be welcoming home 
its Queen. 

For a fortnight Frederick's army had struggled 
along bad roads at the astonishing rate of nearly 
sixteen miles a day. They drew rein at Parchwitz, 
within two marches of Breslau. There on Novem- 
ber 28th the King composed a short testament. ** I 
will be buried at Sans-Souci without pomp or cere- 
mony — and by night," was his decree. " . . . If 
the battle be won, my brother must none the less 
send a messenger to France with full powers to nego- 
tiate for peace." The words show how completely 
he identified himself with Prussia amid circum- 
stances so gloomy that Eichel forbore, ever after, 
to mention the document lest he should recall them 
to the mind of the King. Yet on the same day 
Frederick wrote one of his most characteristic let- 
ters to Wilhelmina, who had expressed her fear that 
the army vanquished at Rossbach would afflict Ger- 
many anew. " This is now our task," ran his reply: 
" to put the Austrians to flight and to recover all that 
we have lost ; and it is no trifle. However, I am under- 
taking it at the risk of what may follow. Neither Sou- 
bise nor the Imperialists will come back this year: as for 



The Seven Years' War 241 

the future, we must hope for peace, for indeed it seems 
as though our enemies had determined to destroy the 
human race. ... I beg you to await the issue in 
these parts with patience ; neither our anxiety nor our 
care make any difference to it, and nothing will happen 
except what pleases His Sacred Majesty Chance. . . . 
If I reach winter quarters, I shall have the honour of 
sending you a prodigious quantity of verse of every 
kind." 

Needless to say, Frederick's fatalism did not abate 
his energy, nor against such odds did his courage 
degenerate into rashness. He gave the command of 
Bevern's ruined army to Zieten, v^^ho had defeated 
the enemy's right in the battle of Breslau, and bade 
him bring men and guns from Glogau. Then he 
and his weary 14,000 waited four full days at Parch- 
witz, with Prince Charles's victorious army to their 
front, the garrison of Liegnitz on their flank, and 
Austrian slowness letting slip the opportunity to 
attack. 

On December 2nd, Zieten arrived at Parchwitz, 
having rallied some 18,000 men. Frederick had now 
an army about 32,000 strong, well furnished with 
cavalry and artillery. His plan had from the first 
been as clear as the task before him. He was re- 
solved to perish rather than abandon Silesia. The 
Austrians held the province by means of an army 
and two strong places, Breslau and Schweidnitz. 
He must therefore first beat the army and then 
capture the strong places. The advent of Decem- 
ber forbade long manoeuvring in the hope of catch- 
ing Prince Charles at a disadvantage. To save 
16 



242 Frederick the Great 

Silesia this year and Prussia next, he must lead his 
army straight to the enemy. The problem that he 
expected to find resembled the problem of Prague 
and of Kolin — to destroy an army not inferior in 
numbers posted in ground of its own choosing. 
Prince Charles, he believed, had his back to Breslau 
and his front protected by a stream of some size. 
*' He is in an advantageous camp," wrote Eichel on 
December ist, ''well furnished with artillery; he 
lives on our magazines, and the possession of Bres- 
lau gives him liberty to retire in any case across the 
Oder, from which God preserve us ! " The ejacula- 
tion reminds us that if the Austrian force remained 
in being, Frederick would be foiled. 

The King was determined to venture all upon a 
battle. That he appreciated the odds against him 
is not entirely clear. Writing to his brother Henry 
on November 30th, he declares himself hopeful of 
pitting 36,000 men against the 39,000 at which he 
estimates the Austrian force. Next day he alters 
the former number to 39,000, and Eichel states that 

" According to many letters from his officers which 
we have intercepted, the enemy has lost more than 
24,000 men, as well as 8000 at the siege of Schweidnitz ; 
he has suffered much from sickness ; half of his cavalry 
is ruined ; yet notwithstanding all this he must be equal 
if not superior in numbers to ourselves." 

On the other hand, Prussian tradition represents the 
King as declaring on December 3rd that, contrary to 
all the rules of war, he would attack Prince Charles's 
army wherever he found it, though it was nearly 



The Seven Years War 243 

thrice as strong as his own. But whatever be the 
truth, — whether or no he would have done what he 
had dedined to do on the day before Rossbach, 
whether or no he knew or guessed the truth that 
Prince Charles had 80,000 men, — Frederick spared no 
effort to fill every soldier with his own spirit. Rest 
and food and drink, the story of Rossbach to chase 
away the memory of Breslau, all these were showered 
upon an army which since adversity had purged it 
of its foreign elements responded with eager loyalty 
to the touch of the Prussian King. 

Stripping off his cherished French manners, he was 
for a brief space the Father of his people. The news 
flew round the army that the King had bandied 
rough pleasantries with his grenadiers, that veterans 
had called him "Thou" and *' Fritz," that he had 
told the Pomeranians that without them he would 
not dare to give battle. The effect was magical, and 
the rank and file caught the glow which warmed the 
breasts of their superiors. For Frederick had done 
what he had perhaps never yet deigned to do, save 
when he quitted his capital in 1740 to grasp Silesia. 
He had called his ofificers together and appealed in 
impassioned phrases to their honour, their loyalty, 
and their patriotism. "Gentlemen," he cried, "the 
enemy stand in their entrenchments armed to the 
teeth. We must attack them there, and conquer, or 
remain every one of us on the field. If any of you 
is unwilling, he may have his discharge at once and go 
home." Then he paused. The devoted men were 
silent, many in tears, only one major cried out : " High 
time for such wretched scoundrels to be off." Fred- 



244 Frederick the Great 

erick smiled and declared that lie was sure of their 
faithful service and of victory. He then denounced 
stern threats against the man or regiment who 
should fail in the hour of battle. " Farewell, gentle- 
men," were his concluding words; "soon we beat the 
enemy or we see one another no more." More than 
twenty years later the rough soldiers wept like child- 
ren as they told the tale, and those who heard it 
could not keep back their tears. 

On Sunday, December 4, 1757, King and army 
set out for Breslau. From Parchwitz to the walls of 
the city the distance is some thirty-two miles as the 
crow flies. The road runs through Neumarkt, about 
twenty-three miles from Breslau, and Lissa, a little 
more than nine. That evening Neumarkt was in 
Prussian hands, and besides the little town 80,000 
Austrian rations of bread, welcome in themselves, 
but far more welcome for the news which they con- 
veyed. '' The fox," cried Frederick, " has crept out 
of his hole, now I will punish his presumption." 

On December 2nd, the day of Zieten's junction 
with the King, the Austrians had indeed determined 
to attack. The reason for this fatal decision was by 
no means over-confidence born of success. Prince 
Charles was very far from despising the adversary 
who had defeated him on four stricken fields. With 
almost nervous anxiety, in spite of his 80,000 men, 
he sought to be informed of every movement in Fred- 
erick's camp at Parchwitz. It is true that Austrian 
policy would be best served if the Queen were to 
regain Silesia without the armies of her allies. It is 
false that she ordered the army of Silesia to give 



The Seven Years War 245 

battle at any cost. Before and after the fight Prince 
Charles stated expressly that his generals were unani- 
mous in favour of marching on Neumarkt. The 
object was to save Liegnitz from Frederick and to 
prevent him from making his position too strong. 

Both combatants, therefore, made for Neumarkt 
on the same day, and the forward movement of the 
Austrians was only quickened when they learned that 
the Prussians had chased their vanguard from the 
town. On the night of December 4th the armies 
lay within a few miles of each other. The Prussians 
were exulting in the news that Prince Charles had 
crossed the two streams which rendered his old posi- 
tion so formidable that Frederick had enrolled 800 
volunteers for the first attack. 

With an army tuned to the highest pitch and a 
King who knew every rood of the ground on the 
road to Breslau, the Prussians advanced to give 
battle. Before five o'clock on the dismal morning 
of December 5, 1757, they were on the march, Fred- 
erick in the van, and only a single battaHon left 
in Neumarkt with the baggage. The exact position 
of the Austrians was not known to them as they 
hastened through the broken country east of Neu- 
markt towards the champaign west of Leuthen. If 
the enemy had placed this champaign at their back, 
the attack would still be hampered by the ground. 

The Prussians had espied watch-fires on a height 
to the south of the great road a few miles east of 
Neumarkt — a height from which in daylight both the 
towers of Neumarkt and the farms and cottages of 
Leuthen may be seen. Was this an Austrian wing? 



246 Frederick the Great 

To their delight it proved to be only a vanguard. 
Three regiments of Saxon light horse, heroes of 
Kolin, had been placed there with two of Imperial 
hussars to collect the wreck of the Neumarkt gar- 
rison and to watch the road to Breslau. They clung 
too closely to their task and were crushed by 
the Prussian vanguard. Eleven officers and 540 
men were taken prisoner, many fell, and the rest 
fled wildly to alarm the Austrian right. Frederick 
could with difficulty check the mad pursuit of his 
hussars, who drew bridle almost within cannon-shot 
of the enemy. 

The King's spirits rose yet higher when he learned 
from the prisoners that Prince Charles had left most 
of his heavy guns in Breslau. He indulged his 
advancing columns with the sight of the captured 
troopers filing past them to Neumarkt and again 
condescended to repartee. " Why did you forsake 
me?" he asked a Frenchman who had previously 
deserted from the Prussian army. " Indeed, your 
Majesty," the man replied, " our position is too hope- 
less." ''Well," said the King, ''let us strike one 
more blow to-day, and if I am beaten we will both 
desert to-morrow." 

As the gathering daylight revealed Prince Charles's 
army Frederick's confidence was more than ever 
justified. The Austrian position, chosen perhaps to 
cover three routes to Breslau, was far too extensive. 
Their line, which stretched from Nippern due south 
across the highroad, then on behind Leuthen vil- 
lage as far as Sagschiitz and the pine-clad hill 
beyond, was not less than five miles long and unpro- 



V///////////A PRUSSIAN 



AUSTRIAN UiUiUU AUSTRIAN 
NJPPERN 




PLAN OF LEUTHEN, DECEMBER 5, 1757. 



The Seven Years War 247 

tected for the most part by the ground. Only the 
right wing, where the Italian Luchesi was in com- 
mand, was defended in front and flank by hills and 
woods and marshes. These made it practically im- 
possible for the Prussians to attack at any point 
between Nippern and the highroad, and if they fell 
upon the centre Luchesi might advance through 
the wood and take them in flank. 

Prince Charles, who knew something of Freder- 
ick's methods, would have done well to strengthen 
his left. But on the day of Leuthen, Fortune 
seemed resolved to favour the side which trusted 
most to her help. By design or by accident, Fred- 
erick's movements were such as to convince Luchesi 
that the Prussians were about to hurl all their 
strength upon him. While the King reconnoitred, 
the heads of his columns remained pointing in the 
direction of their line of march and thus seemed to 
threaten the Austrian right. In each of the great 
battles of this year, at Prague, at Kolin, and in a 
sense also at Rossbach, it was the right wing of the 
allies upon which the Prussians fell. Now when he 
saw Frederick diligently inspecting his own quarter 
of the field Luchesi insisted on being reinforced. 
His clamour prevailed and, at the moment when 
Frederick began the movement towards Leuthen and 
Sagschiitz, Daun was galloping with cavalry from 
the centre and left towards Nippern, the point most 
distant from the danger. 

The Prussian army this day surpassed itself in 
the swift precision of its movements. No sooner 
was the King's plan formed than Maurice and Zieten 



248 Frederick the Great 

were ranking the eager veterans for their mysterious 
march due south — parallel with the Austrian line of 
battle and in part hidden from its view by the un- 
dulations of the ground. Frederick rode along the 
ridge between the armies and exulted as he marked 
the mistake of Daun. For some two miles he might, 
for all the Austrians knew, be in retreat. Then as 
the ground sinks into a plain he drew nearer to the 
enemy's left and hurled all his strength upon it. 

Frederick and his 32,000 men had only some 
four hours of daylight in which to overthrow a 
host nearly 80,000 strong. Despite the tension 
the Prussian machine worked perfectly. The com- 
plicated attack in oblique order was accomplished 
as never before or after, and an invincible as- 
sault began. By steady valour, not by desperate 
onrush, the infantry cleared the height near Sags- 
chiitz and in perhaps fifteen minutes they took the 
battery which crowned it. The Austrians and Ba- 
varians made furious efforts to regain what the 
flight of their comrades from Wiirtemburg had sacri- 
ficed. Nothing, however, could now withstand the 
disciplined onset of the Prussians, who swept before 
them the shattered regiments and the breathless 
supports who hurried to their aid. Hindered by 
ditches, the Prussian cavalry had as yet been able 
to give little help, but the irresistible advance of the 
infantry brought them at length to better ground 
and Zieten completed the ruin of the Austrian 
left. 

In numbers, however. Prince Charles was still 
superior to his assailants. He might fairly ascribe 




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The Seven Yeaj^s War 249 

the disaster on his left to the blunder by which the 
Wiirtembergers, mere auxiliaries, were entrusted 
with the key of the position. Out of his unbroken 
centre and right he formed a new line of battle of 
which Leuthen village was the key. Leuthen, with 
a wall of men and a hasty breastwork in front of it, 
with its courtyards and churchyard packed with 
men, and behind it men in thick masses with cannon, 
might surely be held until Luchesi and his cavalry 
could come to the rescue on the right. 

The advanced guard was soon driven off by the 
terrible fire of the Prussians, whose heavy guns now 
and throughout the battle tore frightful gaps in the 
crowded ranks of the enemy. But the village proved 
a formidable obstacle to their progress. House after 
house had to be stormed, and the churchyard was 
most difficult of all. At last the Prussians car- 
ried Leuthen. Then, however, they were exposed 
to the batteries behind and for perhaps an hour a 
furious conflict raged on something like equal terms. 
Frederick sent his left wing into action, but still the 
Austrians stood firm. But again, when already three 
of the four hours of daylight were spent, Luchesi 
proved to be the evil genius of his side. Coming 
up with his cavalry, he took the Prussian infantry in 
flank, only to be himself outflanked, crushed, and 
killed by a concealed reserve of Prussian cavalry. 
The panic produced by this sudden onslaught spread 
to the infantry, and the Prussians pressed home their 
advantage with a bayonet charge. At last the Aus- 
trians were beaten. They fiung away their muskets, 
forsook their guns, and fled wildly towards Breslau. 



250 



Frederick the Great 



A regiment which strove to cover their flight was 
reduced to one officer and eight men. 

As at Rossbach, darkness robbed the victors of 
the full fruit of their success. The Prussian loss of 
one man in five proved that Leuthen was no easy 
triumph. But they struck down 10,000 men and 
captured 12,000, they put to flight an army nearly 
three times as great as their own, and they won 
Silesia and undying fame. 




— — ■ .11 . II. t- i - . 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE SEVEN YEARS* WAR {continued) 

LEUTHEN TO MAXEN (DECEMBER, 1757, TO DECEMBER, 

1759.) 

WHAT profit would Leuthen bring to Prussia? 
was Frederick's first thought after the glori- 
ous fifth of December, and may well be 
ours. He himself was worn and ill. In the excite- 
ment of victory he had closed the long day of Leu- 
then with a jest. Pressing on to the castle of Lissa, 
he found it full of Austrian officers. ^' Bonjour, 
Messieurs," cried the King, suddenly appearing out 
of the darkness, " can you find room for me?" But 
reaction and depression followed the strain of 1757. 
'' If the year upon which I am entering," he wrote 
on his birthday (January 24, 1758), " is to be as cruel 
as that which is at an end, I hope it will be my 
last." 

Every kind of anxiety, public and private alike, 
pressed at the same time upon the hero of Rossbach 
and Leuthen. His brother, Augustus William, for 
whom a chance bullet might at any moment clear 
the throne, had not yet succumbed under the burden 

251 



252 Frederick the Great [1757- 

of disgrace, and wearied Frederick with complaints 
and acid congratulations. His brother-in-law, Ferd- 
inand of Brunswick, was stricken with fever, and the 
King's mind was full of vague fears which he con- 
fessed but could not account for. Upon his sister, 
Wilhelmina, who had more need of it, he lavished 
sympathy and encouragement in a flood of tender 
messages. 

" I am delighted that you are having some music and 
a little dissipation," he writes, early in the new year; 
" believe me, dear Sister, there is nothing in life that 
can console us but a Httle philosophy and the fine arts. 
, . I swear to give thanks to Heaven on the day 
when I can descend from the tight-rope on which I am 
forced to dance." 

If we must choose a simile from the circus to de- 
scribe Frederick during this war, he might be likened 
to an acrobat juggling with five bomb-shells at once. 
Of three, the Swedes, the Russians, and the Imperi- 
alists, he had not yet felt the full weight, and with a 
supreme effort he had flung the French and the 
Austrians high into the air. What would be his task 
in 1758? 

While he harvested the fruits of Leuthen without 
pause Frederick permitted himself to hope that his 
victory would bring peace. After the fall of Breslau 
on December 19, 1757, he estimated the Austrian 
losses and found them overwhelming. He even 
gave out that at a sacrifice of less than 4000 Prus- 
sians killed and wounded, he had reduced the enemy's 
force by 47,707 men. He was still gathering in pris- 



1759] The Seven Years War 253 

oners and deserters every day. Before the year was 
out he could assure Prince Henry that, according to 
sound opinion, Prince Charles's army consisted of 
no more than 13,000 foot and 9000 horse. " If this 
does not lead to peace," writes Frederick on De- 
cember 2 1st, *'no success in war will ever pave the 
way thither." A week later he is still hopeful, " but 
even if one were sure of it, we must none the less 
labour to make our position formidable, since force 
is the only argument that one can use with these 
dogs of Kings and Emperors." Leuthen indeed 
gave Maria Theresa another opportunity to prove 
her constancy and courage. Frederick made over- 
tures to her for peace, but she refused to engage in 
any negotiation apart from her allies. Early in 
January, 1758, the King became aware that Austria 
whatever it might cost her, was determined on an- 
other campaign. 

Gradually the prospect grew clearer. Almost be- 
yond the hopes of the Queen her alliance with France 
survived the double shock of Rossbach and Leuthen. 
At the beginning of February Louis promised to 
send 24,000 men into Bohemia. Since his encounter 
with Soubise, Frederick regarded the French as brig- 
ands rather than warriors, but their onset compelled 
him to place a sturdy watch-dog in the West. This 
part was played by Ferdinand of Brunswick, who 
drove them across the Rhine before March was over. 
Another foe, the Swedes, were even less consider- 
able. Frederick jeered at them as " cautious people 
who run away eighty miles so as not to be taken," 
and assured his sister, the Queen of Sweden, of his 



254 Frederick the Great [1757- 

willingness to grant them peace. So long as France 
was willing to pay subsidies, however, the Swedes 
were willing to provide 30,000 men. They still occu- 
pied their ** bastion," Pomerania, in force, and there- 
fore Lehwaldt must still act as the Ferdinand of the 
North. The King himself proposed to astonish Eu- 
rope by his dealings with the Austrians and Imperi- 
alists. From his ally he might look for the same 
assistance as in the previous year. He laboured in 
vain to persuade the Sea Powers that the Protestant 
cause and their own interests demanded that they 
should attack France with their own troops. But in 
April Pitt undertook to furnish an annual subsidy 
of ;^670,ooo, and for four years the money was 
punctually paid. 

With Silesia at his back, the French and Swedes 
held in check, and England in close alliance, Freder- 
ick's prospects for the campaign of 1758 might seem 
almost brilliant. He had some 206,000 men under 
arms. Ready money was not plentiful, but Frederick 
procured it in a thoroughly Prussian fashion — unscru- 
pulous but practical. His own subjects he spared so 
far as possible. At times indeed he treated even them 
in the manner of his father. In January, 1758, the 
merchants of Breslau answered " Impossible " to a 
royal demand that they should advance 300,000 
thalers to the Jews who had charge of the coinage. 
Frederick's minister reported the fact, adding that 
the Jews enjoyed no credit in the mercantile world. 
The King's annotation, scrawled in German on the 
back of the report, is still treasured in the archives 
of the General Staff at Berlin. It runs as follows : 



)R1 







CP.l^tniiJiis SonS; Zoiidoti,. i ScwYfrk. 



1769] The Seven Years War 255 

" I will cook something for the President if he don't 
get the money out of those merchants at once with- 
out arguing." 

In general, however, with the exception of a few 
loans, no new demands were made upon the ill-lined 
purses of the Prussians. Indirectly, of course, they 
felt the burden of the war. The coin with which 
the State suppHed them was debased and therefore 
purchased less goods. The pensions of those who 
had served the King in the past, but could serve 
him no longer, were left unpaid or paid only in 
paper. But the chief granary of the Prussian army 
was, whenever possible, the territory of the enemy. 
The second great source of supplies consisted in 
those countries which the fortune of war had placed 
in their hands. " Mark well the contributions of 
Mecklenburg," was Frederick's order to General 
Dohna. "Take hostages, and threaten the Duke's 
bailiffs with fire and plundering to make them pay 
promptly." But by far the heaviest burden fell 
upon the Saxons. Besides systematically draining 
them of cash, Frederick resorted to what he termed 
" reprisals " at their expense whenever " the allies of 
the King of Poland " pillaged any of his dominions. 
Men who were thus made scapegoats for the sins of 
half Europe betrayed with seasonable treachery the 
allegiance which the King of Prussia had compelled 
them to swear against their will. 

In 1758, however, Frederick allowed the notorious 
disaffection of the Saxons to fetter him no more 
than the armies of France and Sweden. He had a 
great plan of campaign, and he began to execute it 



256 Frederick the Great [1757- 

with a speed and secrecy which no one in the world 
could equal. On March 15th he left Breslau. Within 
five weeks he had captured Schweidnitz, the sole 
fortress in Silesia which remained Austrian, and was 
making for Moravia in order to besiege Olmiitz. 
The Austrians, he argued, must relieve it and might 
be vanquished in a battle in which he would have 
choice of ground. Olmiitz could then be taken and 
Vienna threatened. This would compel the enemy 
to concentrate in defence of the capital. Prince 
Henry would thus be free to swoop down from 
Dresden upon Bohemia and to erase the traces of 
Kolin. 

Frederick's idea was brilliant, and for a time suc- 
cess waited upon his arms. Daun, who, to the great 
profit of the Austrians, had replaced Prince Charles 
in the chief command, continued to fortify Bohemia 
against the attack which he expected from the East. 
On May 3rd Frederick reached Olmiitz. Consterna- 
tion reigned at Vienna, but for eight weeks the 
cautious Daun did not venture to disturb the siege. 
Till the last day of June all went well. Then came 
what the King frankly terms a terrible contretemps. 
At Domstadtl a convoy of some 4000 waggons from 
Neisse was destroyed by General Laudon, who made 
himself a great name by a victory which cost Zieten's 
command at least 2400 men. The Prussians were 
thus deprived of the supplies which were indispens- 
able to their success. 

Frederick recognised at once that the siege must 
be abandoned, and with it his whole enterprise. He 
admitted that he had lost the superiority over the 



1759] The Seven Years War 257 

Austrians which he had gained in 1757. Threaten- 
ing to imprison and cashier officers who should make 
faces or say that all was lost, he slipped cleverly past 
Daun's left into Bohemia, and for a month remained 
there at his ease. Then he sped swiftly northward. 
On August 22, 1758, he was at Ciistrin dictating a 
fresh testament on the eve of the encounter with a 
new and gigantic foe. 

In estimating Frederick's prospects for the cam- 
paign of 1758, no account has yet been taken of 
Russia. The action of the Muscovite forces was 
proverbially uncertain and of necessity slow. It 
was possible that they would not influence the main 
struggle at all, or that Frederick's plan of aggression 
in the South would be accomplished before they had 
time to become formidable. Since the New Year, 
however, storm-clouds had been massing to the north- 
eastward. It is fortunately no part of our task to 
peer behind them into the dark secrets of the Rus- 
sian court. Suffice it to say that Elizabeth still 
lived, and that so long as she remained on the throne 
peace with Prussia was impossible. Her armies 
might be ill-found and her ministers corrupt, but it 
would be strange if the mistress of Russia proved 
too weak to wound Frederick in his ill-guarded flank 
beyond the Oder. 

Fermor received the chief command of an army 
34,000 strong. In January, 1758, he overran Ost- 
Preussen and forced the inhabitants to swear fealty 
to the Czarina. In February Konigsberg was illu- 
minated in honour of Russian royalty. Frederick 
avenged the first offence by reprisals upon the 



258 Frederick the Great [1757- 

Saxons, the second by withdrawing his favour for 
ever from the polluted province. His power of self- 
restraint is attested by the fact that he attempted 
nothing by way of rescue. He calculated dispas- 
sionately that Fermor's advance would at best be 
slow, that a broad expanse of barren Polish territory 
separated the invader from the rest of the Prussian 
dominions, and that offensive action in the South 
was more likely to be profitable than defensive in 
the North. Konigsberg had been a Russian city for 
more than three months when Frederick dashed into 
Moravia. 

The danger, however, grew greater throughout the 
summer months. The Muscovite tide rolled slowly 
across Poland into Frederick's dominions east of the 
Oder. Europe now had an opportunity of learning 
something of the nature, of the society which Peter 
the Great had brought within her pale. In the 
Russian army, as in the nation, the highest classes 
were men of honour when not too sorely tried, but 
the lowest were filthy savages, who made the coun- 
try a desert and tortured and burned men and 
women alike. What the rank and file might be, 
Frederick had yet to learn. But that his trusted 
field-marshal, Keith, gave him timely warning, he 
might well have been pardoned for his belief that 
Fermor's unseasoned horde would not face the 
heroes of Leuthen led by himself, the foremost cap- 
tain in the world. 

As the King sped towards his old prison, Ciistrin, 
the trembling peasants came in crowds to kiss the 
hem of his coat. He found the fortress unharmed, 



1759] The Seven Years War 259 

but the defenceless town reduced to ashes by Fer- 
mor's bombs. The Russians, more than 40,000 
strong, lay on the eastern side of the Oder, having 
an open road to Poland, but all others barred by 
swamps and rivers. Before Frederick's arrival, 
Dohna, with perhaps a third of their numbers, the 
waters of the Oder, and the walls of Ciistrin had 
been the only defences of Berlin. Now, however, 
the Prussians were some 36,000 strong and as much 
superior to their foes in mobility as were Drake and 
Hawkins to the Spanish Armada. Fermor was short 
of supplies. He could not go forward and had hund- 
reds of miles of desert at his rear. Was the time 
at the King's disposal so scanty that he could not 
starve, harry, and crush the enemy without the sacri- 
fice of more than a few hundred Prussian lives ? 

Frederick was, however, in no mood for a war 
of strategy. He had published his fixed resolve to 
conquer or die. He was impatient to return to 
Silesia, where he had left 40,000 men under Charles 
of Brandenburg-Schwedt. He was still more im- 
patient to annihilate the bloody vagabonds, who, he 
wrote, were burning villages every day and commit- 
ting horrors which made Nature groan. In the spirit 
of Leuthen, though perhaps without like need, he 
resolved to attack Fermor without an hour's delay. 
Knowing every inch of the dismal country-side, he 
swiftly planned a massacre that should avenge the 
past and safeguard the future. The Russians had 
abandoned the siege of Ciistrin and taken up a posi- 
tion so sheltered by the Oder and its tributary, the 
Mietzel, that Fermor believed it to be unassailable. 



26o Frederick the Great [1757- 

Frederick crossed the Oder some miles below Ciis- 
trin, marched right round their camp, and prepared 
to hurl them into the waters in which they trusted 
for defence. 

The plan seems a sound one only on the supposi- 
tion that Keith's opinion was ill-founded and that 
the Russians would not show fight. They had much 
in their favour. They were a national army, roused 
to enthusiasm by the benedictions of a mob of 
orthodox popes. They outnumbered the enemy 
and were far better furnished with cannon. In cav- 
alry, it is true, Frederick had a great advantage, but 
this was discounted by the Russian formation in 
dense masses, which cavalry could hardly hope to 
pierce. Above all, the King provided his opponents 
with the best possible argument against running 
away when he left them no road by which to run. 
With no alternative save drowning or suffocation, 
the Russians chose to die where they stood, but to 
sell their lives dear. , 

These conditions made the battle fought near 
Zorndorf on August 25, 1758, one of the bloodiest of 
the whole war. It was in great part a desperate 
hand-to-hand struggle, kept up with mutual fury 
until the Russians were cut to pieces. According 
to the Prussian histories, Seydlitz, the matchless 
dragoon, refused point-blank to obey Frederick's 
order to advance on the Russian guns. When and 
where needed, he replied, he would be at hand with 
his men. "After the battle," came the King's mes- 
sage, " you will answer for it with your head." 
"After the battle," answered the imperturbable 



AU5TR/AN 







PLAN OF ZORNDORF, AUGUST 25, 1758. 



1759] The Seven Years War 261 

general, '* my head will be at the service of the 
King." He justified his insubordination by twice 
charging at the enemy on his own initiative. He 
thereby saved the day, and, instead of being cash- 
iered, was embraced by his delighted master. But 
when the issue had once been decided by sheer rage 
maintained for ten hours, some of the Prussian in- 
fantry showed themselves equally insubordinate and 
less successful. It seems not the least strange feat- 
ure of this chaotic death-grapple that in an attack 
upon an army strongly posted the cavalry should 
have formed the chief factor in Frederick's success. 

Success, though much qualified, Frederick might 
indeed fairly claim. Fermor, it is true, bivouacked on 
the field, fought again, though languidly, next day, 
sent off bulletins of victory, and retired unmolested a 
week later. His troops had endured the Prussian 
whirlwind with a steadfastness beyond all praise. 
But of the 30,000 killed and wounded nearly two- 
thirds were his, and Frederick had achieved, though 
at a great cost, his prime object of securing his do- 
minions on the eastern side. 

Against a new foe the King had displayed once 
more those qualities which readers of his history have 
by this time learned to regard as characteristic of him. 
He had been brave, secret, and masterful, swift to 
plan and to carry out, tireless in body and teeming 
in brain. He had at the same time proved himself 
exacting, overbearing, and rash, adroit at supplying 
the need of the moment rather than far-sighted and 
sagacious in providing for the future. Though he 
accepted victory and defeat like a philosopher, there 



262 Frederick the Great [1757- 

was too much of the despot, both in what he exacted 
from his troops and in what he expected from his 
foes. In this, though in this alone, it seemed as 
though the common infirmity of the overpowerful 
had at last assailed a Hohenzollern, and that Fred- 
erick had lost something of his power of seeing facts 
as they are. All the torrents of Prussian blood 
wasted at Prague, at Kolin, and at Zorndorf had 
not swept away his belief that Prussians led by 
himself could carry out any order that he chose 
to give. 

It is chiefly these virtues and foibles of the King 
that shape the story of the remaining months of the 
campaign. While he was on the banks of the Oder 
the Austrians and Imperialists had begun the recon- 
quest of Saxony and Silesia. Frederick by speed 
and cleverness saved both, but his conceit doomed 
nearly nine thousand of his army to wounds, captiv- 
ity, or death. 

First, by wonderful marches, he snatched Dresden 
from the jaws of Daun. The cautious general took 
up a strong position, which barred Frederick's road 
to Silesia, where the Austrians were besieging Neisse. 
Having failed to tempt him to battle, Frederick next 
stole round his army, but Daun retorted with a similar 
manoeuvre and encamped near Hochkirch with some 
65,000 men. On October loth, Frederick with less 
than half the number actually insisted upon occupy- 
ing an untenable position hard by. His generals, 
among whom were the Young Dessauer, Seydlitz, and 
Zieten, remonstrated with him in vain. Next day 
Keith arrived and spoke his mind quite frankly : 



1759] The Seven Years War 263 

" If the Austrians leave us quiet in a position like 
this, they deserve to be hanged.** " It is to be hoped 
that they fear us more than the gallows," rejoined 
the King, and planned a flank attack on Daun, who, 
he beheved, was about to retreat into Bohemia. 
The result was that before daybreak, on Octo- 
ber 14, 1758, the Prussian camp was surprised. 
Five generals, Keith among them, perished. Fred- 
erick's obstinate foolhardiness cost him more than 
one-fourth of his army, with more than a hundred 
guns and much material of war. Kolin, Domstadtl, 
and Hochkirch, three victories over the King of 
Prussia within sixteen months, formed a splendid 
chaplet for a general whose forte was caution. The 
Pope was said to have rewarded Daun with a conse- 
secrated hat and sword. 

*' It may be safely reckoned," so the King in- 
formed the Berlin public a week later, " that our 
loss does not exceed 3000 men. . . . These 
disasters are sometimes inevitable in the great game 
of chance which we call war." The hour of dis- 
aster had again proved Frederick superior to the 
shrewdest blows of Fate. At the moment when the 
Austrians, creeping through the darkness, began to 
butcher his men in their tents, he proved himself once 
more a hero. Disdaining to order a retreat, he extri- 
cated his army from its terrible position and formed 
a new line only half a league to the rear. Daun, who 
had lost more than 6000 men, entrenched himself 
on the field, and was soon plying his old trade of 
circumspectly hanging upon the skirts of the foe. 
Within ten days of the battle Frederick robbed him 



264 Frederick the Great [1757- 

of the fruits of victory by marching round him once 
more. He flung himself between Daun and the be- 
siegers of Neisse, and Silesia was saved. 

Daun's counterstroke was, as was almost inevit- 
able, an invasion of Saxony while Frederick's back 
was turned. He alarmed Dresden, but was once 
more frustrated by Prussian speed. Frederick hur-" 
ried back in time to save both Saxony and its capi- 
tal. In mid-December he went into winter quarters 
at Breslau, master of dominions as broad as when 
he had quitted the city nine months before. 

In those months he had, however, lost much that 
cannot be marked upon the map. Faithful officers 
by hundreds, trained soldiers by thousands, hard- 
wrung thalers by millions had been sacrificed, and 
nothing but glory and a respite had been gained. 
No lands outside Ost-Preussen were as yet con- 
quered by foreign kings, but many had been wasted 
by foreign armies, and some, at the dictate of urgent 
need, by their own defenders. These losses weighed 
upon Frederick, whose task it was to gather men and 
money for next year. But as a man he had cause 
for more poignant grief, for Death had knocked 
hard at the door of his own household. The loss of 
his heir, Augustus William, once his father's favour- 
ite, now the victim of Frederick's cruelty, probably 
afflicted him only because Prince Henry avenged it 
by refusing to see him except on business. But the 
death of Wilhelmina, who died on the eve of Hoch- 
kirch, was the most crushing calamity of his life. 
*' Great God, my Sister of Baireuth ! " scrawled the 
afflicted King as postscript to a brief despatch in 



WIDIlim PRUSSIAN 



AUSTRIAN 













PLAN OF HOCHKIRCH, OCTOBER 14, 1758. 



1759] The Seven Years War 265 

cipher to his brother Henry. The message is more 
pregnant than much fine writing. '* The death of 
Her Highness the Margravine of Baireuth embar- 
rasses me with regard to His Majesty the King 
more than all war matters," wrote the faithful Eichel 
from Dresden on the day after Frederick received 
the news, "since I can judge how highly afiflicting 
and crushing it must be to him. Councillor Coeper 
writes to me yesterday that although every care was 
taken to prepare His Majesty gradually for sad tid- 
ings it has none the less made an indescribably 
great impression upon him, and he does not believe 
that deeper woe is possible." '' If my head had 
within it a lake of tears it would not be enough for 
my grief," sighed the King to another mourner, 
Keith's brother, when the hard fighting and march- 
ing came to an end. 

After three campaigns the war had now, at the 
close of the year 1758, reached what may be called a 
chronic state. Thrice had Frederick lunged at the 
heart of his enemies and each time they had parried 
the thrust. At Vienna alone could the coalition re- 
ceive a mortal wound. St. Petersburg, Stockholm, 
and Paris were equally out of reach, and the States 
of the Empire might be squeezed and harried for 
ever without terminating the war. If the Prussians 
failed to dictate peace at Vienna, their one hope 
must be that they might defend themselves until 
some of the hostile Powers should change their 
minds. Their opponents, too, felt the strain of pro- 
longed and unprofitable war. It was true that they 
had not to strain thenlselves hke the nation whose 



266 Frederick the Great 



[1757- 



very existence was at stake, but neither Russia nor 
Austria nor France knew the secret of Prussian 
thrift. The time might come when even EHzabeth 
and the Pompadour would confess that the game 
was no longer worth the candle. The French, in 
particular, were not all blind to the fact that they 
were losing their Empire to England in order to 
gratify the spite of the King's mistress against the 
King of Prussia. Would they hold to the Austrian 
alliance even for another year ? 

The event falsified the hopes of Frederick. With 
some relaxation of intimacy, the Austro - French 
league was renewed, and the King perceived that 
he must henceforward hold Prussia like a huge be- 
leaguered fortress. Five Powers were still encamped 
upon his frontiers and ready to break in upon him. 
Like all resolute garrisons, therefore, the Prussians 
had recourse to sallies, and some of these met with 
much success. By sudden forays Henry and Ferdi- 
nand destroyed the magazines that were being 
formed by the Austrians and Imperialists and so 
retarded the invasion of Prussia, which could not 
proceed without them. Mere partisan inroads like 
these were, however, insufficient to prevent Daun 
from taking up a strong position at Mark-Lissa, with 
Bohemia at his back and Saxony and Silesia open on 
either hand. There he menaced Frederick while the 
Russian host once more drew near to the Oder, over- 
throwing as it came a Prussian force which had been 
sent into Poland to destroy its magazines and pen it 
in the swamps of the Vistula. 

The story of this Polish campaign throws much 



1759] The Seven Years War 267 

light on the strength and weakness of the Prussian 
army. Rightly neglecting the lesser danger in order 
to make adequate head against the greater, the King 
had sent against the Russians the force which usu- 
ally defended the North against the Swedes. The 
rank and file were good, but without leadership they 
could accomplish nothing. ** Your Polish campaign 
deserves to be printed as an eternal example of 
what every intelligent ofificer must avoid. You have 
done every silly thing which can be done in war and 
nothing whatever that an intelligent man can ap- 
prove. I tremble to open my letters." Such were 
the concluding words of a long indictment which 
Frederick addressed to their commander. General 
Wobersnow. 

Nothing but the royal presence, it seemed, could 
save the situation. The King himself was not yet 
free to leave Daun. He therefore invented a de- 
puty-king, and despatched General Wedell to Poland 
" with the powers of a Dictator in Roman times." 
Twelve curt instructions were drafted for his guid- 
ance. He was *' (4) to forbid lamentation and de- 
preciatory talk among the officers on pain of dismissal. 
(5) To disgrace also those who cry out on every 
occasion that the enemy is too strong. (6) First to 
check the enemy by occupying a good position. 
(7) Then to attack in my own fashion." From the 
King's own lips Wedell received the order to fight 
the Russians whenever he should find them, and 
officers and men alike were commanded to obey him 
as though he were indeed the King. But Frederick 
was never sanguine that these attempts to win a 



268 Frederick the Great 



[1757- 



Russian Leuthen by proxy would succeed. His in- 
structions were followed to the letter, and within 
four days he was condoling with the Dictator upon 
the disaster of Kay (July 23, 1759), where the Prus- 
sians lost more than 80CO men killed and wounded. 
Nothing could now hold back Soltykoff and his 
Russians from the Oder, and across the Oder lay 
Frederick's helpless capital. 

But worse was yet in store. The Russians, for 
all their numbers and their greed, were ill-fed, 
irresolute, and slow. They dreaded the victor of 
Zorndorf and they were determined not to be the 
catspaw of their allies. If only they could be kept 
at a distance from the Austrians they might starve 
before they could agree upon the next step in 
advance. From Kay to Mark-Lissa is some ninety 
miles as the crow flies, and the Oder and Frederick's 
army lay between. To strengthen the barrier the 
King was prepared even to leave Saxony almost 
without defence. He summoned Henry to observe 
Daun while he himself made ^' cruel and terrible 
marches " through the burning sand towards We- 
dell in the North. So severe was the strain that 
he passed six of the torrid nights without sleep. 
But he was racing a fleet, adversary — Laudon, the 
hero of Domstadtl and probably the best partisan 
soldier in the world. Knowing that he had served 
ten years in the Russian army, Daun now detached 
him with 36,000 men to allay Soltykoff's suspicions 
of the Austrians and to speed his coming. Fred- 
erick disturbed the march, but started too late to 
stop it altogether. When Laudon found the Rus- 



1759] The Seven Years War 269 

sians at Frankfurt he was still master of nearly 
20,000 men. 

This reinforcement vastly increased the effect- 
iveness of Soltykoff's army as a fighting force. The 
Russians were well furnished with guns, and their 
infantry had proved its toughness at Zorndorf. But 
their cavalry was bad and Laudon added to it some 
6000 men, well-mounted and well-trained. None 
the less he was received with extreme discourtesy. 
The Russians abused him because he brought no 
supplies. They refused to cross the Oder unless 
Daun's whole army should appear. Until fresh 
orders from St. Petersburg produced some change 
of tone, Laudon felt certain that they were on the 
eve of retreat. Then came the news that the King 
of Prussia was upon them and the voice of discord 
was hushed. 

Frederick had set himself a harder task than the 
destruction of Fermor on the banks of the Oder 
in 1758. Only overwhelming necessity made him 
give battle. He suspected that an Austrian de- 
tachment was threatening his capital. " I believe 
that Hadik means Berlin," he wrote, ''and I am 
obliged to make haste here to parry his blow in 
time. A lost soul in purgatory is not in a more 
wretched situation than I am." In mere numbers, 
it is true, the disparity between the combatants 
was not much greater than at Zorndorf. Fred- 
erick had now nearly 50,000 men against a com- 
posite force of about 68,000, but of the enemy 
nearly one-quarter were light horse, who in the 
shock of battle counted for next to nothing. 



270 Frederick the Great [1757- 

In quality and in position, however, his arnay was 
worse off than before, while the enemy was much 
better. In the previous year he had led seasoned 
troops whose ranks had been purged by incessant 
marches under a scorching sun to join the army 
of Dohna, which was at least unbeaten and un- 
wearied. Their meeting had provoked one of 
Frederick's best-remembered sayings: ''Your men 
have made themselves wonderfully smart ; mine 
look like grass-devils, but they can bite." Now, 
however, a great part of his command consisted 
of troops mishandled by Wobersnow and decimated 
by the Russians at Kay. It was unlikely that they 
would fight like the victors of Leuthen. 

Nor was Frederick favoured by the ground. The 
most casual glance at the two fields is sufficient to 
show that Kunersdorf, the scene of the bloody 
drama of August 12, 1759, presented difficulties 
such as the assailant at Zorndorf never had to over- 
come. The allies were again encamped on the 
right bank of the Oder, and were now separated by 
the broad river from the town of Frankfurt, To 
march round their position was far more arduous 
than at Zorndorf. Their left wing was shielded by 
impassable morasses, and the right by forest. ' Be- 
hind them lay a fortress commanding a well-bridged 
river, before them a tangled mass of sand-hills, 
woods, and lakes which seemed to have been designed 
by nature to impede an attacking force and which 
was now made still more formidable by art. This 
position, even if the 16,000 irregulars be ignored, 
was held by some 40,000 Russians, now veterans in 




PLAN OF KUNERSDORF, AUGUST 12, 1759. 



1759] The Seven Years War 271 

western warfare, aided by 13,000 of the flower of 
the Austrian army under a captain worthy to cross 
swords with Frederick himself. 

On the other hand, the King had still Seydlitz, 
but such men as Wedell could ill supply the place 
of Schwerin, the Old Dessauer, and Keith. Some 
of his troops were men who had fled before the 
Russians every year, at Gross-Jagersdorf, at Zorn- 
dorf, and at Kay, and whom he could not even 
trust. Owing to the difUculties of the ground and 
the King's impatience, most of the Prussians went 
into action suffering under privations that would 
have well-nigh killed ordinary men. They lacked 
food and drink. After two nights without sleep 
they must drag themselves and their accoutrements 
through a manoeuvre of nine hours' duration, now 
tugging cannon through pine-woods, now clamber- 
ing over sand-hills under the broiling August sun. 
Then at noon they were ordered to attack an 
enemy more numerous than themselves who was 
resting quietly behind entrenchments in ground of 
his own choosing. 

That they accomplished what they did proves 
that the Prussians were heroes. Frederick's de- 
sign was, as at Zorndorf, to cross the Oder below 
the Russian camp, to march round it, and then to 
strike. But the barren waste east of Frankfurt 
was to him unfamiliar country. At Leuthen and 
at Zorndorf he had profited greatly by his know- 
ledge of the field. But at Kunersdorf he knew 
neither the difficulties of the ground nor the extent 
to which, in one most important particular, those 



272 Frederick the Great [1757- 

difficulties had been surmounted by the enemy. 
When he scanned their position from the north- 
east before completing his plan of attack, he could 
discern Laudon's force encamped in a seemingly 
isolated peninsula In the great marsh which pro- 
tected the left. He was informed that Laudon and 
Soltykoff could communicate only by a roundabout 
way. Not till the Issue of the day was dubious did 
he learn that a new causeway connected the Aus- 
trians with the main body of the enemy, and the 
error proved fatal. Twice in his life Frederick paid 
dear for imperfect information, but the price of the 
blunder at Prague was a trifle by the side of the 
price paid here. 

The beginning of the fray was such as to make 
the end a doubly crushing blow to the King. After 
long and toilsome preparations it seemed as though 
victory was assured. When the Prussian van went 
into action they advanced like fresh men and turned 
the Russians out of their entrenchments at the 
point of the bayonet. A second onslaught, better 
supported, took the enemy in flank and by two 
o'clock the Russian left was beaten, with a loss of 
seventy guns. Frederick sent off a courier to carry 
the tidings of victory to Berlin. The third attack, 
however, made on difficult ground in the face of 
cannon at 800 yards and musketeers at fifty, did not 
succeed until the Prussian infantry had been deci- 
mated and Its strength almost spent. At this point 
Frederick's generals cried " Enough " ; but the King, 
as at Hochkirch, preferred his own opinion. Once 
more the Prussians stormed forward and for the 



1759] The Seven Years War 273 

fourth time they annihilated the Russian line. If 
one knoll more, the Spitzberg, and the battery 
upon it were taken, the victory, it seemed, would 
be complete. 

But at this crisis Laudon intervened to save the 
battery and the day. His grenadiers climbed the 
knoll when the Prussians were still 150 paces from 
the top, and drove them back with a volley of case- 
shot. Frederick ordered up his artillery, but the 
heavy guns stuck fast in the sand and light field- 
pieces were of no avail. In the agony of the 
moment the King lost his head and ordered the 
cavalry to storm the Spitzberg. As at Zorndorf, 
Seydlitz decHned to sacrifice his troops to a blunder, 
but this time Frederick was deaf to the voice of 
reason. He repeated the order and was obeyed. 
Seydlitz was wounded and his superb squadrons 
shattered, without the smallest gain. A crushing 
countercharge headed by Laudon completed the 
ruin of the Prussian horse, and thenceforward the 
allies were the attacking side. 

Frederick, almost beside himself, continued to 
demand victory from his men, and the infantry, 
though it could not go forward, held its ground 
against the Russians. Laudon, however, contrived 
the coup de grace. At about five o'clock he 
suddenly hurled a fresh Austrian host upon the 
heroes who had been fifteen hours under arms. The 
overthrow was complete. Frederick, who sought 
death in vain, was borne from the field by a party 
of his own hussars. Amid the chaos he wrote a 
terse note in French to inform his capital that the 



2 74 Frederick the Great li767- 

game was up. ** My coat is riddled with balls ; 
two horses were killed under me ; it is my mis- 
fortune to be still alive. Our loss is great ; not 
3000 men out of 48,000 are with me. At this 
moment all are in flight and I am no longer master 
of my troops.'* 

The King's first thought was that he himself 
was crushed and that therefore Prussia was ruined. 
There was indeed good reason for his despair. 
Even if Soltykoff should allow him to recross the 
Oder and to rally the remnants of his army he 
dared not hope to save Berlin. He had fought at 
Kunersdorf in the belief that an Austrian force 
under Hadik was advancing towards his capital 
from the south. If he now attacked Hadik he must 
expose his rear to the victors of Kunersdorf ; if he 
stood firm against them, Hadik would take him 
in flank. " Only a miracle could save us," wrote 
the Secretary of State. 

The downfall of his country seemed inevitable 
and Frederick was resolved not to witness it. For 
years he had carried poison. Before using it he spent 
two days in arranging his affairs. On the plea of a 
severe illness, he entrusted the army to General 
Finck and gave directions that it should swear alle- 
giance to the son of Augustus William. He advised 
the well-to-do citizens of Berlin to fly to Hamburg, 
the Government to make Magdeburg their asylum, 
and Schmettau, the commandant at Dresden, to sur- 
render on good terms if he saw no means of succour 
when attacked. 

Frederick's life-drama, it seemed, was played out, 



17'59] The Seven Years War 275 

but the curtain did not fall. The allies, who had 
bought victory dear, made no move, and on the 
fourth day after the battle the King was himself 
again. "All my troops have done wonders," had 
been his words when he gave up hope. Now he 
sent a new version to the same correspondent, Finck- 
enstein. *' The victory was ours, when suddenly my 
wretched infantry lost courage. The silly fear of 
being carried off to Siberia turned their head and 
there was no stopping them." His loss at Kuners- 
dorf amounted to at least 18,500 men, but he found 
himself master of an army 20,000 strong. They 
were, he said, not to be compared with the worst 
troops of former years, but he prepared to sacrifice 
them and himself for the defence of the capital, and 
awaited Soltykoff on the river Spree. 

A letter to Prince Henry written on August 16, 
1759, shows the temper of the Prussian Leonidas. 

" The moment that I sent you word of our mishap 
everything seemed desperate. Do not think that the 
danger is not still very great, but be assured that until 
my eyes are closed I will sustain the State, as is my duty. 
A case that I had in my pocket was smashed by a shot, 
but saved my leg. We are all in tatters; there is hardly 
anyone who has not had two or three balls through his 
clothes or his hat. But we would cheerfully sacrifice 
our wardrobe, if that were all." 

Despite these signs of reviving courage, Frederick 
felt with tenfold intensity what he expressed years 
afterwards when he said that after Kunersdorf the 
enemy had only to give him the finishing stroke. 



276 Frederick the Great [1757- 

Yet it is highly characteristic of him that already his 
thoughts ran upon another battle. To carry on de- 
fensive warfare, he argued, the support of a fortress 
was indispensable. But he had only Ciistrin and 
Spandau to choose from, and to sit down near either 
would be to sacrifice Berlin. Desperate evils, he 
held, needed desperate remedies, and he would 
court Fortune sword in hand. Eight days after Ku- 
nersdorf he hoped soon to have 33,000 men in his 
camp, but he protested that he feared them more 
than the enemy. " I count on the firmness and hon- 
esty of Pitt, and it is on him alone that we can at 
this juncture base some hope." 

Frederick expected day by day the catastrophe 
of Prussia. Yet the only direct result of Kuners- 
dorf was that for a time he lost a great part of 
Saxony. Early in September Dresden was wrested 
from him by the motley army of the Empire, which 
was accounted the most despicable member of the 
coalition. Schmettau had acted too mechanically 
in following the King's counsels of despair. But the 
Swedes, though their opponents had withdrawn, 
failed to strike south. The French, who had set 
out in earnest to conquer Hanover, were routed at 
Minden by Ferdinand of Brunswick on August i, 
1759. They were driven headlong through the nar- 
row gorge at the spot where the Weser cleaves the 
bulwark of hills which guards the northern plain, 
and thus before the day of Kunersdorf Frederick 
knew that he had nothing to fear on the western side. 
But how, it may well be wondered, could Daun and 
Soltykoff, with 120,000 men at their disposal and 



i 



t759] The Seven Years War 277 

only half the number against them, neglect to follow 
up their victory? The sequel even suggests that 
Frederick's desperate measures beyond the Oder 
had been superfluous. Prussia was far weaker than 
before, yet she did not fall. The King was crippled, 
Austrians and Russians were now massed into one 
unbroken force, triumph at Dresden followed triumph 
at Kunersdorf, yet they accomplished nothing. 

Their opponents, it is true, were tacticians of the 
first rank. Prince Henry, by wonderful marches, 
evaded Daun, and Frederick, returning to the Oder, 
frustrated all Soltykoff's efforts to gain Silesia. It 
was, moreover, beyond the power of Daun to furnish 
the Russians with supplies, and if their ally did not 
supply them they refused point-blank to proceed. 
But the chief cause of Prussia's salvation was that 
victory, though it united the armies of her enemies, 
could not unite their interests. Russians and Aus- 
trians remained as before separate armies with diverg- 
ent interests to consult. At no time did Frederick 
draw greater profit than after Kunersdorf from the 
fact that Prussia was one and her opponents many. 

Soon Berlin breathed freely and even Breslau felt 
safe. Before October was at an end Soltykoff was 
marching home, while Daun was struggling to save 
Dresden at least from Prince Henry's reconquest of 
Saxony. The Te Deiims ceased at Vienna and de- 
jection reigned there. Daun's sluggishness in ag- 
gressive action extinguished the renown due to his 
triumphs of defence. His wife dared not show her- 
self in public. At court the story ran that she 
opened a package addressed to the Field-marshal, 



2^% Frederick the Great [1757- 

and discovered that some wag had mocked his slug- 
gishness by sending him a night-cap. 

At this juncture, however, it would have been 
well for Prussia if her King's activity had been less 
superhuman. Flushed with the triumph of his 
strategy and confident of the devotion of Pitt, he 
had the audacity to demand that compensation for 
Prussia should be the basis of negotiation for peace. 
During the greater part of October, 1759, he was 
tormented by gout and fever. He spent his en- 
forced leisure in writing an essay on Charles XII., 
the Madman of the North, a warrior who would 
have prized the bloody afternoon of Kunersdorf far 
more than the strategy which drove Soltykoff empty- 
handed from Silesia. Then, when the Russian peril 
had vanished, Frederick set out in a litter for Saxony. 
" I am very weak, but although still a cripple, I will 
do all that my feebleness allows me to attempt," he 
wrote on November 4th. His heart beat high with 
the hope of repeating the miracles of 1757, and of 
regaining, by a new Leuthen, all that had been lost 
during the summer, and peace. 

" I make them carry me like the relics of a saint," 
wrote the King after the first day's journey. Though 
sleepless and crippled, he concocted daily bulletins 
to Prince Henry in the spirit of a schoolboy. Since 
it had been noised abroad that Daun had received 
the papal benediction he had more than ever been 
the butt of Frederick's jests. Now, to create *' a fa- 
vourable impression on the mind of the blessed crea- 
ture and his council," he bids his brother announce 
his little escort as 4000 strong, and sends a list of 



1759] The Seven Years War 279 

the regiments of which it may be said to consist. 
" Daun and his Austrians shall not perceive that 
I have the gout," he boasted. 

Two days later, on November 14th, he took over 
the command. Pleased that Daun paid him the com- 
pliment of retreating, he ordered Finck to pursue. 
All the general's objections were overruled, and he 
took refuge in wooden obedience to the letter of the 
King's orders. " In a few days," Frederick wrote 
on the 17th, ''we shall reap the fruit of this disposi- 
tion." In four the royal prophecy was fulfilled, but 
the harvester was Daun. Finck's command, some 
15,000 strong, with seventy guns, was entangled in 
the hills south of Dresden. Believing themselves to 
be surrounded by thrice their number, the Prussians 
laid down their arms at Maxen (November 21, 

1759)- 
The blow was more crushing than Kunersdorf, for 

the whisper now sped through the world that the 
Prussians were turning cowards. Eichel confessed 
that his heart was so full of bitterness and chagrin 
that it was quite out of his power that day to write 
anything in cipher. The King, who had boasted to 
Voltaire that he would despatch his next letter from 
Dresden, complained bitterly that ill-luck pursued 
him all his days. He strove to atone for his over- 
confidence by exertion, and for many weeks kept 
the field, defying the stern winter. He thereby 
averted an Austrian reconquest of Saxony, but 
the gates of Dresden never opened to him again. The 
Prussian cause and the Prussian King, thought the 
world, were failing together. *' If you saw me, you 



28o 



Frederick the Great 



[1757-1759 



would scarcely know me again," Frederick wrote to 
Voltaire. " I am old, broken, grayheaded, wrinkled. 
I am losing my teeth and my gaiety." Yet this de- 
jected veteran alone kept together the Prussian army. 
That army was the sole bulwark of the State. If 
Frederick had in truth lost health, skill, and fortune, 
what hope was left to Prussia? 




I 



CHAPTER IX 

THE END OF THE SEVEN YEARS* WAR (1760-I763) 

BETWEEN the spring of 1760, when the weary 
Frederick braced himself to grapple anew 
with a task which four campaigns seemed 
only to have increased, and the moment when a 
sudden stroke of fortune was to give him rest, there 
intervenes a gap of time as great as that which sepa- 
rates his first plunge into the war from his overthrow 
at Kunersdorf. If we are compelled to be content 
with a swift review of these final phases of the 
struggle, we must by no means lose from sight the 
tenacity and adroitness of the hero upon whom 
every campaign laid a heavier burden than the last, 
and to whom every year seemed endless. After 
Kunersdorf and Maxen, we, who know that Fred- 
erick and Prussia did not perish, may be impatient 
to have done with their long agony. But Frederick 
himself enjoyed no such comfortable prescience. 
Hopes he had indeed in plenty. Denmark might 
join him, the Tartars might rise, the Turks, he was 
constantly assured, were on the very verge of attack- 
ing Austria. Now the French, now the Russians, 
he believed, were about to desert the coalition against 

281 



282 Frederick the Great 



[1760- 



him. The event testified to his courage rather than 
to his insight. Time brought only fresh disappoint- 
ments and prospects ever more black, but the King 
neither flinched nor paused. Under the bludgeon- 
ings of chance his head was bloody but unbowed. 
" It was not the army," said Napoleon, " that de- 
fended Prussia, seven years through, against the 
three greatest Powers of Europe, it was Frederick 
the Great." 

Till near its close the campaign of 1760 seemed to 
be merely the natural sequel to that of 1759. In 
spite of all the chances of high politics, the same 
combatants took the field on either side. France, 
beaten by land and sea, had tempted England with 
the offer of a separate peace. But Pitt displayed 
anew the loyalty to his ally which was the consola- 
tion of Frederick's darkest hours. The English 
minister recognised that his country's triumphs over 
France off Lagos, in the bay of Quiberon, and before 
the walls of Quebec in the glorious campaign of 
1759, had been due to the Prussian alHance almost 
as directly as the victory of Minden. He braved 
the taunt that he was more Prussian than the King 
of Prussia and inflexibly refused to desert him in 
his hour of misfortune. The Russians, on the other 
hand, consented to serve Maria Theresa anew, but 
at a high price. Ost-Preussen, which they had con- 
quered, was to be theirs for ever. Thus the Haps- 
burg, though guardian and head of Germany, was 
compelled to promise that if Prussia were crushed 
the Muscovite should advance to the Vistula. 

The labours of the diplomatists, from which Fred- 



1763] The End of the Seven Years War 283 

erick looked for great gains, had done nothing to 
change the military situation in his favour. The 
campaign of 1760 saw once more Ferdinand con- 
fronting the French in the West, the Swedes para- 
lysed by their own incompetence in Pomerania, Daun 
striving to reconquer Saxony, Laudon striving to 
reconquer Silesia, and the Russians, as usual, advanc- 
ing towards the Oder. But, whereas in 1759 Fred- 
erick's own presence had more than once caused 
disaster to his armies, in 1760 he became again the 
hero of the strife. He was always most formidable 
when the odds against him were heavy, and in 1760 
none could doubt that the Prussians were at an over- 
whelming disadvantage. Even the King regarded 
the campaign as a gambler's last throw. Failing 
extraordinary good fortune, he predicted the col- 
lapse of Prussia before the autumn. 

For the first time in the war the enemy began a 
campaign on Prussian soil. Laudon invaded Silesia, 
and the King's friend, Fouque, believing himself too 
weak to hold Landshut, fell back on Breslau. The 
Silesians protested that they were being abandoned 
to the mercy of the enemy and Frederick com- 
plained that his generals did more mischief to 
him than to the enemy. Under-estimating Laudon's 
talent for war, he ordered Fouque to recover Land- 
shut at once, and promised to come to the rescue in 
person as soon as he had beaten the enemy in Saxony. 
Fouque obeyed, but in Laudon he had an opponent 
far more active than Daun. His force of less than 
11,000 men was soon in as hopeless a plight as that 
of Finck at Maxen. He, too, avenged the insults of 



284 Frederick the Great [1760- 

the King by following his orders to the letter, for 
the more considerate counter-orders which Frederick 
despatched never reached him. On June 23, 1760, 
near Landshut, the Prussians maintained a hopeless 
struggle for seven hours. It is believed that the 
killed and wounded numbered more than 5000 
men. It is certain that only some 1500 cavalry, per- 
haps one-seventh of Fouque's whole force, succeeded 
in cutting their way through the enemy. 

At Landshut the Prussian regiments regained by 
their valour the repute which they had lost at Maxen, 
where they laid down their arms without a blow. 
But the fruits of Laudon's victory were great. 
Silesia now lay defenceless before the Austrians, 
and only Prince Henry's weak force screened it 
from the advancing Russians. Frederick, though 
balked of a battle, was compelled to leave his work 
in Saxony undone and to transfer the bulk of the 
Prussian army to the eastern theatre of war. His 
going was a proof of weakness, but the manner of it 
paid a signal tribute to his fame. None dared to 
stand in his way. The Austrians under Lacy were 
so determined to be on the safe side that they left 
Dresden bare, and Frederick was tempted by the 
opportunity of a brilliant triumph to turn aside. 

He hoped to take the Saxon capital in two or three 
days, but the defenders were stout-hearted beyond 
his calculation. After he had wasted more than a 
fortnight before the walls, the news that Glatz had 
fallen and that Breslau was in danger compelled him 
to resume the dreary tramp towards Silesia. His 
prestige and his position had suffered alike, and his 



1763] The End of the Seven Years War 285 

mood was more dejected than ever. Philosophy, he 
professed, was his only consolation. Since nothing 
worse could happen to him than what he looked for, 
he could have no occasion for disappointment. He 
was determined to hold fast to duty during the 
brief space that might still separate him from the 
abyss. It was no great matter, he told Finckenstein, 
whether they were crushed a month sooner or a 
month later. The death of his old servant, Pode- 
wils, affected him little, for it seemed but a small 
item in the general ruin of the State. 

Thus began the month of August, 1760, in which 
Frederick and his army dispelled by their own valiant 
deeds some of the darkest clouds that hung over 
Prussia. They were escorted into Silesia, where 
Soltykoff's Russians and Laudon's Austrians awaited 
them, by the armies of Daun and Lacy, which 
marched, said the King, like the vanguard and rear- 
guard of their own force. Thanks to the stout-heart- 
edness of the Prussian general Tauentzien, Laudon 
had summoned Breslau in vain. Now, however, he 
effected a junction with Daun, and the united Aus- 
trian forces outnumbered Frederick by three to 
one. 

At no moment of his long career, not even when 
he galloped from the field of Mollwitz nor when he 
gathered round him the wreckage after Kunersdorf, 
had the King's plight seemed so desperate as 
now. He himself upon whom all depended was in 
the depths of dejection. He had with him only 
some 30,000 men, and Kay, Kunersdorf, Maxen, 
Landshut, Dresden formed an unbroken series of 



286 Frederick the Great ii760- 

disasters. Against him were some 90,000 Austrians, 
commanded by Daun, to whom his royal mistress 
had sent the most unequivocal instructions to fight, 
and by Laudon, to whom military instinct no less 
clearly dictated battle. They barred Frederick's 
path both to Breslau and to Schweidnitz, and 
brought his force to the verge of starvation. Across 
the Oder the Russians were masters of the land, 
waiting only for the tidings of victory to pour a new 
host over bridges which they had already built. To 
retreat was to abandon Silesia, to stand still was to 
be starved or crushed, to attack was beyond the 
imagination even of a Frederick. Prussian officers 
talked of a new and greater Maxen, and the British 
ambassador, Mitchell, burned his papers. 

At last Frederick moved. Having learned from 
a drunken deserter that Daun was planning a sur- 
prise, he resolved to march towards the Oder, pre- 
ferring the neighbourhood of the Russians on the 
right bank to a situation which had plainly become 
untenable. On the evening of August 14, 1760, the 
Prussians stole away from their camp and occupied 
a strong position to the north-east of Liegnitz. On 
the western side, where Daun's attack might be 
looked for, the ground was admirable for defence. 
Behind the stream of the Schwarzwasser rises a 
steep and sudden bank, shaped like a natural bastion. 
This was manned by the right wing, encamped on a 
champaign so level that it forms the Liegnitz drill- 
ground to this day. Further north-east a gentle 
slope descended from the lines of the Prussian left 
to the little village of Panten and so to the river 



AUGUST 15"^" 
PRUSSIAN 



AUGUST Z^-'" 
m PRUSSIAN 



LAUDON 



H'llllllll AUSTRIAN 




PLAN OF LIEQNITZ, AUGUST 15, 1760. 



1763] The End of the Seven Years War 287 

Katzbach. There through the moonlit night the 
men lay under arms, forbidden to cheer themselves 
with song, but filled with an expectancy that ban- 
ished sleep. The King, who shared all their priva- 
tions, wrapped himself in his cloak and snatched a 
brief rest by a watch-fire after satisfying himself that 
all was ordered aright. 

Till dawn the stillness was unbroken. Then in a 
moment blazed up one of the shortest and most 
brilliant fights of the whole war. A breathless mes- 
senger cried that the enemy — Laudon — was attack- 
ing in force on the extreme left. Frederick hurried 
off to oppose him. Had the attack been made fif- 
teen minutes earlier, he declared, the issue would 
have been far different. But the Prussians profited 
much by their stealthy change of camp. Laudon's 
march was a part of Daun's concerted attack upon 
the position that they had quitted seven hours 
before. The result of their movement was that 
Daun hardly reached them, while Laudon, who ex- 
pected to surprise their baggage, was himself sur- 
prised. Marching without a vanguard, he found 
himself committed to an uphill fight without sup- 
port from Daun. None the less he attacked with 
such swing and dash that the Prussian left was well- 
nigh cut in two. It was saved by the infantry, who 
first valiantly held Panten and then set it on fire. 
This checked the Austrian advance and enabled the 
Prussians to make good use of their position. About 
an hour and a half after the first onset Laudon re- 
tired across the Katzbach unpursued. The Prus- 
sians claimed to have killed or wounded 6000 men 



288 Frederick the Great [1760- 

and captured 4000 — a total loss thrice as great as 
their own. They had thus annihilated nearly one- 
third of Laudon's force, and — what was even more 
important — they had rent the net that was closing 
round them. Daun had appeared in sight of the 
Prussians only to learn of Laudon's disaster and to 
retire. Henceforward it was beyond the power of 
the Empress to induce her favoured field-marshal to 
attack. 

The moral gain was perhaps the greatest of all 
the advantages that Frederick derived from Lieg- 
nitz. " A second edition of Rossbach," as he called 
the battle, was the best proof that Prussian valour 
and leadership and luck had none of them vanished 
from the earth. The King, who had his coat torn 
by one ball and his horse wounded by another, 
ascribed the victory to the favour of fortune and the 
bravery of his men. No other judge, whether Prus- 
sian, Austrian, or Russian, could fail to ascribe a 
great share in it to the King. The value of this 
renewal of prestige was apparent almost every day 
that the war had yet to run. However huge the 
masses of Austrians and Russians might be, they 
were usually content to watch Frederick at a re- 
spectful distance. The initiative was thus often 
abandoned to the weaker side and the value of 
Frederick's army enhanced threefold. 

Yet nothing could demonstrate more clearly than 
their movements after Liegnitz how weak the Prus- 
sians were. Frederick's departure from the field of 
victory was in truth a flight, but a flight which cov- 
ered the fugitives with glory. Young Lieutenant 



1763] The End of the Seven Years War 289 

Archenholtz, who was among the victors, tells the 
astounding tale of how 

" this army, spent with bloody toil and girt by mighty 
hosts, must press on without rest and without delay, and 
yet must bear with it every gun and man that had been 
taken and all the wounded as well. These last were 
packed into meal-wagons and bread-wagons, into car- 
riages and carts, no matter whose they might be. Even 
the King gave up his. King and generals gave up their 
led horses to carry the wounded w^ho could ride. The 
empty meal-wagons were broken up and their horses 
harnessed to the captured guns. Every horseman and 
driver must take with him one of the enemy's muskets. 
Nothing was left behind, not a single wounded man, 
Prussian or Austrian, and at nine o'clock, four hours 
after the end of the battle, the army with its enormous 
load was in full march." 

Twelve good miles were covered that day under 
the August sun. Frederick was still between two 
armies, each larger than his own. Neither Russians 
nor Austrians, however, dared attack him and he 
joined Prince Henry at Breslau without another 
stroke of sword. 

Of his brother Henry, Frederick said at a later 
date, " There is but one of us that never made a 
mistake in war." But the King continually rejected 
his counsel, though the event proved it to have 
been wise, and his relations with the Prince often 
became strained. A brilliant strategist, Henry 
wished to husband Prussian powder and Prussian 
blood by manoeuvring more and fighting less. The 
victor of Leuthen, on the other hand, was ready to 



290 Frederick the Great 11 760- 

take great risks if he believed that his success would 
be fatal to the chief army either of the Russians or 
of the Austrians. " If you engage in small affairs 
only," he maintained, " you will always remain 
mediocre, but if you engage in ten great undertak- 
ings and are lucky in no more than two you make 
your name immortal." 

Frederick's habitual inclination to throw for high 
stakes was increased by the events of September 
and October, 1760. His task was to guard the 
Silesian fortresses against Daun, but while he — like 
the court of Vienna — yearned for a decisive action 
Berlin fell into the hands of 40,000 Russians and 
Austrians. The raiders occupied the city for four 
days and exacted a contribution of two million 
thalers, but the rumour of the King's approach 
sufficed to drive them off. Winter was drawing 
nigh and the Russians vanished as was their wont. 
There was thus less need to fear for Silesia, but the 
enemy still held Saxony, and Saxony was to Fred- 
erick a recruiting-ground, a treasure-house, and a 
home. With added reasons for a battle, but with 
little assurance of success, he therefore transferred 
thither the seat of war. 

" The close of my days is poisoned," he wrote, " and 
the evening of my life as hideous as its morning. Never 
will I endure the moment that must force me to make a 
dishonourable peace. No persuasion, no eloquence can 
bring me to sign my shame. Either I will bury myself 
under the ruins of my fatherland, or if this consolation 
seem too sweet to the Misfortune that pursues me, I will 
myself put an end to my woes. . . . After having 



1763] The End of the Seven Years War 291 

sacrificed my youth to my Father, and my ripe years to 
my fatherland, I think I have acquired the right to dis- 
pose of ray old age as I please. . . . And so I will 
finish this campaign, resolved to hazard all and to try 
the most desperate measures, to conquer or to find a 
glorious end." 

We who have seen Frederick resign his crown 
after Kunersdorf are free to believe that he would 
have taken his life after a new Kolin. His words 
are in any event highly significant of the view which 
he took of the limits of his duty to the State, whose 
course he had steered according to his own will for 
twenty years. Five days after they were written, 
on November 3, 1760, he did in truth hazard all, 
and try the most desperate measures. Daun, who 
had followed him into Saxony, was encamped near 
Torgau in a position reputed impregnable. He had 
50,000 men with an enormous park of artillery, and 
whatever his shortcomings in attack, none could im- 
pugn his talent for defence. Yet Frederick, with 
44,000 men, determined to attack, and to attack by 
one of the most difficult operations in war, a simul- 
taneous onslaught on opposite sides of the enemy's 
position. The King himself proposed to lead half 
the army through the forest, right round the Aus- 
trian camp, so as to assail it from the north. The 
other half was to attack from the south under 
Zieten, the bravest of hussars but the youngest of 
generals, who had commanded a wing at Liegnitz, 
but had never handled an army, and who did not 
know the ground. 

It is hardly surprising, with such a plan as this. 



292 Frederick the Great [1760- 

that Torgau, like many battles, was fought not as 
was designed but as best it might be. The history 
of the day proved beyond dispute that Frederick 
had ventured much. The weather, their own errors, 
and the enemy's guns ruined the Prussian simul- 
taneous attack. The King's contingent fought a 
desperate battle. Few of his attendants escaped 
without a wound. His own life was saved as if by 
miracle. Three horses were killed under him. A 
spent ball struck him senseless, but his pelisse saved 
him from serious hurt. He rallied both himself and 
his men, but when evening came the Austrians had 
the advantage. Daun felt that he might safely 
leave the field to dress a wound and send news of 
victory to Vienna. 

Then, in the last hour of the fight, something like 
a simultaneous attack was carried out and it suc- 
ceeded. After long indecision, Zieten stormed 
the southern heights with desperate courage and the 
confused struggle was taken up a third time by the 
King's forces on the north. By eight o'clock, thir- 
teen hours after the Prussians had left camp, the 
Austrian resistance was at an end. Ere midnight 
Daun was fleeing across the Elbe, while Frederick, 
seated on the altar-step of a village church, scribbled 
a note to Finckenstein, promising to send details of 
the victory next day. 

Before dawn, he was once more among his troops 
riding through the lines and embracing Zieten. At 
Torgau he had frustrated the Austrian reconquest 
of Saxony and reduced their forces by some 16,000 
men. But when his own loss came to be counted 



o 

TFiOSS//\/ 



PRUSSIAN 






AUSTRIAN 







PLAN OF TORGAU, NOVEMBER 3, 1760. 



1763] The End of the Seven Years War 293 

he strictly forbade his adjutants to reveal the sum. 
Torgau was the bloodiest battle of the war and the 
Prussians had suffered most. Their casualties ex- 
ceeded by nearly one thousand those of the beaten 
side. 

In spite of Liegnitz and Torgau the campaign of 
1760 seemed to have changed Frederick's situation 
but little. Dresden was still beyond his reach, but 
he was able to spend a pleasant winter at Leipzig, 
surrounded by books and men of letters. Di- 
plomacy, as before, promised much and performed 
little, but drilling and recruiting went on without 
pause. Although the quality of the Prussian army 
could not but deteriorate, the numbers were astonish- 
ingly maintained. Commissions were given to mere 
lads, freebooters were welcomed, and the lands of 
the lesser German princes were scoured for men, till 
in the spring of 1761 a hundred thousand soldiers 
were ready to take the field. To furnish the neces- 
sary funds no new taxes were laid upon the Prus- 
sians, but Frederick issued great quantities of base 
coin and Saxony, where the Austrians might other- 
wise have found support, was harried to the verge 
of devastation. 

It was believed at Vienna that Frederick would 
resort to his plan of the preceding year by pitting 
himself against the army which covered Dresden. 
The Empress therefore implored Daun once more to 
take command. He consented, but only on the 
astounding condition that he should not be expected 
to make conquests. Then the King of Prussia trans- 
ferred himself to Silesia, which became the principal 



294 Frederick the Great [1760- 

scene of the events of 1761, perhaps the dreariest of 
all campaigns. 

For the third year in succession it was beyond 
the power of the Prussians to prevent the armies 
of the Empress and Czarina from joining hands in 
Silesia. The King would have risked a battle 
against either, but battle was not vouchsafed him. 
Yet in face of an enemy who outnumbered his 55,000 
men by more than two to one he had still a weapon 
at his disposal and it proved effectual. The bold 
offensive of his earlier campaigns had perforce given 
place to defensive action only. Although Ferdi- 
nand still gloriously held his own against the French, 
Frederick knew that he himself was too weak to 
meet the combined Austrian and Russian army in 
the field. He therefore entrenched himself and de- 
fied the allies either to destroy him where he stood 
or to make lasting conquests while his army re- 
mained undestroyed. 

For five weeks, till near the end of September, he 
thus inhabited the famous camp of Bunzelwitz, rest- 
ing upon Schweidnitz, the key of Lower Silesia. 
Then, deeming the danger past, he moved south- 
ward to seek fresh supplies. His absence woke the 
foe to life and the campaign closed with disaster. 
On October i, 1761, Laudon astonished Europe by 
storming Schweidnitz. A second reverse followed. 
Before the year was out the Russians were masters 
of Colberg, the Baltic gate of Prussian Pomerania. 
For the first time, therefore, the armies of the 
enemy could winter on Prussian soil. A huge cres- 
cent of foes, French, Imperialists, Austrians, Rus- 



1763] The E fid of the Seven Yeai^s War 295 

sians, Swedes, was at last enfolding Prussia. When 
spring came would they not surely stifle her ? 

Frederick, moping through the winter at Breslau, 
declared once more that Fortune alone could save 
him. He likened himself to a fiddler from whose 
instrument men tore away the strings one by one 
till all were gone and still demanded music. Once 
more he declared that philosophy alone could con- 
sole him in his ^' pilgrimage through this hell called 
the world." " I save myself," he wrote, ''by view- 
ing the world as though from a distant planet. 
Then everything seems infinitely small, and I pity 
my enemies for giving themselves so much trouble 
about such a trifle." Yet he never ceased to recruit, 
to drill, and to make plans for the glorious offensive 
campaign that he hoped to engage in with the aid 
of the Tartars and the Turks. 

In December, 1761, he professed indifference to 
the course of events in England, though two months 
earlier his champion Pitt had given place to men 
who preferred the Austrian alliance to the Prussian, 
and who desired that separate peace with France 
which Pitt had rejected in 1758. The treaty then 
made between England and Prussia forbade either 
to make peace without the other till April nth of 
the following year. In 1759, 1760, and 1761 this 
compact had been renewed. Now, however, New- 
castle and Bute began to clamour for what Pitt had 
ventured only to suggest — that Frederick should 
purchase peace by some concession conformable to 
the course of the Continental war. The Prussian 
envoys in London dared to advise their sovereign 



296 Frederick the Great [1760- 

to comply. He answered that they were in nowise 
permitted to give him such foolish and impertinent 
counsel. "Your father," he wrote to one of them, 
though the charge was baseless, " took bribes from 
France and England ; has he bequeathed the habit 
to you ?" 

Frederick's inflexible resolve to make no con- 
cession was by no means the same as a resolve to 
make no bargain. He often played with the fancy 
that Saxony or a part of it might be left in his 
hands at the peace. For this he would gladly sur- 
render any or all of his outlying provinces. But he 
would rather forfeit the English subsidy and jeo- 
pardise the very existence of the Prussian State than 
sue for the peace which Kaunitz was more than 
willing to conclude on terms of moderate profit for 
the allies. Two weighty reasons of policy increased 
his determination. The labours of the winter once 
again filled the ranks and the war-chest of Prussia. 
And Fortune, of whom the King said that she alone 
could extricate him, now gave with one hand more 
than she took away with the other. At the moment 
when England left him, Russia ranged herself at his 
side. 

The cause of this marvellous revolution was the 
accident that the Czarina died early in January, 1762, 
and that her nephew and successor, Peter HI., was 
a worshipper of the King of Prussia. Elizabeth 
had lived in debauchery and left upwards of 15,000 
dresses to bear witness to her luxurious tastes. It 
is possible that her chief motive in attacking Fred- 
erick was a desire to chastise the man who had 



1763] The Efid of the Seven Years War 297 

spoken ill of her. But there can be no doubt that 
her policy was suited to the interests of the State. 
It was argued at a later date that her alliance with 
the Queen had cost Russia countless lives and sixty 
millions of money. But in 1762 it had already pro- 
cured Ost-Preussen and part of Pomerania, and there 
seemed to be good hope that Prussia, the only Power 
which could prevent a vast extension of Russian 
influence in Poland, would be permanently crippled. 
If the allies dared not attack the King of Prussia, 
they were at least in a fair way to exhaust his 
strength. 

In a moment, however, the rash young Holsteiner 
who now wielded the sceptre of his great namesake, 
Peter, flung away all that his troops had purchased 
with their blood in five campaigns — at Gross-Jagers- 
dorf, Zorndorf, Kay, Kunersdorf, and Colberg. In 
the first hours of his reign he ordered his army to 
take no step in advance. Before January was over, 
Frederick knew that peace with Russia was assured. 
The Czar's one desire seemed to be to gratify his 
brother of Prussia. He craved investiture with the 
order of the Black Eagle, and declared that he would 
stand by while Turks and Tartars attacked the Aus- 
trian dominions. He resigned the Russian con- 
quests without indemnity, undertook to promote 
peace with Sweden, and even offered Frederick his al- 
liance. Influenced by his withdrawal, the Swedescame 
to terms of their own accord and concluded the Peace 
of Hamburg (May 22, 1762), which re-estabhshed 
the conditions of 1720. Frederick could therefore 
face the remnants of the coaHtion without anxiety 



298 Frederick the Great [1760- 

for his rear. From Ost-Preussen he now drew 15,- 
000 men. By undertaking to assist Peter in his 
schemes for winning back the lands which the House 
of Holstein had lost to Denmark forty years before, 
he secured the immediate help of 20,000 Russians. 

The situation was so completely transformed since 
the days when Frederick lay motionless at Bunzel- 
witz that in 1762 he determined once more to take 
the aggressive. His first aim must be the recovery 
of Schweidnitz. This could only be accomplished 
by inducing Daun to give battle, for his army, which 
had encamped near the fortress, was now playing the 
part that had fallen to the Prussians in the previous 
year. While the manoeuvres were pursuing their 
tedious course the news arrived that Peter HI. had 
been deposed. His wife, the German princess 
Catherine H., who was thus placed in power, at once 
recalled the 20,000 Russians from Silesia. Fred- 
erick, however, calculating on the influence which 
their presence would exercise upon the mind of 
Daun, persuaded their commander to conceal the 
order and to remain a few days longer as a spectator 
of the war. Then on July 21, 1762, the Prussians 
surprised Daun's right wing and gained a clever 
victory at Burkersdorf. At a sacrifice of some 1600 
men they reduced the enemy's force by nearly 10,- 
000, and the retreat of the Austrians enabled them 
to begin the siege of Schweidnitz. 

Thenceforward it was plain that the dragging war 
would lead to no decisive issue. Frederick was so 
sure of his cause that he had already sent a commis- 
sioner to examine the civil needs of Pomerania. But 



1763] The End of the Seven Years War 299 

he could only undertake formidable aggressive move- 
ments if the Turks and Tartars rose, and once again 
they disappointed his hopes. Instead of new com- 
batants joining in the fray the old ones were quitting 
it. Bute was eager to take the step which Pitt had 
scorned to take in 1760. Before the year was out 
France and England signed the preliminaries which 
were embodied in the Peace of Paris in February, 
1763. Immediately after Burkersdorf, the Russians 
withdrew and it was not to be expected that the 
Austrians and ImperiaHsts could accomplish by 
themselves a task which had baffled the unbroken 
coalition Daun, indeed, attempted to avenge Bur- 
kersdorf by a counter-surprise. He failed and in 
October, 1762, Schweidnitz fell. Before the month 
was over Prince Henry, who was conducting the 
campaign in Saxony, gained a great victory over the 
Imperialist army at Freiberg. The campaign closed 
with an armistice between Frederick and the Aus- 
trians and a series of Prussian forays against the 
hostile princes of the Empire. 

At last the Queen realised that she had failed. 
She promptly determined not to prolong a struggle 
which could only add to the misery of mankind. So 
vast a legacy of hate had, however, been left by the 
war that it was difficult to find a single Power whose 
good offices both sides could accept with a view to 
peace. The Queen therefore brought herself to 
approach **the wicked man" direct and sent an 
envoy to the King of Prussia. For nearly seven 
weeks negotiations went on at Hubertusburg, a 
castle of the unfortunate Saxon monarch. Frederick 



300 Frederick the Great [i760-!763 

showed himself pliant in matters of etiquette and 
unbending where any practical advantage was at 
stake. He was wilHng to gratify Hapsburg pride 
by sending his envoy more than half-way to meet 
the envoy of the Queen, by allowing her name to 
precede his in the documents, and by promising to 
further the election of her son Joseph as Emperor. 
But he insisted on the restoration of Glatz by the 
Austrians, and on the payment by the Saxons of 
his grinding taxes up to the very eve of peace. 

On February 15, 1763, the Peace of Hubertus- 
burg was signed. After seven campaigns and an 
incalculable loss of blood and treasure, Austria and 
Prussia agreed to return to their situation before the 
outbreak of the war. 





CHAPTER X 

FREDERICK AND PRUSSIA AFTER THE WAR 

THE monarch who had borne the burden of seven 
campaigns — a burden of which his ten great 
battles formed but a trifling fraction — might 
well have been pardoned for appropriating to him- 
self some share in the repose which his labours had 
won for Prussia. Even if it is difficult to couple the 
thought of Frederick with that of repose, it might 
at least be expected that after a triumph of defence 
hardly surpassed in human history he would delight 
his army by praising their achievements and his 
people by accepting their plaudits. Relaxation for 
himself and courtesy towards others were, however, 
equally distasteful to the King. He slunk into his 
capital by back streets and thus frustrated the pre- 
parations of the citizens to express their loyalty and 
joy. Yet in the darkest moments of the war he had 
been devising plans for the improvement of Prussia 
and he hardly waited for the peace to be signed before 
plunging into a rapid career of reform. After Kun- 
ersdorf, while his despair was gradually giving place 
to hope and hope to confidence, he was not too ab- 
sorbed in strategy to lay to heart the defects which 

301 



302 Frederick the Great 

he observed in the schooHng of the peasants near 
the Spree. The weeks which passed while his envoy 
at Hubertusburg was harvesting the fruits of the 
war were spent by Frederick in planning reforms for 
the army which had proved its matchless quality 
through all the seven campaigns. 

His first desire was to get rid of those helpers 
whose services he had accepted only because of 
pressing need. Twenty-one free battalions had been 
raised and had proved immensely serviceable. Now 
the King bade two-thirds of them go their ways 
without reward. His learned friend and servant, 
Colonel Guichard, upon whom in consequence of a 
dispute about the battle of Pharsalia he had inflicted 
the name Quintus Icilius, appealed to him to repay 
to his ofificers part at least of the money which they 
had spent from their own pockets in enlisting their 
men. '' Thy ofificers have stolen like ravens," replied 
the King ; " they shall not have a farthing." Still 
more ungenerous was his treatment of a section of 
his army whose only fault was their lack of noble 
birth. During the long war many students and 
schoolboys of the citizen class entered the army as 
volunteers and received commissions. In the hour 
of triumph they were ruthlessly sacrificed to Fred- 
erick's principle that his ofificers, save perhaps among 
the garrison regiments, must belong to the caste of 
nobles. Prussians who had served him in his ex- 
tremity must submit to be cashiered, while foreign- 
ers of rank were enlisted to atone for the dearth of 
natives whose pedigrees satisfied his requirements. 

At the same time the army as a whole was 



Frederick and Prussia after the War 303 

wounded by harsh criticism and harsh reforms. This, 
Hke much of Frederick's conduct, may be ascribed 
to the contempt for mankind which experience only 
increased, and to the almost inevitable effect upon 
himself of the unbridled absolutism described in the 
sixth chapter of this book. "Dogs, would ye live 
for ever?" he shrieked at his men in the crisis of 
one of his fights. He was forced to confess that, as 
his strength became less and the number of his sub- 
jects greater, he could not hope to look into all 
affairs of government with his own eyes. Yet he 
shrank more and more from creating an official or a 
system in anywise independent of his own immedi- 
ate control. In 1763 he therefore appointed inspect- 
ors of cavalry and of infantry in every province and 
endowed them with wide powers of supervision of 
the officers and all that they did. This measure, it 
need hardly be said, roused the utmost bitterness 
among the regimental staff, which had hitherto en- 
joyed a great measure of independence on the sole 
condition that the King was satisfied with the results 
of its work. It was the more distasteful for the very 
reason which made it acceptable to Frederick — that 
the new inspectors were appointed at the royal pleas- 
ure without regard to seniority. The chief ofificer 
of a regiment, who had been wont to rule it like 
a patriarch, was now subjected to the control of a 
rival, perhaps his junior, who did not resign his own 
command and could favour it as he pleased. 

The captains, too, suffered in pocket from another 
unpopular reform. They had hitherto received from 
the treasury the full wages of every man on the 



304 Frederick the Great 

muster-roll of their company. In time of peace, 
however, the native-born soldiers spent nine or ten 
months of the year on furlough without pay. Each 
captain defrayed the cost of recruiting foreigners for 
his company out of what he received and pocketed 
the balance. Now, at the moment when war ceased, 
Frederick cut off this source of income. By retain- 
ing regiments of special merit on the old footing he 
insulted the rest, and by graduating according to his 
opinion of the regiment's efficiency the trifling allow- 
ances paid by way of compensation he cast a slur 
upon the professional honour of officers and men 
alike. The King paid his officers ten thalers a month 
and their pensions depended entirely upon his ca- 
price. Many captains were thenceforward unable to 
resist the temptation to falsify the muster-rolls so as 
to receive pay for soldiers who did not exist. 

The King's despotic power, however, enabled him 
to make light of mihtary discontent in time of peace. 
He resolved to keep up an army of 150,000 men, to 
drill it as it had never been drilled before, to educate 
the officers, to review all the troops every year, to 
build new fortresses, and to establish stores of money 
and munitions sufficient to enable Prussia to enter 
at a moment's notice upon a war of eight campaigns. 
It is a highly significant fact that in Frederick's 
secret estimates for the future struggle the annual 
contribution of Prussia was set down at 4,700,000 
thalers and the sum to be extorted from Saxony at 
5,000,000. The balance of the 12,000,000 thalers, 
which was the price of a campaign, must come from 
the royal accumulations. Frederick's own expenses 



Frederick and Prussia after the War 305 

were only 220,000 thalers a year. At the close of 
his reign, when the total revenue of the State was 
not quite 22,000,000 thalers, the treasure amounted 
to more than 51,000,000, a sum fully five times as 
great as that which he had inherited from his father. 

Frederick was compelled by his past to stand to 
arms all his life through. With advancing years he 
became more lonely and more subject to disease. 
In 1765 he lost his sister, the Margravine of Schwedt, 
and next year the aged Madame de Camas, whom he 
always called Mamma. His old friends died one by 
one and the French wits had vanished. His brothers, 
Henry and Ferdinand, were often estranged from 
him by his bitter words. Yet to the end of his life 
he prided himself on his cheerfulness between the 
attacks of gout and he permitted no disease to inter- 
rupt his labours. These were devoted first, as we 
have seen, to making the land secure from attack by 
means of the army, and also to guarding it from 
famine by methods which may next be considered. 
Close on the heels of these essential duties came 
tasks of fresh development and reform, the acquisi- 
tion of West-Preussen in 1772, and new endeavours 
to uphold Prussian prestige against the House of 
Hapsburg. 

It is of course impossible to calculate exactly the 
damage which a country suffers in time of war. 
Moral gains and losses count in the long run for 
more than material, and no statistics even of material 
losses are truly satisfactory. As between one Prus- 
sian province and another, however, a rough com- 
parison may be made by means of the growth or 



3o6 Frederick the Great 

decline of the population. Silesia and the lands 
east of the Oder had naturally suffered most, since, 
in addition to their quota of soldiers slain, they 
had long endured the presence of invading armies. 
In Silesia the numbers fell by 50,000, about one in 
twenty-three, but further north, in the districts in 
which the Russians had encamped, the proportion 
was nearly five times as heavy. Frederick's own 
estimate was that one-ninth of his subjects had 
perished. 

The loss of property had undoubtedly been very 
great. The conscience of the age forbade massacre, 
but was lenient towards pillage and devastation. 
But the King surpassed himself by what Carlyle 
terms ** the instantaneous practical alacrity with 
which he set about repairing that immense miscel- 
lany of ruin." So far as the material losses sustained 
by individual Prussians could be ascertained, they 
were set down by the careful hands of royal com- 
missioners and mitigated by royal gifts. The King 
had at his disposal depreciated coin to the amount 
of nearly 30,000,000 thalers, the sum which had been 
accumulated to pay for the eighth and ninth cam- 
paigns. This more than sufficed for the needs of 
the army and the repayment of the trifling loans, 
less than five and a half million thalers in all, that 
Frederick had contracted during the war. With the 
residue and with the surplus revenues of the State 
the King set to work to prevent a single one of his 
subjects from falling into absolute ruin. His doles 
were graduated not by any standard of abstract just- 
ice, but by the rule that the minimum amount of 



Frederick and Prussia after the War 307 

help should be given that would serve the purpose 
of the State. Many towns had paid ransoms to the 
enemy to avoid being sacked. That of Berlin, two 
million thalers, was repaid out of the treasury, but 
Halle received less than one-sixth of what it claimed, 
and in the majority of cases the burghers were left 
to bear the loss themselves. 

In the country districts, however, there was less 
power of recuperation than among the comparatively 
wealthy towns. According to Frederick's opinion, 
it was therefore necessary that the State should 
make it possible for nobles and peasants alike to 
resume their normal duties. The spare horses from 
the army, to the number of 35,000, and many rations 
for man and beast from the magazines were at once 
distributed to the most needy. Officials allotted to 
the peasants wood to rebuild their houses and sums 
of money to assist the work. Their rents were re- 
mitted for a time, and oxen, cows, sheep, meal, and 
seed-corn were supplied to them free of charge. 
The State reaped its reward in the rents and taxes 
which speedily flowed into the royal coffers, as well 
as in the rapid growth of population. 

While the King was thus doling out relief to a 
great part of his subjects, he indulged in a singular 
extravagance which has been the subject of much 
criticism and conjecture. Though he inequitably 
threw upon the people the expense of Restoring the 
coinage, though his subjects were sending him 
sheaves of petitions for aid, though he was of all 
monarchs the least addicted to pomp, none the less, 
three months after peace had been signed he began 



3o8 Frederick the Great 

to build a third palace at Potsdam. The astonished 
Prussians believed that the cost was 22,000,000 
thalers. If no more than one-tenth of this was act- 
ually expended, the King lavished on a superfluity 
more than one-third of the sum that he assigned to 
the restoration of the land. 

Those who insist that he did nothing without a 
motive of State may find it in his desire to convince 
foreign Powers that it was dangerous to attack a 
nation which could afford luxuries while its enemies 
were deep in debt. Other conjectures are possible. 
Frederick loved to indulge the hope that the Scien- 
ces, which had visited Greece and Italy, France and 
England, in turn, might settle for a while in Prussia, 
and the new palace, like the salary paid to Voltaire, 
might be regarded as a sacrifice at their altar. The 
claims of the new Prussian industries, especially the 
manufacture of silk, which was largely used in adorn- 
ing the interior, may have induced the King to 
provide an artificial market in this way. Frederick's 
Versailles, however, remains to this day both a mon- 
ument to his absolutism and an enigma. 

Absolutism and diligence are still the hall-marks 
of all his measures. The military reforms, the work 
of restoration, and the attention paid to the arts 
taxed him but lightly when compared with his la- 
bours for the development of the agriculture, manu- 
factures, commerce, and finance of his dominions. 
No sooner was the war at an end and the work 
of restoration set on foot than Frederick began to 
pour forth a flood of edicts for the regulation and 
advance of every department of national life, and to 



Frederick and Pritssia after the War 309 

engage in incessant labours of inspection to see that 
they were carried out. 

In promoting agriculture he was guided by prin- 
ciples with which we are already familiar. His prime 
rule was still to increase the number of tillers of the 
soil and to make them safe against starvation. He 
therefore continued to bring in colonists from far 
and near, to drain marshes, to reclaim wastes, and 
to build new habitations. It is computed that at 
the close of his reign one-fifth or one-sixth of his 
subjects were immigrants or the descendants of im- 
migrants. Besides a knowledge of husbandry and 
handicraft which in many cases surpassed that of the 
Prussians, the aliens brought with them substantial 
additions to the material wealth of the land. The 
oi^cial inventory of their belongings, though incom- 
plete, shows that 6392 horses, 7875 head of cattle, 
20,548 sheep, 3227 pigs, and upwards of 2,000,000 
thalers in money were thus added to the capital 
of the nation. 

To provide for the accommodation of the recruits 
to his army of agriculture, the King applied every 
art of government to bring new land under cultiva- 
tion and to increase the fertility of the old. The 
superior enhghtenment of Prussia was attested by 
the curt refusal of Brunswick and Hanover to co- 
operate in works of drainage. No site for a farm- 
stead was to be left vacant and in the forests — so ran 
the decree — " no place where a tree can stand, un- 
planted." The sterile nature of the soil challenged 
the unwearied industry of the King. Many cent- 
uries before blotting-paper came to be known. 



3 1 o Frederick the Great 

Brandenburg was nicknamed " the sand-box of the 
Holy Roman Empire." Thousands of acres had to 
be set with bushes to prevent its surface from being 
blown over the neighbouring fields. 

" I confess," wrote Frederick to Voltaire, '' that with 
the exception of Libya few states can boast that they 
equal us in the matter of sand. Yet we are bringing 
76,000 acres under cultivation this year as pasture. This 
pasture feeds 7,000 cows, whose dung will manure and 
improve the land, and the crops will be of more value." 

The spectacle of the royal philosopher writing to 
Voltaire about manure and walking almost daily 
from Sans Souci to his turnip-field is a visible proof 
of Frederick's devotion to this branch of his steward- 
ship. He was wont to speak with authority as the 
leading agriculturist of the realm. Here, as else- 
where, his breadth of view often enabled him to 
discern the best product or practice in other lands, 
and his command of resources to transport it to his 
own. Having once attained his object by teaching 
his subjects to produce an article at home, he imper- 
atively forbade them to import it from abroad. 
The full reward of his policy would be reaped when 
Prussia began to supply it to other countries in 
exchange for gold and silver. * 

A single instance of the minuteness and imperious- 
ness with which the King applied this policy to agri- 
culture may be cited from Professor Koser's history 
of the reign. The Berlin egg-market was still de- 
pendent on foreign supply. In 1780 a royal hen- 
census showed that there were 324,175 hens in the 



Frederick and Prttssia after the War 3 1 1 

Electoral Mark and that 36,300 more were required 
to meet the demand for eggs. '' What will it matter," 
asked the King, " if every peasant keep ten or twelve 
more hens ? Their food does not cost much ; they 
can pick up most of it in the straw and dung of the 
farmyard." Prohibition of the import of foreign 
eggs followed. This caused the market price to rise 
and the ministers expressed the fear that the supply 
would not be sufficient. The King rejoined : 

*' It is all the fault of the farmers and peasants for 
not setting about it, I have laboured forty years to 
introduce things of this kind. If the ministers want to 
eat eggs, let them take more trouble with the Chambers 
to carry it through. The prohibition of foreign eggs 
remains as before." 

Only a six months' interval was allowed later to give 
the new establishments time to develop. 

All through his reign Frederick set his face firmly 
against any attempt to bridge over the gulf which 
divided the country from the town. The tobacco and 
sugar with which the peasant solaced himself, the 
clothes he wore, the plough and hoe which served him 
to till the fields were all made more costly in order that 
the towns might thrive. The vast majority of handi- 
crafts might be practised only within their walls. 
On the other hand, the King's ordinances against 
artisans who meddled with farming were so severe 
that they could not be strictly carried out. He also 
tried many measures with a view to conferring upon 
the peasant a secure position on the soil. He was 
successful in preventing the nobles from buying up 



312 Frederick the Great 

the holdings of the class below them. He estab- 
lished some three hundred new villages by breaking 
up outlying farms. But in other directions even 
his autocratic power failed to overcome the passive 
resistance of the rural population. 

In theory, Frederick was a champion of human 
freedom. He condemned slavery in strong terms 
and viewed askance the legal position of the Prus- 
sian countryfolk whom their lords regarded as so 
many head of labour. But he dared not shake the 
pillars of his army and of his treasury by giving the 
peasant leave to quit the soil. He desired to retain 
serfdom, but only in its mildest form. He set his 
heart on making every serf a hereditary tenant at a 
money rent. This was, however, repugnant both to 
the nobles, who feared that they would not be able to 
secure labourers for hire, and to the peasants, who 
feared that they would in future be obliged to bear 
the loss when their cattle died and to pay their arrears 
of taxation themselves. The proposed reform, as 
well as an attempt to assign limits to the labour that 
the lords might lawfully exact, had therefore to be 
given up. 

A change of still more unquestionable benefit, of 
which England had enjoyed the fruits for fully two 
centuries, likewise proved impracticable in Prussia, 
even on the domains of the Crown. Each holder, 
whether noble or peasant, had a number of scattered 
strips of land in huge fields which were unenclosed 
and were ploughed and sown in common by the 
labour of the whole village. The abuses of such a 
system were manifold. It stereotyped the succes- 



Frederick and Prussia after the War 3 1 3 

sion of crops, checked individual enterprise, pre- 
vented the high cultivation which depended on the 
aid of walls or hedges, and exposed the strips of the 
industrious to the spreading tares of his slothful 
neighbour. Frederick, once more guided by his 
loftier outlook on affairs, ordered commissioners to 
remedy this unprofitable system by a rearrangement 
of all the holdings. Peasants, baiHffs, ministers, all 
protested in vain, but Frederick in his turn com- 
manded in vain. All that he could accomplish in 
his lifetime was the severance of noble from peasant 
land. He was compelled to content himself with 
abolishing practical slavery as distinguished from 
serfdom, with codifying the services due from the 
peasants, and with other minor reforms. 

Whatever may have been its effect in the long 
run, however, there can be little doubt that it was 
Frederick's deeds rather than his laws which con- 
ferred the greatest immediate benefit upon Prussian 
agriculture. His subjects were assured, as were 
those of no other great monarch in Europe, that 
there would be a market for their produce in years 
of plenty, relief of their necessities in years of dearth, 
and succour from the State where fire or flood or 
pest would otherwise have ruined them. This sense 
of security against starvation, though now so com- 
mon that it is difficult to appreciate it, was then so 
rare that thousands of freemen left their native lands 
for the despotism and sterile soil of Prussia. 

In the sphere of industry Frederick was less ham- 
pered than in that of agriculture by the inertia of his 
people. He found Prussia making few commodities 



314 Frederick the Great 

save the simplest and exporting only three, — wool, 
linen, and wood. Before he died his minister, Hertz- 
berg, could boast that every conceivable manufacture 
found a home in his dominions. 

The record of the steps by which the transforma- 
tion was effected is simply a further series of illus- 
trations of the autocracy and diligence of the King. 
He strove with might and main to reanimate and 
develop the old industries and to establish new ones. 
This involved incessant contrivance and inspection 
on his part, the free use of subsidies by the State, 
and the constant imposition of vexatious restrictions 
upon every form of trade. 

One of the most conspicuous examples of Freder- 
ick's methods is the development of the porcelain 
industry of Berlin. During the Prussian occupation 
of Saxony the secret of the far-famed Dresden ware 
was extorted from the employees of Augustus. The 
King spared no effort to make the most of his prize. 
He bought up the manufactory at Berlin, forbade all 
purchase of rival goods from abroad, installed porce- 
lain at his own table in place of the gold and silver 
associated with royal state, used porcelain snuff- 
boxes, and bestowed samples of the finest products 
when convention prescribed a regal gift. To pro- 
mote the welfare of Prussia, Jews who wished to 
marry were compelled to purchase a service of porce- 
lain and to dispose of it abroad. 

With the same unflinching resolution the King 
pursued his design of making Berlin a great indus- 
trial centre, of establishing manufactures in all his 
towns, and of forcing Prussia to provide for all her own 



Frederick and Prussia after the War 3 1 5 

needs and for many of the needs of foreign lands. 
Every industry, silk and satin, cloth and linen, ship- 
building and mining, alike received the royal stimulus 
and was compelled to submit to the royal interfer- 
ence. Frederick's success varied, for in some cases 
it was more apparent than in others that precepts, 
prohibitions, and subsidies could not make good 
deficiencies of climate, skill, and enterprise. While 
the production of porcelain was firmly established, 
that of tobacco by no means fulfilled the expecta- 
tions of the King. He commissioned a Prussian 
chemist to find out a sauce which would make the 
home-grown leaf at least comparable with the Vir- 
ginian. The experiment, which occupied more than 
two and a half years, was furthered by all the re- 
sources of Government. No less than 1 180 samples 
were tested. The report of the General Tobacco 
Administration, however, stated that only 34 of 
these were in any way better for the treatment, and 
that these 34, " notwithstanding they made a brave 
show to outward seeming," were too unsavoury even 
to be mixed with the products of Virginia. 

Twice a year the King with the aid of his minis- 
ters was wont to take stock of his kingdom, and to 
measure the progress of all his schemes. In the in- 
terval he travelled through his provinces and issued 
instructions for the amendment of all that he found 
amiss. " Schweidnitz and Neisse are still very short 
of tiled roofs, N. B., someone will have to look to 
it " is one of fourteen points that he noted down in 
the course of a visit to Silesia. No detail was too 
trifling for his attention. At the time when a paper 



3i6 Frederick the Great 

manufactory was determined on, doubt was ex- 
pressed whether sufficient raw material in the shape 
of fine rags would be forthcoming. 

" The ill custom prevails among us/' rejoined the 
King, " that both in town and country the servant-girls 
make the best rags into tinder to light the fire. We 
must try to break people of it, and therefore the rag- 
collectors must be provided with touch-wood, which is 
just as good as tinder for lighting a fire, to give to the 
girls in exchange for rags." 

A king who took upon his own shoulders so vast 
a share as did Frederick in regulating the agriculture 
and industry of his subjects could not avoid concern- 
ing himself also with their foreign trade. The gen- 
eral principles of commercial policy which he followed 
were simple. He was determined to see that Prus- 
sian subjects sold as much as possible to foreigners 
and bought as little as possible from them in return. 
The latter part of his task could be, and was, ac- 
complished by prohibiting the importation of certain 
commodities, such as salt, porcelain, and steel, and 
by appointing a host of customs-officers to make the 
prohibition effective. But to sell to foreigners goods 
which were produced in Prussia chiefly because the 
King willed that his subjects should forego the con- 
venience of buying them from foreigners was a feat 
which taxed Frederick's statecraft to the utmost. 

In general it may be said that Prussian commerce 
did not thrive. Thanks to the strenuous efforts of 
King and ministers, who imported foreign artisans, 
endowed them with implements and homes, com- 



Frederick and Prttssia after the War 3 1 7 

pelled natives to learn crafts, bought sheep in Spain, 
forbade the export of raw material or the import 
of finished goods, forced the monasteries to support 
unprofitable industries, vetoed profitable industries 
that threatened in any way to prejudice their favour- 
ites, in short, exhausted the arts of government to 
foster production, — thanks to all this the Silesian ex^ 
port of cloth and linen rose to between five and six 
million thalers a year. 

This result was not achieved by domestic inter- 
ference only. The King did not shrink from tariff 
wars with Austria and Saxony, nor from much toil 
to procure commercial treaties. It often appeared, 
however, that there were spheres in which statecraft, 
even when practised by a Frederick, could accom- 
plish little. 

" When at that time a new republic arose across the 
ocean," writes Professor Koser, " King Frederick made 
haste to enter into commercial relations with it, in order 
to exchange cloth, woollen stuffs, and linen, iron goods 
and porcelain, for rice, indigo, and Virginian tobacco. 
The 'most favoured nation' treaty of 10 September, 
1785, between Prussia and the United States of America 
fulfilled, it is true, few of the expectations which both 
parties formed of it, for the English, who from a sea- 
faring and capitalist point of view were more competent, 
long continued to be the commercial intermediaries be- 
tween those renegade colonies and the Old World." 

In the course of his efforts the King endeavoured 
at different times to supplant Hamburg, to ruin 
Danzig, and to make Silesia an impenetrable barrier 



3 1 8 Frederick the Great 



between Polish wool-growers and their customers in 
Saxony. It was a peculiar feature of Prussia that 
her straggling frontiers were crossed by many roads 
and rivers which connected foreign states. The 
HohenzoUern laboured to turn this fact to account 
and to favour Prussian merchants by hampering 
foreigners with enormous tolls. The result was that 
commerce was compelled to avoid the borders of his 
dominions. 

Frederick was indefatigable in inciting his subjects 
to take up new enterprises as well as in striving to 
procure for them advantages abroad. As a rule, 
however, the commercial companies which he formed 
either decayed or relapsed into the position of State 
undertakings. It may be surmised that what might 
have been possible to the Frederick and the Prussia 
of 1740 had been rendered well-nigh impossible by the 
changes in both which a generation of militarism had 
produced. The system of despotic command and 
automatic obedience was fatal to the growth of a class 
of self-reHant merchants, and the King complained 
bitterly that neither individuals nor corporations 
would act with enlightened patriotism in develop- 
ing the commerce of Prussia. Able advisers of the 
Crown, indeed, did something to atone for this lack of 
initiative. Thanks to the talent of Hagen, the Bank, 
which was established in 1765, survived its early 
perils and became serviceable to Prussian trade. The 
Marine Commercial Company also outlived many 
of Frederick's semi-ofificial creations. 

It is perhaps in the sphere of taxation that Fred- 
erick's unflinching autocracy is most remarkably 



Frederick and Pricssia after the War 3 1 9 

displayed. He claimed not only to regulate the 
consumption of his people according to his own 
standard of propriety, but also to select agents to en- 
force his rules without the smallest consideration for 
their feelings. Frederick wished to make existence 
easier for the poor, especially for the soldier. He 
therefore abolished the tax on grain, but subjected 
meat, beer, and wine to progressive imposts. Every 
Prussian was forced to buy from the State a fixed 
quantity of inferior salt at a price equal to four 
times its cost of production. The King's delight in 
coffee did not make him blind to the fact that the 
State would gain more profit if his subjects were 
forced to abandon it in favour of Prussian beer. 
Accordingly in 1781 coffee became, like salt and to- 
bacco, a monopoly of State and a tax of 250 per 
cent, upon its value was imposed. Frederick strove 
to refute the remonstrances of the Pomeranian gentry 
with the words : '^ His Majesty's high person was 
reared in youth on beer-soup, therefore the people 
in that part can equally well be reared on beer-soup ; 
it is much more wholesome than coffee." The 
people, however, seem to have mitigated the incon- 
venience to which they were put by their King in 
part by brewing decoctions of herbs, but chiefly by 
smuggling. It has been estimated that no less than 
two-thirds of the coffee which they used was contra- 
band. It boded ill for the State when to knock one 
of the King's spies on the head excited none of the 
odium of murder. 

The measure which most of all estranged the 
hearts of the Prussians from their King dates, 



320 Frederick the Great 

however, from the year 1766, when Frederick resolved 
to introduce the French system of farming out the 
indirect taxes, or Regie. Not the system alone, but 
also the chief agents who carried it into effect, were 
brought from France. The lessee-in-chief, de Launay, 
exercised great influence over the King, who ac- 
cepted his opinion as to the possibilities of taxation 
in preference to that of his Prussian commissioners. 

The people, as was natural, detested an innovation 
which both wounded their Teutonic sensibilities and 
raised the price of food. De Launay and his assist- 
ants were caricatured as marching behind beasts 
laden with rackets, foils, and fiddles, to avenge the 
shame of Rossbach on the inhabitants of Berlin. 
Patriots might well chafe at the thought that a new 
and foreign department was introduced into the Gen- 
eral Directory itself, and that whereas a Prussian 
minister was paid only 4000 thalers a year, each of 
the four chief Frenchmen received 15,000. Less 
than ten per cent, of the 2000 tax-gatherers were 
foreigners, but the Germans were insulted at being 
deemed fit for the lower grades alone. 

Their murmurs, however, were powerless to alter 
the purpose of the King. The innovation, indeed, 
was not recommended by conspicuous success. 
Though it simpHfied the fiscal administration, a large 
proportion of the returns was still swallowed up by 
expenses of collection. On a review of the twenty 
years, 1766- 1786, the proceeds of the Regie seem to 
have been in no wise augmented by de Launay 's 
hated invasion. Yet Frederick adhered to his plan, 
kept the taxes high, administered the funds of the 



i 



Frederick and Prussia after the War 321 

State in secret, and crowned all by bringing coffee 
under the control of the French. To his fiscal mea- 
sures more than to all else was it due that the State 
which he had exalted drew a deep breath of relief 
when he died. 




CHAPTER XI 

FREDERICK AND EUROPE, 1763-1786 

THE chief significance of the Peace of Hubertus- 
burg for Prussia was not expressed in any of 
its clauses. The signature of the treaty im- 
plied that Europe renounced the endeavour to de- 
prive her of the rank among the Great Powers which 
she had arrogated to herself in 1740. Their survival 
of the great ordeal conferred a new consequence 
upon Frederick and his State. '' Frederick himself," 
Mr. James Sime happily says, *' acquired both in 
Germany and in Europe the indefinable influence 
which springs from the recognition of great gifts 
that have been proved by great deeds." The brief 
sketch of his domestic labours that has been given in 
Chapter X. suggests that he was not lacking in the 
energy which was needed to maintain this influence 
and to derive full profit from it. The history of his 
dealings with foreign Powers during the latter half 
of his reign is the story of how this was done. 

From the moment at which he signed the treaty 
down to the day of his death, Frederick felt that 
Austria was still his enemy. Joseph II., the eldest 
son of the Queen, who was unanimously elected 

322 




^()^Ll■•;l ,.-< n 



I'lh q^: \, 1)^ 



JOSEPH THE SECOND. 

AFTER THE PAINTING BY LISTARD. 



1763-1786] Frederick and Europe 323 

Emperor in 1765, had learned politics from the King 
of Prussia. He desired nothing so much as to restore 
the immemorial pre-eminence of his House by a sud- 
den blow at its upstart rival. Frederick, who had 
spies everywhere, was soon acquainted with the am- 
bitions of the restless youth. For the present he 
could place some rehance on the pacific influence of 
the Queen and more on the emptiness of the Austrian 
treasury, but he was none the less compelled to make 
it his foremost task to thwart successive Hapsburg 
schemes of aggrandisement. 

His security was the greater, however, because the 
Peace of Paris of 1763 reconciled P'rance and Eng- 
land as little as the Peace of Hubertusburg recon- 
ciled Austria and Prussia. Frederick, it is true, was 
still treated with coldness by the French, who clung 
to their alliance with the Queen, and he was re- 
solved never again to trust an English ministry. 
With a rare access of spite, indeed, he condemned 
the charger which he had named after Lord Bute 
to be yoked with a mule and to perform hui^iliat- 
ing duties in his sight. But though neither of the 
Great Powers of the West was his ally, their latent 
hostility was still too incurable to permit them to 
unite against him. 

On the remaining Great Power, therefore, the well- 
being of Prussia depended. The Seven Years' War 
of the future, which Frederick was always labouring 
to avert by means of elaborate armaments, was im- 
probable if Russia stood neutral and impossible if she 
became his ally. From 1763 onwards the Russian 
alliance was the prize for which he strove. He had 



324 Frederick the Great [1763- 

to surmount the obstacle that as sovereign of Ost- 
Preussen he was the natural enemy of the Russian 
designs upon Poland. But Austria, on the other 
hand, besides being interested in Poland, was the 
natural enemy of the Russian designs upon the 
Turk. Frederick might reasonably hope that by 
humouring Russia to the extreme limit which the in- 
terests of his State permitted, he might establish 
a good understanding with her to the prejudice of 
the more formidable empire in the south. 

Catherine, whose throne was far from secure, 
seemed at first resolved to shun a new connexion 
with the ally of her murdered husband. Early in 
October, 1763, however, her neighbour, Augustus, 
died, and the stress of the election to the throne of 
Poland compelled her to seek the aid of some foreign 
Power. France, Austria, and finally the Russian 
faction in Poland all disappointed her, and she feared 
a hostile combination between Prussia and the Turk. 
On April 11, 1764, therefore, Frederick's desire was 
gratified. He bound himself to aid Catherine in 
upholding the existing constitutional anarchy in Po- 
land and in Sweden, and received in return the 
coveted Russian guarantee for Silesia. Then, by 
means of force and corruption, Stanislaus Ponia- 
towski was installed as King of Poland (September 
7, 1764). " God said, let it be light, and it was 
light," was Frederick's congratulation to Catherine. 
"You speak and the world is silent before you." 

In accommodating himself without undue humility 
to the flighty humours of his imperious ally, and in 
appropriating for Prussia most of the benefits of 



1786] Frederick and Europe 325 

the compact, Frederick showed that experience had 
taught him much. The state of Polish and Turkish 
affairs gave to the Eastern Question of that day two 
storm-centres which threatened wide and immediate 
disturbance. Frederick, who was deep in his labours 
of restoration and reform at home, desired above all 
to keep the peace. This imposed upon him tasks of 
the utmost delicacy. He had to prevent the forma- 
tion of a Northern league which Russia desired, to 
cow Austria by means of the Russian alliance, to 
follow with the closest attention the turbulent course 
of politics in Poland, to keep Austria from acquiring 
influence there, to check the military ardour of the 
Turk, and to hinder a rapprochement between Austria 
and Russia. During more than four years (April, 
1764-October, 1768), he was able to stave off war, 
and when at last France induced the Turks to attack 
Russia, he found himself liable only to pay an annual 
subsidy of less than half a million thalers. In 1769 
the alliance was prolonged till 1780. 

The war between Russia and the Turks seemed 
to Frederick a pitiable display of incompetence. 
*'To form a correct idea of this war," he wrote, 
"you must figure a set of purblind people who, by 
constantly beating a set of altogether blind, end by 
gaining over them a complete mastery." But the 
triumph of Russia, however achieved, threatened to 
kindle the general conflagration which he dreaded. 
It was clear that if left to herself she would make 
conquests, and Austria was on the alert for com- 
pensation. The Hapsburg claims might possibly 
be satisfied at the expense of the Turk, but this 



326 Frederick the Great [1763- 

resource was of no avail to furnish the compensation 
which Prussia herself would not forego. Frederick 
cast longing glances towards West - Preussen, but 
could not bring himself to believe that Russia would 
consent to an acquisition which would add im- 
mensely to the power of a rival state. He therefore 
feared that the knot would yield only to the sword. 

At this crisis the King twice met Joseph II. face 
fo face. At Neisse, in August, 1769, little save a 
personal introduction was effected. Frederick pro- 
fessed to be charmed with the beautiful soul and 
noble ambitions of the young Emperor, while Joseph 
reported to his mother that the King talked admir- 
ably, but betrayed the knave in every word he spoke. 
At the second meeting, which took place in Moravia 
in September, 1770, Frederick spared no effort to 
captivate Joseph and Kaunitz. He donned the Aus- 
trian uniform of white, though he smilingly confessed 
that his mania for snuff made him too dirty to wear 
it. He extolled the Imperial grenadiers as worthy 
to guard the person of the God of War. He made 
Laudon sit beside him, saying in graceful allusion to 
Hochkirch and Kunersdorf, that he would rather 
have General Laudon at his side than be obliged 
to face him. After sacrificing to the vanity of the 
Chancellor by listening for an hour to a monologue 
on political affairs, he won his heart by posing as a 
grateful convert to his views. 

The result was that Frederick was able to offer 
Catherine the joint mediation of Austria and Prussia 
to end the war. The offer was not accepted, but it 
proved that the two foes were not irreconcilable. 




WENZEL ANTON, PRINCE VON KAUNITZ. 

AFTER THE PAINTING BY STEINER. 



1786] Frederick and Europe 327 

The mere hint that Austria might compete for the 
Prussian alliance was enough to raise its value at St. 
Petersburg. It became clear, too, that only the fear 
of Prussia was preventing Austria from interfering 
on behalf of the Turk. Urged on by his brother 
Henry, who had just returned from the Russian 
capital, Frederick determined early in 1771 to take 
the risk of offending Russia and provoking Austria 
to war, in order to net his profit from this advanta- 
geous situation ere it changed. 

In the summer of 1770 Austria had drifted, half 
involuntarily, into an occupation of Zips, a portion 
of the territory of Poland which was almost sur- 
rounded by her own, and of some of the adjacent 
districts. Frederick now seized upon this, though 
the Queen was willing to draw back, as an excuse 
for pressing upon Russia a plan which he had pro- 
mulgated under an alias at an early stage in the war. 
On February i, 1769, he had suggested to his 
ambassador at St. Petersburg 

"that Russia should offer to the Court of Vienna 
Lemberg and the surrounding country in return for 
support against the Turks ; that she should give us 
Polish Preussen with Ermland and the protectorate over 
Danzig ; and that she should herself incorporate a suit- 
able part of Poland by way of indemnity for the expenses 
of the war." 

The plan of dismembering Poland because the 
Turks were defeated was, as Frederick knew full 
well, distasteful to both of the Powers whose com- 
plicity he desired. Russia was strongly opposed to 



328 Frederick the Great [1763- 

any aggrandisement of Prussia to the eastward. 
Austria, besides being averse to the aggrandisement 
of her rival in any quarter, preferred any lands to 
the Polish and any method to that of naked force. 
Yet the King, while professing that he was an old 
man whose brain was worn out, secured the co- 
operation of Russia within a year (15th January, 
1772), and of Austria less than eight months later. 

The triumph of his diplomacy was enhanced by 
the fact that he would have been completely foiled 
if Austria had consented to join Russia in dismem- 
bering the Turk. As it was, he was permitted to 
enjoy the spectacle of the Queen struggling with her 
conscience and upbraiding herself, her Chancellor, 
and her son. She complained that they had aimed 
at two incompatible objects at once, "■ to act in the 
Prussian fashion and at the same time to preserve 
the semblance of honesty." The prospective addi- 
tions to her domains were to her odious, since they 
were " bought at the price of honour, at the price of 
the glory of the monarchy, at the price of the good 
faith and religion, which are our peculiar possession." 
"She is always weeping, but always annexing," 
sneered the triumphant King. 

On August 5, 1772, Austria signed the Treaty of 
Partition. By agreeing upon their demands the 
three Powers had accomplished the hardest part of 
their enterprise.^ The strength of Poland had been 
wasted by the anarchy which Russia and Prussia 
had studiously conserved. Since 1768, Romanists 
and Dissidents had been engaged in a bloody and 
desolating war in which Russia, the protector of the 



1786] Frederick and Europe 329 

Greek Church, played the decisive part. No party 
among the Poles still retained sufficient energy to 
oppose in arms the claims to Polish provinces which, 
in order to save appearances, were formulated by 
the Powers. Frederick even put forward a double 
title to Pomerellen, alleging that it had been wrong- 
fully alienated by the Margrave of Brandenburg in 
131 1, and that if he as suzerain consented to over- 
look this irregularity, he would still be entitled to 
the province as heir, since 1637, to the elder branch 
of the House of Pomerania. He claimed Great 
Poland as heir of the Emperor Sigismund, who had 
pawned it to the Teutonic Order, from which the 
Poles had wrested it by force. The remainder of 
his share was due to him as compensation for the 
loss of the revenues of these two provinces for so 
many centuries. 

The Polish statesmen had no difficulty in refuting 
such nonsense as this. But King Stanislaus was 
convinced that true patriotism dictated obedience in 
order to save what remained. France and England 
were too intent on their own affairs to interfere by 
force. Hence a mixture of persuasion, bribery, and 
the presence of 30,000 soldiers was sufficient to pro- 
cure the unanimous acquiescence of the Diet after 
six months' negotiation (September 30, 1773). The 
Austrian ambassador was astonished at the trifling 
sums for which the nobles sold their votes. His 
Saxon colleague lamented that they shamelessly laid 
upon the gaming-tables the foreign gold with which 
they had just been bribed. 

Frederick's share of the spoil amounted to more 



330 Frederick the Great L1763- 

than sixteen thousand square miles, and in 1774 he 
was able quietly to filch two hundred additional vil- 
lages from Poland. Long before the Diet consented 
to the cession he had inaugurated Prussian rule. In 
June, 1772, he made a triumphal entry into his 
new province. He gave out to all and sundry that 
no one could envy his good fortune, for as he came 
he had seen nothing but sand, pines, heath, and 
Jews. '* It is a very good and very profitable acquis- 
ition,'* he wrote to Prince Henry, *' both for the 
political situation of the State and for its finances." 
Men said that without Danzig, which along with 
Thorn remained Polish, West-Preussen was but a 
trunk without a head, but the King was full of 
schemes for partitioning the trade of Danzig among 
his own ports. Voltaire, finding him deaf to his 
exhortations to free the Greeks, lamented that the 
harbour of Danzig lay nearer his heart than the 
Piraeus. 

Soon the poverty-stricken land echoed to the un- 
tiring march of Hohenzollern progress. The con- 
tempt which the King openly expressed for " this 
perfectly imbecile set with names ending in ki " 
was apparent in all his dealings with the privileged 
classes. His treatment of private estates as well as 
of provinces seemed to warrant the Poles who added 
the word Rapuit to the Suum Cuique which they saw 
inscribed beneath the Prussian eagle. The local of- 
ficials were simply dismissed from office, and their 
lands appropriated at the cost of a trifling compensa- 
tion. Though Frederick bound himself to respect 
the existing rights and property of the Roman 



1786] Frederick and Europe 331 

Catholics, the bishops and abbots likewise lost their 
lands, but in their case an allowance amounting to 
nearly half of their previous incomes was conceded. 
Upon the nobles a tax of one-quarter of their net 
revenues was imposed, but Protestants were entitled 
to a discount of twenty per cent. In the hope of 
cleansing West-Preussen of its Polish inhabitants, 
the King went so far as to favour the purchase of 
noble lands by German peasants. Strict watch was 
kept on the frontier for Polish immigrants who might 
try to enter the country. 

The common people, however, could not but gain 
from the introduction of that poHcy of developing 
all the resources of the land which formed the Ho- 
henzoUern ideal of domestic government. Slavery 
was abolished and serfdom regulated. New water- 
ways were dug. Colonists were brought in by 
thousands. Prussian soldiers scoured the country 
in search of gipsies, tramps, and begging Jews. 
Toleration, justice, and education were established 
where all three had been far to seek. The peasants 
and townsmen were subjected to the Prussian system 
of taxation, which laid upon their shoulders a bur- 
den heavy indeed, but steady and not beyond their 
strength. Soon the royal revenue from West-Preussen 
amounted to more than two million thalers a year. 

But for a timely revival of energy in her royal 
House, it is not impossible that Sweden, like Poland, 
would have been the poorer for the Russo-Prussian 
alliance. In 1769 Catherine and Frederick had 
pledged themselves to maintain anarchy in Stock- 
holm as well as in Warsaw. Should the existing 



332 Frederick the Great [1763- 

constitution be modified, Russia would take up arms 
and Frederick's contribution to the war was to be 
the invasion of Swedish Pomerania. It is easy to 
imagine that with Russia and Prussia in cordial 
agreement and France and England embroiled or 
apathetic, a war with Sweden might have resulted 
in the annexation of Finland and the remainder of 
Pomerania by the allies. In 1772, however, young 
Gustavus III., the son of Frederick's sister Ulrica, 
delivered Sweden from the trammels of her constitu- 
tion by an unlooked-for coup d'etat. Russia, which 
was still hampered by the Turkish war, was unable 
to wage war against the revolution, and Frederick, 
who for once was taken by surprise, grudgingly ac- 
cepted the apologies of his nephew. 

The remainder of Frederick's life was dedicated 
to the defence of the position that he had already 
attained. He was determined to do nothing that 
could prejudice his cause in a future struggle with 
Austria. He therefore looked on while Russia and 
Austria despoiled the Turk in 1774, while England 
and her Colonies fell to blows in the next year, and 
while France joined in the fray in 1778. His private 
opinion, indeed, was that the country which could 
commit its destinies to a Bute could hardly fail to 
be in the wrong. He blamed the English both for 
political and military folly — for beginning a terrible 
civil war with no settled plans or adequate prepara- 
tions, for underestimating the enemy's force, for 
dividing her own and for trampling upon the rights of 
neutrals. But he avoided with the most scrupulous 
care any action that could give offence to either 



1786] Frederick and Europe 333 

combatant, and declared to his ministers that he in- 
tended to await the issue quietly and to throw in his 
lot with the side which fortune favoured. 

In the very year in which France allied herself 
with the Colonies against England (1778) Frederick's 
long-expected struggle with Austria came to pass. 
Joseph II., whose restless desire to imitate the 
achievements of the King of Prussia was not satis- 
fied by his gains from Poland and the Turk, thought 
that the moment had arrived for acquiring a portion 
of Bavaria, the great geographical obstacle to the 
consoHdation of the Hapsburg lands. At the close 
of the year 1777 the Elector of Bavaria died, and his 
lands passed by right to the aged and childless 
Elector Palatine. Austria, however, furbished up a 
claim to a considerable portion of eastern Bavaria, 
and on January 14, 1778, the Elector was half bribed, 
half frightened into acquiescence. Two days later 
10,000 Austrian troops occupied the ceded districts. 
Joseph's triumph seemed to be assured. 

Frederick, however, had still to be reckoned with. 
Though his health was indifferent and his desire was 
all for peace, he took up the challenge without an 
hour's delay. Determined, as he said, "once for all 
to humble Austrian ambition," he assumed his an- 
cient pose as champion of the German princes 
against an Emperor who was trampling upon their 
constitutional rights. " I know very well," he owned 
to Prince Henry, ''that it is only our own interest 
which makes it our duty to act at this moment, but 
we must be very careful not to say so." Few volun- 
teers, however, declared themselves on his side. 



334 Frederick the Great [1763- 

The Elector's cousin and heir, Duke Charles of 
Zweibriicken, became a pawn in Frederick's hands, 
and the Elector of Saxony, who had claims on the 
estate of the dead prince, promised 21,000 men. 
But his only other ally was Bavarian public opinion, 
which was shocked at the idea of partition. The 
Bavarians, according to the current jest, left off their 
pious invocation of " Jesu, Mary, Joseph," and cried 
to "■ Jesu, Mary, Frederick " to deliver them. 

The Austrian statesmen were willing enough to 
negotiate, but they clung to the gains which they 
had made. Their preparations for war were not 
complete, but they did not believe that Prussia 
meant to fight. Both sides, indeed, hoped more 
from negotiation than from battle. It became evi- 
dent, too, that Frederick was no longer the general 
whose delight was in swift and resolute movements. 
Not till April 6, 1778, did he march from Berlin, and 
then he drew rein in southern Silesia, and spent 
three months more in fruitless haggling. At last, on 
July 3rd, he made a declaration of war, and two days 
later completed his march across the mountains into 
Bohemia. Even then the Queen brought herself to 
beg for peace, so that, although hostilities continued, 
August was half gone before the diplomatists finally 
dispersed. 

The War of the Bavarian Succession formally be- 
gan, however, when Frederick set out for Bohemia, 
on July 3, 1778. He was attacking with two armies, 
each about 80,000 strong. Earlier in the year he 
had hoped that the main Austrian force would as- 
semble in Moravia. In that case his plan was to 



1786] Frederick and Europe 335 

lead his own army from Silesia against it, to win a 
great victory, and thus to compel the enemy to call 
back their troops from Bohemia. This would make 
it easy for Prince Henry with a combined host of 
Prussians and Saxons to advance on Prague while 
the King made progress in Moravia. The two ar- 
mies, if all continued to go well, would then press 
forward towards the Danube. 

The plan was spoiled, however, because the Aus- 
trians were bold enough to choose north-eastern 
Bohemia for their place of concentration. There 
they were indeed further from Vienna, but they 
secured greater possibilities of offensive action. If 
Frederick invaded Moravia they could overrun Si- 
lesia behind his back or fall upon Prince Henry and 
Saxony in overwhelming force. The King, there- 
fore, reluctantly turned aside into Bohemia by way 
of Nachod in order to engage the enemy's attention 
until his brother, marching from Dresden, should 
have established himself firmly in the north. 

On his arrival in Bohemia, Frederick found the 
Austrians some 250,000 strong. Joseph and Lacy 
with the bulk of the troops confronted him in a 
position on the Elbe nearly fifty miles in length and 
as strong as water, earthworks, and cannon could 
make it. Judging it impregnable, Frederick waited 
impatiently for his brother to get the better of 
Laudon, who was guarding the northern gate into 
Bohemia. The army chafed at the enforced inac- 
tion, but the King still hoped by sending repeated 
detachments to Moravia to compel the enemy to 
meet him there in the field. 



2,^6 Frederick the Great [1763- 

Prince Henry, after hesitating for some time be- 
tween different routes, performed his task to perfec- 
tion. Early in August he led his army over the 
mountains to the east of the Elbe by ways hitherto 
reputed impassable. Laudon was at his wits* end. 
He fell back upon the line of the Iser, but on August 
14th, Joseph himself admitted that he was too weak 
to hold it. If Laudon were driven off, the great 
position on the Elbe would be untenable, but Prince 
Henry lacked the hardihood to venture the decisive 
move. Dissensions between the royal brothers and 
the failure of their efforts to effect a junction justi- 
fied the policy of their opponents, who, Frederick 
sneered, seemed to be turned into stone. Soon the 
movements of the Prussians were dictated largely 
by hunger and the conflict earned its nickname of 
the Potato War. Heavy rains completed their dis- 
comfiture. By the middle of October the exultant 
Austrians had seen the last of the invaders. 

The campaign of 1778 cost the combatants some 
20,000 men and 29,000,000 thalers in money. Fred- 
erick had shown himself captious and irresolute. 
His brother declared that he was more on his guard 
against the treachery of the King than against the 
enterprises of the enemy. The army had become 
dejected, ill-disciplined, and disaffected. Frederick, 
though he prepared to invade Moravia in the spring, 
spent the winter in working his hardest for peace. 
France and Russia lent their aid. In March, 1779, 
a congress of the four Powers met at Teschen, and 
on May 13th peace was signed. 

The Peace of Teschen was in some degree a 



1786] Frederick and Europe 337 

triumph for Frederick. The chief points for which 
he had taken up arms were secured at no great cost. 
The Austrian acquisitions were Hmited to the Quar- 
ter of the Inn, a strip of territory bounded on the 
west by that river, while Bavaria was obHged to pay 
4,000,000 thalers in settlement of the Saxon claims. 
Prussia seemed thus to have maintained the rights 
of two great German princes from motives of pure 
patriotism. Her miHtary prestige, on the other 
hand, had suffered. She had not derived prompt 
support from her intimacy with Russia and she had 
failed to disturb the connexion between Austria 
and France. No less than four royal marriages 
now linked the Bourbons to their secular foes the 
Hapsburgs. By accepting the guarantee of France 
and Russia to a treaty in which the Peace of 
Westphalia was once more confirmed, Prussia had 
moreover paved the way for unwelcome foreign 
intrusions into German affairs. 

Frederick saw good reason to fear that the danger 
from Austria would be renewed so soon as Joseph 
should be emancipated from the restraining influ- 
ence of the aged Queen. For the time being, how- 
ever, he was free to resume his round of toil, to 
mourn the loss of Voltaire, to correspond with the 
philosopher d'Alembert, and to pursue reforms in 
law and education. The Prussian judges were now 
empowered to interrogate the parties to suits and 
compelled to hear what they had to say. A codi- 
fication of the law and a Book of Rights which 
should stereotype the existing feudal system of 
society in Prussia were set on foot. And at the 



338 Frederick the Great [1763- 

moment when Romanist sovereigns drove out 
the Jesuits, Frederick welcomed the fugitives as 
harmless individuals, who could help to supply- 
one of the most pressing needs of the State by 
instructing the common people. 

The lack of qualified elementary teachers in Fred- 
erick's dominions was attested by the fact that in 
1763 an edict of educational reform in Silesia per- 
mitted them to continue such employments as tail- 
oring, but forbade them to eke out their incomes 
by peddling, by selling beer or brandy, or by fid- 
dling in public-houses. A counsel of despair had 
been to set the worn-out sergeants to keep school. 
Out of 3443 of them, however, only 79 were re- 
ported by the military officials as possibly fit to 
serve, and investigation by the civil authorities still 
further reduced the number. Under such condi- 
tions as these the influx of members of an order 
which had long been famous for its schools was 
regarded by the King as a boon to Prussia. To 
grant them an asylum gratified his real love of 
toleration, without in his opinion involving the 
smallest peril to the allegiance of his subjects. 

From time to time, however, Frederick was un- 
pleasantly reminded of his insecurity. In the 
summer of 1780, Austria secured a portion of the 
Bavarian inheritance which it was beyond his power 
to take away. In spite of all his diplomacy, the 
mighty sees of Cologne and Miinster fell into Haps- 
burg hands. At this moment of triumph, Maria 
Theresa died (November 29, 1780). " She has done 
honour to her throne and to her sex," wrote 



1786] Frederick and Europe 339 

the King to d'Alembert. " I have made war against 
her, but I have never been her enemy." 

Though Frederick regarded his great antagonist 
as bigoted and hypocritical, he mourned her sin- 
cerely, for her death removed the most potent 
check upon her son. Joseph seemed to have in- 
herited his mother's energy, without her reverence 
for existing institutions. He now plunged into a 
medley of hasty and sweeping reforms, treating 
the inhabitants of his miscellaneous provinces 
as cavalierly as though he were a Frederick and 
they submissive Prussians. The King could afford 
to look on while Joseph and Kaunitz embroiled 
themselves with the landowners, the Hungarians, 
and the Church. It was not long, however, before 
their foreign policy compelled him to active inter- 
ference. 

Since 1780 the Russian alliance had failed him. 
He valued it as a means of preserving peace, but 
the policy which now prevailed at St. Petersburg 
looked towards war. Frederick, who was strangely 
blind to this, declared in response to the blandish- 
ments of the Czarina that the time was not ripe to 
seize more of Poland (1779). He proposed the 
admission of the Turk into the league at the 
moment when Catherine was dreaming of a new 
crusade. In Joseph, on the other hand, the Czarina 
found a willing partner in a policy of adventure. 
From the time when he visited her in the summer 
of 1780, the alliance between Russia and Prussia 
was practically dead. Frederick sacrificed to it in 
May, 1 78 1, by joining the Armed Neutrality which 



340 Frederick the Great [1763- 

Russia had organised in order to check the high- 
handed treatment of neutral vessels by Great Brit- 
ain. But in the same month Catherine and Joseph 
made a defensive alliance for eight years. Fred- 
erick rightly divined that the ambitious Czarina had 
won the Emperor's countenance to the scheme of a 
revival by Russia of the old Eastern Empire. Her 
eldest grandson was destined to be Czar of all the 
Russias. Her second was named after the founder 
of Constantinople and suckled by six Greek nurses. 
The third, sneered the King, when another was ex- 
pected, would presumably become Great Mogul. 

But though Frederick regarded Catherine as pre- 
tentious, saying that if she were corresponding with 
God the Father she would claim at least equal rank, 
none knew better than he the value of her alliance. 
In 1762 Russia had turned the scale, and had she 
been favourable to the plan, Joseph's bold throw 
for Bavaria might have been successful. It was no 
light matter for Frederick that in his old age his 
State was threatened by an Emperor whose thoughts 
were still running on Silesia and who had succeeded 
in seducing his sole ally. France and England 
were beyond the range of his overtures, and when 
the Russian armies moved in 1783 Europe believed 
that the Turk was about to be finally expelled. 
Frederick, it seemed, was doomed to perilous iso- 
lation. 

One force indeed remained — a force difficult to 
marshal, but as Charles V. had found, formidable 
when marshalled — which Frederick might hope 
to rally to his side. The tilted balance of Europe 



■t786] Frederick and Europe 341 

might still be redressed in Germany. By his con- 
duct in the affair of the Bavarian Succession Fred- 
erick had proved that it was not impossible for 
Germans to trust him, and since that time Austria 
by fresh aggressions had alienated from herself the 
general body of Romanist opinion among them. It 
appeared that the Empire which was a corporation 
for the preservation of rights had acquired in Joseph 
a head who set at naught all rights save those of 
Austria. The inevitable result was that the princes 
began to think of uniting in self-defence. 

From the beginning of the year 1784, Frederick 
devoted himself to the task of organising a con- 
federacy of German States to defend the existing 
constitution. This was a far more arduous under- 
taking than any negotiation with a single Great 
Power. It was always difficult to induce a number 
of naturally jealous neighbours to combine. In 1784 
the difficulty was increased threefold. The danger 
from Austria was general and prospective, rather 
than specific and imminent. It might be averted, 
indeed, by maintaining an equality of strength be- 
tween Prussia and Austria, but the princes would 
beware of embarking upon a course which might 
make Prussia the stronger of the two. Frederick, 
moreover, was compelled to entrust a great share in 
the negotiations to his ministers. His chief agent, 
Hertzberg, had dared to form political ideas of his 
own. In the hope that a rapprochement with Aus- 
tria would lead to further gains in Poland, he quietly 
obstructed the measures of the aged King. 

The inactivity of the Prussian ministers might 



342 Frederick the Great [1763- 

have delayed the confederation indefinitely had not 
all Germany been shocked by the sudden revival of 
the Emperor's designs upon Bavaria. Again, just 
as seven years earlier, Austria corrupted the Elector 
Palatine without the privity of his heir and again 
her acquisition of the Electorate was paraded before 
the world as an accomplished fact. In the first days 
of January, 1785, Rumianzow, the Russian agent at 
the German Diet, suddenly presented to the Duke 
of Zweibriicken a joint demand of Austria and 
Russia for his acceptance of a bargain to which the 
Elector Palatine had already consented. The sub- 
stance of this was that Bavaria was assigned to the 
Emperor in return for the Austrian Netherlands, the 
title of King, and handsome rewards in money. 

" I, who am already more than half beyond this 
world," complained Frederick to his brother, "am 
forced to double my wisdom and activity, and con- 
tinually keep in my head the detestable plans that 
this cursed Joseph begets afresh with every fresh 
day. I am condemned to enjoy no rest before my 
bones are covered with a little earth." His energy, 
none the less, was as great as the crisis demanded. 
Austria was always hampered in time of war because 
the distant Netherlands were hers as much as be- 
cause the adjacent Bavaria was not. The exchange 
was therefore most alluring, but the opposition of 
Prussia to the scheme was so stout as to evoke dis- 
claimers from all the parties to it. Catherine pro- 
tested that she would countenance no violation of 
the Peace of Teschen. Louis XVI., whom Fred- 
erick believed to have been bribed by the offer of 



1786] Frederick and Europe 343 

Luxemburg, stated in answer to his protests that 
the Emperor renounced the scheme. Before the 
end of February, 1785, the danger was past. 

To guard against its recurrence Frederick none 
the less completed the Furstenbund or League of 
Princes. On July 23, 1785, Prussia, Saxony, and 
Hanover entered into an alliance, with the object of 
safeguarding the lands and rights of every member 
of the Empire. By separate articles the three 
Electors bound themselves to act together in Impe- 
rial business. The accession of the Archbishop of 
Mainz, who as president of the Electoral College 
had a casting vote, both gave the League a majority 
at the election of the Emperor, and prevented it 
from being regarded as a mere clique of Protestants. 
Frederick's triumph was complete when, in spite of 
the diplomatic opposition of the Emperor, a host of 
German princes accepted the result of his work. 
The rulers of Zweibriicken, Hesse-Cassel, Gotha, 
Weimar, Brunswick, Ansbach, Baden, Anhalt, Meck- 
lenburg, and Osnabriick formed with the four pro- 
tagonists a great body of organised German con- 
servatism led by the King of Prussia. Frederick in 
his old age had improvised with marvellous success 
a temporary insurance against the greatest danger 
that visibly threatened his State. 




CHAPTER XII 

FREDERICK'S DEATH AND GREATNESS 

THE League of 1785 was Frederick's last con- 
tribution to the politics of Europe. He felt 
that his days were numbered, but answered 
the summons of Death only by quickening the step 
with which he had long traversed the routine of 
daily duty. In his last months he remained true to 
his long-cherished ideal of life and still proved him- 
self diligent, imperious, stoical, and even gay. 

The fatal shock to his health, which was already 
shaken by gout and dyspepsia, seems to have been 
given at a review in Silesia on August 24, 1785. 
After the manoeuvres of the previous year he had 
written to the Infantry Inspector -General of the 
province that he was more dissatisfied with his 
troops than ever before. " Were I to make shoe- 
makers or tailors into generals, the regiments could 
not be worse," declared the King by way of prelude 
to more particular strictures. He threatened court- 
martial in the following year to whomsoever should 
not then fulfil his duty. 

When the time arrived for the visit of 1785 to 
Silesia, no symptoms of disorder could keep the 

344 




DEATH-MASK OF FREDERICK THE GREAT. 

FROM THE ORIGINAL IN THE HOHENZOLLERN MUSEUM, BERLIN. 



Frederick's Death and Greatness 345 



King from his post. As he made his usual tour 
of inspection, thousands of the country-folk flocked 
in to see him pass and to utter their gratitude for 
his subsidies. So he arrived at the review of August 
22nd-25th, which was held in the plain that Hes 
south of Breslau, and which military Europe regarded 
as one of the greatest tactical displays of the year. 

On the third morning of the four, Frederick in- 
sisted on teaching his men their duty by sitting his 
horse for six hours in a deluge of rain without the 
shelter of a cloak. In spite of the inevitable chill, 
he then presided at dinner, at which the Duke of 
York, Lafayette, and Cornwallis were among the 
guests. Fever and ague followed, but he shook 
them off in a night and completed the review, the 
progress through Silesia, the journey to Potsdam, 
and the inspection of artillery at Berlin. On Sep- 
tember lOth, he left his capital for the last time. 

At Potsdam, on the eve of the Grand Review, 
the blow fell. Within a month of his indiscretion 
in Silesia he was seized in the night with a fit of 
apoplexy (September 18-19, 1785). Gout, asthma, 
dropsy, and erysipelas set in, and after days of tor- 
ment he was compelled to spend his nights in fight- 
ing for breath in an armchair. Yet no disease could 
break his spirit. " There is traceable," says Carlyle 
with fine insight, '' only a complete superiority to 
Fear and Hope." 

Partly, perhaps, because Austrian troops might 
menace the frontiers if his weakness were known, 
but doubtless in part out of fortitude and pride, 
he concealed his illness so far as possible from his 



346 Frederick the Great 

subjects and from his friends. He performed the 
labours of the Cabinet with unclouded brain and 
with a growing fever of energy. His mind was 
full of plans for establishing new villages upon 
the districts reclaimed from the sand, for providing 
technical instruction in agriculture, and for arranging 
the coming manoeuvres in Silesia. He continued 
to read history day by day, and to converse cheer- 
fully with his friends. Once he enquired of the 
Duke of Courland whether he needed a good watch- 
man, maintaining that his sleeplessness at nights 
qualified him to fill the post. After seven months of 
suffering he entertained Mirabeau with lively con- 
versation, though his state was so pitiable as to 
render the interview painful to his favoured guest. 

Very early on the morning of April 17, 1786, he 
left the palace in Potsdam town, where he had passed 
the winter, and made a long, circuitous journey to 
his favourite abode. Sans Souci. But the change 
was powerless to bring relief. Some days he was 
too weak to converse as usual with his guests. 
On June 30th, however, he shocked his doctor by 
taking a copious dinner of strong soup full of spices, 
beef steeped in brandy, maize and cheese flavoured 
with garlic, and a whole plateful of pungent eel-pie. 
Four days later he actually quitted his chair for a 
short gallop on horseback, but the exertion left him 
prostrate. 

Again he rallied, and until the middle of August 
disease and his inflexible determination to accom- 
plish the daily routine struggled for the mastery. 
On August loth, he sent a tender little note to his 



Frederick's Death and Greatness 347 

widowed sister Charlotte of Brunswick. "The old," 
wrote the dying King, *' must give place to the young, 
that each generation may find room clear for it : and 
life, if we examine strictly what its course is, con- 
sists in seeing one's fellow-creatures die and be 
born." By an almost pathetic chance his last letter, 
written on August 14th, was to de Launay, demand- 
ing more minute accounts of the hated excise. 

Frederick, like his ancestors, died at his post. 
The Great Elector, whose only fear was that dropsy 
might unfit him to govern, held a Privy Council 
within two days of the end. Frederick William 
amid all his torments spent his last days in private 
conference with his heir. Frederick, an older man 
than either, began work at five o'clock on the 
morning of Tuesday, August 15th. He made the 
arrangements for a review at Potsdam and dictated 
despatches of weight with all his wonted clearness. 
On Wednesday he failed, struggling in vain to give 
his weeping general the parole. All that day he lay 
in his chair dying, attended by valets, ministers, 
and physicians. In the evening he slept, and when 
eleven o'clock struck he enquired the time and 
declared that he would rise at four. Towards mid- 
night he asked for his favourite dog and bade them 
cover it with a quilt. Then for more than two hours 
his faithful valet Striitzky knelt by his chair to keep 
him upright, passing both his arms around the half- 
unconscious King. At twenty minutes past two 
in the morning of August 17th, Frederick passed 
quietly away. 

Hertzberg closed his eyes and led his nephew and 



348 Frederick the Great 

successor, Frederick William, to the corpse. The 
King had willed to be buried on the terrace of 
Sans Souci, but he could now command no longer. 
Throughout one day, August 1 8th, he lay in state at 
Potsdam. In the evening his coffin was borne to a 
vault in the garish church of the Potsdam garrison, 
where it rests by the side of his father's. 

Frederick's fame, as was inevitable in the case of 
one who died on the eve of the French Revolution, 
has fluctuated with the current of subsequent events. 
The world that he quitted paid to his memory the 
homage due to one who had been for a generation 
the foremost among its princes. Among his poorer 
subjects traces of a warmer feeling may be dis- 
cerned. The legend of the Prussian soldier who 
boasted all his life that Frederick had answered his 
challenge with the words, " Dog, hold thy peace," is 
doubtless symbolic of the attitude of many of the 
rank and file. It would be idle to imagine that mul- 
titudes of humble serfs did not bewail the loss of the 
Father whose charity succoured them in time of need 
and whose equity they could always invoke against 
oppression. It would be no less idle to imagine that 
among his veteran servants no hearts beat in unison 
with the heart of General Lentulus, who craved the 
honour of following his great chief as rear-guard, 
since Zieten, who died earlier in the year, had se- 
cured the place of pride in the van. 

Berlin, however, rejoiced that F'rederick was no 
more. The cry of the hour was. Back to Frederick 
William I ! Led by a silly King (i 786-1 797) Prussia 
plunged into a Teutonic reaction. Good-humour, 







^^^ 




z < 

< 



Frederick' s Death and Greatness 349 

pomp, aggressive orthodoxy, the use of the German 
speech, and a grandiose foreign poHcy marked the 
royal condemnation of Frederick's practices. Prussia 
was tempted by profits in Poland and in Germany to 
regard the convulsions of France with narrow selfish- 
ness. On the field of Jena, twenty years after Fred- 
erick's death, she paid the price of all her errors (1806). 
Next year her Russian ally agreed with Napoleon 
that she should lose half her land, forego the right 
to arm, and submit for the future to be hemmed in 
by four hostile States. 

Prussia was rescued from this plight by forces 
which found no place in Frederick's system. Great 
ministers now gained ascendancy over the King. 
The nation flung ofT the fetters of feudalism, all 
classes joined in the War of Liberation, and the 
final triumph in 1813-1815 was inspired by the spirit 
not of autocracy but of German nationality. The 
memory of Frederick faded into that of a ruler of 
that old despotic type which the sovereigns, in de- 
fiance of the claims of their people, were striving 
to restore. 

It was the spirit of nationality, however, that in 
the long run revived Frederick's renown. The Ger- 
man people cried out for an organisation that should 
be closer and more virile than the federation into 
which they had been formed after the overthrow of 
Napoleon. In 1848-49, while Austria was paralysed 
by revolt, they turned hopefully to Prussia for lead- 
ership, but the reigning King refused to accept an 
Imperial crown at the hands of the mob. From 
that time onwards, however, the theory gained wide 



350 Frederick the Great 

credence that it was the destiny of Prussia to unite 
and to regenerate Germany. 

When in 1866 she worked her will with Austria, 
and when in 1871 the Imperial crown was handed 
to her over the body of prostrate France, the 
Hohenzollern legend grew. Results so glorious, 
men thought, could have been achieved only be- 
cause a long series of national heroes had worked 
towards a common goal. The Hohenzollerns, and 
Frederick chief among them, were extolled by a 
thousand pens as the pioneers of a solid and tri- 
umphant Germany. A generation which salutes by 
the title of " Great " the Emperor whom Bismarck 
was wont to hoodwink and cajole is logically com- 
pelled to regard Frederick as superhuman. 

The student who reviews the life-work of Fred- 
erick without either the sympathy or the bias of 
German patriotism may return a calmer answer to 
the question, — Is Frederick rightly termed '* The 
Great " ? Having followed the main steps in his 
long career, we may at its close sift out and set 
down those qualities and achievements, if such exist, 
which entitle him not merely to a place among the 
great, but to a place in that small circle of the 
world's heroes whose memory is so illustrious that 
greatness is always coupled with their names. 

As a thinker, Frederick falls very far short of 
greatness. Though he struggled all his life with 
the problem of the World and its Maker, he con- 
vinced himself only that nature furnished irresistible 
proof of an intelligent Creator, but that the idea of 
an act of creation was absurd. In no department 



Frederick's Death and Greatness 351 

of thought was his range of vision long, but he saw 
with wonderful clearness so far as his sight could 
penetrate. The very fact that all objects within his 
ken seemed so distinct prevented him from realising 
that great forces might he beyond. Thus the method 
of progress which he followed was that of devising 
ingenious improvements in a world that was settled 
and known. Though he witnessed the American 
Revolution and died within three years of the great 
explosion in France, he seems to have had no sus- 
picion that the framework of the world might change. 

This lack of sympathy with the deeper currents 
of human progress reveals itself by many signs in 
almost all the phases of Frederick's activity. In the 
art of war, indeed, he had witnessed too great an 
advance during his own career not to suppose that 
further advance was possible. He had himself given 
the infantry a mobility then unrivalled. He had 
introduced horse-artillery, and created the finest 
cavalry in the world. In his old age he turned to 
account the lessons of wars in both hemispheres, by 
raising his artillery to the importance of a separate 
arm and experimenting with the straggling tactics of 
the Americans. 

Literature and learning, however, he regarded with 
a less open mind. While Voltaire lived, he viewed 
him as the sole surviving man of letters. He treated 
the work of young Goethe, his own fervent admirer, 
with contempt and showed himself no less blind to 
the latent possibilities of natural science and mathe- 
matics. What he saw clearly was that these studies 
claimed much devotion, but sometimes failed to 



352 Frederick the Great 

produce practical results. " Is it not true," he de- 
manded of d'Alembert, *' that electricity and all the 
miracles that it reveals have only served to excite 
our curiosity ? Is it not true that the forces of at- 
traction and gravitation have only astonished our 
imagination ? Is it not true that all the operations 
of chemistry are in the same case?" Euler himself 
had failed to make the fountains at Sans Souci play 
successfully, and the King jeered at geometricians 
as the very type of the pig-headed. In the cam- 
paign of 1778 an officer who trusted his theodolite 
in preference to his eye was bidden to go to the 
devil with his trigonometry. 

None of Frederick's opinions or whims can be 
termed unimportant, for his power was so unfettered 
that he could embody any of them in acts of State. 
The building of the New Palace furnishes a hint of 
how great might have been the consequences had he 
given rein to a single enthusiasm in the sphere of 
art. But with this reservation it is in the domain of 
statecraft, especially in his system of foreign policy, 
his economic doctrine, and his theory of the organisa- 
tion of the State, that we must seek the true meas- 
ure of his mind. 

In his conception of the political world and of 
Prussia's place in it, acuteness and lack of profundity 
are again apparent. The acuteness is indeed im- 
paired because of the existence of two political 
factors, honesty and women, that Frederick never 
understood. The former, it is true, was so rare that 
his ignorance of its nature hampered him but little, 
save when Augustus frustrated all his plans in 1756, 



Frederick' s Death and Greatness 353 

and when in the later stages of the Seven Years' 
War Louis XV. fulfilled his unprofitable engage- 
ments with the Queen. But during Frederick's life- 
time women played an unusually prominent part in 
Europe, and his misjudgment of them was a serious 
political defect. Prussia suffered severely for his 
belief that Maria Theresa was pliable, Elizabeth of 
Russia incapable, the Pompadour insignificant, and 
Catherine II. shallow. 

In general, however, Frederick was as gifted a 
tactician in politics as in war, and in both he knew 
how to profit by experience. Compared with his 
handling of France in his early years, his handling 
of Russia from 1762 to 1779 shows an advance as 
marked as that of his guardianship between Mollwitz 
and Leuthen. The circumstances of the age fa- 
voured a policy of opportunism for Prussia. Dex- 
terity, not depth, was profitable, and Frederick 
therefore earned handsome rewards — Silesia, East 
Frisia, and West-Preussen. 

The pillars of his system, none the less, were built 
of crumbling stone. The triumphs of his successors 
have to this day shored up some among them — that 
profit ranks before promises in affairs of State, that 
morals are to be reserved for manifestoes, and that the 
rectitude of an act is determined by its success. 
Some, on the other hand, were swiftly demolished 
by the course of subsequent events. That Austria 
was Prussia's most dangerous foe, that the German 
princes were her least desirable allies, and that last- 
ing concord with Russia was expedient, may be re- 
garded as mistakes, natural enough but damaging 
23 



354 Frederick the Great 

to Frederick's reputation for profound statesman- 
ship. 

His economic errors have been discussed in earlier 
chapters of this book. Where an original thinker 
would have reflected and enquired, Frederick plunged 
into ill-judged action. While he claimed for Prussia 
a place among the Great Powers, he was bent on ad- 
ministering her resources as despotically as though 
she were a farm and he the steward. His thrift 
and industry palliated but could not cure the evils 
which flowed from this confusion. The birth of in- 
dividual enterprise was retarded, while by the con- 
centration of its attention upon petty cash the 
hereditary tendency of the Prussian Government to 
be sordid was intensified. The King, though admir- 
ably acquainted with the details of the production 
of material wealth, was insensible to the vastly 
greater value of goods which cannot be seen or 
handled. How, it may be wondered, could his 
Government foster honour, initiative, or independ- 
ence — qualities which in the long run are the funda- 
mentals even of material success? 

In foreign policy Frederick was successful, and in 
economic practice his failure was qualified. But his 
lack of true insight into the functions of govern- 
ment was fraught with terrible consequences for 
Prussia. Judged by the standard of the age, it is 
true, Frederick's administration was a pattern to the 
world. The State, as the fashion then was, inter- 
fered everywhere and with irresistible strength. Its 
machinery, though cumbrous, ran smooth and true, 
and the actual expense was small. *' If Prussia 



Frederick's Death and Greatness 355 

perishes," wrote Mirabeau, *' the art of government / 
will return to its infancy." 

From the same pen, however, came a verdict, 
damning, indeed, yet unshaken by appeal to reason 
or to the event. " If ever a foolish prince ascends 
this throne we shall see the formidable giant sud- 
denly collapse, and Prussia will fall like Sweden." 
Frederick secured his own triumph by making it 
impossible to succeed him. 

Against this department of his statecraft a double 
indictment must be brought. He was not profound 
enough to see that the machine which he laboured 
to render indissoluble was such that only an unbroken 
series of monarchs as gifted as he could guide it. Nor 
was he wise enough, though he knew that the next 
steersman of the State would be a fool, to alter the 
machine so as to give it some power of self-direction. 

The folly of tacitly assuming that successors like 
himself would be forthcoming was shared by Fred- 
erick with many of the great autocrats of history. 
Men abhor the thought of a vacuum created by their 
own disappearance. The self-abnegation of a Wash- 
ington is as much rarer as it is wiser than the aug- 
mented industry of an aged Louis XIV. Yet the 
sketch that has been given in this book of the all-em- 
bracing activity of the King, who nominated even the 
sergeants and corporals in an army of 200,000 men, 
and allowed no branch of his civil hierarchy the least 
real independence, suffices to show how improbable 
it was that an ordinary prince could put himself in 
Frederick's place, and how fatal it would be to the 
Government if he did not. 



356 Frederick the Great 

Frederick himself stated clearly the ruin that 
would ensue if a King of Prussia relaxed his grip on 
the finances, embarked upon schemes of premature 
aggression, or paused to enjoy his kingship. His 
nephew and heir, to look no further into the future, 
was a man whom he knew to be likely to commit all 
these faults. The remedy was to call into existence 
a body outside the throne and to entrust to its keep- 
ing some share in the power which had grown too 
great for the monarchy to wield. In the bureaucracy 
Frederick possessed a body of loyal and upright 
men who were not connected with any dangerous 
caste. Yet so far from training them for partial in- 
dependence, he continued to treat them, from the 
General Directory downwards, like schoolboys who 
deserved to be flogged. His standing recipe was to 
keep them between fear and hope. In 1780, to cite 
only one instance from many, he wrote to the Cham- 
ber for West-Preussen : " Ye are arch-rogues not 
worth the bread that is given you, and all deserve to 
be turned out. Just wait till I come to Preussen ! " 
It is not surprising that men of birth and capacity 
hesitated to serve in the administration during Fred- 
erick's lifetime and that narrow-minded pedantry 
soon became its distinguishing feature after he died. 
The King bequeathed an impossible task to posterity 
and the catastrophe of the Prussian State at Jena 
was the result. 

As a thinker, then, even in politics and adminis- 
tration, Frederick falls very far short of greatness. 
His powers were, in reality, those of a man of action. 
The versatility with which he entered into every 




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Frederick's Death and Greatness 357 

department of government in turn is no more astound- 
ing than the clearness with which he perceived the 
immediate obstacles to be overcome in each, the 
courage with which he faced them, and the force, 
swift, steady, and irresistible, by which he triumphed. 
The wonderful energy which prompted him to bear 
on his own shoulders all the burden of the State in 
war and peace, and to put forth all his strength at 
every blow, was yet more marvellous because it was 
susceptible of control. Frederick, as we have seen, 
ceased from the labours of the Seven Years' War, 
only to undertake the reconstruction of the economic 
life of a great kingdom. By mere overflow of force 
he finished his History of the War early in the year 
after that in which peace was made. Yet, with all 
his energy, he was able to realise that not seldom 
force needs the help of time. He was gratified 
when some of his enterprises began to repay him 
after twenty years, and he declined to aggrandise 
Prussia beyond the limit which his statesmanlike in- 
stinct taught him that her strength would warrant. 

Among Frederick's powers, then, energy alone is 
truly great, but his energy was such that to him few 
achievements were impossible. If we turn from his 
powers to his performance, we find his name asso- 
ciated with three great phenomena of history. 
^ Under his guidance Prussia rose at one step from 
" the third to the highest grade among the Powers. 
He was, moreover, the pattern of the monarchs of 
his time, the type of the benevolent despots of the 
later eighteenth century. Finally, in the great series 
of events by which Germany has become a united 



358 Frederick the Great 

military Empire his life-work fills a conspicuous 
place. How far, we may enquire, should his work 
in any of these three fields compel the admiration of 
succeeding ages? 

That part of the Hohenzollern legend which por- 
trays Frederick as the conscious or semi-conscious 
architect of the modern German Empire finds little 
support in the record of his life. Sometimes, it is 
true, he used the language of Teutonic patriotism 
and posed as the indignant defender of German lib- 
erties against the Hapsburg. But he posed with 
equal indignation as the protector of Polish or Swed- 
ish " liberties " against a reforming king or as the 
champion of Protestantism against Powers who might 
be represented as its foes. The whole course of his / 
life witnessed to his preference for French civilisation 
over German, and to his indifference as to the race 
of his subjects and assistants, if only they were serv- 
iceable to the State. His point of view was invari- 
ably and exclusively Prussian. It would never have 
occurred to him to refuse to barter his Rhenish 
provinces for parts of Bohemia or Poland because 
the former were inhabited by Germans and the latter 
by Slavs. He was far from being shocked at the 
suggestion that he might one day partition the Em- 
pire with the Hapsburgs. He struggled for equality 
with Austria, never dreaming of the time when his 
descendants should expel her from Germany and 
assume the Imperial crown. Thus, though his work 
was a step towards their triumph, it was unconscious. 
He must be judged by viewing his achievements in 
relation to his own designs. 



Frederick' s Death and Greatness 359 

Frederick's influence upon his contemporaries was 
enormous, and in many respects it cannot be over- 
praised. He found what has been styled ** Sultan 
and harem economy " prevalent among his peers, 
together with a tendency to regard the income of 
the State as the pocket-money of the ruler. For 
this he substituted in Europe a great measure of his 
own ideal of royal duty. Fearing nothing and hop- 
ing little from any future state, he was yet too proud 
to flinch from an atom of the lifelong penance that 
he believed was prescribed for kings by some law of 
nature. Duty to his House and duty to his State 
were to him the same, and they dictated a life of in- 
cessant labour for his subjects' good, and forbade 
the appropriation of more than a living wage. Other 
sovereigns followed the Prussian mode, and '' benevo- 
lent despotism " came to be regarded as the panacea 
for the ills of Europe. Though it hardly survived 
the storm of the Revolution, it was instrumental in 
removing many abuses and in promoting during 
several decades the comfort of the common people. 
Thanks in great part to Frederick, irresponsible 
monarchy became impossible for ever. 

Frederick's fame, none the less, finds its most 
solid basis in the achievement to which all else in 
his life was subordinate, — the successful aggran- 
disement of Prussia. Though it may be true that 
another and a better way lay open to him, that the 
path which he marked out led straight to Jena, that 
he owed much of his success to fortune, and that his 
work was rescued by forces which he had not prized, 
in spite of all it is to him that Prussia owes her place 



360 Frederick the Great 

among the nations. By his single will he shaped 
the course of history. His rule completed the fusion 
of provinces into a State, his victories gave it pres- 
tige, and the success of his work of aggrandisement 
was great enough to consecrate the very arts by 
which it was accomplished. Two decades after his 
death a king of Prussia entered his tomb by night, 
seeking inspiration to confront Napoleon. The archi- 
tects of modern Germany declare that all that they 
have built rests upon the foundations that he laid. 
As long as the German Empire flourishes and the 
world is swayed by the principles of its founders, so 
long will the fame of Frederick the Great remain 
secure. 




INDEX 



Agriculttire, Prussian, sog ff. 

Aix - la - Chapelle (Aachen) , 

129; Peace of (1748), 156, 

157. 194 , 
Alembert, d, 160, 337, 339, 

352 
Algarotti, 82, 160 
Amelia, Princess, 31 
Anhalt-Dessau, Leopold, 

Prince of ("the Old Des- 
sauer"), 78, 82, 109, 116, 
126, 140, 143, 150 if. 
Anhalt-Dessau, Leopold, 

Prince of ("the Young 
Dessauer"), 104, 105, 109, 
115, 262 
Anne of Russia, 44, 91 
Ansbach, Margravine of, 81 
Anti-Machiavel, 53 
Archenholtz, cited, 289 
Armed Neutrality of 1780, 

339 

Army, Prussian, 15, 19, 22, 
66, 78, 81, 104, 109, 114, 
117, 126, 147, 150, 165 ff., 
188, 203, 221, 243, 247, 
267, 271, 289, 293, 302 ff., 
336, 344, 351 

Augustus III., Elector of 
Saxony and King of Po- 
land, 66, 67, 130, 138, 148, 
151, 153, 204, 206 ff., 324, 
352 



Augustus William, Prince, 
112, 203, 228, 230 ff., 251, 
264 



B 



Baireuth, 81, 82, 135 
Baireuth, Margrave of, 41, 

43, 82 
Bank, Prussian, 318 
Barberina, 131, 132 
Baumgarten, 109 
Bautzen, 230, 232 
Bavaria, in 1778, ss3r 334', 

in 1785, 342, 343 
Bavarian Succession, war of 

the, 334 ff. 

Belleisle, Marshal, 118, 121, 
139 

Berg, 61 ff., 76, 85, 98 

Berlin, 28, 35, 80, 98, 129, 
150, 171, 173, 233, 290, 
307, 314, 345, 348; treaty 
of (1728), 62; treaty of 
(1742), 127, 136, 149, 153 

Bevern, Duke of, 212, 219, 
220, 224, 232, 238 

Bismarck, 3, 94, 350 

Black Eagle, Order of the, 20 

Bohemia, campaignin (1778), 

334 ff- 
Book of Rights, Prussian, 

337 
Borcke, 100, 102, 205 
Botta, Marquis di, 98-100 



361 



362 



Index 



Breslau, 79, 90, 103, 105, 118, 
119, 121, 145, 239 #., 252, 
285 

Brieg, 104, 109, 116, 121 

Broglie, Marshal, 160 

Browne, 207, 216 

Briihl, Count, 150, 151, 204 

Brunn, 125 

Bunzelwitz, 294 

Bureaucracy, Prussian, 356 

Burkersdorf, battle of, 298 

Bute, Lord, 295, 299, 323 



Camas, Madame de, 29, 51, 

161, zo'-, 
Carlyle, Thomas, cited, 15, 

20, 24, 47, 79, 104, 107, 

113, 130, 143, 158, 172, 

200, 306, 345 
Carteret, 125, 135 
Catherine II. of Russia, 298, 

324, 326, 331, 339, 340, 

342, 353 
Catt, M. de, 74, 75 
Charles I. of England, 10 
Charles V., Emperor, 56-58 
Charles VI., Emperor, 58 ^f., 

62, 66, 70, 75, 88, 96, 103, 

181 
Charles XII. of Sweden, 65, 

278 
Charles Albert of Bavaria 

(Emperor Charles VII.), 

118, 123, 132, 141 
Charles, Prince, of Lorraine, 

125, 126, 142, 144, 145, 

214 jf., 228, 232 ^., 238, 

239. 241 1f' 
Charles of Brandenburg- 

Schwedt, 259 
Charlotte of Brunswick, 347 
Chotusitz (battle also called 

Czaslau), 126, 127, 147 
Cleve, or Cleves, 6, 9, 10, 14, 

17, 63, 71, 79, 80, 98, 171 
Cocceji, 176, 181 



Codex Fridericianus, 176 
Coffee in Prussia, 319 
Colberg, 71, 294 
Colbert, 70 

Commerce, Prussian, $16 ff. 
Contribution, the, 165, 178 
Cornwallis, 345 
Cosel, 145 

Curland, or Courland, 68 
Courland, Duke of, 346 
Cumberland, Duke of, 232 
Ciistrin, 34, 37> 4i, 44, 46, 73, 
81, 90, 257 jf. 



D 



Danzig, or Dantsic, 66, 68, 

^73, 317, 327, 330 

Daun, 215, 218 ff., 232, 247, 

248, 256, 262 jf., 266 jf., 

277 #., 283, 285 f[., 290 #., 

298 
Dessauer, the Old and the 

Young. See Anhalt- 

Dessau. 
Dettingen, 135, 144, 194 
Dohna, 255, 259 
Domstadtl, 256 
Dresden, 151 jf., 262, 264, 

276, 284, 293; Treaty of 

^ (1745), 154, iSS 
Duhan, 29, 78 

E 

East Frisia, 187, 188 
Eastern Question, 325 



I50, 

232, 



182, 
233, 



Edict of 1723, 23 
Education, Prussian, 338 
Eichel, 150, 164, 

201, 225, 226, 

239, 240, 242, 265, 279 
Elector Palatine, z^^, 342 
Elizabeth of Brunswick- 

Bevern, 44 f[., 161 
Elizabeth of Russia, 130, 193, 

197, 257, 296, 353 



Index 



363 



Emden, 133 

Empire, Holy Roman, 4, 13, 

36, 56 ^.,62, 75, 76,86,95, 

210 
England, 21, 31, 58, 60, 61, 

84, 92, 135, 136, 148, 317, 

332 
Ermland, 327 
Eugene, 44, 52, dd, 96 
Euler, 185, 352 
Europe 1713-56, 191 j\. 
Excise, 165, 178, 347 



Fehrbellin, battle of, 16, 17, 
46, 65 

Ferdinand of Brunswick, 231 
238, 252, 253, 276, 283 

Ferdinand, Prince, 99, 266 

Fermor, 257/7. 

Finck, 274, 279 

Finckenstein, 285, 292 

Fleury, dT,, 84, 96, 99, 107, 
108, 117, 119, 122, 135 

Fontenoy, 143, 148, 194 

Fouque, 283, 284 

Francis of^ Lorraine (Em- 
peror Francis I.), 97, 100, 
loi, 149 

Frankfort, on the Main, 81, 
118 

Frankfort, Union of, 136 

Frankfurt-on-Oder, 99, 185, 
269 

Frederick William, Elector 
of Brandenburg 1640-86, 
See Great Elector. 

Frederick I. (King in Prus- 
sia 1 701), otherwise Fred- 
erick III., Elector of Bran- 
denburg 1686-1713, 18-20, 
22, 25, 32, 72 

Frederick II. of Prussia, 
called Frederick the Great, 
statue (Berlin, Unter den 
Linden), i; policy, 3, 62 
fi-. 77. 83 jj., 102, 129 ^., 



169 jf., 183 j\.; and his 
forerimners. Chapter I. pas- 
sim, 14, 17, 23; on Thirty 
Years' War, 8 ; mother, see 
Sophia Dorothea; birth, 
25; personality, 25, 49 jj., 
107, 128, 132, 133, 143, 
159 ff., 261, 262, 281, 282, 
296, 305; education, 28 jf., 
41 if.; marriage, 31, 44 #•; 
plan of flight (i_73o),_ 32, 
2yy., trial and imprison- 
ment, 2>Z ff-> writings, 53, 
55, 75, 163; philosophy, 
etc., 53 f[., 73 ff., 160, 290, 
291, 295, 304 ff., 319; ac- 
cession and early mea- 
sures, 77 ff.; seizure of Si- 
lesia, 89 ff.; campaign of 
1741, logff.; Klein Schnel- 
lendorf, etc., 120 ff.; cam- 
paign of 1742, 123 ff.; 
diplomacy of 1743-44, 134 
ff.; campaign of 1744, 137 
ff.; campaign of 1745, 141 
ff.; in peace, 1746-56, 155 
ff.; and religion, 79, 105, 

170 ff. ; habits, 162 ff.; 
power, 164 ff.; and Seven 
Years' War, 195 ff.; in 
1757, 211 ff.; in 1758, 251 
ff.; in 1759, 266 ff.; in 1760, 
281 ff.; in 1 761, 293 ff.; 
in 1762, 296 ff.; in 1763, 
299 ff.; his work of resto- 
ration, 306 ff.; economic 
policy, 312 ff.; foreign 
policy from 1763, 322 ff.; 
partition of Poland, 325 
ff. ; and West - Preussen, 
330, 331; foreign policy 
from 1772, 332; Bavarian 
Succession, 333 ff.; life and 
government from 1779, 
337 ff->' foreign policy from 
1779, 339 ff-; visit to Si- 
lesia in 1785, 344; illness 
and death, 345 ff.; esti- 
mate of, 350 ff. 



3^4 



Index 



Frederick William I., King 
of Prussia, 1713-40 (the 
"Sergeant King"), father 
of Frederick the Great, 20 
f., 25 ^., 45 ^M 60 #., 76- 
78, 86, 97, 104, 167, 177- 
180, 182, 347^ 

Frederick William II., King 
of Prussia (i 786-1 787), 
274, 348, 349. 356 

Freiberg, battle of, 299 

Frisia, East, 73, 133 

Fiissen, Treaty of, 141 



General Directory, 177 ^., 
320 

George II., 31, 32, 84, 108, 
135, 149, 194 

George William, Elector of 
Brandenburg, 1619-40, 6, 
8, 78 

Glatz, 79, 122, 126, 132, 140, 
142, 284, 300 

Glogau, 103 fj., 121 

Goethe, 351 

Golden Bull, 13 

Goltz, 231 

Gotter, 1 01, 102 

Great Elector, The {see Fred- 
erick William), 6, 8-20, 22, 
64, 65, 72, 73, 83, 165, 347 

Great-Fredericksburgh, 72 

Gross-Jagersdorf, 233 

Grumbkow, 34, 35, 39, 44, 
45, 61, 76-78 

Guichard, Colonel, 302 

Gundling, 27 

Gustavus Adolphus, 6, 16, 65, 
76, 85, 113 

Gustavus III. of Sweden, 332 

H 

Hadik, 269, 274 
Hagen, 318 
Halberstadt, 13, 21 



Halle, 150, 307 

Hamburg, 317; Peace of 
(1762), 297 

Hanover, 18, 25, 31, 32, 63, 
71, 84, 133, 135, 194 ^., 
206, 232; Convention of 

(1745), 149. 153 

Hapsburgs, policy of, 94 tj. 

Hastenbeck, 232 

Hedwigs-Kirche, 171 

Hennersdorf, 151 

Henry, Prince, 99, 231, 237, 
242, 264, 266, 268, 275, 
277, 278, 289, 299, 305, 

327- ZZ^^ 333, 335 #• 
Herstal, 81, 87, 88, 102 
Hertzberg, 314, 341, 347 
Hesse-Cassel, Landgrave of 

86 
Hille, 41, 44, 47, 90 
History of the War, Freder- 
ick's, 357 
Hochkirch, battle of, 262, 

263 
Hohenfriedberg, 145 ff.; 

March of, 148 
HohenzoUern, Albert of, 5 
HohenzoUem, Frederick of, 
4 ; family policy and traits, 
4/7., 19, 20, 36, 46, 52, 59, 
61-64, 80, 85, 93, 132, 143; 
legend, 350, 358 
Hoorn, 88 
Hubertusburg, Peace of, 299, 

300, 322, 323 
Hyndford, Lord, 120, 122 



Jena, 349, 356, 359 
Jenkins' Ear, war of, 1 93 
Jesuits, 171, 172, 338 
Jews in Prussia, 314, 330 
Joachim II., Elector of Bran- 
denburg, 1535-71, 6 
John Sigismund, Elector of 

Brandenburg, 1608-19, 6 
Jordan, 82 



Index 



365 



Joseph II., Emperor, 300, 


Leipzig, 151, 233, 234, 293 


322, 323, 326, 333, 335, 


Leitmeritz, 228 


i?i^^ 339 fi- 


Lemberg, 327 


Jiilich, 61 if., 118 

Junius Brutus, the new ( = 


Lentulus, 348 


Leuthen, battle of, 245 ff. 


Frederick WiUiam L), 31 


Lichtenstein, 208 




Liege, 87 


K 


Liegnitz, 105, 245; battle of, 




286 ff. 


Katte, Lieutenant von, 32, 


Lissa, 244, 251 


34, 35, 37-39, 41, 42, 47, 


Lobositz, 207, 208 


48, 78; father of, 78 


Louis XIV., 16, 17, 28, 32, 


Katzbach, 287 


58, 70, 93, 94 


Kaunitz, 191, 194 ^., 326, 


Louis XV., 32, 117, 130, 141, 


339 


143, 353 


Kay, battle of, 268 


Louis XVI., 342 


Keith, 217, 233, 258, 262, 263; 


Luchesi, 247, 249 


Lieutenant, 78 


Lusatia, 228, 230, 232, 233 


Kesselsdorf, 151, 152 


Luther, 5 


Klein Schnellendorf , Conven- 




tion, 119 /7-, 139 


M 


Klinggraffen, 203, 204 




Kolin, battle of, 220 jj. 


Macaulay, 189 


Koniggratz, 145, 147 


Magdeburg, 13, 50, 169, 235 


Konigsberg, 5, 9, 10, 15, 19, 


Mahon, Lord, cited, 50, 173 


80, 257, 258 


Mainz, 86, 102 


Konigsbriick, 239 


Mannheim, 33 


Konigstein, 206 


Manstein, General, 223 


Koser, Professor, cited, 133, 


Maria Theresa, statue (Vien- 


310, 311, 317 


na, Hofburg), I, 44, 92, 96, 


Kunersdorf, battle of, 269 //. 


loi, 102, 119, 122, 123, 




138, 142, 148, 150, 154, 


L 


214, 240, 253, 299, 323, 




327, 328, 334, 33^^ 353 


Lacy, 284, 285, 335 


Marine Commercial Com- 


Lafayette, 345 


pany, Prussian, 318 


Lagos, 282 


Mark, the, of Brandenburg, 4 


Landrat (or Sheriff), 177 


ff., 9, 14, 63, 169 


Landshut, 283, 284 


Mark-Lissa, 266, 268 


Laudon, 256, 268, 269, 272, 


Maupertuis, 82 


273, 283 ^., 294, 326, 335, 


Maurice of Anhalt- Dessau, 


336 


223, 225, 233 


Launay, de, 320, 347 
Lavisse, cited, 21 


Maxen, 279, 283, 284 


Meissen, 151 


Law-reforms, Frederick's, 176 


Melnik, 205 


League of Princes {Fiirsten- 


Memel, 71, 72 


bund), 340 ff. 


Menzel, 198 


Lehwaldt, 198, 218, 228, 238, 


Merseburg, 236, 237 


254 


Mietzel, 259 



366 



Index 



Miller, Arnold, case of, 174, 

17s 
Minden, 13; battle of, 276, 

282 
Mirabeau, 346, 355 
Mitchell, Sir Andrew, 199, 

201, 202, 206, 212, 227, 

230, 234, 286 
Mollwitz, 112 ff., 147 
Miinchow, 182 

N 

Nachod, 335 

Nantes, Edict of, 58 

Napoleon, 207, 349, 360 

Naumburg on the Queiss, 239 

Neckar, 86 

Neipperg, no f[., 120, 144 

Neisse, 104 ff., n 9-1 21, 144, 

262, 264 
Neumarkt, 239/7- 
Newcastle, Dtike of, 295 
New Palace (Neues Palais), 

308, 352 
Nippern, 246, 247 
Noailles, 135 



Ohlau, III, 112, 114 

Oliva, Peace of, 65 

Olmiitz, 122, 256 

Oppeln, 114 

Ordinance of 1748, 182 

Ostend, 70 

Ost-Preussen (East Prussia), 
5, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 53, 54, 
65, 68, 69, 80, 233, 238, 
257, 282, 297, 298, 324 



Panten, 286, 287 

Paper industry in Prussia, 

^ 315. 316 

Parchwitz, 240, 241, 244 



Paris, Peace of (1763), 299, 

323 
Partition of Poland, 325 /f. 
Peene, 22, 69 
Peter the Great of Russia, 27, 

68, 70, 73 
Peter III. of Russia, 296- 

298 
Pfalz-Sulzbach, House of, 63 
Philippson, Professor, cited, 

168 
Pillau, 71, 72 
Pirna, 20^ ff. 
Pitt, William, 213, 238, 254, 

276, 282, 295 
Podewils, 89, 91, 98, 99, 131, 

135, 150, 201, 202, 209, 

210, 226, 285 
Poland, 10, 34, 64 ff. 
Polish Succession, War of, 5 2 
Pollnitz, 172 
Pomerellen, 329 
Pompadour, 194, 196, 227, 

229, 353 
Population, statistics of, 187, 

306 
Porcelain, Prussian, 314 
"Potato War," 336 
Potsdam, 113, 129, 162, 171, 

308, 345 ff. 
Potsdam, Ogre of (= Fred- 
erick the Great), 31 
Pragmatic Sanction, 59-61, 

66, 70, 92, 95, 96, 118 
Prague, 121, 123, 126, 138, 

139, 206, 218 ^.; battle of, 

214 ff. 
Pretender, the, 148 
Prussia, early history, 3; 

East {see Ost-Preussen). 



Q 



Quarter of the Inn (Jnn- 

viertel), 337 
Quebec, 282 
Quiberon, 282 
Quintus Icilius, 302 



Index 



367 



Rambonnet, 87 
Regie, 320, 321 
Rheinsberg, 52 ^., 82, 88, 98 
Richelieu, 232 
Rittner, Andreas, 7 
Rochow, von, 33 
Rossbach, battle of, 235 ^. 
Roucoulle, Madame de, 29 
Rumianzow, 342 
Rutowski, 151, 152 



Sagschiitz, 246-248 
Salt, Prussian, 319 
Salzach, 86 
Sans Souci, 129, 161, 

346, 348 
Sazawa, 217, 218 
Schafer, cited, 216 
Schaffgotsch, 171 
Schandau, 208 
Schmettau, 274, 276 
Schonhausen, 129, 161 
Schulenburg, General 
^ 36, Z1. 78 

Schwarzenburg, 6, 9, 17 
Schwarzwasser, 286 
Schwedt, Margravine of, 
Schweidnitz, 238, 239, 

256, 294, 298, 299 
Schwerin, 89, 105, logjf. 

ff., 122, 126, 138 ff., 

205, 208, 214, 216, 217 
Schwiebus, circle of, 19 
Serfdom in Prussia, 312, 
Sergeant King, the. 

Frederick William I. 
Sej^dlitz, 237, 238, 260, 
Sigismund, 329 
Silesia, 16, 20, 67, 89 ff., 

141 ff., 155-157. 171. 

283, 306, 315, 317, 
. 340, 344 ff- 
Sime, Mr. James (cited), 
Soltykoff, 268 ff., 285 



187, 



von, 



305 
241, 

114 
200, 
228 



3^3 

See 



273 

126, 

182, 
324, 

322 



Soor, 149, 150 

Sophia Dorothea, Queen- 
mother of Frederick the 
Great, 25, 27, 31, 45, 81, 
148, 161, 226, 227 

Soubise, 232 ff., 253 

Spandau, 33 

Spanish Succession, War of 
the, 20 

Stanislaus Poniatowski, 324, 

329 
Stettin, 17, 65, 71, 72 
Strasburg, 81 
Strehlen, 114 
Striegau, 146 
Striitzky, 347 
Sweden and Swedes, 7, 11, 

13, 16, 22, 64, 65, 71, 332 
Sweden, Queen of, 253 
Swedish drink, 7 



W 



Tangermunde, 7 
Tauentzien, 285 
Teschen, Peace of, 336, 337, 

342 
Teutonic Knights, 5 
Thiennes, 223, 224 
Thirty Years' War, 6 ff., 13, 

57. 58 
Thorn, 330 

Tobacco, in Prussia, 315, 319 
Tobacco Parliament, 27 
Torgau, battle of, 291 ff. 
Toumay, 143, 144 
Traun, 140-142, 144, 150, 

153 
Turenne, 16 
Turin, battle of (1706), 19, 

60 



U 



United States of America, 

317 
Usedom, 22 
Utrecht, Peace of, 58, 70, 84 



368 



Index 



V 


27. 31. Z^^ 43. 49. 80 if.. 




135, 226, 227, 240, 252, 264 


Valori, Marquis de, 202 


William I., German Em- 


Vasa, House of, 64 


peror, 350 


Versailles, Treaty of (May, 


William II,, German Em- 


1756), 197, 198 


peror, 69, 173 


Vistula, 68, 69 


Winterfeldt, 203, 206, 231 


Voltaire, 51, 53, 81, 82, 89, 


Wladislaus IV. of Poland, 10 


98, 129, 130, 158, 162, 163, 


Wobersnow, 267 


172, 187, 228, 279, 280, 310, 


Wolden, 47 


330. 337. 351 


Wolf, 27 




WoUin, 22 


W 


Worms, Treaty of (1743), 136 




Wreech, Madame von, 43 


Wales, Prince of, 31 


Wusterhausen, 28, 95 


Wallis, 104 




Walpole, Robert, 58, 84, 125, 


Y 


192, 193 




Wartha, 34 


York, Duke of, 345 


Wedell, 267, 268 


Young Pretender, 197 


Weissenfels on the Saale, 234 




Wesel, zz, 80, 81, 87 


Z 


Westminster, Convention of, 




19S-197 


Zieten, 216, 222, 241, 248, 


Westphalia, Peace of (1648), 


256, 262, 291 #., 348 


13. 14, 57» 60, 65, 337 


Zips, 327 


West-Preussen, 326,327, 330, 


Zittau, 228 


331 
Wilhelmina, Princess, sister 


Zorndorf, battle of, 260 f. 


Zweibrucken, Charles of, 334, 


of Frederick the Great, 26, 


342, 343 




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SALADIN. By Stanley Lane- 
Poole. 

BISMARCK. By J. W. Head- 
lam. 

ALEXANDER THE GREAT. By 
Benjamin I. Wheeler. 

CHARLEMAGNE. By H. W. C. 
Davis. 

OLIVER CROMWELL. By 
Charles Firth. 

RICHELIEU. By James B. Per- 
kins. 

DANIEL O'CONNELL. By Rob- 
ert Dunlop. 

SAINT LOUIS (Louis IX. of 
France). By Frederick Perry. 

LORD CHATHAM. By Walford 
Davis Green. 

OWEN GLYNDWR. By Arthur 
G. Bradley. $1.35 net. 

HENRY V. By Charles L. Kings- 
ford. $1.35 net. 

EDWARD I. By Edward Jenks. 
$1.35 net. 

AUGUSTUS C^SAR. By J. B. 
Firth. $1.35 net. 

FREDERICK THE GREAT. By 
W. F. Reddaway. 

WELLINGTON. By W. O'Connor 
Morris 



Other volumes in preparation are: 



By J. B. Firth. 
Spencer Wilkin- 



By Israel 



CONSTANTINE. 
MOLTKE. By 

son. 
JUDAS MACCABEUS. 

Abrahams. 
SOBIESKI. By F. A. Pollard. 
ALFRED THE TRUTHTELLER. 

By Frederick Perry. 
FREDERICK II. By A. L. 

Smith. 



MARLBOROUGH. By C. W. C. 

Oman. 
RICHARD THE LION-HEARTED 

By T. A. Archer. 
WILLIAM THE SILENT. By 

Ruth Putnam. 
CHARLES THE BOLD. By 

Ruth Putnam. 
GREGORY VII. By F. Urquhart. 
MAHOMET. By D. S. Margoliouth. 



G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, Publishers, 
New York, 



London. 



tB 15 1950 














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